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ABSTRACT 
 
My dissertation is a political and cultural history of seventeenth-century Anglo-
Algonquian New England.  Between the Pequot War of 1637 and King Philip‘s War in 
1675-76, a covalent Anglo-Algonquian society existed in New England.  This created 
conditions which allowed the Pequots to reconstitute their communities after the 
devastation of the Pequot War.  Robin Cassacinamon was instrumental in this process.  
His skills as an interpreter, diplomat, intermediary, and community leader connected 
Cassacinamon to the surviving Pequots and to important regional Algonquian and Puritan 
figures of the time.  Cassacinamon became Pequot sachem, leading his people until his 
death in 1692.  His work provided the Pequots with essential tools needed for long-term 
survival as an identifiable people: a land-base and the ability to form and maintain Pequot 
communities.  Cassacinamon and the Mashantucket Pequots navigated this conflicting 
political climate to pursue their own agenda.   
The period between the Pequot War and King Philip‘s war provided a finite 
window of opportunity by which Cassacinamon could exploit the seventeenth-century 
 viii 
Native strategies outlined in Eric Spencer Johnson‘s work.  These strategies included 
alliances, marriages, settlement patterns, coercion, and others.  Cassacinamon‘s deep ties 
to the Pequots and other Algonquian groups, as well as with the Winthrop family and 
other colonial leaders, let him exploit various political and social tools.  Cassacinamon‘s 
skills made him an essential part of regional negotiations between these Algonquian and 
English polities.  By operating in the gaps and intersections where these polities met, 
Cassacinamon and the Pequots carved out a place for themselves within the regional 
social and political power structure.  By focusing on Cassacinamon‘s story, a greater 
understanding of how the Pequots survived after the Pequot War is reached.  
Cassacinamon‘s biography also broadens our understanding of this seventeenth Anglo-
Algonquian society, as well as what happened when the Anglo-Algonquian frontier 
shifted to an Anglo-Iroquoian frontier after King Philip‘s War.  Thus, my dissertation is 
not just a biography; it is a political and cultural study of New England, with broader 
Atlantic World elements.  It provides insight as to how an indigenous North American 
population exploited overlapping political and social systems and tactics to survive in a 
changing colonial world.          
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 1 
Introduction 
 The Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center (MPMRC) opened its 
doors to the public on August 11, 1998.  Billed as ―a new kind of archaeological, cultural, 
and historical museum,‖1 the Pequot Center brings to life the history and culture of the 
Pequot Tribal Nation, as well as other Native American peoples.  Mashantucket Pequot 
leaders spared no expense on the project; the facility cost $193.4 million dollars, money 
generated from the tribe‘s Foxwoods Casino, one of the largest and most successful 
gambling resorts in the eastern United States.
2
  The complex boasts 85,000 square feet of 
permanent exhibits, containing dioramas, ethnographic and archaeological collections, 
interactive computer programs, videos and films, as well as the work of Native American 
artisans and craft specialists.
3
  The museum houses the Mashantucket Pequots‘ tribal 
archive, where historians, archaeologists, and others employed by the tribe — tribal 
members and their allies — preserve, analyze, and protect the tribe‘s cultural, material, 
and intellectual heritage.  The MPMRC operates as a Native-controlled scholarly space; 
the general public and academics can come to share the tribe‘s history on the Pequots‘ 
terms.   
 On my first day at the museum I took the standard tour through the complex.  The 
entire structure is designed to tell the Pequots‘ story.  The upper levels deal with early 
tribal histories of the Pequots and other indigenous peoples.  Each subsequent level adds 
                                                 
1Neil Asher Silberman, ―Invisible No More,‖ in Vol. 51 of Archaeology, no. 6 (November-
December 1998): 68-72.  
2Robert D. McFadden, ―Indian Bureau Recommends Federal Recognition for Two Pequot Tribes 
in Connecticut,‖ The New York Times, 25 March 2000, sec. B5.  
3―Facts About The Permanent Exhibits,‖ in MPMRC-Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research 
Center [official online page of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation]; available from 
http://www.mashantucket.com/handicap/efacts.html; Internet; accessed on 02 December 2010.  
 2 
new details to the Pequots‘ tribal history: a recreated Pequot village, detailing the daily 
lives of Pequot men, women, and children and their subsistence activities; the importance 
of wampum to all the indigenous peoples of Northeastern North America, and the 
Pequots‘ central role in its manufacture; and finally, the arrival of Europeans — the 
Dutch and the English — in the 1620s, who introduced a fundamental shift in the 
Pequots‘ world.   
 At the bottom level, darker and colder than the rest of the museum, I entered one 
of the two theaters that play a film — ―The Witness‖ — at regular intervals throughout 
the day.  ―The Witness‖ dramatizes the defining tragedy in Pequot history: the massacre 
of Pequot men, women, and children at Mystic Fort during the Pequot War in 1637.  
Thirty minutes later, as the credits rolled and the lights turned on, I left the theater for the 
next stage of the tour.  The tribe‘s efforts at rebuilding were symbolized by rising from 
the depths of the museum.  I ascended from the bottom floor on an escalator that took me 
to a brightly-lit section with tall windows that flooded the level with natural light.  As I 
reached the top, a life-sized statue of a middle-aged Algonquian man stood at the top.  
The statue commemorates a seventeenth-century Pequot man wearing a mix of English 
and Algonquian clothing.  The bright red coat and wampum jewelry signified the man‘s 
status as an important Pequot leader.  In one hand he held a musket, in the other, a land 
deed securing the Mashantucket reservation for the tribe.
4
  The statue depicts Robin 
Cassacinamon, the most important Mashantucket Pequot sachem. 
                                                 
4
Photo of Robin Cassacinamon statue, Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center 
Booklet (Mashantucket, CT: Mashantucket Pequot Museum & Research Center, 2000), 42.  
 3 
 The statue and the museum memorialize Cassacinamon‘s place in Pequot history.5  
Outside the tribe, few people have heard of this important Algonquian leader.  When 
Cassacinamon is mentioned in scholarly works, he remains a minor character in the 
stories told about other regional leaders.  This peripheral status holds true for the Pequots 
as a whole.  They take center stage in the Pequot War, but are then thrust into the 
background after 1637, a scattered and defeated people.  Scholars shift their focus to 
other Algonquian confederations, such as the Mohegans and the Narragansetts, which 
assumed greater prominence leading up to King Philip‘s War in 1676.  Yet, by neglecting 
Cassacinamon and the Pequots we ignore an important aspect of the relationship between 
colonial populations and indigenous groups.  Cassacinamon not only shaped Pequot 
history, he played an important role in Anglo-Algonquian New England politics 
throughout much of the seventeenth-century.  This dissertation seeks to correct this 
historical oversight.      
*************************************** 
This study addresses two interconnected themes: it offers a biography of the 
seventeenth-century Pequot leader Robin Cassacinamon, and a political and cultural 
history of seventeenth-century Anglo-Algonquian New England.  Between the Pequot 
War of 1637 and King Philip‘s War in 1675-76, a ―covalent‖ Anglo-Algonquian society 
existed in southern New England, one that bound Algonquian and English colonial 
communities together in deep political, social, and economic ways.  According to 
                                                 
5
The statue is an artistic representation; no known image of Cassacinamon exists.  However, in 
recent years it has been suggested that the portrait of the late seventeenth-century sachem, formerly thought 
to be Ninigret II, may in fact depict Robin Cassacinamon.  The portrait is currently housed at the School of 
Art in the Rhode Island School of Design, which was founded in 1877.  The portrait is from the late 
seventeenth-century (circa 1681), and was gifted to the school by Mr. Robert Winthrop, who himself was a 
direct descendant of John Winthrop Jr.   
 4 
historian Neal Salisbury, this political and economic world ―differed markedly from that 
which emerged‖ after King Philip‘s War.6  During this forty-year period, Native peoples 
throughout the region — the Pequots, the Mohegans, the Narragansetts, the Niantics, the 
Wampanoags, and many others — participated in a system of ―interdependence rather 
than dependence‖ with the English colonies.  That degree of interdependence vacillated 
at times due to competition over natural resources, namely land.  While a certain level of 
social segregation persisted, these communities (Algonquian and Anglo) remained bound 
to one another.   
Southern New England Algonquians lacked the political autonomy they possessed 
before Europeans arrived, but they still controlled enough land to provide for their 
subsistence needs and engaged in reciprocal relationships with other Natives and the 
English.  Southern Algonquian peoples traded furs, engaged in land transactions, sold 
their services and labor, and purchased European manufactured goods.  For their part, the 
English desired and required what the Natives offered.  Their voracious hunger for land 
was all-consuming of course, but the New England colonists also depended on the 
services of Natives as hunters, interpreters, laborers, and consumers.  And, distanced as 
they were from Oliver Cromwell‘s Puritan Commonwealth, the colonists relied on the 
wampum controlled by the Natives, which served as a currency to enact these 
transactions.
7
  Algonquians and colonials needed one another.  
                                                 
6Neal Salisbury, ―Indians and Colonists in Southern New England after the Pequot War: An 
Uneasy Balance,‖ in The Pequots in Southern New England: The Fall and Rise of an American Indian 
Nation, eds. Laurence M. Hauptman and James D. Wherry (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1990), 82. 
 
7Salisbury, ―Indians and Colonists in Southern New England,‖ 82-83, 94; Lynn Ceci, ―Native 
Wampum as a Peripheral Resource in the Seventeenth-Century World-System,‖ in The Pequots in Southern 
New England, 60-63.  
 5 
Despite the realities of this interdependent relationship, in the minds of colonial 
officials the Natives remained too independent.  In an attempt to exert English dominance 
over the Anglo-Algonquian frontier, Connecticut, Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, and 
New Haven created the United Colonies of New England in 1643.  Although no major 
Anglo-Algonquian confrontation disrupted New England between 1637 and 1675, 
tensions and political intrigue remained constant.  Algonquian leaders like the Mohegan 
grand sachem Uncas, the Narragansett sachem Miantonomi, and the Narragansett-Niantic 
sachem Ninigret vied to be the premier Native leader in southern New England.  An 
ongoing series of Native-on-Native attacks took place, as the major Algonquian 
confederations battled for supremacy on the changing Anglo-Algonquian frontier.  The 
colonies failed to control the region; they succeeded only in positioning themselves at the 
center of Native politics.  Since the English would not leave, Native leaders incorporated 
them within the Algonquian political structure as allies and pawns.  In so doing, these 
leaders secured places for themselves and their people in the regional political and 
economic networks of mid-seventeenth century southern New England.  Operating within 
these overlapping political situation, Cassacinamon played all sides to his advantage and 
secured for the Pequots a new home and semi-autonomy; these were significant gains 
after the devastation of the Pequot War.
8
 
                                                 
 
8
 Eric Spencer Johnson, ―‗Some by Flatteries, Others by Threatenings,‖ PhD dissertation 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1993), 105-109, 307-315; Michael Leroy Oberg, Dominion & 
Civility: English Imperialism & Native America, 1585-1685 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999) , 
134; Salsibury, ―Indians and Colonists after the Pequots War,‖ 85-86.  See also J.M. Sosin, English 
America and the Restoration Monarchy of Charles II: Transatlantic Politics, Commerce, and Kinship 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 2, 74-76; Stephen Saunders Webb, The Governors-
General: The English Army and the Definition of Empire, 1550-1681 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1979), 441; Bernard Bailyn, New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979),54-57, 59-60, 75; Stephen Innes, Labor in a New Land 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), chapter 2; Francis Jennings, Invasion of America: 
 6 
The unique conditions fostered by this interconnected society enabled the Pequots 
to reconstitute their communities after the devastation of the Pequot War, and Robin 
Cassacinamon was the essential figure in this process.  The Pequot War of 1637 
destroyed the Pequots‘ influence as a regional military power, but even after the war the 
tribe influenced regional politics in direct and indirect ways.  In the ensuing decades, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts Bay, the Mohegans, and the Narragansetts vied for control 
over the Pequots‘ former lands.  The competing Algonquian and colonial powers also 
battled for jurisdiction over the surviving Pequots: the Algonquians desired the survivors 
to join their confederations, while the colonies wanted the Pequots subjugated and erased 
as an identifiable people. These competing agendas between the Anglo-Algonquian 
polities facilitated the agenda of Cassacinamon and the Pequots, as they successfully 
played each side to achieve their ultimate goal: the reestablishment of Pequot 
communities in their traditional territory and a definitive place within the social and 
political framework of seventeenth-century Anglo-Algonquian southern New England.   
In this contest of loss, risk, and redemption, Cassacinamon‘s skills as an 
interpreter, diplomat, intermediary, and community leader made him a successful cultural 
broker.  His abilities tied him to the surviving Pequots and to other important Algonquian 
and Puritan leaders, such as Connecticut governor John Winthrop Jr., Uncas, and 
Ninigret.  Cassacinamon‘s lineage and abilities as a cultural broker secured for him the 
position of Pequot sachem, a role he held from the 1640s until his death in 1692.  He 
drafted a blueprint that subsequent Pequot leaders followed as they faced the challenges 
                                                                                                                                                 
Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975), 234; Richard S. 
Dunn, Puritans and Yankees: The Winthrop Dynasty of New England, 1630-1717 (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1973), 74-75.  
 7 
of the subsequent centuries, and these achievements enabled the Pequots to survive into 
the twentieth-century, when they began their next major resurgence.  Cassacinamon‘s 
leadership provided the Pequots with two crucial needs: a land-base and the ability to 
form and maintain Pequot communities.  These victories proved essential in the 
development of Pequot kin networks and interpersonal relationships, the quintessential 
conditions they needed for their long-term survival as an identifiable people. 
Biography is as an effective format for such a political and cultural study because 
Cassacinamon was fully integrated into the fabric of seventeenth-century southern New 
England Anglo-Algonquian relationships.  In understanding his life and work, a greater 
understanding of most of the major events of the century is reached.  Cassacinamon‘s 
tactics demonstrate that the Pequots were not helpless victims, nor were they simple 
pawns of other ambitious leaders and communities.  The actions taken by Cassacinamon 
and the Pequots showcase the agency of indigenous peoples, even when deprived of the 
traditional sources of political power: a sizeable land base, large populations, and military 
strength.  Cassacinamon‘s story thus serves as a unique lens through which to view the 
major events of seventeenth-century Anglo-Algonquian New England.   
Previous works have examined the importance of the Pequot War and King 
Philip‘s War in shaping New England society; Alfred Cave, Francis Jennings, Jill Lepore, 
Jenny Hale Pulsipher, Alden Vaughan, Neil Salisbury, James Drake are just some of the 
many voices that have contributed to our increased understandings of these events.  
Biographers have examined the lives of obvious important leaders like John Winthrop Jr. 
and Uncas, and their roles in the political and social changes of the time.
9
  Yet, despite 
                                                 
9
The only well-known historical Pequot to receive a previous biographical treatment was the 
nineteenth-century minister and social commentator William Apess, in the works of Barry O‘Connell.    
 8 
Cassacinamon‘s decades-long presence in regional politics, he has rarely received 
attention as a prominent ethnohistorical subject.  At best, scholars stated his importance 
to the Pequots.  A few authors described his appearance in key historical events.   In 1851 
and 1852, John William De Forest and Francis Caulkins, each recognized Cassacinamon 
as an important Pequot leader after the Pequot War.
10
  De Forest and Caulkins knew that 
Cassacinamon secured the Mashantucket reservation for the tribe, and they criticized the 
brutal treatment the Pequots received during the Pequot War and the abuses they suffered 
after it.  However, De Forest and Caulkins only briefly acknowledge Cassacinamon‘s 
significance; no serious, substantial examination of Cassacinamon has been done.  This 
scant attention in the existing scholarship of Anglo-Algonquian New England has 
perpetrated a disservice to both Cassacinamon and the Pequots.     
Only one essay to date has focused solely on Cassacinamon.  Written by Dr. 
Kevin McBride, head of the Research Department at the MPMRC, ―The Legacy of Robin 
Cassacinamon: Mashantucket Pequot Leadership in the Historic Period‖ appears in 
Robert Grumet‘s edited collection, Northeastern Indian Lives, 1632-1816.  McBride 
provides an overview of Cassacinamon‘s life, charts his major successes, and illustrates 
his importance in the Pequots‘ survival after 1637.  McBride introduces Cassacinamon‘s 
importance, but since his essay is only eighteen pages long, McBride cannot analyze 
Cassacinamon‘s skills, tactics, and alliances in an in-depth manner.  McBride‘s essay is a 
valuable starting point that hits many important themes, and is an important part of this 
dissertation.  A major study that examines Cassacinamon‘s importance in Pequot history 
                                                 
10
William De Forest, The History of the Indians of Connecticut, from the Earliest Known Period to 
1850 (Hartford, CT: 1851), 226-229, 231, 242-246, 260, 283, 422; Francis Manwaring Caulkins, History of 
New London, Connecticut, from the First Survey of the Coast in 1612 to 1852 (New London, CT: 1852), 
186-187.  
 9 
and the broader seventeenth-century Anglo-Algonquian social and political world 
provides an essential addition to both Native American and Early American 
historiographies.  To understand how and why the Pequots lost the Pequot War and 
reconstituted themselves after it, we must chart these broader associations. 
Cassacinamon‘s story is intrinsically linked to the story of the Mashantucket Pequots; at 
the same time, the Pequots‘ history is inextricably connected to the history of the English 
colonial Atlantic world.   
Cassacinamon‘s relationship to other Algonquian leaders has not been examined 
in great detail, and to understand how the Pequots reconstituted themselves this needs 
further exploration.  This is particularly true of the relationship between Cassacinamon 
and his principal adversary, the Mohegan sachem Uncas.  I feel the comparison with 
Uncas is critical, since Uncas and the Mohegans absorbed most of the surviving Pequots 
after the Pequot War.   For the Pequots to re-emerge as a distinct tribal group, 
Cassacinamon engaged Uncas in a political contest of leadership, with the support of the 
surviving Pequots as the ultimate prize.  The English colonies of Connecticut and 
Massachusetts Bay participated in this Algonquian duel, as each sachem counted on 
powerful English allies to support his agenda.  All the while, colonial leaders pursued 
their own interests.  Of the English participants, John Winthrop Jr. retains critical 
importance; the alliance between Cassacinamon and the younger Winthrop profoundly 
affected the sachem and the Pequot people.  The complex relationships between 
Cassacinamon, Uncas and John Winthrop Jr. shall prove worthy of further exploration, as 
is Cassacinamon‘s connection to other Algonquian leaders like Wequashcook, Ninigret, 
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and Metacom.  This dissertation examines how these interconnected personal 
relationships proved essential in the Pequots‘ struggle.   
This study is an essential companion to the most recent biographies of two 
important Connecticut leaders: the Mohegan Uncas and Puritan scion and Connecticut 
governor John Winthrop Jr.  Michael Oberg's Uncas: First of the Mohegans attracted 
much positive attention for the way it situated Uncas in the historical context of 
seventeenth-century New England, and in its examination of the complex political and 
social alliances Uncas exploited to secure Mohegan interests.
11
  Oberg discusses 
Cassacinamon in his book, since Uncas‘s plans for regional prominence included 
incorporating the Pequots into his Mohegan confederation.  However, since Uncas is 
Oberg‘s major concern, Cassacinamon naturally takes a secondary position in the 
narrative, appearing only in certain dramatic incidents that involved Uncas.  The same 
holds true for Walter W. Woodward‘s Prospero‟s America: John Winthrop, Jr., Alchemy, 
and the Creation of New England Culture, 1606-1676.  Woodward examines how the 
younger Winthrop established himself — apart from his famous father — as an 
independent political leader in the region.  Woodward recognizes Cassacinamon as the 
leader of the Pequots, but the sachem takes a secondary role in the narrative.  He is, in 
essence, a ―sidekick‖ to the much more prominent younger Winthrop.  This imbalance is 
unfair, and not reflective of the reality.  The available evidence suggests that, despite 
surface differences, Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr. formed a true partnership.  I believe 
that a biography of Cassacinamon expands upon this social and political sphere of Anglo-
Algonquian relations.  Cassacinamon‘s story showcases the ability of Native peoples in 
                                                 
11
Michael Oberg, Uncas: First of the Mohegans (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).  
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the Northeast to utilize both indigenous and European political, legal, and social systems 
to protect themselves and their interests.      
Other works continued this trend of only mentioning Cassacinamon, or providing 
peripheral descriptions of his importance.  The most important scholarly volume to date 
dealing with Pequot history was The Pequots of Southern New England: The Fall and 
Rise of an American Indian Nation, edited by Laurence Hauptman and James Wherry, 
which came out of a conference sponsored by the tribe.  These essays provide a historical 
overview of Pequot history from before contact with Europeans until shortly after the 
Mashantucket Pequots gained federal recognition in 1983.  Among the scholars who 
contributed essays, Jack Campisi and Kevin McBride, still serve as directors for the 
Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center.  This collection recognized 
Cassacinamon‘s importance, but the authors mention him only in passing, and they do 
not attempt to analyze his efforts. 
A number of scholars have addressed the various strategies employed by various 
New England Natives to survive over the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth-
centuries in a white-dominated society.  These authors include Russell Barsh, Amy Den 
Ouden, Ann McMullen, Jean O‘Brien, Michael Silverman, and Jack Campisi.  While 
living on the outskirts of New England society, Native peoples continued to participate in 
the regional economy, particularly in sea-related industries like whaling.  They sustained 
their population levels through intermarriage with whites, blacks, and other Native 
peoples.  Most importantly, Native communities in New England retained their 
distinctiveness as Native by maintaining family and kinship bonds and by holding on to a 
land base, even as those lands faced continued encroachment by outsiders.  These tactics 
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allowed New England Natives to withstand the constant pressures exerted by Euro-
American society.
12
 
Barsh, Den Ouden, and Sarah Louise Holmes all deal with the Pequots, but their 
studies do not focus solely on Robin Cassacinamon.  Both Den Ouden and Holmes 
examine the legal strategies employed by the Mashantucket Pequots to protect their 
reservation from white encroachment and resist the seizure of their reservation lands by 
whites.  Barsh concentrates on the economic and kinship links formed between Natives 
(particularly Pequots) and African-Americans in the whaling industry.  Den Ouden and 
Holmes discuss the role of Pequot sachems in these legal fights, with Holmes in 
particular discussing Cassacinamon‘s efforts to protect Pequot lands.  However, 
protection of Pequot lands is Holmes‘s central focus; her study, while insightful, does not 
capture the full scope of Cassacinamon‘s abilities or influence.13   
In recent years, the issue that has generated the most public attention for the 
Pequots is Foxwoods Resort and Casino, alongside the general issue of gaming and 
Native peoples.
14
  The three most recent ―popular histories‖ of the Pequots, published in 
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For their part, McMullen, Campisi, Silverman, and O‘Brien do not really address the Pequots, 
but their works provide a necessary context for the Mashantucket situation, as the tribes they address dealt 
with many of the same social and economic issues.  Therefore, no scholar has yet tackled a community 
study of nineteenth and twentieth century Mashantucket that examines how the tribe survived long enough 
for their second resurgence to take place in the second half of the twentieth century.  As it stands, only one 
unpublished, eighty-five page undergraduate thesis in Anthropology, ―Redefining Themselves: The 
Mashantucket Pequots Return to a Reservation Community,‖ by Kristyn K. Joy of Amherst College, 
attempts to explain why Mashantucket Pequots strengthened their ties to the reservation in the late 1970s 
and 1980s.  According to Joy, who based her argument on interviews with tribal members and written 
sources, the key to the Mashantucket Pequot‘s renewed success is rooted in their synthesis of tribal identity 
and personal identity membership.  Submitted in 1988, Joy‘s thesis does not address the tribe‘s later 
success and development, nor does it address Cassacinamon in any way.        
13Sarah Louise Holmes, ―‗In Behalf of Myself & My People‘: Mashantucket Pequot Strategies in 
Defense of Their Land Rights,‖ PhD dissertation (Storrs, CT: University of Connecticut, 2007).  
14
The most recent scholarly work addressing the Pequots‘ relationship with gaming, Paul 
Pasquaretta‘s Gambling and Survival in Native North America, tackles this theme by employing the idea 
that ―gaming‖ can be viewed as a metaphor for the many struggles Pequots and other Native peoples have 
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2001 and 2003, all address this issue of gaming, some under the aegis of anti-Pequot 
political agendas.  The authors — Jeff Benedict, Kim Isaac Eisler, and Brett Duval 
Fromson — are not scholars, but lawyers and journalists.  For them, the issue of casino 
gambling is intrinsically tied to the question of whether or not the Mashantucket Pequots 
are "real Indians.‖  Benedict‘s interpretation is by far the most egregious.  He asserts that 
the entire Mashantucket resurgence was premised on fraud, and that the Mashantucket 
are not ―real‖ Pequots, but members of other New England tribes and other minority 
groups that have illegitimately claimed Pequot heritage purely for economic gain.  It is 
not surprising then that Benedict‘s work has won considerable favor among certain 
political interest groups in Connecticut, who view the Mashantucket Pequots in a less 
than favorable light.  Unlike Benedict, Eisler and Fromson recognize that tribal members 
are, indeed, Pequots, but they raise another issue by questioning if the Mashantucket 
Pequot tribe too dependent on the casino as a unifying factor.  These authors mention 
Cassacinamon briefly, but only as a Pequot leader who remains in the distant past and has 
no contemporary significance to Pequot history.   
Cassacinamon‘s peripheral treatment by scholars belies the historical reality.  
From the mid-1640s until his death in 1692, Cassacinamon consistently appears in the 
colonial records as a leader, diplomat, interpreter, and provocateur.  However, the 
Pequots did not simply obey Cassacinamon‘s orders.  They launched their own 
independent actions and required that Cassacinamon prove his worth as a sachem.  If he 
                                                                                                                                                 
faced since European contact.  A revised version of Pasquaretta‘s Ph.D. dissertation in English literature, 
this book examines gambling metaphors in colonial war narratives, nineteenth-century romance fiction, 
tribal memorials, and Native American novels.  Pasquaretta argues that these literary sources reflected the 
many survival strategies Native peoples participated in for their own survival as ―games of chance.‖  
Pasquaretta mentions Cassacinamon in his discussion of why former Pequot tribal chairman Richard 
Hayward chose Cassacinamon‘s mark as the tribe‘s symbol.  However, since this work is a literary 
analysis, it neglects Cassacinamon‘s participation in the intricate network of Anglo-Algonquian alliances 
and relationships.  
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had failed to do this, they would not have followed him.  The Pequots‘ world changed, 
but the requirements of the sachemship did not.  A sachem must be persuasive and 
demonstrate a proven ability to lead.  Given their perilous circumstances after the Pequot 
War, the surviving Pequots required a well-connected leader who could successfully 
coordinate the various interconnected networks of alliances and contentious relationships.  
Cassacinamon possessed those abilities, so the Pequots granted him their allegiance.    
The decades between the Pequot War and King Philip‘s War provided a finite 
window of opportunity through which Cassacinamon could exploit the seventeenth-
century Native strategies outlined in the work of anthropologist Eric Spencer Johnson.  In 
his dissertation, ―‗Some by Flatteries Others by Threatenings:‘ Political Strategies among 
Native Americans of Seventeenth-Century Southern New England,‖ Johnson examines 
―the political processes within Native American societies of societies of seventeenth-
century southern New England, focusing on the strategies used by individuals and groups 
to legitimize or challenge political authority within Native society.‖  Johnson identifies 
seven strategies utilized by indigenous peoples: ideology, alliance, marriages, settlement 
patterns, coercion, the manipulation of material culture, and exchange.
15
  In this 
important work, Johnson explores how the Algonquian leaders among the Pequots, 
Mohegans, and Narragansetts, employed these strategies to legitimize their authority.    
Johnson offers a profound interpretation of the political actions of seventeenth-
century Algonquian leaders, and the value of his study cannot be underestimated.  
However, while Johnson draws on the experiences of several indigenous communities 
during the seventeenth-century for his study, and includes a brief discussion of the 
                                                 
15Eric Spencer Johnson, ―‗Some by Flatteries, Others by Threatenings,‖ PhD dissertation 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1993), vi.  
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Pequots and Cassacinamon, his study concentrates primarily on the Mohegans and the 
Narragansetts.  In one respect, this makes sense, since after 1638, those two powerful 
Algonquian confederations dominated the Native political scene throughout much of the 
century from positions of obvious political power.  Still, the strategies Johnson examines 
— namely ideology, alliances, settlement patterns, and coercion — hold particular 
significance for Cassacinamon and the Pequots, and they provide a key to understanding 
Cassacinamon‘s importance and how the Pequots reconstituted themselves after the 
Pequot War.  Sassacus, Pequot sachem during the war, failed in his duties because he 
failed to master these strategies.  Denied the martial power they held before the Pequot 
War, these strategies acquired a vital level of importance for Cassacinamon and the 
Pequots; the Pequots depended on them in ways that the other, stronger, Algonquian 
confederations did not.  By employing these tactics, and by exorcising his linguistic and 
diplomatic abilities, Cassacinamon situated himself as an indispensable ―information 
broker‖ on the Anglo-Algonquian frontier.  He transformed his influence as a cultural 
intermediary and information broker into tangible political gains for the Pequots.           
The first two chapters of the dissertation deal with the political and social status of 
the Pequots prior to 1638.  Chapter one provides an ethnographic profile of Pequot 
society before 1637.  Cassacinamon came of age in the 1620s and 1630s, a time when 
Dutch and English traders and colonists were already known to the Algonquian peoples 
of southern New England.  During this period, Europeans moved from the peripheries of 
New England into the Pequots‘ territory in present-day Connecticut.  As the European 
presence moved ever closer to the Pequots‘ lands, they precipitated dramatic social 
changes within indigenous communities due to disease and displacement.  However, this 
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also brought opportunities for political and territorial expansion for the Pequots.  The 
tribe dominated the important wampum trade and extended its power and influence over 
several other Algonquian groups in the region.  This prominence was short lived 
however, as other Native and European forces aligned against them.  
The second chapter addresses the Pequot War of 1637, which proved the turning 
point of Pequot history.  Cassacinamon does not figure in this chapter, because he is not 
mentioned in the existing documentation about the war.  This absence from the records of 
the war suggests that Cassacinamon was not an office-holding sachem at the time.  If he 
was not yet sachem, and had not distinguished himself during the war, he would have 
escaped notice by the English authorities.  Despite Cassacinamon‘s absence, the chapter 
is nonetheless essential.  It is the defining moment in Pequot history, and the turning 
point in Anglo-Algonquian relations in New England.  The Pequots‘ defeat created the 
circumstances that Cassacinamon combated for the rest of his life and tenure as sachem.  
The Pequot War is also relevant because many of the Algonquian and English leaders 
whom Cassacinamon interacted with participated in the conflict: Uncas, John Winthrop 
Sr. and John Winthrop Jr., John Mason, Thomas Stanton, and others.  Most importantly, 
the failure of Sassacus (the Pequot sachem during the war) to lead his people to victory 
provided lessons for Cassacinamon, and proved that for an Algonquian leader to survive, 
they needed powerful European allies to support his agenda.      
Chapter Three propels Cassacinamon into regional politics and society. After the 
Pequot War, the victorious English and Algonquian alliance forced the surviving Pequots 
off their lands and dispersed them among the Mohegans, Narragansetts, and New 
England colonials.  Cassacinamon led one branch of Pequot survivors after the war — the 
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―Western‖ group under Mohegan authority, which served as the genesis of the 
Mashantucket Pequots.  As their leader, Cassacinamon devised several plans to remove 
his people from Uncas and the Mohegans, and ally with influential English leaders.  This 
may seem strange, given English conduct during the Pequot War.  However, 
Cassacinamon‘s objectives are made clear when interpreted through the strategies 
outlined by Johnson.  Cassacinamon‘s partnership with John Winthrop Jr. proved 
essential to these plans, so this chapter explores Cassacinamon‘s association with the 
younger Winthrop.  A mutually beneficial relationship, the Cassacinamon-Winthrop (or 
Winthrop-Cassacinamon) alliance may have exemplified the concept of ―fictive kinship.‖  
Cassacinamon drafted the basic blueprints for success at this time: a strong political 
alliance, the migration of Pequots into Cassacinamon‘s sphere of influence, and the 
manipulation of colonial legal processes and Algonquian political strategies to promote 
his own Pequot agenda.    
Chapter Four encapsulates all of the major themes of this study.  It begins in 
1647, with Cassacinamon‘s first attempt to free his community from the Mohegan Uncas, 
and concludes with Cassacinamon‘s victory in securing their reservations within their 
traditional territory in 1666.  Cassacinamon‘s leadership of the Pequots combined with 
his alliance with John Winthrop Jr. and his personal skills as an interpreter and 
intermediary, fully enmeshed Cassacinamon in regional politics.  Cassacinamon and the 
Pequots directly inserted themselves into political affairs and tense situations so as to 
foment or exacerbate discord between Algonquian and colonial groups.  Cassacinamon 
navigated and manipulated these currents; in so doing, they secured the ultimate prize 
sought by these Pequots in 1666 — the two reservations of Noank and Mashantucket.  
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Cassacinamon broke the Pequots away from Uncas‘s control, but at the cost of placing 
the Pequots community under English jurisdiction.  This balancing act secured for the 
Mashantucket Pequots a state of semi-autonomy that would remain in place for the 
ensuing decades of the seventeenth-century. 
The fifth chapter examines the tactics Cassacinamon used to extend his sphere of 
interest into larger regional politics.  Exploring international issues, this chapter brings to 
the foreground the relationship between the New England colonies and England proper, 
and explains how the Stuart Restoration altered that arrangement.  The Restoration 
government of Charles II attempted to assert its control over New England and Anglo-
Algonquian relations, even as it successfully conquered the Dutch colony of New 
Netherlands, renaming it New York after Charles‘ brother, the Duke of York.  
Cassacinamon used these opportunities to his own political advantage; he gained 
victories against his old rivals Uncas and Ninigret, and he achieved full recognition by 
English and Algonquian leaders as an established Algonquian diplomatic figure.  
However, during this period of trans-Atlantic change, the covalent Anglo-Algonquian 
society tipped in favor of the colonials.  The power shift created new challenges for 
Cassacinamon and the Pequots, as they had to situate themselves in an English system 
that began to exclude them.  
The conflagration known as King Philip‘s War temporarily arrested these 
changes, enabling Cassacinamon and the Pequots to thrust themselves in the forefront of 
Anglo-Algonquian relations in Connecticut.  Chapter Six compares Cassacinamon‘s 
situation to the dilemmas faced by Metacom (King Philip) and the Christian Indian John 
Sassamon.  The Pequot sachem possessed resources and abilities that Metacom and 
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Sassamon lacked; thus Cassacinamon navigated the social and political changes with 
greater success than either of those two individuals.  During the war, Cassacinamon and 
the Pequots sided with the English.  The Pequots reaffirmed old alliances and created 
new ones, and they forced concessions from colonial leaders who, once again, needed the 
Pequots‘ assistance.  Cassacinamon‘s renewed alliance with the English produced 
tangible results: the Pequots gained adoptees, wampum, weapons, and other spoils of 
war.  King Philip‘s War destroyed the covalent Anglo-Algonquian society of New 
England, but the alliance forged between Cassacinamon and the Connecticut colonial 
government offered the Pequots continued protection.     
The long-term effects of the English victory in King Philip‘s War are discussed in 
Chapter Seven, as the Anglo-Algonquian frontier centered in New England shifted to an 
Anglo-Iroquoian frontier focused in New York.  Cassacinamon reaffirmed his alliances 
with Connecticut leaders, but the Pequots could not avoid the ramifications of this 
political shift for long.  This shift triggered the first significant internal challenge to 
Cassacinamon‘s position as sachem.  Cassacinamon‘s legacy was evident following his 
death in 1692 as the sachem immediately achieved symbolic power.   As factions within 
the Mashantucket Pequot tribe fought to establish their own leadership, subsequent 
Pequot leaders invoked Cassacinamon‘s name, memory, and his mark to legitimize their 
own authority and influence supporters among the tribe, a sign of things to come in the 
twentieth century.               
In understanding Cassacinamon‘s story, a greater understanding of the Pequots‘ 
survival is reached.  Thus, this study is not just a biography; it is a political and cultural 
study of New England, framed within broader Atlantic World elements.  It provides 
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insights as to how an indigenous North American people exploited overlapping political 
and social systems and tactics to survive in a changing colonial world.  Although the 
Pequots suffered a cataclysm in 1637, losing their political and military prominence, they 
did not become powerless victims.  Cassacinamon tapped into the strength of the 
surviving Pequots and provided a focal point around which the tribe could rebuild their 
communities.  In addressing the three interconnected themes of biography, community 
study, and seventeenth-century regional New England politics, the story of how Robin 
Cassacinamon and the Mashantucket Pequots survived in Anglo-Algonquian New 
England society attains clarity.  
 21 
Chapter 1: People of the Shallow Waters 
In August of 1662, Algonquian and English colonial leaders assembled for the 
latest round of negotiations over land rights in the former Pequot country.  Such councils 
were common after the Pequot War in1637, when the Anglo-Algonquian alliance 
consisting of Connecticut, Massachusetts Bay, the Mohegans, and the Narragansetts 
defeated the Pequot confederation.
16
  Though no longer the political and military power 
they once had been, the Pequots continued to shape regional politics: their territory 
served as a bargaining chip between polities, and the Pequots themselves a precious 
resource to the competing Algonquian and English powers.  This meeting brought 
together representatives of the United Colonies and several Algonquian dignitaries, 
including the Mohegan grand sachem Uncas and his counselors.  The Pequot sachem 
Robin Cassacinamon, leader of the semi-autonomous Pequots, also attended.   Uncas 
claimed a disputed portion of the Pequot territory, and this meeting determined the 
validity of that claim.  Cassacinamon and the other Algonquian leaders worked with 
English officials to construct a territorial map; the map confirmed that the disputed area 
originally belonged to the Pequots. However, Uncas was denied his victory.
17
   
This episode typified the continuous negotiations between the political powers on 
the Anglo-Algonquian frontier.  Yet, it also revealed a more personal struggle: the 
ongoing contest between Uncas and Cassacinamon.  For decades, the two sachems vied 
for the support of the Pequots and formed alliances with powerful colonial allies to 
                                                 
16Eric Spencer Johnson, ―‗Some by Flatteries and Others by Threatenings‘: Political Strategies 
among Native Americans of Seventeenth-Century Southern New England‖ (PhD dissertation, Unversity of 
Massachusetts-Amherst, 1993), 115-121. 
17―Plan of the Pequot Country and Testimony of Uncas, Casasinomon, and Wesawegun, August 
1662,‖ Acts, II: 450.  
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further their own agendas.  Though lacking military strength, Cassacinamon found ways 
to strike at Uncas.  The Pequot sachem siphoned Pequots away from Mohegan 
communities, and forged his own networks of amity and alliance with Connecticut 
officials and other indigenous communities.  This meeting provided yet another 
opportunity for Cassacinamon to thwart Uncas‘s desires.  Cassacinamon declared that 
before the Pequot War Uncas was only the leader of a small community and was often 
―proud and treacherous to the Pequot Sachem.‖  His insolence forced the Pequot sachem 
to ―drave Uncas out of his country‖ as a punishment; only by ―humbling‖ himself before 
the Pequot grand sachem was Uncas permitted to return to his country.  Only his alliance 
with the English gave Uncas any political importance; it was the English who ―made him 
[Uncas] high.‖  Cassacinamon testified that much of the land Uncas claimed had been 
Pequot territory, and therefore, it belonged to the English, and not Uncas, due to right of 
conquest.  Cassacinamon and the other witnesses charged that according to their manners 
and customs, Uncas had no lands at all, being so conquered…if [Uncas] should deny it, 
the thing is known to all the Indians round about.‖18  Pleased that Cassacinamon‘s 
testimony coincided with their own interests, colonial authorities denied Uncas‘s claim.  
This displeased the Mohegan grand sachem.  Uncas responded to Cassacinamon with a 
devious political attack of his own. 
Although this occurred in 1662, this exchange illustrated the system of personal 
and political networks that characterized the Anglo-Algonquian frontier in southern New 
England throughout much of the seventeenth-century.  Issues of land ownership, political 
subterfuge, diplomatic negotiations, and attempts by leaders like Cassacinamon, Uncas, 
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 ―Report of a Committee appointed to inquire respecting the Claims of Uncas to the Pequot 
Country; presented the Commissioners, at their Meeting in Boston, Sept. 1663,‖ Acts, II: 379-380. 
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and others (both Algonquian and English) to legitimize their leadership and influence in 
the region produced a dynamic state of affairs.  The Pequot War was the defining event 
for the tribe; the Pequots and Cassacinamon dealt with its effects throughout the 
seventeenth-century, and beyond.  However, many of the conditions and strategies 
outlined in the 1662 episode are evident before the Pequot War took place.  This chapter 
explores some of these strategies and themes, constructing a picture of the Pequots‘ world 
prior to 1637, where the Pequots‘ connections to their land and to their Algonquian 
neighbors ran deep.                       
I 
  ―People of the Shallow Waters.‖  ―Pequats.‖  ―Pequatoos.‖  ―Pequots.‖19  Known 
by many names, the Pequots lived in southern New England long before the arrival of 
Europeans, and long before Robin Cassacinamon‘s birth sometime in the early decades of 
the seventeenth century.  Over the centuries, the Pequots established deep connections to 
their environment and among their indigenous neighbors via a complex system of 
alliances, kin networks, and political strategies.  Such tactics regulated the Pequots‘ 
interactions with their neighbors, as well as internally stabilized their own communities.
20
  
                                                 
19It appears that ―People of the Shallow Waters‖ is the English translation of the Pequots‘ tribal 
name.  The Pequots spoke a version of the Eastern Algonkian language that was common throughout 
Southern New England.  ―Pequats,‖ ―Pequatoos‖ and ―Pequots‖ are all spellings of the tribe‘s name in early 
European documents and maps.  Adrien Block and Cornelis Doedtsz, Untitled, 1614; Willem Janszoon 
Blaeu, Nova Belgica et Anglia Nova, ca. 1635; Allison Lassieur, The Pequot Tribe (Mankato, MN: 
Bridgestone Books, 2002), 7; Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center, ―Mashantucket Pequot 
Nation Timeline,‖ 
http://www.pequotmuseum.org/TribalHistory/TribalHistoryOverview/TimelineofEvents.htm. 
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 Kevin A. McBride, interview by author, tape recording, Mashantucket, CT, July 2008.  It is 
difficult to determine Robin Cassacinamon‘s exact date of birth.  Cassacinamon first appears in the 
documentary evidence in the year 1638, following the Pequot War.  The fact that he survived the war and 
the later purge of Pequot sachems suggests that he was young man at the time.  For an in-depth exploration 
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Although his date of birth is unknown, the available evidence suggests that 
Cassacinamon grew up in the 1620s, and was a young man in 1637.  Thus, Cassacinamon 
came of age in a world where Europeans made their first tentative steps into the region, 
and where the Algonquians of southern New England established their first links to them.  
As Cassacinamon grew older, Europeans moved from the peripheries of the Pequots‘ 
territory to their very doorstep, setting the stage for the Pequot War.           
 The Pequots‘ ties to their homeland were just one part of a lengthy human saga 
that connected a number of indigenous peoples to the area dubbed ―New England‖ by 
English explorers.  Human colonization of southern New England began some eleven to 
twelve thousand years ago, with the physical remains of homesteads, ceramics, and 
household goods serving as the silent testament to countless generations of indigenous 
habitation.
21
  The Pequots made the Thames River drainage basin in Connecticut their 
home for centuries before the arrival of Europeans.  Over time, the Pequots developed 
extensive cultural and linguistic ties to other Algonquian-speaking peoples in the region.  
While one must be wary of creating ―a false impression of homogeneity and stasis among 
the Native people of southern New England,‖ the existing evidence supports the notion 
that Pequot culture shared many characteristics with the other Algonquian peoples in the 
region.
22
  These close ties with their neighbors suggest that the Pequots developed in situ 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the political strategies used by seventeenth –century southern Algonquian sachems, see Johnson, ―Some 
by Flatteries,‖ vi, 1-26, 69-94, 164-182, 255.  
21Dena F. Dincauze, ―A Capsule Prehistory of Southern New England,‖ in The Pequots in 
Southern New England: The Fall and Rise of an American Indian Nation, ed. Laurence Hauptman and 
James Wherry (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 19.   
22
Kathleen J. Bragdon, Native People of Southern New England, 1500-1650 (Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 136, and Native People of Southern New England, 1650-1775 
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009), 204-211; Michael Leroy Oberg, Uncas: First of the 
Mohegans (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 20.  
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in southern New England.  By the early 17
th
 century, the indigenous population of New 
England was estimated to be somewhere from one hundred fifty thousand to two hundred 
thousand individuals, with the Pequots comprising some 13,000 people.
23
  The Pequots‘ 
original territory began near present-day New London, Connecticut, and stretched 
eastward to the present border of Connecticut and Rhode Island.  From the sea coast, 
Pequot hegemony reached northward to the headwaters of the Thames River.  By the 
seventeenth century, Pequot influence extended across Long Island Sound to the eastern 
end of Long Island, with several tribes under tributary status.
24
  
                                                 
23
 The Pequots had not, as was previously believed, migrated into the area from the Hudson Valley 
region of New York State. Extensive archaeological surveys and excavations sponsored by the tribe on the 
contemporary Mashantucket Pequot reservation support this lengthy connection to the land.  Human beings 
occupied the land and utilized its resources from at least the Early Archaic Period (ca. 7000 BCE) through 
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 The Pequots were ―closely related, both culturally and linguistically,‖ to other 
Algonquian-speaking peoples in the region, including the Narragansetts and, especially, 
the Mohegans.
25
  However, while the two shared ties of language and kinship, they lived 
in separate communities and developed their own distinctive ceramic styles, suggesting 
that the two were distinct groups for a significant period of time.  Excavations at the 
Mystic Fort site, located on the west side of the Mystic River and now known as Pequot 
Hill, have uncovered these distinct Pequot ceramics, which are only found in late-
sixteenth and early seventeenth century Native settlements in eastern Connecticut.  These 
settlements were in the heart of the Pequots‘ traditional territory.  The Pequot style is 
easily distinguishable from the type found at Mohegan sites, a ceramic variety commonly 
known as Ft. Shantok, named after the principal settlement and base for the Mohegan 
sachem Uncas.
26
        
 The Algonquians of southern New England were, according to the early 
ethnographic reports of Europeans like Francis Higginson, a ―tall and strong-limbed 
people.‖  William Wood observed that the Native people of Massachusetts were 
―between five or six foot high, straight bodied, strongly composed, smooth skinned, 
merry countenanced, of complexion something more swarthy than Spaniards, black-
                                                 
25
 The Pequots and the Mohegans spoke an almost identical variant of the Eastern Algonquin 
language known as Mohegan-Pequot.  Starna, ―Pequots in the Early Seventeenth Century,‖ 33; DeForest, 
History, 59-61; Johnson, ―Some by Flatteries,‖ 44-53; Frank G. Speck and J. Dyneley Prince, eds., A 
Vocabulary of Mohegan-Pequot (Bristol, PA: Evolution Publishing, 1999), 1, 12, 81.  Originally printed in 
J. Dyneley Prince and Frank G. Speck, ―Glossary of the Mohegan-Pequot Language,‖ American 
Anthropologist 6: 1 (1904), 18-45.  
26McBride, ―Archaeology of the Mashantucket Pequots,‖ 99; McBride, ―Prehistory fo the Lower 
Connecticut River Valley,‖; Johnson, ―Some by Flatteries,‖ 45; Laurie Weinstein-Farson, ―Land Politics 
and Power: The Mohegan Indians in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 Centuries,‖ Man in the Northeast 42 (1991), 14; 
Oberg, Uncas, 18.  
 27 
haired, high foreheaded, black eyed, out-nosed, broad shouldered, brawny armed, long 
and slender handed, out breasted, small waisted, lank bellied, well thighed, flat kneed, 
handsom grown legs and small feet.‖  The type of clothing worn by New England Native 
peoples depended on the season.  In fair weather, Wood noted that New England Natives 
wore very little, ―saving for a pair of Indian breeches to cover that which modesty 
command to be hid, which is but a piece of cloth a yard and a half long, put between their 
groinings, tied with a snake‘s skin about their middles.‖  During cold weather, many 
Native men and women wore ―skins about them, in form of an Irish mantle, and of these 
some be bear‘s skins, moose‘s skins, and beaver skins sewed together, otter skins, and 
raccoon skins, most of them in winter having his deep-furred cat skin, like a long large 
muff, which he shifts to that arm which lieth most exposed to the wind.‖  Elderly tribal 
members often wore ―leather drawers, in form of Irish trousers, fastened under their 
girdle with buttons.‖  Their shoes were also made of skins, ―to cut of a moose‘s hide.‖27        
 The Pequots‘ sacred world was dominated by many spirits, with two being 
particularly powerful.  The creator, Cautantowwit or Kytan, resided in the southwest.  
According to Roger Williams, it was there where ―the Court of their great God 
Cautantouwwit‖ was held and where ―they [the Indians] goe themselves when they die‖ 
to spend the afterlife.  Cautantowwit was not only a creator, he was a provider.  Several 
southern New England Algonquian legends claimed that Cautantowwit sent a crow to 
bring them the first corn and bean plants.  It was for this reason that the crow was treated 
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as one of many sacred animals, despite the fact that ―they [the crows] doe the corne also 
some hurt.‖  While Cautantowwit was a benevolent force, the second was far more 
ambivalent, and thus the focus of much more concern.  Known by a variety of names — 
Cheepi, Abbomocho, or Hobbomok — Cheepi sent the Pequots misfortunes like illness 
―for some conceived anger against them.‖  However, it was also Cheepi who could take 
those misfortunes away.  It was Cheepi to whom they prayed ―to cure their wounds and 
diseases.‖28            
 In order to sustain their communities men and women invoked spiritual powers, 
known as manitou, through rituals designed to garner their favor.  Manitou could be 
anything — people, animals, plants, objects, or events — felt to have ―an immediate and 
pervasive power beyond and greater than that of [ordinary] humans.‖29  Rituals were the 
vehicle through which balance was maintained in the world, and it was the powwow 
(shaman) who performed the most important rituals.  Powwows were religious figures 
who acted as intermediaries between the spiritual and physical worlds.
30
  Powwows 
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controlled guardian spirits, and these spirits took on a variety of animate and inanimate 
forms.  They had access to tremendous power, and tribal leaders often consulted with 
their powwows when making vital decisions.
31
  Another important religious figure in the 
community was the pniese.  The pniese was an individual who had received a vision 
during a ritual ordeal, during which he/she experienced a transformation of 
consciousness.  These individuals served as trusted counsels in decisions regarding war 
and peace.
32
   
 The first European explorers to New England frequently reported on the 
abundance of plant and animal life in the region.  While all of the descriptions reflected 
the individual biases of the recorders, Thomas Morton summed up these European ideas 
most succinctly with his assertion that the region was ―a paradice: for in mine eie t‘was 
Natures Masterpeece,‖ and ―if this Land be not rich, then is the whole world poore.‖33  
Gabriel Archer noted in 1602 that Cape Cod was ―full of wood, vines, Gooseberie 
bushes, Hurtberies, Rapices, Eglentine, &c.‖  In the early 1630s, Francis Higginson 
reported on the great ―store of pumpions, cowcumbers, and other things of that nature 
which I know not‖ that seemed to burst forth from the Massachusetts coast.  Higginson 
continued with his report, and noted how all of the ―excellent pot-herbs grow abundantly 
among the grass, as strawberry leaves in all places of the country, and plenty of 
strawberries in their time, and penny-royal, winter savory, sorrel, brooklime, liverwort, 
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carvel, and watercress; Also leeks and onions are ordinary, and divers physical herbs.‖  
Forests were filled ―with excellent good timer,‖ and served as the habitat for bears, 
―severall sorts of Deere,‖ ―Wolves, Foxes, Beavers, Oters, Martins, great wilde Cats,‖ 
and moose, a ―great beast…as bigge as an Oxe.‖34  Early European maps, such as Willem 
Blaeu‘s 1635 Nova Belgica et Anglia Nova, sometimes included artistic representations 
of these animals, such as deer, bears, and others.  These representations were as detailed 
as the cartographic depictions of the New England coastline, and they served as a visual 
testament to the seeming abundance of the land.
35
   
  Southern New England was not a paradise where the indigenous inhabitants lived 
in harmony with the natural world.  The Pequots and their Algonquian neighbors engaged 
in a wide variety of subsistence activities that allowed them to take full advantage of their 
environment‘s potential.  Indigenous people did not own the land in the proprietary 
manner of the later English colonists.  Instead, Native communities claimed the use of the 
land and the things that were on it.  They were, according to Roger Williams, very 
particular about their claims; he noted that ―the Natives are very exact and punctuall in 
the bounds of their lands, belonging to this or that Prince or People.‖  Families planted 
crops, fished in the rivers, hunted in the forests, and gathered wood for their fires and 
building materials, but when they were finished others could use the land.
36
  By the early 
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seventeenth century, the Pequots were firmly involved in a mixed maritime and 
horticultural subsistence economy.
37
  The tribes‘ extensive use of the estuaries, lakes, 
streams, tidal marshes, and forests that filled their territory, as well as their close 
proximity to the ocean, may perhaps be the reason the Pequots‘ identified themselves as 
the ―People of the Shallow Waters.‖  Seasonal rotation between these different 
subsistence bases meant that the Pequots reduced any potential strains they placed on 
local food sources.  Thus, the Pequots participated in a constant seasonal round of 
activities that shaped the environment for their own benefit.
38
    
 By 1300 CE, the Algonquian peoples living along the rivers, estuaries, and coastal 
environments of southern New England had fully incorporated agriculture into their 
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subsistence activities.  Agriculture provided the major contributions to southern New 
England Native diets — anywhere from one-half to two-thirds — and cultivated fields of 
corn, beans, and squash were spread across the landscape next to Pequot settlements.  
Gardening tools were commonly made from animal bones, large shells, and turtle 
carapaces.  Maize cultivation fostered a settlement pattern of ―tethered mobility‖ as the 
Pequots became tied to their villages and fields for much of the year, yet were still 
dependent on the fruits of their seasonal subsistence patterns.
39
   
 A typical agricultural plot was prepared in March by cutting down and burning 
any existing trees and brush, with the ashes adding needed nutrients to the soil.  While 
men and women participated in the clearing of farm land, a sexual division of labor was 
the norm.  Farming was by and large the primary responsibility of women; as a 
centralized activity near their homes, it was possible for women to tend to both their 
fields and their child-care duties.  The only crop that men raised was tobacco for 
ceremonial purposes.  After a plot of land was cleared, Pequot women began the work of 
planting.  William Pynchon observed that this occurred during ―Squanikesos: part of 
Aprill and pt of May, when they set Indian corne.‖40  The women shaped tiny mounds out 
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of the soil and placed the corn kernels inside them, with each mound spaced four to five 
feet apart.  The spaces between the mounds were used for the planting of different types 
of squash, gourds, artichokes, cucumbers, and other plants.  As the corn stalk grew, bean 
seeds were added to the mounds; the bean vines used the stalk as a stabilizing pole.  All 
of the plants grew together in a symbiotic relationship, although European observers 
thought that Indian fields looked disorderly.  Culturally determined notions of order 
aside, Pequot fields were extremely productive.
41
     
 Native women worked throughout the spring and early summer tending the fields 
to keep them free of weeds and pests.  Roger Williams noted that the Narragansetts, a 
neighbor and rival tribe of the Pequots, built ―little watch-houses in the middle of their 
fields, in which they, or their biggest children lodge, and earely in the morning prevent 
the birds‖ from feeding on the crops.  At the end of the summer and in early fall, the 
women prepared for the harvest, and gathered ―all the corne, and Fruites of the field.‖  
Surplus crops were stored in large, grass-lined earthen pits.  Thomas Morton, in his 
observations of New England indigenous life, identified these storage pits as ―Barnes‖ 
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that could ―hold a Hogshead of corne apeece in them.‖42  Around harvest time, when the 
crops had been brought in and many kinds of wild plants gathered, the Pequots and their 
Algonquian neighbors held their largest festivals.  At these gatherings, Pequot men and 
women ate, danced, gave up offerings of thanksgiving, and reaffirmed social, political, 
and cultural ties.
43
  
 When the soil was exhausted, fields were left to lie fallow.  As the forest 
reclaimed the area, nutrients returned to the soil so that the farming cycle could start 
again.  However, even empty fields served a useful purpose for the tribe.  As forest 
vegetation expanded into the fields, several types of animals foraged through them 
looking for food.  Pequot hunters then brought down those animals for their meat, bones, 
and fur, which were all put to good use as food, tools, and clothing.
44
   
 While the tending of domesticated plants was the domain of women, hunting and 
fishing was the province of Pequot men.  Pequot men hunted for a diverse array of New 
England animals and fowl, although deer were the favorite target of New England 
Algonquian hunting parties.
45
  Hunters were ―very tender of their Traps, where they lie, 
and what comes at them; for they say, the Deere (whom they conceive have a Divine 
Power in them) will soone smell and be gone.‖  Rituals were performed to ensure a 
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successful hunt.
46
  The oceans, rivers, and estuaries also provided vital subsistence for the 
Pequots.
47
  Fishing was a vital subsistence activity that provided an important food 
source.  The site where Cassacinamon‘s group of Pequots settled after the Pequot War, 
and that later became New London, Connecticut, and was called ―Nameag.‖  ―Nameag‖ 
meant ―the fishing place‖ in the Pequot-Mohegan language.48      
 Pequot men taught boys the skills they needed for the hunt.  While large-scale 
communal hunts of two-to-three hundred warriors may have happened occasionally, 
small hunting parties, comprised of only a few warriors or individuals from a single 
family, seemed to be the norm.
49
  During the hunt, William Wood observed that the men 
built ―hunting houses‖ in areas ―where they know the deer usually doth frequent.‖  
Pequot hunters remained in these lodges for considerable lengths of time, stalking their 
prey or setting up snares or traps to catch their quarry.  After the men brought down the 
                                                 
46
Williams, Key, 132, 191, 225; Oberg, Uncas, 33; For works that explore Indians-animal 
relationships, see Calvin Luther Martin, Keepers of the Game: Indian-Animal Relationships and the Fur 
Trade (Berkeley, CA: 1978) and The Way of the Human Being (New Haven, CT: 1999).  See also Indians, 
Animals, and the Fur Trade: A Critique of „Keepers of the Game,‟ ed. J. Shepard Krech III (Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 1981) and J. Shepard Krech III, The Ecological Indian: Myth and History 
(New York: 2000).  
47
The Pequots took Atlantic sturgeon, salmon, striped bass, scup, tautog, and other fish, they 
hunted gray and harbor seals, and they collected a wide variety of shellfish (bay scallop, quahog, whelk, 
long clam, Virginia oyster).  Starna, ―Pequots in the Early Seventeenth Century,‖ 35; Cf. Frederic W. 
Warner, ―The Foods of the Connecticut Indians,‖ Bulletin of the Archaeological Society of Connecticut 37 
(1972), 27-47; Eva L. Butler, ―Algonkian Culture and the Use of Maize in Southern New England,‖ 
Bulletin of the Archaeological Society of Connecticut 22 (1948), 3-39; Kevin McBride, ―Prehistory of the 
Lower Connecticut River Valley,‖ Ph.D. dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1984; Cronon, Changes, 
45-47‘ Kevin A. McBride, ―Transformation by Degree: Eighteenth Century Native American Land Use,‖ 
Eighteenth Century Native Communities of Southern New England in the Colonial Context, ed. Jack 
Campisi, (Windsor, CT: The Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center, 2005), 48.  
 
48
Morton, New English Canaan, 20; Kevin A. McBride and Nicholas F. Bellatoni, ―The Utility of 
Ethnohistorical Models for Understanding Late Woodland Contact Change in Southern New England,‖ 
Bulletin of the Archaeological Society of Connecticut 45 (1982), 52-53; Oberg, Uncas, 27-28.  
49
Oberg, Uncas, 28.  
 36 
game, the women would take the animals back to camp to smoke the meat and dress the 
hides.
50
   
 Excavations at Mashantucket have identified several small seasonal hunting and 
gathering camps that date prior to the Pequots‘ permanent occupation of the reservation 
in the late-seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.  These sites lend support to an idea 
put forward in the primary documents; prior to 1637, the Pequots used Mashantucket 
mainly as a hunting ground.  The cedar swamp located at the center of Mashantucket was 
referred to as Ohomowauke (―owl‘s nest‖) and Cuppacommock (―refuge or hiding 
place‖), place names that suggest the seasonal nature and purpose of the area.51   
 Robin Cassacinamon participated in these hunts as a boy, although it cannot be 
determined whether he hunted specifically at Mashantucket.  Cassacinamon reminisced 
about these childhood activities much later in life during those diplomatic negotiations in 
August 1662.  At the meeting Cassacinamon, Wesawegun (another Pequot sachem), and 
the Mohegan sachem Uncas drew up a map in the presence of English officials describing 
the Pequot territory before the War of 1637 and the area bordering the Narragansett 
territory.  According to the English interpreter, Cassacinamon mentioned that as a boy he 
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would often hunt deer near a pond that the Pequots called Muxquota, at the eastern end of 
the Pequots‘ traditional territory.52   
 Subsistence was only one aspect of Pequot community life.  The village served as 
the basic social and political unit for the Pequots and other New England Indian 
communities.
53
  These villages exercised a degree of autonomy in their political and 
social relationships.  According to anthropologist Eric Spencer Johnson, individuals and 
entire communities practiced ―fluidity of affiliation.‖  This allowed for individuals to 
move, should the need arise, among communities ―based upon that individual‘s personal 
or familial network of kin and allies.‖  Communities could shift their political allies as 
well, often using similar networks of allies and relations.  However, in response to the 
demands and changes wrought by European contact, villages gathered together into 
hierarchical chiefdoms.  Even within these new arrangements, the composition of these 
―tribes‖ remained fluid, as members shifted their allegiance from one community to 
another with little difficulty.
54
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 Pequot villages appear to have been organized around specific lineages or smaller 
groups of extended families, with patrilineality being the general, but not exclusive, 
rule.
55
  Settlements were dispersed and varied in size, purpose, and scope.  Villagers 
adopted a semi-sedentary lifestyle geared toward meeting the demands of their seasonal 
subsistence activities; houses had to conform to this lifestyle.  This mobility also 
provided a political strategy for Pequot communities, as it allowed for the fluidity of 
affiliation that Johnson described.  Smaller settlements, ranging in size from villages of 
twenty to thirty dwellings to hamlets of three to five dwellings, appear to have been the 
norm.  Pre-contact and early seventeenth century Pequot villages were constructed 
primarily in estuarine environments, namely along the Thames River, the Mystic River, 
and Poquetannuck Cove.  Large agricultural fields — some as large as 200 acres — were 
located next to the settlements.
56
   
 The most common type of domicile in Pequot villages was the wigwam, which 
housed both nuclear or extended families depending on size.  Wigwams were round with 
circular floor plans between 10 to 16 feet in diameter.
57
  A framework made of saplings 
was fixed into the ground, with the poles then bent and bound to create a dome-shaped 
structure approximately six to ten feet high.  The domed frame was then covered with 
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bark sheets or woven mats constructed out of rushes, cattails, or flag leaves.  These 
houses served as the perfect accompaniment to the Pequots‘ semi-sedentary lifestyle, for 
they could be easily and quickly built, taken down, and then reconstructed in a new 
location.
58
         
 However, two Pequot settlements from the early seventeenth century are 
noteworthy because they do not fit into the typical settlement pattern.  These villages —
the Fort Hill and Mystic sites — each contained thirty to seventy wigwams, were built on 
strategic hilltop locations, and were surrounded by fortifications.  The hills on which the 
villages were built were a considerable distance away from the customary estuary 
environments, a characteristic that separated the two settlements from other Pequot 
towns.  No pre-contact Pequot villages have been found in similar locations.  The 
fortifications, increased size, and defensive positions of these two villages suggest that 
settlements of this type in southern New England were likely a result of European 
contact.
59
         
 Pequot society, like that of other indigenous groups in southern New England, 
was ranked, though not stratified.  Rank was communicated in a variety of ways, 
including jewelry and other adornments.  Men and women wore ―pendants in their ears, 
as forms of birds, beasts and fishes, carved out of bone, shells and stone.‖  European 
observers also noted that ―many of the better sort‖ decorated their bodies with tattoos, 
painting, and scarring, symbols which commemorated ―certain portraitures of beasts, as 
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bears, deers, mooses, wolves, etc; some of fowls, as of eagles, hawks, etc.‖  
Ornamentation conveyed social status within the Native community, as well as contact 
the person shared with powerful spiritual forces.
60
   
 While the Pequots did not face the rigid and fixed classes that divided European 
society, high-status positions still existed within the tribe.  These positions were either 
inherited or earned through public recognition of skill and achievement.  Land ownership, 
descent, and residence, especially for these families of high social status, were primarily 
patrilineal.  However, Pequot society also recognized bilateral kin groups, from both the 
father‘s and the mother‘s family.  Because of this, it was not unheard of for titles, land 
claims, or inheritances to pass down through families via the female line.  In fact, the ties 
to both patrilineal and matrilineal kin connected sachems to ―the homelands they presided 
over and the people they led.‖61  The bonds between the Pequots and their neighbors were 
strengthened through marriages that connected the powerful families and sachems of 
each group.  These families held the hereditary titles for the sachems, and prominent 
families of different tribes cemented alliances and strengthened territorial claims through 
marriage.  One of these attempts at a political marriage pushed the Mohegan sachem 
Uncas into conflict with the Pequots in the 1630s.
62
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 The most important high-status political position among the Pequots was that of 
the sachem.  The sachemship was a civil position, and, depending on the size of the 
village or the number of lineages and kin groups present, one or two sachems could be 
appointed.  There appear to have been different levels of status among sachems, with 
some being more prestigious than others, and a principal sachem at the head of 
Algonquian confederations.  It was the responsibility of the sachem to maintain balance 
and order within the community, weigh the stability of tribal interests against the 
autonomy of local settlements, and negotiate relationships with outsiders.
63
  A 
sachemship was inherited, passed along patrilineal lines, although there were instances of 
sachemships being given to women.  This patrilineal pattern of inheritance, combined 
with the fact that grand sachems typically possessed higher status then other sachems, 
convinced Europeans that Natives had a monarchical system similar to the ones that 
existed in Europe.
64
  William Wood believed that while a sachem had ―no kingly robes to 
make him glorious in the view of his subjects, nor daily guards to secure his person, or 
court-like attendance, nor sumptuous palaces,‖ his followers still ―yield all submissive 
subjection to him, accounting him their sovereign, going at his command and coming at 
his beck.‖65   
 The truth was that the socio-political position of the sachem was uniquely Native 
American.  Although a man gained access to a sachemship through heredity, ―the 
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authority which accompanied that dignity depended, for amount, very much on his own 
abilities.‖66  The sachem may have received authority and tributary wealth due to his 
lineage, but if he intended to keep that position, a sachem had to earn the respect and 
loyalty of his people.  While sachems took on the daily tasks of leadership, their authority 
was not absolute.  Pequot government, like that of other southern New England 
Algonquians, appears to have been a highly consensual, village-oriented affair.  Roger 
Williams observed that sachems ―will not conclude of ought that concerns all, either 
Lawes, or Subsides, or warres, unto which the people are averse, and by gentle 
perswasion cannot be brought.‖  Sachems seldom acted on ―any weighty matter without 
the consent of his great men,‖ receiving advice from other high-ranking individuals in the 
community, such as elders, warriors, clan leaders, and religious authorities.  If a sachem 
acted in ―harsh dealing‖ with his people, according to Daniel Gookin, villagers would 
―go live under other sachems that can protect them.‖  This interdependent relationship 
ensured that sachems tried ―to carry it obligingly and lovingly unto their people, lest they 
should desert them, and thereby their strength, power, and tribute would be 
diminished.‖67   
 Preserving the social order was an important responsibility of the sachem; it 
reduced the chance that villagers would seek vengeance on their own, thus tearing the 
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community apart.
68
  Sachems also oversaw matters of peace and war.  They entertained 
guests who visited their towns, and conducted diplomatic negotiations that were sealed 
via the ritual exchange of gifts.  They led war parties against their enemies to capture 
prisoners, exert their authority over tributary villages, and gain status through acts of 
bravery.  Thus, the sachem bore the responsibility of maintaining balance both within the 
community and with the outside world.
69
          
 Sachems also fulfilled economic, as well as political, roles.  They distributed land 
rights to their followers and decided how those lands were used.  Sachems also 
supervised trade relationships within the community and across long-distance trading 
networks.
70
  For their leadership, sachems received tribute payments from their followers.  
Corn was a popular tribute item throughout the Eastern Woodlands.  Once a year, 
according to Pilgrim founder Edward Winslow, a sachem‘s closest advisors ―provoke the 
people to bestow much corn on the sachim.  To that end, they appoint a certain time and 
place, near the sachim‘s dwelling, where the people bring many baskets of corn, and 
make a great stack therof.‖71  Another popular tribute item was wampum.  Wampum 
consisted of small, tubular white and purple beads made from quahog (hard-shell clam) 
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shells, as well as whelk or conch shells, which were harvested from the coast of Long 
Island Sound.  Wampum served a ceremonial purpose throughout the Native northeastern 
woodlands.  Wampum was worn as ornamentation, but it was perhaps best known for 
being strung together into belts that were used to pay tribute, pay ransoms, provide 
compensation or restitution for crimes, and commemorate treaty negotiations and 
political arrangements.
72
          
 While sachems received substantial tribute payments which enhanced their social 
status and allowed them to live in great comfort, they were expected to redistribute much 
of those payments to their followers.  A sachem earned the trust of the community 
through their use of persuasion, their skill, and by operating within a system of reciprocal 
gift exchanges.
73
  The ritual exchange of gifts, as well as games of chance, redistributed 
this wealth and cemented these relationships.  This system of reciprocity was the 
cornerstone of the political and social relationship between sachems and their 
communities.  A Pequot sachem entered into a social contract when he (and sometimes 
she) accepted a tribute from the community.  The sachem then granted the gift-giver a 
request.  Sachems fulfilled their part of the social contract by making decisions that 
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benefited the petitioner and the community as a whole. The sachem-tributary relationship 
was thus a conditional one.
74
    
 The largest disruption to New England Indian life in the early seventeenth 
century, as was true throughout the Americas, came from European-introduced diseases.  
Pre-contact New England was believed to be a healthy environment, although it was not 
disease-free.
75
  Yet none of the existing indigenous maladies caused the widespread death 
and social dislocation that European pathogens caused.  Communicable diseases like 
smallpox, measles, chicken pox, whooping cough, scarlet fever, cholera, diphtheria, 
plague, and others swept through the continent.
76
  The indigenous people of southern 
New England quickly fell to these new diseases, having no real immunities against them.  
In fact, some Native medicinal practices, such as the use of sweat baths to purge the 
illness out, helped spread European pathogens and dehydrated those who were already 
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sick.  While there is no way to be sure, scholars estimate that the mortality rates ranged 
from as low as 55 percent to as high 95 percent in some areas.  These ―virgin soil 
epidemics‖ ensured that by the time Europeans established a permanent colonial presence 
in the region, much of New England had become a ―widowed land.‖77   
 While localized outbreaks of communicable disease happened sporadically 
throughout this period of contact between Indians and whites, two outbreaks served 
―benchmarks‖ in the history of the New England Anglo-Algonquian frontier.  The first 
was an outbreak of hepatitis that ravaged the Atlantic coast of New England from the 
Kennebec River in Maine south to Narragansett Bay between 1616 and 1619.  Hepatitis 
was introduced to eastern Algonquian populations by European fisherman who visited 
the region to fish and trade.  Among the Wampanoags and the Massachusetts mortality 
rates reached as high as 90 percent.  This epidemic allowed the early English colony of 
Plymouth to gain a foothold in New England in 1620; the colonists built their town on the 
site of a previous indigenous settlement whose inhabitants had died in the outbreak.
78
 
 The Pequots were spared the worst of the 1616-1619 outbreak as it stopped short 
of their territory.  However, the Pequots were not lucky a second time.  In 1633, smallpox 
struck the tribe.  No place was safe; the disease swept over the entire region.  John 
Winthrop, governor of the Puritan English colony of Massachusetts Bay, wrote in 1634 
that ―for the natives in these parts, Gods hand hath so pursued them, as for 300 miles 
space, [that] the greatest parte of them are swept awaye by the small poxe, which still 
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continues among them.‖79  The Pequot population, originally thought to be around 
thirteen thousand, plummeted to about 3,000 people in 1634, a mortality rate of seventy-
seven percent.  It dropped again after 1637, to a post-war population of around 1,000 
people.
80
 
 The tribe suffered greatly, and not only in demographic terms.  The tremendous 
loss of life disrupted all levels of Pequot society.  Affected communities could no longer 
meet the daily tasks needed to complete the basic requirements of life.  Social chaos 
ensued as elders died taking their knowledge with them, fertility rates dropped, and 
children were left orphaned with few surviving kin to take them in.
81
           
II 
 Even with their diminished population, the Pequots posed a significant challenge 
to both European expansion and to the ambitions of their Native rivals well into the 
1630s.  New communities formed out of the ashes of old ones, as survivors banded 
together and set upon the process of rebuilding their lives.  The high mortality rates may 
have also presented gifted and ambitious Pequots new opportunities for leadership.  
Despite the demographic decline wrought by epidemic disease, the Pequots extended 
their political and territorial spheres of influence along the Connecticut River Valley and 
eastern Long Island during the late 1620s and early 1630s.  This expansion enabled the 
Pequots to place several smaller wampum-producing tribes under tributary status.  Their 
new found hegemony in the region allowed the Pequots to grow ―rich and potent‖ via the 
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wampum trade, and it gave them premier access to European trade goods coming out of 
the Dutch colony of New Netherlands.
82
   
 The Dutch were the Pequots‘ first verifiable European contact, and that 
interaction set in motion events that propelled the Pequots forward as a major regional 
power.  In 1613-1614, Dutch merchant Adriaen Block and his crew explored Long Island 
Sound and the Thames River.  During this exploration, the Dutch sailors in Block‘s party 
encountered the ―Pequatoos‖ living along a small river which the Dutch named ―the river 
of Seccanamos after the name of the Sagmos or Sacmos [Sagamore].‖  Block and his men 
also traded with another group of Natives on this trip ―who are called Morhicans.‖83  
Despite that initial meeting, the Pequots did not maintain sustained contact Europeans 
until the early 1620s.  In 1622, Dutch trader Jaques Elekes traveled to the mouth of the 
Thames River and visited a Pequot village.  The details of this meeting are sketchy, but at 
some point relations between Elekes‘s party and the village broke down.  Elekes then 
seized the sachem and announced that ―his [the sachem‘s] head would be cut off‖ unless 
the Pequots paid a hefty ransom.  The Pequots paid ―forty fathoms‖ of ―small beads 
which they [the Pequots] manufacture themselves and prize as jewells.‖  Elekes released 
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the sachem, and he realized that the ―jewells‖ — called ―zeewan‖ by the Dutch and 
―wampum‖ by the English — were highly prized by Indians throughout the Northeast 
and could be traded for furs.  Elekes was expelled by the Dutch West India Company for 
his actions, but the revelation he made regarding wampum-for-furs revitalized the North 
American fur trade.
84
      
 The Dutch began sending fur-trading expeditions to the region in 1611.  However, 
it was not until 1624, that the Dutch West India Company (first chartered in 1621) 
authorized the construction of Fort Orange (present-day Albany, NY).  With the creation 
of Fort Orange at the head of the Hudson River, and New Amsterdam on Manhattan 
Island, the Dutch established their colony of New Netherland, which lasted until 1664 
when English forces seized the colony and renamed it New York.
85
  Despite high hopes 
for New Netherland‘s fur trade, profits fell short of expectations.  The Dutch West India 
Company initially supplied traders with copper and iron kettles, but soon those items 
became less-desired by Indian fur suppliers.  The Indians‘ demand for iron vessels was 
quickly satiated in the areas closest to the Dutch settlements, and Indians refused to pay a 
higher premium in furs for the more expensive copper vessels.  While metal trade goods 
were still desired by tribes further inland, they were too heavy and difficult for Dutch 
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traders to transport.
86
  When the Dutch discovered the Indians‘ desire for wampum, they 
had found an answer to their problems.   
 In 1626, Secretary Isaak de Rasieres, the Dutch West India Company‘s 
commercial agent stationed at New Amsterdam, revitalized the fur trade by offering 
wampum to Indian fur suppliers.  In a letter to the company directors, Rasieres outlined 
the ―trade triangle‖ that the Dutch created.  Rasieres acquired large quantities of wampum 
from the Indians living around Long Island Sound, and paid them metal goods and 
―duffles,‖ a cheap textile, in exchange for the beads.  The wampum was then sent to the 
company‘s upriver trading posts, where fur-trading Indians from the interior came to the 
Dutch ―for no other reason than to get sewan [wampum].‖  The furs were then sent down 
to New Amsterdam and shipped back to Holland.  Rasieres‘s ―trade triangle‖ worked.  
The Dutch were soon shipping 10,000 pelts a year to Holland by the end of the 1620s, 
and by 1635, that number had risen to 16,304 pelts worth 134,925 guilders.
87
   
 The commodification of wampum profoundly impacted the Pequots and their 
neighbors.  While wampum retained all of its traditional importance for Native people, its 
new value as a ―currency‖ in the fur trade locked New England Natives into a trans-
Atlantic economic system.  Metal drills procured from European traders increased the 
Native production of wampum, which meant that more furs could be purchased with it.  
The increased availability of wampum meant that Native hunters sought even more furs, 
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placing Natives and Europeans alike in a commercial cycle.
88
  Wampum attained an 
additional value, at least for a while, among Europeans beyond its importance as a 
medium of exchange with Indians.  The scarcity of hard currency from Europe meant that 
for several decades, wampum — being ―small, durable, and backed by the steady worth 
of beaver in European markets‖ — acted as an acceptable form of cash in the New 
England colonies starting in 1637 at three beads per penny.  Between 1634 and 1664, 
Native peoples paid over twenty-one thousand fathoms (almost seven million beads) of 
wampum in tribute and fines to English colonists.
89
  
 In 1627, the Dutch opened the door to other European competitors, when 
delegations sent by Director General Peter Minuit traveled to the Plymouth colony.  
English Separatists (otherwise known as the Pilgrims) established Plymouth in 1620, but 
in order to pay back English creditors and obtain supplies, the Pilgrims sought Indian 
trading partners to bolster their economy.  In 1623, Plymouth governor William Bradford 
sent envoys to the Narragansetts, but they were turned away because the Pilgrims could 
offer ―only a few beads and knives which were not there much esteemed.‖90  At the time, 
the Narragansetts were trading partners with the Dutch, and they informed Dutch agents 
of the Pilgrims‘ entreaties.  The Dutch, seeking to protect their trade monopoly with the 
Indians and their access to the wampum that had become the cornerstone of the fur trade, 
sent their first delegation to Plymouth in early 1627 with the hope of negotiating a trade 
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agreement with Plymouth.  Governor Bradford thanked the Dutch for their offer, and he 
responded that while Plymouth was ―fully supplied with all the necessaries,‖ they might 
buy Dutch goods the following year ―if your rates be reasonable.‖91  Bradford‘s letter 
also contained a warning.  He told Dutch authorities in New Netherland that the King of 
England was the rightful sovereign of North America, and that ―his patentees had the 
right to eject intruders.
92
  However, in remembrance of past kindnesses and as a gesture 
of goodwill, the Plymouth settlers promised to leave the Dutch settlements in New 
Netherland alone.  In return, Bradford asked that the Dutch cease trading with the 
Narragansetts and other Native groups who lived ―at our [Plymouth‘s] doors.‖  If the 
Dutch abided by this agreement, Bradford believed that ―no other English will go any 
way to trouble or hinder you.‖  Unimpressed by Bradford‘s warning, Minuit responded 
with one of his own.  ―As the English claim authority under the king of England,‖ Minuit 
stated that ―we derive ours from the states of Holland, and will defend it.‖93                              
 Still seeking an arrangement with the English, Minuit sent another delegation to 
Plymouth later in 1627 led by Rasieres.  Rasieres feared that the English would tap into 
the rich wampum trade of Long Island Sound and Narragansett Bay, and push for their 
own Native alliances.  Rasieres warned that if that happened, ―it would be a great trouble 
for us to maintain [trade in Connecticut], for they [the English] already dare to threaten us 
that if we will not leave off dealing with that people [the Narragansetts and other 
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Indians], they will be obliged to use other means.  If they do that now, while they are yet 
ignorant of how the case stands [with regards to wampum], what will they do when they 
get a notion of it?‖94  While attempting to stave off English activities in Long Island 
Sound and Narragansett Bay, Rasieres made a grave mistake.  He sold the Plymouth 
colonists fifty fathoms of wampum to be used at their northern trading post on the 
Kennebec River in Maine.  That fifty fathoms of wampum changed the economic course 
of Plymouth Colony, because for the first time they gained a profit from the Indian trade.  
At first, the northern Indians thought that wampum was only suitable for ―the sachems 
and some special people.‖  However, within two years those northern Indians ―could 
scarce ever get enough.‖95  Rasieres strategy of keeping English traders in Maine 
backfired, and soon the English got their wampum directly from the Indians of 
southwestern New England.  Thus after 1627, the cost of both wampum and furs rose due 
to increased competition.
96
         
 By the early 1630s, the English set their sights on the Connecticut River Valley, 
despite Dutch efforts to keep them out.  Its rivers and access to furs and wampum made it 
an attractive trading prospect, and the fertile land offered possibilities of settlement.  
Early English reports actually spoke well of the Pequots.  While they described the 
Mohawks, the Abenakis, and the Narragansetts as potential threats to the colonies, the 
English referred to the Pequots as ―just and equal in their dealings, not treacherous either 
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to their countrymen or English.‖97  Such encouraging reports only made the area more 
attractive to English colonists stationed along the coast at Plymouth and Massachusetts 
Bay who eagerly sought new areas of expansion for their growing populations, and new 
trading partners among the River Valley indigenous peoples.
98
  
 Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth soon battled one another for dominance in the 
Connecticut region, a precursor of the jurisdictional battles to come.  Plymouth struck 
first, when in 1631 it sent a reconnaissance team to the area led by Edward Winslow.
99
  
They constructed the first English outpost in the Connecticut River Valley, commanded 
by Lieutenant William Holmes, on lands purchased from a River Valley Indian named 
Natawante.  Natawante had been persistent in his invitations to the English; he saw a 
relationship with them as a way to regain authority lost to the Pequots, also a sign of 
things to come.  The deal enabled the Plymouth men to contest Dutch claims to the area.  
For their part, the Dutch only offered half-hearted resistance, having found the potential 
military fight too costly.
100
   
 Plymouth was not the only English colony interested in the Connecticut River 
Valley.  On July 12, 1633, Plymouth and Bay Colony leaders met in Boston for a week-
long conference to discuss issues of mutual importance.  One of these matters concerned 
the Connecticut River region, and whether or not to establish a trading post on the river 
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―to prevent the Dutch, who were about to build one.‖  Bay Colony officials rejected the 
idea, telling the Plymouth delegates that such a task was beyond their means to support.  
Plymouth officials declared their intentions to move forward with the idea.  However, the 
Bay Colony leaders had misled Plymouth, and launched their own plans to acquire the 
region for themselves.
101
  John Winthrop sent his ship, The Blessing of the Bay, on a 
trading mission to Long Island and Dutch-controlled New Amsterdam.  The ship 
explored the Connecticut coast and Long Island Sound, and confirmed that while the 
Indians of Long Island appeared to be ―a very treacherous people,‖ they also possessed 
much high-quality wampum.  A subsequent expedition to the region by John Oldham 
reiterated its substantial trading potential.
102
  These voyages only strengthened the Bay 
Colony‘s resolve to expand into Connecticut. 
 The Connecticut River Valley proved an attractive prospect for permanent 
English settlement, and residents in Bay Colony towns like Dorchester, Watertown, 
Newton, and Roxbury soon cast their eyes towards the valley.
103
  Newton residents joined 
The Blessing of the Bay on its trip to New Amsterdam and Long Island, and surveyed 
Connecticut in 1634.  The following year, Roger Ludlow led settlers from Dorchester to 
the Plymouth trading post; soon the settlers dominated the area despite the protests of the 
Plymouth men.  Two years of squabbling followed.  Eventually they reached a 
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settlement; the Dorchester settlers, organized as the town of Windsor, formally purchased 
the land they had squatted on.  The town occupied nearly ninety-four percent of the land 
the Plymouth group originally acquired from the River Indians.
104
 
 As the colonists vied for control over Connecticut, prominent Puritans living in 
England laid claim to the area under the 1632 Warwick Patent.
105
  The actions of 
Plymouth and Bay Colony settlers, or squatters, troubled these English patrons; they 
desired an independent colony at the mouth of the Connecticut River.  On July 7, 1635, 
the patentees contracted John Winthrop Jr., the twenty-nine year old year old son of the 
Bay Colony‘s principal leader, to be the ―Governour of the river Connecticut in New 
England and of the Harbors and places adjoining.‖  This appointment was for one year, 
during which time the younger Winthrop was tasked with the ―makinge of fortifications 
and buildinge of houses.‖  The fort was to contain houses ―as may receave men of 
qualitie‖ should any of the patentees decide to settle in Connecticut.  Winthrop Jr. 
accepted the appointment the day before he married his second wife, Elizabeth Reade, 
and the couple sailed for New England a few weeks later.
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 John Winthrop Jr. seemed a capable choice as the new governor.  The son of John 
Winthrop Sr., the younger Winthrop came from a family with deep connections in both 
Old and New England.  He also had successful colonial experience; he first moved to the 
Bay Colony in 1631, and founded the town of Agawam (later renamed Ipswich) in 1633.  
He returned to England after the death of his first wife in 1634, but with his new 
appointment (and new marriage) he was primed to try again.  He immediately set about 
the patentees agenda, and proclaimed Connecticut an independent colony, outside of both 
Plymouth and Bay Colony jurisdiction.  Any English settlers who wished to reside in 
Connecticut needed to obtain title from him, the duly appointed governor.  He then tasked 
Lieutenant Lion Gardener with building the requested fort at the mouth of the 
Connecticut River, named ―Saybrook‖ in honor of two patentees, Lord Saye and Sele and 
Lord Brook.
107
 
 However, Governor John Winthrop Jr. soon realized that proclaiming authority 
was much easier than actually wielding authority.  The number of towns and settlers 
upriver continued to grow, and by summer of 1636 included Thomas Hooker‘s town of 
Hartford.  These settelemtns antagonized the Dutch, the Plymouth traders, and violated 
Saybrook‘s authority.  Winthrop Jr. negotiated a settlement whereby the upriver towns 
recognize him as governor of Connecticut, and he consented to their settlements under 
the Warwick Patent.  However, this fell outside his stated powers, so both Saybrook and 
the upriver towns turned to Massachusetts Bay to help administer the agreement.  On 
March 3, 1636, the General Court of Massachusett Bay created an eight member 
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commission with limited power to govern the Connecticut settlements.  This one year 
commission was ―authorized to regulate trade, allocate land, and, if necessary, call a 
general court and raise a militia for defense of their villages.‖108   
 Although an ingenious solution to the problem, Winthrop Jr.‘s agreement did not 
hold.  By 1636, Connecticut had become, in the words of Francis Jennings, a ―curious 
spectacle of a substantial colony upriver, pretending to have a governor, and a fortified 
governor downstream, pretending to have a colony.‖109  The upriver towns continued to 
grow and drive out all other claimants, while Governor Winthrop Jr. wielded no real 
power outside the area surrounding Saybrook.  If Winthrop Jr. ever hoped to exercise 
influence as a respected authority in the colony, he needed local allies.  
************************************ 
 Situated between coastal wampum and interior furs, the Pequots were in a premier 
position to control the valuable wampum trade, and play the competing Europeans off of 
one another.  They quickly pressed their advantage.  Despite the 1622 Elekes debacle, the 
Pequots entered into a trading relationship with the Dutch, who were at the time ―the best 
source of European trade goods in southern New England.‖  A more tactful negotiator 
and trader named Pieter Barentsen, a man said to be fluent in several regional Native 
dialects, secured this new Pequot-Dutch arrangement.  Shortly after this steady contact 
with the Dutch began, the Pequots launched a series of expansionist moves that gave 
them control of the Connecticut River.  The Pequots quickly emerged as the dominant 
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Indian regional power.
110
  In 1626, Pequot warriors, after ―three desperate pitched 
battles,‖ defeated the Wangunk sachem Sequin.  Sequin led a loose alliance of 
Connecticut River Indian bands that lived west of the Pequots‘ Thames River territory.  
After their defeat, those River Indians became tributaries of the Pequots, paying an 
annual tribute to the Pequot grand sachem in exchange for Pequot protection.  This 
expansion continued into the early 1630s, as the Pequots placed several eastern Long 
Island tribes under tributary status by 1632.  With their victories in Connecticut and 
eastern Long Island, the Pequots dominated key aspects of Rasieres‘s ―triangle trade‖: 
wampum production on the New England seacoast and furs coming down the 
Connecticut River.  Their control over the area allowed the Pequots to grow ―rich and 
powerful and also proud‖, and it filled them with ―pieces, powder, and shot.‖  By 1634, 
the Pequots reputation as ―a stately warlike people‖ had been solidified.111       
********************************************* 
 Pequot dominance however would be short-lived, as English settlers out of 
Massachusetts set their sights on the Connecticut River Valley, and other Native groups 
fought to establish themselves as regional powers.  The English sought to oust the Dutch 
as the dominant European presence in the region.  English colonial officials also 
presented the chief rivals of the Pequots, the Mohegans and the Narragansetts, with the 
opportunity to remove a major obstacle to their own political designs of expansion.  In 
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the ensuing chaos the Pequots were brought to the brink of destruction.  Cassacinamon 
and his fellow Pequots had to rely on centuries of tradition and social networks to help 
them rebuild their communities and adapt to this ―new world.‖   
 61 
Chapter 2: “Your feet shall be set on their proud necks” – The Pequot War of 1637 
 
 The Pequots‘ monopoly over the Connecticut River Valley trade made them ―the 
stoutest, proudest, and most successful in their wars of all the Indians‖ by the early 
1630s.
112
  Yet, this regional dominance was short-lived; tensions over issues of land, 
trade, and political prominence erupted into violence with the Pequot War of 1637.  The 
Pequot War was a milestone; ―the first large-scale violent encounter between the English 
colonists of New England and an indigenous people,‖ giving it ―a special [albeit dubious] 
place in the overall encounter of European and American civilizations.‖113  The Pequot 
War foreshadowed future battles along the westward-moving Anglo-Indian frontier.  Yet 
the war was not simply an Anglo-Indian conflict.  Before 1637, the Pequots possessed no 
allies among the New England colonies; a failure that spelled of leadership that proved 
disastrous.  Other major Algonquian confederations — namely the Mohegans and the 
Narragansetts — counted English allies as friends and advocates.114  The Mohegans and 
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the Narragansetts promoted their own self-interests; with the Pequots removed as a 
regional power, ambitious leaders like the Mohegan sachem Uncas and the Narragansett 
sachem Miantonomi advanced their own agendas.  This made the Pequot War a contest 
between rival Native powers as much as an Anglo-Indian war.  The English victory lay 
not in their ―superiority,‖ but in these Anglo-Algonquian alliances and the brutality of 
English tactics. 
 For the Pequots, the war nearly spelled their destruction, with hundreds of their 
people killed or enslaved, their territory seized and the survivors scattered amongst their 
enemies.  Robin Cassacinamon‘s actions during the conflict are unknown, although he 
was likely in his teens at the time.
115
  Several key political figures, English and 
Algonquian, rose to prominence during and after the war; individuals with whom 
Cassacinamon struggled, negotiated, and manipulated throughout the seventeenth-
century.  Cassacinamon assumed leadership after the war, faced with the monumental 
task of working with the Pequots to rebuild their communities.  The war brutally 
demonstrated several critical facts.  First, Cassacinamon needed a strong English ally to 
champion his people among the colonial power brokers.  Second, the Pequots had to 
control the lines of communication and information that pertained to them, so as to 
                                                                                                                                                 
114Eric Spencer Johnson, ―‗Some by Flatteries, Others by Threatenings‘: Political Strategies 
among Native Americans of Seventeenth-Century Southern New England,‖ PhD dissertation (Amherst, 
MA: University of Massachusetts, 1993), 109.   
115Again, Cassacinamon‘s exact date of birth is unknown.  He first appears in colonial records in 
1638, following the Treaty of Hartford, and is recognized as carrying out a diplomatic mission for the 
Mohegan sachem Uncas.  This suggests that he would have been at least in his mid-to-late teens, as it is 
doubtful that Uncas would have made a child part of a diplomatic envoy to the English.  However, the fact 
that Cassacinamon was not executed or identified as a sachem during or after the end of the war suggests 
that he had not yet attained the position.  Kevin A. McBride, interview by author, tape recording, 
Mashantucket, CT, July 2008.    
 63 
prevent others from manipulating it against them.  And third, while Pequot communities 
favored Pequot leaders, those leaders must be capable individuals who mastered the first 
two issues.  Sassacus, sachem during the war, failed at these tasks.  Denied these crucial 
elements, the Pequots lost the war; their communities could not be rebuilt until they 
addressed those conditions.  Although the Mohegans, Narragansetts, Connecticut, and 
Massachusetts Bay united to eliminate the Pequots, personal conflicts and jurisdictional 
battles plagued the endeavor.  These conflicting agendas provided Cassacinamon another 
factor to exploit in the post-war period.  The Pequot War stands as a definitive milestone 
in Cassacinamon‘s story, the history of the Pequots, and all of southern New England.        
I 
 The Pequots‘ hegemony in the region in part depended on the limited number of 
traders who provided European goods.  As long as the Dutch remained the sole 
Europeans trading in the Connecticut River Valley, the Pequots retained their advantage 
and power.  However, when English colonists cast their eyes toward the Connecticut 
River Valley, some Natives saw an opportunity to rid themselves of the Pequots‘ 
authority.  Wahginnacut, a sachem of the River Indians that lived in the Connecticut 
River Valley, contacted both John Winthrop and William Bradford in April of 1631.  The 
sachem asked the governors of Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth, respectively, if they 
would ―have some Englishmen to come plant in his country,‖ and enter into an alliance 
with him.  If the English immigrants came to settle in his ―very fruitful‖ country, 
Wahginnacut offered to provide them with corn and eighty beaver skins a year.  
However, both Bradford and Winthrop realized that Wahginnacut possessed other 
motives.  Massachusetts Bay rejected Wahginnacut‘s invitation, while Plymouth sent 
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only a token force led by Edward Winslow that spent more time harassing Dutch traders 
than aiding the River Indians.  As a result, the Pequots defeated Wahginnacut and further 
extended their control over the River Valley.
116
 
 Uncas, grand sachem of the Mohegans, nursed an even greater grudge against the 
Pequots.  In 1626, Uncas‘s father, the Mohegan sachem Owaneco, orchestrated an 
alliance with the Pequot grand sachem Tatobem.  The sachems arranged for Tatobem‘s 
daughter to marry Uncas‘s brother, but the brother died, so they arranged for ―Uncas, the 
next brother to the deceased, should proceed in the said match.‖117  Uncas married the 
woman, and Owaneco died shortly after the marriage.  With his father‘s death, Uncas 
became the Mohegan‘s new sachem.  However, the Pequot alliance placed the Mohegans 
(and Uncas) under Tatobem‘s authority.  Uncas could not resist the situation; disease had 
weakened the Mohegans, and the Pequots controlled access to European traders.  Only by 
accepting subordination to Tatobem could Uncas ―have liberty to live in his own 
Countrey‖ near the Thames River.118 
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 Tatobem proved an effective grand sachem.  Capable of negotiating several 
agreements with a variety of Native and European leaders, he oversaw much of the 
Pequots‘ rise to power.  However, his authority was not absolute.  In response to English 
interest in the area, the Dutch increased their presence in the region.  In 1632, Hans 
Ercluys of the Dutch West Indian Company purchased land near the mouth of the 
Connecticut River that the Dutch named Kievet‘s Hook.  The following year, in June 
1633, Jacob Van Curler purchased twenty acres of land near present-day Hartford from a 
Pequot sachem named Nepuquash.  The Dutch built a new trading post on the site that 
they called the House of Good Hope.
119
   
 The Dutch build-up in the river valley did not deter English expansion.  Shortly 
after the Dutch completed the House of Good Hope, William Holmes of Plymouth led an 
expedition up the Connecticut River.  Despite threats by the Dutch, Holmes and his crew 
sailed to a site north of the Dutch trading post and erected their own fort.  The Plymouth 
men were accompanied by a River Indian sachem named Natawante who, like 
Wahginnacut, appealed to the English for help against the Pequots.  Unlike Wahginnacut, 
Natawante successfully gained English attention, and by 1633, English colonists believed 
Connecticut an ideal place for settlement.
120
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 The Pequots perceived this increased European presence as a threat, and ―were 
much offended‖ that the English ―brought home and restored‖ Natawante.  William 
Bradford, the governor of Plymouth Colony, wrote that the English fortified their post 
because ―they were to encounter with a double danger in this attempt, both the Dutch and 
the Indians.‖121  More European traders in the region weakened the Pequots‘ control over 
both the trade and their Native tributaries.  The Pequots targeted any Natives who 
attempted to trade with the Europeans without their permission.  In the fall of 1633, 
Pequot warriors killed several Narragansetts (or Narragansett tributaries) that traveled to 
the House of Good Hope.  This proved a grave miscalculation.  The Dutch believed that 
their agreement with Nepuquash gave all Natives the right to come to the trading post; 
the Dutch interpreted the Pequots‘ attack as a breach of that agreement.  They kidnapped 
Tatobem, and the Pequots paid a huge ransom in wampum and furs to secure his safe 
release.  The Dutch took the ransom and returned Tatobem‘s corpse.122       
 Though long interested in the Connecticut River Valley, it was a case of mistaken 
identity that drew the English into this political quagmire: the murder of Captain John 
Stone in 1634.  Stone was not a respectable citizen by any Puritan standard; 
Massachusetts Bay banished him for disorderly behavior, attempted piracy, and drunken 
debauchery.  As they traveled to Virginia, Stone and his men stopped at the Connecticut 
River, and roughed up some Natives.  Stone‘s crew then drank themselves into a stupor 
and neglected to stand guard.  Pequot warriors, thinking Stone was Dutch and thus 
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responsible for the death of Tatobem, snuck into his camp and murdered him.  This 
proved to be another grave mistake.
123
   
 In the chaos that followed Tatobem‘s murder, the Pequots chose a successor, 
which exacerbated the rift between the Pequots and the Mohegans.
124
  The name of the 
first successor was lost; however, it is known that he orchestrated the murder of John 
Stone, and was himself killed during an attack on a Dutch outpost.  The Pequots faced yet 
another major decision, and the Mohegan Uncas pressed his advantage.  Uncas 
acquiesced to the Pequot grand sachem while Tatobem lived, but now that he was gone 
and the Pequots faced a new challenge from the Dutch, Uncas seized the opportunity to 
press his advantage.  Uncas claimed the Pequot sachemship through his wife, Tatobem‘s 
daughter.  However, the Pequots chose Sassacus, Tatobem‘s brother, as sachem instead.  
When Uncas rebelled against the decision, the majority of the Pequots remained loyal to 
Sassacus, because Sassacus was a Pequot and Uncas was not.
125
   
 Although he was a Pequot, Sassacus was not an effective leader, and Uncas 
challenged Sassacus on at least five separate occasions.  Uncas and other Mohegan 
leaders began an expansionist drive westward from their principal village of Shantok and 
the Thames River, with their efforts backed by the Narragansetts.  They attempted to 
seize Pequot territory and hunting grounds ―almost to the Connecticut River,‖ but were 
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repelled each time by Pequot counterattacks.
126
  The Pequots drove Uncas and his 
followers into temporary exile among the Narragansetts.  However, after each attempt, 
Uncas ritually supplicated himself before Sassacus, who permitted the Mohegan sachem 
to return to his homelands.  Scholars have posited that Sassacus ―could not generate the 
support necessary to execute his Mohegan rival, no matter how treacherous his behavior.‖  
Uncas, despite his defiance, was deeply connected to Sassacus and other high-status 
Pequots through marriage, and these kin relationships protected Uncas from permanent 
reprisal.  If Sassacus accepted Uncas‘s submission, he avoided retaliatory strikes by 
Uncas‘s kin, and perhaps staved off further threats to his position.127  These kin 
relationships did produce political gains, but those gains did not benefit Sassacus.  
************************************  
 In November 1634, Sassacus sent envoys to Massachusetts Bay to negotiate a 
reasonable settlement with English authorities.  He hoped to avoid a war with the 
English, secure a trade agreement with them after losing the Dutch, and enlist the Bay 
Colony‘s aid in negotiating with the Narragansetts.  Governor John Winthrop Sr. met 
with the envoy, and demanded that the Pequots hand over the men responsible for 
Stone‘s death.  However, according to the Pequot envoy, the guilty parties had 
themselves been killed in skirmishes and by smallpox.  Instead, the Pequots offered the 
English compensation for Stone‘s death in wampum, furs, and other trade goods.  The 
Pequots considered this to be a fair deal; the English received compensation for the dead 
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man, and they would have the opportunity to reestablish friendly relations with the 
English.  The Pequots then requested English help in brokering peace with the 
Narragansetts.  The English refused to believe that Stone‘s killers were dead; they 
demanded the Pequots turn over the perpetrators, and allow English settlers into their 
territory.  In return, they agreed to a trade deal with the Pequots and promised to help 
negotiate with the Narragansetts.  The final agreement gave the English the right to 
establish more settlements in Connecticut (after proper payment for the land was made) 
and established renewed trade relations between the two parties.  The agreement also 
reaffirmed the English claims for Stone‘s killers as well as granting the English 
restitution in wampum and furs.
128
  
 For two years, the agreement between the Pequots and the English held, although 
it was ―imperfectly observed on both sides.‖  The Pequots and English established a trade 
relationship, and more settlers moved into the Connecticut River Valley.  However, 
problems soon emerged.  The Bay Colony arbitrarily increased the demanded payments, 
which affronted the Pequots.  The increased amounts shifted the payments from 
compensation to tribute, and within Algonquian political relationships, ―tribute implied 
subordination.‖  Sassacus and the Pequots refused to make the payments, and did not turn 
over Stone‘s killers (assuming they still lived).  And ultimately, the only provisions the 
colonists fulfilled with any true commitment involved sending settlers into 
Connecticut.
129
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 Tension between the Puritans and the Pequots escalated with the death of John 
Oldham in 1636.  Oldham was murdered by Indians from Block Island, who were, in 
fact, Narragansett tributaries.  However, by 1636 English authorities could not miss an 
opportunity to demonstrate their strength to the Pequots, and by extension, to other 
Native communities in the region.
130
  The murder of John Oldham, coupled with the 
Pequots‘ refusal to comply with the terms of the 1634 treaty, led Massachusetts Bay 
officials to assume that the Pequots plotted against them.  After they consulted with their 
ministers ―about doing justice upon the Indians for the death of Mr. Oldham,‖ the Bay 
leaders organized a punitive expedition in August 1636, comprised of ninety volunteers 
and led by John Endicott.
131
  Officials ordered Endicott to seize control of Block Island 
and kill all the adult men and enslave the women and children as punishment for 
Oldham‘s death.  Endicott was to then sail to the Pequot village at the mouth of the 
Pequot River (later renamed the Thames River) and demand that the Pequots hand over 
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―the murderers of Capt. Stone and other English.‖  The Pequots were to pay one thousand 
fathoms of wampum to the Bay Colony in damages and turn over a few children as 
hostages to ensure their compliance.  If they refused, Endicott was to take the children 
―by force.‖132   
 With the Endicott expedition, the English began a concerted effort to extend their 
authority over the Connecticut region.  The expedition reached Block Island shortly 
before dusk on August 22, 1636, and spent the next two days trying to carry out their 
objectives, but they failed.  The Indian inhabitants of Block Island successfully avoided 
capture, but Endicott‘s tactics made an impression.  After the raid, the Block Islanders 
sent an annual wampum tribute to Boston to secure English protection.
133
  
 Endicott‘s expedition next arrived at Fort Saybrook to launch the second phase of 
the Bay Colony‘s plan.  He failed to endear himself to Lieutenant Lyon Gardener, the 
English commander at Saybrook.  ―You come hither to raise these wasps around my 
ears,‖ Gardener exclaimed, ―and then you will take wing and flee away.‖134  The 
expedition made the quick journey from the fort to the Thames River, where they 
encountered an envoy of Pequots and Western Niantics, one of the Pequots‘ tributary 
allies.  Underhill claimed that ―the Indians spying us came running in multitudes along 
the water side crying, ‗What cheer, Englishmen, what cheer, what do you come for?‖  
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Underhill noted that the Indians‘ mood quickly changed when the English refused to 
answer their calls.  The Indians, growing suspicious of the Englishmen‘s silence, called 
out ―are you angry, will you kill us, and do you come to fight?‖135  The Natives watched 
the ships throughout the night.  In the morning, Underhill reported that a Pequot elder, ―a 
grave senior, man of good understanding,‖ came aboard to parlay with the English.  The 
expedition‘s leaders told the elder in no uncertain terms that the English would not 
―suffer murderers to live,‖ and that ―the governors of the Bay sent us to demand the 
heads of those persons that had slain Captain Norton and Captain Stone and the rest of 
their company.‖136 
 After a series of humiliating exchanges, Endicott decided to attack the Pequots 
first.
137
  As the commanders readied their men for battle, another Pequot envoy came 
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 The envoy again offered the English compensation for Stone‘s death, but Endicott and the English 
commanders believed the envoy was lying to them.  Endicott refused to believe that the Pequots could not 
tell the difference between the English and the Dutch, after the Pequots ―had sufficient experience of both 
nations.‖  The Englishman grew angry, and yelled that ―you [Pequots] have slain the King of England‘s 
subjects.‖ To avenge this, the English stated again that they ―have come to demand an account of their 
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they are both strangers to us, we took them all to be one; therefore, we crave pardon, we have not willfully 
wronged the English.‖  The expedition‘s leaders refused to accept that answer, and asserted they would 
attack the Pequots if ―the heads of those persons that have slain ours‖ were not immediately handed over to 
them.  The Pequot elder then declared that ―Understanding the ground of your coming, I will entreat you to 
give me liberty to go ashore, and I shall inform the body of the people what your intent and resolution is, 
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forward; he promised that if the English put down their weapons and marched thirty 
paces closer to the Pequots, a sachem would meet with Endicott and his commanders.  
According to Captain Underhill, Endicott ―rather chose to beat up the drum and bid them 
to battle.‖  As the Bay Colony troops marched forward and ―displayed our colors,‖ they 
soon found that ―none would come near us, but standing remotely off did laugh at us for 
our patience.‖138  Furious at yet another humiliation, the English ―gave fire to as many as 
we could come near,‖ and forced the Pequots to flee.  Endicott and his men ―spent the 
day burning and spoiling the country,‖ the Pequots‘ wigwams and corn were put to the 
torch, and any buried supplies they could find were also destroyed.
139
  Unable to kill any 
Natives, the English forces contented themselves with ―having burnt and spoiled what we 
could light on.‖  Endicott‘s men then returned to Fort Saybrook for a brief stay before 
departing for Boston.
140
   
                                                                                                                                                 
and if you will stay on board, I will bring you a sudden answer.‖ The Pequot ambassador then disembarked 
the ship, but Endicott refused to wait for the Pequots‘ response and sent his troops ashore clad in their 
armor and ready for battle.  Although the envoy tried to get the English to hold their position, Endicott 
marched his troops up to a small hill to prevent the Pequots from seizing the high ground ―to our [English] 
prejudice.‖  The Pequot envoy then informed Endicott that the high-ranking sachems had gone to Long 
Island, so there were no Pequot leaders with sufficient status to respond to their demands. 
 The English again called the envoy a liar, and threatened to ―beat up the drum, and march through 
the country, and spoil your corn,‖ if Sassacus did not present himself immediately.  The envoy once again 
promised he would try to find Sassacus, and left the English forces on the hill.  After several hours of 
waiting, during which time Underhill claimed he and his men ―used as much patience as ever men might, 
considering the gross abuse they offered us,‖ the Pequot only sent the occasional envoy to ask the English 
to keep waiting while they tried to find Stone‘s killers.  The English troops then realized that the Pequots 
were only stalling for time; there were no women or children in the Pequot camp, and some of the Pequot 
men were seen burying supplies. 
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 Underhill reported only one English casualty during the raid, while John 
Winthrop later heard through the Narragansetts that thirteen Pequots had been killed.
141
  
However, English pride in their ―victory‖ was short-lived, as everything Lt. Gardener 
feared came to pass.
142
  Despite complaints from both Gardener and Governor Bradford 
of Plymouth Colony, who told Winthrop ―that we had occasioned a war, etc., by 
provoking the Pequots,‖ Massachusetts Bay considered the raid a success.  Winthrop felt 
justified, saying that ―we went to not make war upon them, but to do justice.‖143  
Winthrop hoped that Endicott‘s raid convinced the Pequots that ―they could not save 
themselves nor their corn and houses from so few of ours,‖ and secured the Pequots‘ 
good behavior.  However, the people of Saybrook and the Connecticut River Valley 
settlers lacked Governor Winthrop‘s optimism.  In April 1636, Connecticut settlers sent a 
letter to the Bay Colony, and complained that Endicott‘s raid placed all of their lives in 
danger.
144
 
 
 
                                                 
141According to Underhill, one Englishman was wounded in the leg.  Underhill, ―Newes from 
America,‖ 60; Winthrop, Journal, 1:189-190; Cave, Pequot War, 117.  
 142Gardener‘s dislike of Endicott proved justified.  Endicott abandoned the Saybrook men who had 
accompanied him on the raid.  Endicott promised that the Saybrook group, who traveled in their own boats 
rather than in the Bay Colony ships, would be the first ones evacuated after the raid.  However, Gardener 
reported that Endicott‘s forces simply boarded their three Bay Colony ships and left the Saybrook men 
behind, who ―ought to have marched aboard first.‖  The Saybrook party tried to leave in their boats, but a 
shift in the wind made that impossible.  Stuck until the weather changed, the men decided to try and gather 
as much Indian corn as they could.  The Pequots, who had been watching from the surrounding woods, then 
―came forth, about ten at a time‖ and shot arrows at the Englishmen.  The Saybrook party fell into a 
defensive position and fired back into the woods.  After several hours of this standoff, the Pequots left.  The 
Saybrook group reached their ships and returned to the fort, where Gardener noted that ―two of them came 
home wounded.‖  Gardener, ―Relation,‖ 127; Cave, Pequot War, 118.  
 
143
Winthrop, Journal, 1:194; Cave, Pequot Cave,118-119.  
144
 Endicott killed thirteen Pequots and burned a total of sixty wigwams; Bay Colony leaders felt 
this to be justifiable retribution for the Pequots‘ killing of ―four or five‖ Englishmen.  Winthrop, Journal, 
1:194, 212; Cave, Pequot Cave, 119.  
 75 
II 
 The concerns of the Connecticut settlers proved well-founded.  Roger Williams, 
the banished minister and Indian trader living among the Narragansetts, heard through his 
Native contacts that Endicott‘s raid galvanized Pequot resistance.  In a letter to John 
Winthrop, Williams noted that ―the Pequts heare of your preparations, etc., and Comfort 
themselves in this that a witch amongst them will sinck the pinnaces, by diving under 
water and making holes, etc.‖  Once they had defeated the English with the power of their 
shamans, the Pequots expected to ―enrich themselves with a store of guns.‖  While the 
Pequots failed to obtain these weapons, they were psychologically prepared to confront 
the English.  Several weeks after the raid, Williams heard from his informants once 
again.  Williams told Bay Colony leaders that the Pequots and Western Niantics were 
determined to ―live and die together, and not yeald one up.‖  Williams then notified 
Winthrop of a more dangerous development: the Pequots attempted to convince the 
Narragansetts ―that the English were minded to destroy all Indians,‖ and proposed a 
Pequot-Narragansett alliance to confront this mutual threat.
145
  If this alliance took place, 
Puritan leaders foresaw disaster for all of the New England colonies. 
 Bay Colony authorities implored Williams to convince the Narragansetts to side 
with the English.  Williams, in very dramatic prose, later recounted this mission.  Once 
he reached the Narragansett village that hosted the Pequot delegates, Williams recalled 
the many ―dayes and night my Busines forced me to lodge and mix with th bloudie Pequt 
Embassadors, whos Hands and Arms, (me thogt,) reaked with the bloud of my 
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counrimen, murther‘d and massacred by them on Connecticut River, and from whome I 
could not but nightly looke for their bloudy Knives at my owne throat allso.‖  Since these 
Pequot ambassadors were guests of the Narragansetts, Williams had little to fear in the 
way of violence.  However, the minister successfully used his connections among the 
Narragansetts ―to breake to pieces the Pequt‘s negociation and Designe,‖ and he secured 
the Narragansetts‘ neutrality for the time being.146   
 Bay Colony authorities still desired a formal alliance with the powerful 
Narragansetts, and influential voices among the Narragansetts made the case for the 
English.  The Narragansetts sheltered several of the Pequots‘ enemies and disgruntled 
tributaries, who openly favored an English alliance.  Cutshamekin was one such 
instigator; the Massachusett sachem had traveled with Endicott as an interpreter and sent 
a Pequot scalp to the Narragansett sachem Canonicus after the raid.  Wequash and 
Wuttlackquiakommin, two Pequot rivals of Sassacus, saw this as a chance to remove 
their communities from his authority also supported an Anglo-Narragansett alliance.
147
  
Despite those entreaties, an Anglo-Narragansett military alliance remained a difficult 
prospect.  Some of the Narragansetts resented the English for an earlier alliance between 
Plymouth Colony and the Wampanoags, while Canonicus distrusted all Europeans.  
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However, Williams enjoyed ―far better dealings‖ with Miantonomi, Canonicus‘s nephew 
and heir-apparent as Narragansett grand sachem.  Miantonomi was interested in an 
alliance with the English, who he believed would be useful partners in trade and war.  He 
cultivated ties with Williams, and ―kept his barbarous court‖ at Williams‘ trading post.148   
 Bay Colony leaders, resumed their negotiations with the Narragansetts in the fall 
of 1636, and Miantonomi traveled to the Bay Colony in October 1636, accompanied by 
―two of Canonicus‘s sons, and another sachems, and twenty sanaps.‖  Miantonomi 
assured Bay Colony authorities that the Narragansetts ―had always loved the English and 
desired firm peace,‖ and he promised that ―they would continue in war with the Pequods 
and their confederates until they were subdued, and desired that we should do so: They 
would deliver our enemies to us, or kill them.‖  Miantonomi tempered his offer with a 
condition; ―if any of theirs [Narragansetts] should kill our [English] cattle, we would not 
kill them,‖ but accept payment for damages rendered.  If the English agreed, Miantonomi 
declared that ―they would now make a firm peace, and two months hence they would 
send us a present.‖149   
 The next day, Governor Vale and the Bay Colony officials presented the 
Narragansetts with a treaty that allowed for ―free trade‖ between the Narragansetts and 
the English, but stipulated that the Narragansetts should not ―come near our plantations 
during the wars with the Pequods, without some Englishmen or known Indians.‖  The 
Narragansetts were not to harbor any Pequots that sought refuge with them, they had to 
execute any Natives that killed any Englishmen or turn them over to colonial officials, 
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and they had to send back to the colonies any servants that ran away from their English 
masters.  In return, the English promised ―to give them notice when we go against the 
Pequods,‖ whereupon the Narragansetts would provide the English forces with guides.  
Finally, both sides promised that neither one would ―make peace with the Pequods 
without the others consent.‖  The Narragansett delegates put their personal marks on the 
treaty, but when they complained they did not understand some of the terms, the Bay 
Colony officials ―agreed to send a copy to Mr. Williams, who could best interpret it for 
them.‖  Williams‘s receipt of the treaty reassured the Narragansetts and after lengthy 
negotiations, the Anglo-Narragansett alliance was formalized late in the fall of 1636.
150
                                                                        
************************************** 
 As political negotiations took place in Boston, the men at Saybrook were left to 
deal with the immediate danger of a protracted struggle with the Pequots.
151
  Victory 
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 151 The first matter of business was securing their food supply, so Gardener and a group of men 
journeyed to the English cornfields that lay two miles from the fort.  After harvesting the corn, Gardener 
stored it ―in the strong-house,‖ which he ―had built for the defence of the corn.‖  At the end of the day, 
Gardener ―left five lusty men in the strong-house, with long guns‖ behind to guard the harvest, and 
promised that he would send a shallop to pick them up the next day.  Three of the men ―not regarding the 
charge I [Gardener] had given them,‖ left the strong house to go duck hunting.  As the men returned to the 
strong house, Pequot warriors, who had been hiding in the vegetation watching them the entire time, ―arose 
out of their ambush, and shot them all three.‖  One of the men ―escaped through the corn, shot through the 
leg,‖ and reached the safety of the strong house.  His two compatriots were not as fortunate; captured by the 
Pequots, the two men were tortured throughout the night until they died.  The next morning, the shallop 
from Fort Saybrook found only three survivors.  Gardener later noted in his record that as the shallop 
moved away from the shore, the Englishmen ―saw the house on fire.‖  After the Pequot warriors burned the 
strong house, they followed the shallop back to the fort, and burned the hay stacks and outbuildings ―within 
a bow shot of the fort itself.  They slaughtered a cow outside the palisade, and for some days thereafter 
other cattle wandered back to the fort with arrows stuck in their hides.‖ 
 At the same time the cornfield guards faced down the Pequot ambush, the Saybrook men faced a 
similar situation.  Matthew Mitchell, a trader from the upriver town of Wethersfield, journeyed to Saybrook 
and asked Gardener to lend him a shallop so that he could ―fetch hay home from the Six-Mile Island.‖  
Gardener was initially reluctant to help Mitchell, since he felt that Mitchell had ―too few men, for his four 
men could but carry the hay aboard, and one must stand in the boat to defend them, and thy must have two 
more at the foot of the Rock, with their guns, to keep the Indians from running down upon them.‖  
However, Mitchell persisted and Gardener gave in, but only after he warned Mitchell that he should ―scour 
the meadow with their three dogs‖ first so as to make sure there were no Pequots present.  Mitchell, like 
Endicott and the strong house guards, did not listen to Gardener‘s warning, and he paid the price.  When 
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seemed remote to the men of Saybrook, who despite promises of aid had essentially been 
abandoned by the Connecticut River towns, Massachusetts Bay, and the Warwick 
Patentees and their agent, John Winthrop Jr.  In the fall of 1636, a close associate of the 
Winthrop family named Edward Gibbon visited the fort.  Gibbon found Gardener to be a 
capable leader who kept his troops well-prepared, but the structure itself proved to be 
inadequate, certainly not the well-kept settlement the Warwick Patent holders wished it to 
be.  Gibbons advised John Winthrop Jr., ostensibly the governor of the river towns of 
Connecticut, to stay away, and Winthrop Jr. followed his advice.
152
   
                                                                                                                                                 
Mitchell‘s men arrived at Six Mile Island, they immediately started loading the hay without checking the 
meadow first.  Pequot warriors ―rose out of the long grass, and killed three‖ of Mitchell‘s men.  The 
Pequots captured a fourth man, who Gardener recorded was ―the brother of Mr. Mitchell,‖ and then 
―roasted him alive.‖  Gardener, ―Relation,‖ 128-129; Winthrop, Journal, 1: 192; Cave, Pequot War, 128-
129, 214-215.   
 Jill Lepore examines a similar phenomenon in her work on King Philip‘s War.  According to 
Lepore, the destruction of colonial property was an Algonquian attack on English notions of bounded 
systems and private property.  See Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip‟s War and the Origins of 
American Identity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 74.  The torture of prisoners struck the English as 
evidence of Native barbarism, but to the Pequots and other indigenous peoples of the Northeast, the ritual 
torture of enemies was a contest of power.  The torturers attempted to take their enemy‘s power, while the 
victim proved his by withstanding the torture.  For a greater examination of this phenomenon, see Gregory 
Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 13-16.      
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examination of the complicated political situation in Connecticut, and Winthrop‘s relationship to Saybrook, 
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In November 1636, Lt. Gardener wrote to Winthrop to protest his decision, and decry the fact that 
the fort had not received any of the supplies they had been promised.  Gardener‘s suffering was made more 
pronounced by the fact that ships journeyed up the Connecticut River every week to supply the colonists 
living at Windsor, Hartford, and Wethersfield.  Gardener reminded Winthrop Jr. that he had done all he 
could to keep the garrison at Saybrook in ―a warlike condition‖ so ―there shall be noe cause to complayne 
of our Fidelitie.‖  However, he warned that ―if I see that there be not such care for us that our lives may be 
preserved, then I must be forced to shift as the lord shall direct.‖   
As Gardener composed his letter, a supply ship arrived at Saybrook ―in dark night beyond 
expectation.‖  Gardener however, did not destroy the letter or remove his complaints; instead, he added a 
postscript to it.  In that addition, Gardener apologized for his edginess, but he stressed to Winthrop the 
danger that everyone in the Connecticut River Valley faced.  The river was surrounded by hundreds of 
 80 
 Edward Gibbons may have found the Ft. Saybrook complex wanting, but it did 
possess several cannons mounted in its walls which discouraged a direct assault on the 
fort.
153
  However, on February 22, 1637, Gardener led a party of ten men and three dogs 
half a mile upstream from the fort to a narrow strip of land that jutted into the river, to 
retrieve twenty ―timber-trees‖ that they cut the previous summer and float them down to 
Saybrook.  As a precaution Gardener ordered his men ―to burn the weeds, leaves and 
reeds, upon the neck of land,‖ and as the fire spread, ―there starts up four Indians out of 
the fiery reeds.‖  The Indians burst out of the reeds and drove the Englishmen back to the 
fort.  Gardener and another man were wounded but recovered from their injuries, while 
three Englishmen died.  In the chaos of the battle, the Pequots captured another man from 
Gardener‘s group.  They cut off his hands and his nose, and tortured him until he died.154  
Gardener took eight men and ―found the guns that were thrown away, and the body of 
one man shot through, the arrow going in the right side, the head sticking fast, half 
through a rib on the left side, which I took out and cleansed it.‖  They took the arrowhead 
                                                                                                                                                 
hostile Natives intent on war with the English, so Gardener advised that all English vessels traveling the 
river be armed for their own safety and that their crews only disembark at the English towns.   
The fate of Joseph Tilly, a trader from Massachusetts Bay who frequently traveled up the river 
from his small depot at Saybrook to Windsor, stood as a testament to Gardener‘s warning.  In April 1637, 
Tilly returned to Saybrook following a Pequot raid.  Tilly and Gardener got into an argument, and Tilly 
soon left to go to Windsor.  The trader sailed three miles upriver and left his vessel to hunt with a shipmate, 
at a place that was nowhere near the English settlements and that Gardener later named ―Tilly‘s Folly.‖  
The Pequots captured the two men; the second man was killed immediately but Tilly was not.  The Pequots 
took Tilly downriver to a location visible from Ft. Saybrook.  As the men at Saybrook watched, the Pequots 
―tied him to a stake, flayed his skin off, put hot embers between the flesh and the skin, cut off his fingers 
and toes, and made hatbands of them.‖  The Pequots, like other Native peoples in the region, believed that 
the way a warrior endured ritualized torture was a testament to their personal power and inner strength.  
John Winthrop later recorded that Tilly won the respect of his captors ―because he cried not in his torture.‖   
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from the body and sent it to the authorities in Massachusetts Bay, ―because they had said 
that the arrows of the Indians were of no force.‖155 
 Several days later, the Indian trader Thomas Stanton stopped at Saybrook on his 
way to Boston.  A large group of Pequots surrounded the fort, but instead of attacking, 
three men came to negotiate.  Gardener took Stanton, one of the few Englishman who 
was fluent in regional Algonquian dialects, with him to meet the Pequots.  Interpreters 
like Stanton performed a vital function and could influence the outcome of such delicate 
negotiations.  At this time however, the Pequots lacked an interpreter of skill and 
intelligence to promote their own agenda.
156
  The Pequots asked if the English were at 
war with the Western Niantics across the river, ―for they were our friends and came to 
trade with us.‖157  Gardener, suspecting this to be a trap, replied through Stanton that ―we 
knew not the Indians from one another, and therefore would trade with none.‖  The tense 
discussion continued, and as Gardener related the story years later, ―they [the Pequots] 
said, Have you fought enough?  We said we knew not yet.‖  The Pequots continued with 
                                                 
155
 Once the party was safe behind Saybrook‘s defenses, Gardener confronted ―the cowards that 
left us,‖ Thomas Rumble and Arthur Branch, and ―resolved to let them draw lots which of them should be 
hanged‖ for their desertion.  According to Gardener, Rumble and Branch had violated the Articles of War, 
which ―did hang up in the hall for them to read, and they knew they had been published long before.‖  It 
was only through ―the intercession of old Mr. Michell, Mr. Higgison [Higginson], and Mr. Pell‖ that 
Gardener spared their lives.  Gardener, ―Relation,‖ 130; Oberg, Dominion & Civility, 108; Cave, Pequot 
War, 132.  
 
156Gardener, ―Relation,‖ 131; Cave, Pequot War, 133; Johnson, ―Some by Flatteries,‖ 108.  
According to Johnson, most translators were Native Americans which proved to be a source of frustration 
and suspicion among English colonials.  English colonials needed Native interpreters in order to conduct 
business with Native Americans, but feared and/or distrusted them.  
 157Not trusting the Pequots, Gardener ordered six men ahead to make sure the Pequots did not cut 
Gardener and Stanton off from the fort when they went out to negotiate.  The English troops ―found a great 
number of Indians creeping behind the fort, or betwixt us and home,‖ but when the Pequots saw the troops 
―they ran away.‖  The Pequots refused to believe Gardener was who he claimed to be, because he had been 
―shot with many arrows‖ during their previous confrontation.  Gardener confirmed that he had been hit by 
their arrows, but that his ―buff coat preserved me, only one [arrow] hurt me.‖  The Pequots were convinced 
that Gardener was the fort‘s commander because when he spoke to them, ―they knew my voice, for one of 
them had dwelt three months with us, but ran away when the Bay-men came first.‖  Gardener, ―Relation,‖ 
131-132; Cave, Pequot War, 133-134; Oberg, Dominion & Civility, 108  
 82 
their questions and, invoking Endecott‘s raid, ―they asked if we did use to kill women 
and children?‖  Gardener replied that ―they should see that hereafter.‖  The Pequots 
―were silent a small space,‖ and then defiantly said, ―We are Pequits, and have killed 
Englishmen, and can kill them as mosquitoes, and we will go to Conectecott and kill 
men, women, and children, and we will take away the horses, cow, and hogs.‖158 
 After he translated this statement, Stanton grew enraged and told Gardener ―to 
shoot that rogue, for, said he, he hath an Englishman‘s coat on, and saith that he hath 
killed three, and these other four have their cloathes on their backs.‖  Gardener calmed 
Stanton down, and challenged the Pequots to fight the men of Fort Saybrook and ignore 
the other Connecticut River towns.   In an attempt to protect the settlements, Gardener 
engaged in a bit of reverse psychology.  He warned the Pequots that if they attacked the 
towns they would be sorry because, ―English women are lazy, and can‘t do their work; 
horses and cows will spoil your corn-fields, and the hogs their clam-banks, and so undo 
them.‖  If the Pequots desired useful English supplies, they would find hatchets, hoes, 
cloth, ―and all manner of trade‖ within Fort Saybrook; all they had to do was take it.  
Gardener recorded that after hearing this speech, the Pequot delegation ―were mad as 
dogs, and ran away.‖  Gardener waved his hat above his head ―and the two great guns 
went off, so that there was a great hubbub amongst them.‖159 
 Fort Saybrook received English reinforcements from the river towns and 
Massachusetts Bay two days after this meeting with the Pequots.  The reinforcements 
found the Saybrook defenders to be physically and mentally exhausted.  Captain John 
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Underhill, a veteran of the Endicott raid, arrived ―with twenty lusty men, well armed,‖ to 
―supply the necessity of those distressed persons, and to take the government of that 
place for the space of three months.‖  Underhill recalled the distressed state of the 
Saybrook garrison.  The Pequots had taunted the Englishmen throughout the siege.  
According to Underhill, 
 Some of their [the Pequots] arms they got from them [the English],  
 others put on the English clothes, and came to the fort jeering of them,  
 and calling, Come and fetch your Englishmen‘s clothes again; come  
 out and fight, if you dare; you dare not fight; you are all one like women.   
 We have amongst us that if he could kill but one of you more, he would  
 be equal with God, and as the Englishman‘s God is, so would he be.
160
 
However, despite the siege and constant psychological warfare, the Pequots could not 
breach the Saybrook palisades.  When the various English reinforcements arrived in the 
spring of 1637, the Pequots gave up and left. 
III 
 On April 23, 1637, Pequot warriors ―fell upon Watertowne, now called 
Wethersfield, with two hundred Indians.‖  The Pequot warriors ―slew nine‖ Wethersfield 
residents and ―took two young maids prisoners, killing some of their cattle, and driving 
some away.‖161  Taking their two prisoners with them, about one hundred Pequots again 
journeyed to Fort Saybrook to taunt the English garrison.  The Pequots ―put poles in their 
canoes, as we put masts on our boats, and upon them hung our English men‘s and 
women‘s shirts and smocks, instead of sails, and in way of bravado came along in sight 
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of us.‖  As the Pequot flotilla drew closer to the fort, the Saybrook defenders ―made a 
Shot at them with a Piece of Ordnance, which beat off the Beak Head of one of their 
Canoes.‖  The Pequots fled.162   
 The two English girls were eventually retrieved from the Pequots via the 
intervention of Dutch traders.  The Dutch, after making an agreement with the English at 
Saybrook, had seized hold of seven Pequots who had come to trade with them.  The 
Pequots returned the girls to secure the release of their own people.  When the girls 
returned to Fort Saybrook, English authorities questioned them about their experiences.  
They reported that the ―Indians carried them from place to place, and showed them their 
forts and curious wigwams and houses, and encouraged them to be merry,‖ and that they 
were not abused in any way.  However, they also said that the Pequots had fifteen guns, 
and the powder and shot needed to inflict substantial damage on English troops.
163
   
 After the Pequots ―triumphed and succeeded‖ in Wethersfield, they experienced a 
renewed sense of purpose.  Wethersfield was a prime example of Algonquian warfare: 
minimal casualties, the taking of captives and loot, and taunting the foe with the proof of 
their superior prowess.  The Pequots‘ treatment of their captives was also typical; 
captives were taken for adoption and ransom, so they were not mistreated.  Although they 
faced an uncertain foe in the English, the Pequots dealt with them in a strictly Algonquian 
framework, unaware that the English did not share the same kind of restraint.  The 
Wethersfield victory reaffirmed Pequot power to both their tributaries and their enemies.  
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This enhanced prestige also had political repercussions, as some of the Pequots‘ former 
tributaries reaffirmed their loyalty to the Pequots.
164
   
 Wethersfield forced colonial officials to adopt stronger tactics.  If they did not act 
―to take the pride and take down the insolencie of these now-insulting Pequots,‖ John 
Higginson of Massachusetts Bay wrote that ―we are like to have all the Indians in the 
countrey about our ears.‖  Nothing the English attempted had thus far worked, and Native 
leaders like Uncas and Miantonomi saw it as an opportunity to overrun the Pequots.  The 
sachems goaded their English contacts, hoping to provoke colonial authorities into a bold 
course of action.  They too encouraged the English to operate within an Algonquian 
concept of war; a big victory stood to enhance English prestige just as Wethersfield had 
done for the Pequots.  The Narragansetts ―sent word to the English, that the Pequets had 
solicited them to join their forces with them,‖ and Miantonomi told Roger Williams that 
―the Nanhigonsicks are at present doubtfull of Realitie in all our [English] promises.‖165 
 In this time of escalating English fears, Uncas pressed his advantage.  Unlike the 
lengthy negotiations that secured the Narragansett‘s aid, the Mohegans proved eager to 
confront Sassacus and the Pequots.  According to Eric Spencer Johnson, sachems like 
Uncas viewed such Anglo-Algonquian alliances as a strategic weapon in their own 
internal Algonquian struggles.
166
  A Mohegan-English alliance strengthened Uncas in his 
campaign against the Pequot confederation, and he encouraged bold action from the 
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English in Connecticut.  In his talks with Thomas Hooker and other Connecticut 
authorities, Uncas argued that the English could not abide such an affront to their honor.  
Hooker wrote that ―The Indians here our friends were so importunate with us to make 
war presently,‖ they threatened ―that unlesse we had attempted some thing we had 
delivered our persons unto contempt of base feare and cowardice, and caused them to 
turn enemyes agaynst us.‖  If the English did not join Uncas in his struggle against 
Sassacus, then the English would face ―a larger and more dangerous Indian opponent that 
did not fear the Puritans.‖167     
 Uncas arrived in Hartford with seventy Native warriors as the River Towns 
debated over what action to take against the Pequots.  In his assessment of their motives, 
John Underhill wrote that ―these Indians were earnest to join with the English, or at least 
to be under conduct, that they might revenge themselves of those bloody enemies of 
theirs.‖  On May 1, 1637, the Connecticut General Court issued their resolution.  The 
General Court resolved ―that there shalbe an offensive war agt the Pequoitt.‖168   
 Captain John Mason conscripted ninety men from the river towns into his force.
169
  
Besides fighting men, each town provided other needed supplies and provisions for this 
military operation.  Uncas and his warriors received ―liberty to follow the company, but 
not to join in confederation with them; the Indians promising to be faithful, and to do 
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them what service lay in their power.‖  Before heading downriver to Fort Saybrook, 
Mason and his troops attended a church service in Hartford.  Just as the Pequots had 
done, the English sought the protection of their spiritual benefactors.  The minister 
instructed the men to ―execute vengeance upon the heathen…binde their Kings in 
chaines, and Nobles in fetters of Iron…make their multitudes fall under your warlike 
weapons…your feet shall be set on their proud necks.‖  In early May of 1637, Mason set 
out for Fort Saybrook with ninety English troops and seventy Mohegan warriors.
170
   
**************************************** 
 The voyage to Saybrook took several days, as the three English vessels frequently 
ran aground.  Uncas grew ―Impatient of Delays,‖ and asked that the Mohegans ―be set on 
shoar, promising that they would meet us at Saybrook.‖  Mason agreed, and Uncas led his 
men overland to Saybrook while the English forces continued down the Connecticut 
River.  When the Mohegans reached Saybrook, they came upon a party of thirty to forty 
Pequots camped near the fort in order to gather information on English activities.  Uncas 
and his warriors ―fell upon…the Enemy near Saybrook Fort, and killed seven of them 
outright; having only one of their‘s wounded.‖  When Uncas presented Mason with seven 
Pequot heads, Mason interpreted the attack as an act of ―special Providence; for before 
we were somewhat doubtful of his [Uncas‘s] Fidelity.‖171   
 Once Mason‘s forces reached Saybrook, he discussed strategy with Underhill and 
Gardener.  The Pequots expected an attack from Pequot Harbor, and ―kept a continual 
Guard upon the [Pequot] River Night and Day.‖  The English risked a confrontation with 
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an enemy whose ―Numbers far exceeded‖ theirs; any battles at the harbor could ―possibly 
dishearten‖ the Saybrook forces and make the trek to Sassacus‘s village impossible.  
Instead, Mason proposed that the English forces sail farther east to Narragansett Bay and 
then march overland.  Mason reasoned that ―we should come upon [the Pequots‘] Backs, 
and possibly might surprise them unawares, at worst we should be on firm land as well as 
they.‖  The new plan also offered the possibility that the Narragansetts might join them, 
which served as a tremendous boon for their alliance.
172
   
 The Saybrook commanders questioned whether the new plan would work, while 
Mason himself expressed reluctance to go against their established orders.  And questions 
still lingered as to the loyalty of the Mohegans.  After months of battling the Pequots, 
many of the Saybrook men feared that their supposed allies ―might revolt, and turn their 
backs against those they professed to be their friends, and join with the Pequeats.‖  
Gardener displayed an understanding of the complexity and interconnectedness of Native 
relationships when he asked Mason and Underhill ―how they durst trust the Mohegin 
[Mohegan] Indians, who had but that year come from the Pequits.‖  Mason assured 
Gardener that they could trust the Mohegans due to their previous actions, and because 
―they could not well go without them for want of guides.‖  Gardener remained 
unconvinced, and spoke directly to Uncas through the interpreter Thomas Stanton.  
Gardener demanded that Uncas prove his loyalty to the English by sending twenty men 
―to the Bass river, for there went yesternight six Indians in a canoe thither; fetch them 
now dead or alive, and then you shall go with Maj. Mason, else not.‖173   
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 The Mohegans returned with ―five Pequeats‘ heads, one prisoner, and mortally 
wounded‖ a seventh Pequot warrior.174  Gardener recognized the prisoner as a Pequot 
named Kiswas, who spoke English and had spent a great deal of time around Saybrook.  
He also killed Englishmen.  Gardener acquiesced to Uncas‘s demand that they let the 
Mohegans deal with Kiswas.  The Mohegans started a large fire, and tied Kiswas‘s leg to 
a post.  According to Peter Vincent, Kiswas ―braved the English,‖ and taunted the 
Mohegans ―as though they durst not kill a Pequet.‖  After they burned Kiswas, they cut 
off pieces of his flesh; finally, they tied a rope around his free leg, and ―pulled him in 
pieces.‖  The Mohegans then started to sing and dance ―round the fire in their violent and 
tumultuous manner,‖ when Underhill, unable to witness the ritual torture any longer, shot 
Kiswas in the head to end his life.
175
   
 Later writers embellished the gory details of Kiswas‘s death to satiate audience 
demands for ―bloodthirsty Indians,‖ and often added that Uncas and the Mohegans 
relished eating Kiswas‘s flesh raw.  Historian Michael Oberg doubts the cannibalistic 
elements because they are not substantiated by the evidence, but he argues that much of 
the original story may be true.  Northeastern Natives ritually tortured captured enemies to 
prove that their power was greater than their foe‘s.  The condemned warrior endured the 
torture as a testament of his own strength, and the power of his kin, who would avenge 
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his death.  Previous incidents where the Pequots tortured captured Saybrook defenders 
can be understood in this manner.  By ritually torturing Kiswas, Uncas proved that he 
―was not a Pequot traitor or an English pawn.  Uncas was a Mohegan.‖176     
 Convinced of the Mohegans‘ commitment to the English, Mason, Underhill, and 
Gardener agreed to the new plan.
177
  On Friday May 19, ninety Englishmen and seventy 
Mohegans left Fort Saybrook, and arrived in Narragansett Bay on Saturday evening, May 
20, 1637.  The English spent the Sabbath aboard their ships, but then foul weather kept 
them from going ashore for a couple of days.  On the evening of May 23, the 
expeditionary force reached the village of the Narragansett sachem Miantonomi.
178
   
**************************************** 
 Mason met with Miantonomi and informed him of the colonists‘ plans.  
Miantonomi granted the Anglo-Mohegan forces permission to travel through his territory, 
but warned that Mason‘s forces ―were too weak to deal with the Enemy, who were (as he 
said) very great Captains and Men skilful in War.‖  The Narragansett‘s ―somewhat 
slighting‖ comment reaffirmed for Mason his fear that the battle-tested Pequot warriors 
―far exceeded‖ the English in number and skill.  The Anglo-Mohegan company resolved 
to carry out its mission.  Marching twenty miles westward from Miantonomi‘s village, 
the joint force reached an Eastern Niantic village led by the sachem Ninigret, where they 
camped for the night.  Mason wrote that the Niantics ―carried very proudly‖ towards the 
Englishmen, ―not permitting any of us to come into their fort.‖  The Eastern Niantics, like 
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the Western group, had once been tributaries of the Pequots, and many of them had ties to 
the Pequots through marriage and kin.  Ninigret had ties to both the Pequots and the 
Narragansetts, and was related to the Narragansett sachem Canonicus through marriage.  
To prevent any Niantics from alerting their Pequot kin, Uncas surrounded the village so 
that no Niantic ―should be suffered to pass in or out…upon peril of their lives.‖  The next 
morning, Narragansett warriors joined the expedition, and ―encouraged divers Indians of 
that Place to Engage also.‖  The expedition grew to several hundred members.179    
 The joint English-Algonquian force left the Niantic village at around eight in the 
morning on May 25.  The march was long, the English were low on rations, and the heat 
was oppressive; several men passed out along the way.  After about twelve miles, the 
expedition reached the Pawcatuck River and stopped ―at a Ford where our Indians told us 
the Pequots did usually fish.‖  Mason later claimed that the Narragansetts manifested 
―great Fear‖ and deserted in large numbers.  Mason then asked the Mohegan sachem 
Uncas, whose seventy warriors had stayed with the English, ―what he thought the Indians 
would do?‖  Uncas, seeking to enhance his own alliance with the English, replied that the 
Narragansetts would all leave them, but that he and the Mohegans ―would never leave 
us.‖180  Mason later formed an alliance with the Mohegans, so his singling out of the 
Narragansetts as fearful bolstered later Mohegan claims.     
 Three miles west of the Pawcatuck River, the Anglo-Algonquian force reached 
the Pequot territory.  The Pequots ―had two Forts almost impregnable,‖ one at 
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Weinshaucks and one at Mystic.  At first, the English considered assaulting both forts, 
but they realized that Weinshaucks ―was so remote that we could not come up with it 
before Midnight, though we Marched hard.‖  The fact that Sassacus and the majority of 
the Pequot warriors remained stationed at Weinshaucks also influenced their decision.  
Exhausted from the march, and eager to avoid stronger enemy warriors, the Anglo-
Algonquian force decided to attack Fort Mystic.
181
  Though well-fortified, Mystic was 
closer and contained far fewer warriors within its palisades.  About an hour after 
nightfall, the men came ―to a little Swamp between two Hills,‖ and camped for the night.  
The guards heard singing coming from Fort Mystic; the Pequots celebrated, ―with great 
Insulting and Rejoycing,‖ the fact that they had seen the English ―sail by them some Days 
before.‖  The Pequots took this as a sign that ―we [the English] were afraid of them and 
durst not come near them.‖182 
 Fort Mystic was built on ―a piece of ground, dry and of best advantage.‖  It 
covered ―at least two acres of ground,‖ and was surrounded by palisades ―ten or twelve 
feet high‖ made of ―young trees and half trees, as thick as a man‘s thigh or the calf of his 
leg.‖  The Pequots latched them ―as close together as they can‖ in a circular pattern.  
Between the palisades were ―divers loopholes‖ that permitted defenders to fire arrows — 
or ―winged messengers‖ in the words of Reverend Philip Vincent — at any attackers.  
The fort possessed two entrances that were ―entered sideways‖ and located where the 
defensive walls overlapped, and then stopped ―with boughs or bushes, as need requireth.‖  
Located behind the walls were hundreds of Pequots, most of them elderly men, women, 
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and children.  This massive structure proved a departure from standard Pequot 
habitations.  The fort ―was so crowded with these numerous dwellings, that the English 
wanted foot-room to grapple with their adversaries.‖183                   
 Gardener‘s earlier threat that the Pequots ―would see that hereafter‖ came true on 
May 26, 1637.  In the early morning hours, Mason, Underhill, Uncas and their men 
quietly approached the fort.  The expedition soon reached the Pequots‘ cornfield at ―the 
foot of a Great Hill.‖  Mason spoke with Uncas and Wequash — the renegade Pequot 
who, like Uncas, had joined the alliance as a way to break away from Sassacus — and 
gave the Mohegans yellow bands ―for their heads‖ so the English forces could identify 
their allies, but he did not have enough for the Narragansetts.  A few Narragansetts were 
hit during the fight as a result of this.  After a prayer, Mason and Underhill divided their 
forces into two groups that would attack each entrance simultaneously.
184
           
 Mason intended ―to destroy them [the Pequots] by the Sword and save the 
Plunder.‖  The three hundred or so Native allies surrounded the fort ―in a ring battalia, 
giving a volley of shot upon the fort,‖ while the English entered through the forts two 
gates.  As the English forces made their way to the northeast gate, Mason recalled that he 
―heard a Dog bark, and an Indian crying Owanux! Owanux! Which is Englishmen! 
Englishmen!‖  The English then ―called up our Forces with all expedition‖ and ―gave fire 
upon them through the Pallizado,‖ as they worked their way through the main entrance 
clearing whatever tree branches and bushes blocked their way.  While Mason‘s force 
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attacked one gate, Underhill led the charge through the second.  After clearing the 
entrance, the Englishmen entered the village with ―our swords in our right hand, our 
carbines and muskets in our left hand.‖185           
 As the English burst through the gates, the Pequots inside mounted a strong 
resistance.  The Pequots launched a barrage of arrows that struck several of Underhill‘s 
men ―through the shoulder, some in the face, some in the legs.‖  Underhill and Mason 
were themselves nearly wounded or killed during the course of the battle.  Underhill 
―received a shot in the left hip,‖ but was unharmed due to his thick buff coat, while 
Mason‘s life was only spared because his helmet deflected several arrow strikes.  In his 
retelling of the events at Mystic, Underhill praised the Pequots for their courage, and felt 
that many had ―perished valiantly‖ defending their homes.  ―Mercy did they deserve for 
their valor,‖ he wrote, ―could we have had the opportunity to have bestowed it.‖186   
 Mason was not as charitable toward the Pequots, and later blamed them for what 
the English did next.  As the English stormed into the village, some of the Pequots ran, 
while others ―crept under their Beds‖ looking for shelter.  Mason, ―seeing no Indians, 
entered a Wigwam.‖  When he did, ―he was beset with many Indians, waiting all 
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opportunities to lay Hands on him, but could not avail.‖  Mason beat them off and 
stumbled back out into the crowded alleyways between the dwellings, where he ―saw 
many Indians in the Lane or Street; he making towards them, they fled.‖  Mason pursued 
them ―to the End of the Lane, where they were met by Edward Pattison, Thomas Barber, 
with some others.‖  At the end of the lane, the English slew seven of those Pequots, while 
the rest escaped.  Frustrated by the battle, and angry that the Pequots were not fighting in 
an ―acceptable‖ way, Mason ―Marched at a slow Pace up the Lane he came down.‖  As 
he neared the northeast gate, he ―saw two Soldiers standing close to the Pallizado with 
their Swords pointed to the Ground.‖  Seeing their swords, Mason told the soldiers that 
―We should never kill them after that manner…We must burn them.‖  Mason then 
stepped into the wigwam he had been in earlier and ―brought out a Firebrand, and putting 
it into the Matts with which they were covered, set the Wigwams on fire.‖  Two of 
Mason‘s men, Lt. Thomas Bull and Nicholas Olmstead, saw what Mason had done and 
picked up torches of their own.  Captain Underhill then ―set fire on the south end with a 
train of powder.‖  Soon, fires were spreading throughout the village, as ―the Indians ran 
as Men most dreadfully Amazed.‖  The fires ―blazed most terribly, and burnt all in the 
space of half an hour.‖187                       
 As the Pequot wigwams burned, the English watched as ―such a dreadful Terror 
did the Almighty let fall upon their [the Pequots] Spirits, that they would fly from us and 
run into the very Flames, where many of them perished.‖  Mason and Underhill then 
ordered their men to ―fall off and surround the Fort.‖  Trapped inside the fort, the Pequots 
panicked; some climbed ―to the Top of the Pallizado; others of them running into the 
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very Flames.‖  A group of Pequots managed to overcome their panic, and regrouped 
―windward‖ of the flames to start ―pelting at us [the English] with their Arrows.‖  
However, Mason and his men ―repayed them with our small Shot,‖ and they fell.   
 Forty other Pequots, whom Mason identified as ―the Stoutest,‖ made a bold 
charge out of fort and ―perished by the Sword.‖  English troops gunned down or 
―entertained with the point of the sword‖ anyone that tried to escape, be they men, 
women, or children.  Pequots that somehow avoided the flames and the swords of the 
English ―fell into the hands of the Indians that were in the rear of us.‖  Underhill 
recounted that many more ―were burnt in the fort, both men, women, and children.‖  
―There were only seven taken captive,‖ Mason recalled, ―and about seven escaped.‖  The 
carnage continued, and ―in little more than one Hour‘s space was their impregnable Fort 
with themselves utterly Destroyed, to the Number of six to seven Hundred.‖188   
 The English reveled in their victory.  Mason justified the incineration of the 
Pequots as divine retribution leveled against the heathens  
 who not many Hours before exalted themselves in their great Pride,  
 threatening and resolving the utter Ruin and Destruction of all the  
 English, Exulting and Rejoycing with Songs and Dances: But God  
 was above them, who laughed his Enemies and the Enemies of his 
 People to scorn making them as a fiery Oven: Thus were the Stout 
 Hearted spoiled, having slept their last Sleep, and none of their Men 
 could find their Hands: Thus did the Lord judge among the Heathen,  
 filling the Place with dead Bodies!
189
  
Underhill struggled more with the morality of what the English had done.  In his account 
of Mystic, Underhill recalled that ―young soldiers that never had been in war‖ were 
troubled ―to see so many souls lie gasping on the ground.‖  He even recognized that some 
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readers of his account might question ―Why should you be so furious?...Should not 
Christians have more mercy and compassion?‖  Yet, despite his acknowledgement of the 
brutality at Mystic, Underhill felt that English actions were justified.  ―When a people is 
grown to such a height of blood, and sin against God and man, and all confederates in the 
action,‖ Underhill wrote, ―there he hath no respect to person, but harrows them, and saws 
them, and puts them to the sword.‖  In cases like the Pequot War, ―the most terriblest 
death that may be‖ was allowed against one‘s enemies.   
 The Mohegans and Narragansetts who accompanied the English in this expedition 
did not share Mason‘s or Underhill‘s views.  Although they wanted to defeat the Pequots, 
Algonquian custom allowed for the adoption of captives and survivors.  For Native 
peoples, warfare was a test of prowess, skill, and cunning, and captives could be adopted 
as members of the village and tribe.  As the Natives watched the slaughter of their rivals, 
they were horrified at the brutality they witnessed.  Underhill noted that ―our Indians 
came to us,‖ and ―cried Mach it, mach it; that is It is naught, it is naught, because it is too 
furious, and slays too many men.‖190   
 While one hundred and fifty of the six to seven hundred Pequots killed at Mystic 
were warriors, most of the Pequots killed were women, children, and elderly tribal 
members.  In contrast, the English only lost two men during the battle, with twenty others 
wounded.  The indiscriminate slaughter of women and children alongside warriors 
―suggests that the burning of Fort Mystic cannot be dismissed or excused…as a military 
necessity.‖   The Mystic massacre ―was an act of terrorism intended to break Pequot 
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morale‖; at worst, it was a deliberate attempt at genocide.191  However, the English would 
never have had the chance to unleash such brutality had they not received Algonquian 
aid.  With this one swift, brutal act, the English and their Native allies dealt a mortal blow 
to the Pequots‘ resistance.  
IV 
  The Pequots‘ crushing defeat at Fort Mystic did not translate into an immediate 
cessation of hostilities.  While hundreds of Pequots had been killed, hundreds more 
remained with Sassacus at Weinshauks.  The tribe reeled from the brutal loss of so many 
of their kin, and Sassacus, overwhelmed by the circumstances, failed to hold the Pequot 
confederation together.  The Pequots‘ authority over their remaining tributaries collapsed.  
Three days after Mystic, Waiandance, a Montauk leader and the ―next brother to the old 
Sachem of Long Island,‖ journeyed to Saybrook to parley with the English.  The 
Montauks, being former Pequot tributaries, and Waiandance wanted ―to know if we were 
angry with all Indians.‖  Gardener told him, ―No, but only with such as had killed 
Englishmen.‖  Waiandance then asked if ―they that lived upon Long-Island might come 
to trade with us.‖  Gardener told him that the English could not risk trading with any 
Long Island Indians as long as they harbored any Pequots among them.  However, 
Gardener advised him that ―that if you will kill all the Pequits that come to you, and send 
me their heads, then I will give to you as to Weakwash [Wequash], and you shall have 
trade with us.‖  Waindance took this message to his brother, and within days, another 
messenger arrived bearing five Pequot heads.
192
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 Waiandance was not the only sachem to turn over such gruesome trophies.  John 
Mason recalled that ―Happy were they that could bring in [Pequot] heads to the English: 
Of which there came almost daily to Windsor or Hartford.‖  Colonial authorities in 
Connecticut and Massachusetts encouraged as many Natives as they could to help hunt 
down Pequots, so as to avoid giving ―breath to a beaten enemy, lest he return 
armed…with greater despite and revenge.‖  Wequah, Sassacus‘s old rival, approached 
Lyon Gardener after the burning of Mystic and offered to tell him ―how many of the 
Pequits were yet alive that had helped to kill Englishmen.‖  According to Roger 
Williams, Sequassen, a sachem in the Connecticut River Valley, ―cut of twenty Pequot 
women and children‖ who they caught trying to reach the Mohawks in what is now the 
eastern part of upstate New York.  These leaders had all determined that the English were 
the best way to remove the Pequots as ―a viable and autonomous native community.‖  In 
so doing, they hoped to escape the authority of the Pequots, avoid the ire of the English, 
or, in the case of Uncas, strengthen their own regional power base.
193
         
 The day after Mystic, the Pequots called a council to consider their options.  
Sassacus and the council ―propounded these three things…whether they would set upon a 
sudden revenge upon the Narragansetts, or attempt an enterprise upon the English, or 
fly.‖194  At the council meeting, Sassacus ―was all for blood,‖ but his authority as Pequot 
grand sachem slipped away.  Several tribal members charged ―that he was the only Cause 
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of all the Troubles that had befallen them; and therefore they would Destroy both him 
and his.‖  Sassacus was spared ―by the Intreaty of their Counsellors‖ and his bonds of 
kinship to them.  However, kinship did not save everyone.  Some Mohegans lived among 
the Pequots, and the Pequots focused their vengeance upon them.  The Pequots ―cut off 
all the Mohigens that remain[ed] with them (lest they should turn to the English).‖  Seven 
escaped to Fort Saybrook.  The council then sent one hundred warriors out to punish the 
Narragansetts for their part in the attack.  However, the expedition was unsuccessful.
195
  
 While the council spared Sassacus‘s life, the Pequots scattered amongst several 
neighboring Native peoples, and ―spoiled all those goods they could not carry with them, 
broke up their tents and wigwams, and betook themselves to flight.‖196  At least seventy 
Pequots surrendered to the Narragansetts, while another hundred managed to reach Long 
Island and found refuge with the Montauks.  Sassacus led the largest refugee group, 
which included most of the sachems and several hundred men, women, and children, 
westward in a desperate attempt to reach Mohawk territory in New York.  The 
Narragansetts were convinced that Sassacus had purchased the Pequots‘ safety with a 
substantial payment of wampum.
197
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 The Pequots‘ rush to the Mohawks generated many rumors, as the Mohawks 
reputation as fierce warriors generated fear throughout the region.
198
  Roger Williams 
warned that the Mohawks were ―the most savage, their weapons more dangerous, and 
their crueltie dreadfull.‖  If the Pequots created an alliance with the Mohawks, the war 
might turn again in their favor.  As Sassacus‘s group crossed the Connecticut River, ―they 
met with three English Men in a Shallop going for Saybrook,‖ and killed them.  A group 
of about forty Pequots broke away from Sassacus, and turned back toward their home 
territory.  They hid out in the cedar swamp just north of Weinshauks, a place known to 
the Pequots as Ohomowauke, meaning ―Owl‘s Nest,‖ and Cuppacommock, or 
―Refuge/Hiding Place.‖  The swamp seemed a suitable refuge.  The terrain was difficult 
to navigate, and swamps served as havens for Cheepi/Hobbamock — spirit of dreams, 
visions, the cold northeast wind, death, and the deceased.  The hiding place lies within 
the bounds of the Mashantucket Pequot reservation.
199
 
************************************ 
 As the Anglo-Algonquian forces waited outside of the burnt remains of Mystic, 
Mason feared reprisal from the Pequots at Weinshauks.  They knew that the Pequots had 
superior numbers, and Mason‘s fears grew larger when most of the Narragansett warriors 
departed for their home territory.  The Puritan force was thus left with only Uncas, his 
Mohegan warriors, and a small remnant of Narragansetts.  Unable to take the Pequots‘ 
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major stronghold at Weinshauks, the reduced forces marched from the burnt-out remains 
of Mystic towards friendly territory.
200
   
 Pequot warriors, some from Weinshauks and some from smaller surrounding 
encampments, attacked the Anglo-Algonquian army using hit and run tactics.  The 
Mohegans and the few remaining Narragansetts fought the Pequot warriors to keep them 
away from the exhausted English.
201
  When the Native warriors engaged each other in 
battle, Underhill observed that ―they came not near one another, but shot remote, and not 
point-blank, as we often do with our bullets.‖  The indiscriminate violence of English 
warfare shocked the Mohegans and the Narragansetts, but Native warfare left the English 
unimpressed.  After the Mohegans and Narragansetts chased away the Pequots, Underhill 
commented that ―this fight is more for pastime, than to conquer and subdue enemies.‖  
John Mason was even more contemptuous.  During later engagements between the 
Mohegans and the Pequots, Mason dismissed their ―feeble Manner‖ of warfare, and 
declared that ―it did hardly deserve the Name of Fighting.‖202   
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 According to Underhill, the English allowed them to do this so that they could ―see the nature 
of the Indian war.‖  However, given the sorry state of Mason‘s troops, ―Provision and Munition near spent; 
we in the enemies Country, who did far exceed us in Number, being much enraged…our Pinnaces at a 
great distance from us,‖ sheer exhaustion on the part of the English was reason enough for letting the 
Mohegans fight.    
 
 
202
As Michael Oberg and others have argued, Mason and Underhill did not understand the nature 
of Native warfare.  Native peoples ―fought for limited and specific purposes: to exact revenge, to extend a 
sachem‘s authority, to contest a territorial boundary, or to acquire, but not destroy, another people.‖  The 
English manner of warfare, the killing of men, women, and children alike, was a savage exercise in the 
eyes of these Algonquian people.  The massacre at Mystic vividly demonstrated for Southern New England 
Natives that the English could be unpredictable and deadly.  Underhill, ―Newes from America,‖ 82; Mason, 
―Brief History,‖ 31-32, 41; Cave, Pequot War, 153-154; Oberg, Uncas, 69; Paul Alden Robinson, ―The 
Struggle Within: The Indian Debate in Seventeenth Century Narragansett Country‖ (diss., SUNY-
Binghamton, 1990), 111; Adam J. Hirsch, ―The Collision of Military Culture in Seventeenth-Century New 
England,‖ Journal of American History 74 (1988): 1187-1212; Karr, ―Violence of the Pequot War,‖ 876-
909; Harold E. Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut (New Haven, CT: 1990), 9; Patrick M. 
 103 
 As the Anglo-Algonquian forces made their way east, they turned toward the 
coast and saw English vessels ―before a fair Gale of Wind, sailing into Pequot Harbour.‖  
Mason recalled that it was a sight that met with ―great Rejoycing‖ from the expedition.  
As the exhausted men hurried towards the ships, at least three hundred Pequot warriors 
dispatched from Weinshauks ―immediately came up‖ to attack.  Mason counterattacked, 
leading his strongest and best-armed men ―to Skirmish with them,‖ but ―chiefly to try 
what temper they were of.‖  Hesitant to engage with the better-armed English forces in a 
direct confrontation, the Pequots fell back.
203
  However, this restraint proved temporary, 
once the warriors heard from the scouting party sent to Fort Mystic a quarter of a mile up 
the hill.  When the party reached the burnt-out remains of the fort, and saw all of the men, 
women, and children lying dead on the ground, they ―stamped and tore the Hair from 
their Heads.‖  Mason recalled that the Pequots ―came mounting down the Hill upon us, in 
a full career, as if they would over run us.‖  The men in the rear of the retreating column 
turned around and ―when they came within Shot…giving Fire upon them.‖  The enraged 
Pequots attacked in a confused and disorderly manner, giving the English the advantage.  
Several of the charging Pequots were hit, which ―made the rest more wary.‖  The force 
then scattered, ―running to and fro, and shooting their Arrows at Random.‖  However, 
these random attacks did no actual harm to the English.  According to Mason, after 
having ―taught them a little more Manners than to disturb us,‖ the English found the time 
to stop at ―a small Brook, where we rested and refreshed our selves.‖204             
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 After their brief rest the army resumed its march, and ―falling upon several 
Wigwams‖ they found along the way, they ―burnt them.‖  The Pequots dogged the 
English the entire way, and set up small groups to ―lay in Ambush behind Rocks and 
Trees, often shooting at us.‖  The English suffered no major casualties from these 
ambushes, due in large part to the efforts of Uncas and the Mohegans.  The Mohegans 
kept the enraged Pequot warriors away from the exhausted and injured English troops.  
They also carried the English who were too wounded to walk on their own.  The English 
and Mohegans soon developed a strategy to clear their path.  ―And as we came to any 
Swamp or Thicket,‖ Mason recalled, ―we made some Shot to clear the Passage.‖  Mason 
observed that several Pequots ―fell with our Shot; and probably more might, but for want 
of Munition.‖  When any of the Pequots fell, the Mohegans ―would give a great Shout,‖ 
fall upon the body, and ―then would they take so much Courage as to fetch their Heads.‖  
This continued until the English and their allies were about two miles from Pequot 
Harbor on the Thames River, when the Pequots ―gathered together and left us.‖  In a 
dramatic display of dominance, Mason and his men marched to the top of a hill and 
unfurled their banners.  After this, the men ―came to the Water-Side,‖ and ―sat down in 
Quiet.‖205 
 Mason and Underhill discovered that the ship that had come to their aid was the 
shallop that they had sailed to Narragansett Bay, only now it was commanded by Captain 
Daniel Patrick of Massachusetts Bay.  Over the next few hours, Mason, Underhill, and 
Patrick argued over control the ship and how to transport the troops from the expedition.  
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The arguments were symptomatic of the continued friction between Massachusetts Bay 
and Connecticut; colonial leaders vied for control over the mission, and their conflicting 
agendas resulted in yet another series of miscommunications.
206
  Underhill eventually 
took the small pinnance and set out for Saybrook.  However, ―before he [Underhill] was 
out of Sight,‖ Patrick changed his mind.  He declared that ―he must wait for the Bay 
[Colony] vessels at Saybrook,‖ and he also told Mason that he should secure his own 
Native allies.  Given the weakened state of his own forces, Mason declared that this task 
―at first seemed very Difficult, if not Impossible.‖  However, ―absolutely neccesitated to 
March by Land,‖ Mason set out with his men, Uncas and his Mohegans, and 
accompanied by the remaining Narragansetts.  Captain Patrick then changed his mind 
again, and marched with them to Saybrook.
207
  The English forces reached the east side 
of the Connecticut River and camped there for the night.  The next morning, they ―were 
all fetched over to Saybrook, receiving many Courtesies from Lieut. Gardener.‖208 
**************************************** 
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 Flush with their barely achieved victory, colonial authorities in Connecticut and 
Massachusetts Bay recommitted to permanently end the Pequot ―threat,‖ and secure the 
Pequots‘ territory for themselves.  In June of 1637, Massachusetts Bay sent Israel 
Stoughton and William Trask to Connecticut with one hundred and twenty men.  Fueled 
by this influx of new troops, the war spiraled to a close; the English and their Native 
allies steadily picked off the runaway Pequots.  The Mohegans captured several Pequots 
―and by them delivered to the Massachusetts Soldiers,‖ while Stoughton himself led a 
party that captured the small Pequot group that had hidden out at Ohomowauke.  Uncas 
and the Mohegans pursued Sassacus and the majority of the Pequots over land.  The 
Pequot refugees were slowed by ―their Children and want of Provision; being forced to 
dig for Clams, and to procure such other things as the Wilderness afforded.‖  Uncas and 
the Mohegans easily captured the Pequot stragglers, as did Narragansetts war parties.
209
 
 Stoughton marched to Saybrook and joined his Bay Colony forces with Mason‘s 
squadron of forty Connecticut troops.  The majority of the English forces then traveled by 
sea to Quinnipiac, later called New Haven Harbor.  As soon as they landed, the English 
captured a small party of Pequots who had been watching them; two were executed and 
two were spared.  One of the men the English spared, whom they named Luz, kept his 
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life by agreeing to lead the English to Sassacus.
210
  Sassacus and his followers abandoned 
their camp and went on the run again.  On July 14, 1637, the English discovered a large 
contingent of Pequots near ―a most hideous swamp, so thick with bushes and so 
quagmiry, as men could hardly crowd into it.‖  When the English reached a hilltop, they 
―saw several Wigwams just opposite, only a Swamp intervening, which was almost 
divided in two Parts.‖  The Pequots, sought refuge in the later-named Sadque swamp, and 
abandoned the twenty or so wigwams.  Lieutenant Davenport led a small group of 
Englishmen into the swamp, and when they ―were there set upon by several Indians,‖ 
who launched arrows at them and then charged the English.  Davenport‘s men ―slew but 
few,‖ but ―two or three of themselves were Wounded.‖211         
 The English quickly surrounded the swamp and they offered the Pequots the 
chance to surrender.  The Pequots had taken refuge with another group of Natives 
―belonging to that Place,‖ and the English hoped to avoid killing noncombatants.  The 
English then tapped Thomas Stanton, Gardener‘s interpreter at Saybrook, to approach the 
Natives in the swamp and negotiate.  Stanton assured the Natives that anyone not guilty 
of killing Englishmen would be spared.  After about two hours, nearly ―Two Hundred old 
Men, Women and Children,‖ came out and ―delivered themselves, to the Mercy of the 
English.‖  However, most of the Pequot warriors refused to surrender and remained in the 
swamp.  The battle raged throughout the night; some of the Pequot warriors shot by the 
English drowned in the mud of the swamp.  The fighting continued until ―about half an 
Hour before Day,‖ when some sixty or seventy warriors broke through Patrick‘s lines.  
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Some of the Pequots escaped with their live, but many were struck down by English 
guns, and others were found dead the following day along the trail out of the swamp.  
The English forces then divided the spoils.  They seized the Pequots‘ wampum, as well as 
some trays and kettles, and then turned their attention to the two hundred Natives who 
had surrendered.  The Connecticut and Bay Colony soldiers released the twenty non-
Pequots, and divided the one hundred and eighty Pequots, ―to keep them as Servants.‖212                          
 Sassacus reached the Hudson River Valley with only his councilman Mononotto 
and about forty warriors and their families.  The ragged sachem sought refuge and aid 
among the Mohawks; given the Mohawks‘ reputation for being fierce warriors and ―the 
most terrible to their neighbors of all these nations,‖ the English feared such a prospect.  
However, instead of allies, Sassacus found that ―the Pequots now became a Prey to all 
Indians.‖  The Mohawks did not wish to ally themselves with a lost cause like Sassacus.   
―In contemplation of the English,‖ and in act of self-interest, Mohawk warriors attacked 
the party.  The Mohawks killed Sassacus and ―cut off his head and sent it to Hartford.‖  
They also killed ―his brother and five other Pequot sachems, who, being fled to the 
Mohawk for shelter, with their women, were by them surprised and slain, with twenty of 
their best men.‖ With the death of the grand sachem, the slaughter of hundreds of 
Pequots, and the capture of hundreds more, the Pequot War was over.
213
 
****************************************** 
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 The human tragedy of the Pequot War cannot be underestimated.
214
  Political 
rivalries and circumstances had allied against the Pequots, and the tribe suffered 
devastating losses as a result.  Over months of fighting, hundreds of Pequots had died.  
Hundreds more had scattered throughout the region; the majority were captured, 
imprisoned, or enslaved by the victorious English, Mohegans, and Narragansetts.  The 
survivors faced an uncertain future.  Though they won the war, the English, Mohegans, 
and Narragansetts faced the much more complicated challenge of administering the 
―peace.‖  Each polity claimed the Pequots‘ territory, and each committed itself to 
absorbing as many of the surviving Pequots as they could manage.  The English desired 
the Pequots as servants, either within the colonies or down in the West Indies, while the 
Algonquians incorporated Pequot individuals and towns into their confederations so as to 
expand their populations and power base.  A delicate balancing act soon followed, as 
each group, and each leader, sought advancement without triggering another war.      
 Cassacinamon assumed leadership after the war, and faced the monumental task 
of rebuilding Pequot communities.  The war, and Sassacus‘s failures, proved that the 
Pequots needed a strong English ally to champion their cause among colonial power 
brokers.  The Pequots could not solely rely on Algonquian political tactics; they required 
access to both Algonquian and English systems in order to protect themselves.  The war 
also demonstrated the necessity of controlling the flow of information.  Controlling all 
pertinent information allowed the Pequots to promote their own agenda, and prevented 
others from manipulating it against them.  And while Pequot communities favored 
Pequot leaders, those leaders must be capable individuals.  The Pequots could not rebuild 
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until they addressed all those issues.  The will of the Pequots to survive, combined with 
the conflicting agendas and jurisdictional struggles of the Mohegans, Narragansetts, 
Connecticut, and Massachusetts Bay, set Cassacinamon‘s leadership agenda as sachem.  
But it was an agenda set in pain, and suffering, and blood.          
 111 
Chapter 3: The Pequot Robin 
 
 On July 23, 1638, Roger Williams wrote to Governor John Winthrop of 
Massachusetts Bay, to discuss the latest scheme orchestrated by the Mohegan grand 
sachem Uncas.  Uncas had dispatched envoys to the Winthrop home in Massachusetts 
Bay with explicit instructions to ―buy one of the [Pequot] maidens‖ being held there.  The 
woman in question came from a prominent Pequot family but she had been forced, as 
punishment after the Pequot War, to serve in the Winthrop household.  Uncas sought her 
as his latest wife, anticipating access to her hereditary titles and lands.  If the Native 
delegation could not buy her freedom from Winthrop, one of the delegates was to stay at 
the home to ―perswade and worck their Escape.‖  The envoy consisted of nine Mohegans 
and ―the Pequt [Pequot] Robin.‖   ―The Pequt Robin‖ was Robin Cassacinamon, and he 
remained with the Winthrops to ensure that the deal closed.  Cassacinamon succeeded; 
Uncas got his bride, and Cassacinamon received a payment of ten fathoms of wampum, 
an award equal to the maximum bride price for a sachem‘s daughter.215   
 This exchange marks the first time Robin Cassacinamon appears by name in the 
historical record.  The episode reveals much about the social and political state of the 
southern New England Anglo-Algonquian frontier following the Pequot War.   After the 
Pequots‘ power collapsed in 1637, Connecticut, Massachusetts Bay, the Mohegans, the 
Niantics, and the Narragansetts scrambled to fill the void left behind.  In late 1637 and 
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early 1638, neither Natives nor English controlled the southern New England Anglo-
Algonquian frontier.  Powerful Algonquian leaders like Uncas, Miantonomi, and Ninigret 
incorporated the Pequot survivors into their own confederations and used them to 
strengthen their own confederations.  For their part, the colonies of Connecticut and 
Massachusetts Bay claimed Pequot lands by right of conquest and argued over claims to 
the Pequots‘ former territories for years.   It was a period of dramatic transition.216 
 Yet even in this chaos, seeds were planted for the Pequots‘ reemergence.  While 
hundreds of Pequots died during the war, the survivors continued to play ―an important 
role in the intercultural politics of the region as Englishmen and Indians worked to 
reshape the postwar world.‖217  That Pequots had survived the war, and that these 
survivors still had an important role in regional politics, proved foundations on which to 
build.  Robin Cassacinamon was essential to this rebuilding, positioned as he was to 
exploit these competing Algonquian and English interests.  Connected to all the major 
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players in Connecticut — the Pequot survivors, Uncas and the Mohegans, the 
Narragansetts, and the English via the powerful Winthrop family — Cassacinamon used 
all of these groups to reestablish distinct Pequot communities.  Cassacinamon and the 
Pequots exploited the seventeenth-century strategies outlined in Eric Spencer Johnson‘s 
work, and utilized tactics of alliances, ideology, settlement patterns, and coercion and to 
navigate these conflicting political goals and pursue their own agenda.
218
  
Cassacinamon‘s skills made him an essential part of regional negotiations between these 
Algonquian and English polities.  In doing so, he served as the strongest possible 
advocate for the surviving Pequots.  By operating in the gaps and intersections where 
these polities met, Cassacinamon and the Pequots carved out a place for themselves 
within the regional social and political power structure.   
I  
 The months following the Pequot War were marked by intense social and political 
intrigue.  Massacusetts Bay and Connecticut primarily concerned themselves with 
acquiring the Pequots‘ former lands.  Both the Bay Colony and the River Colony claimed 
the territory by right of conquest, and each hoped to gain control over the region‘s 
wampum production and acquire more land for their expanding populations.  On June 2, 
1637, the Connecticut General Court at Hartford ordered ―there shalbe sent forth 30 men 
out of the sevrall plantacons in this River of Conectecott to sett downe in the Pequoitt 
Countrey & River in place convenient to maynteine or right yt God by Conquest hath 
given to us.‖  Meanwhile, Massachusetts Bay leaders argued that they were owed 
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compensation for their part in the Pequot War, declaring that Connecticut would have lost 
―had not we rescued them at so many hundred charges.‖219  However, neither colony 
could achieve these goals ―without the assistance of the native communities that had 
already been working to shape the region in ways that accorded with Indian political and 
social practice.‖  In recognition of that fact, each colony strengthened alliances with a 
confederation.  Massachusetts Bay turned to Miantonomi and the Narragansetts, while 
the Mohegans and Uncas became the principal ally of Connecticut.
220
         
 The pertinent issue for the Mohegans and Narragansetts concerned the fate of the 
surviving Pequots.
221
  Colonial authorities and their Native allies had captured several 
hundred Pequots during the war, and the English claimed nearly three hundred Pequots as 
servants or slaves.  Pequot captives were distributed as servants to prominent colonial 
families in Connecticut, Massachusetts Bay, and Rhode Island, while others were shipped 
to the sugar plantations in Bermuda.
222
  For their part, the Mohegans, Narragansetts, and 
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Niantics absorbed any Pequots they could find; sometimes they informed the colonial 
authorities about it, and sometimes they did not.  Incorporating Pequot survivors 
strengthened these Algonquian confederations depopulated by disease and war.  Given 
the extent to which marriage and kinship interconnected these Natives, in all likelihood, 
the Mohegans, Narragansetts, and Niantics not only absorbed Pequots, they took in 
relatives.
223
  In the seventeenth century, Native ―tribes‖ were mainly collections of 
independent villages, held together by various social, political, and cultural links.
224
  
Individuals and families joined existing villages within these confederations.  However, 
whole Pequot villages also remained intact.  This familiar arrangement permitted Pequot 
survivors to live in their own communities; they just owed allegiance to a new principal 
sachem.
225
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 The Mohegans‘ treatment of the Pequots exemplified this pattern.  Roger 
Williams reported that twenty wigwams were located at a village identified as ―Pequot 
Nayantaquit,‖ where Uncas spent a great deal of time when he was away from his 
principal village of Shantok.  Even more Pequot villages were spread throughout 
Mohegan territory: another twenty Pequot homes were located at Tatuppequauog (near 
present day Waterford, CT), fifteen were at Paupattokshick, ten at Sauquunckackock, and 
eight wigwams were located upriver along the Thames at Maugunckakuck.
226
  Though 
forced to join the Mohegan confederation, by maintaining their own towns the Pequots 
fostered a sense of segregation from others in the confederation.  This separation helped 
the Pequots sustain a sense of their own uniqueness as Pequots.  They simply needed a 
way to express that identity and affiliation publicly and safely.  
 However, while the Pequots retained their own villages, they remained at the 
mercy of their new ―masters,‖ and these new authorities kept from the Pequots from their 
former territories.  In the summer of 1639, a group of Pequots, tributaries of the Niantic 
sachem Ninigret, resettled in the Pequots‘ former territory along the Pawcatuck River.  In 
an attempt to undercut Ninigret, Uncas informed Connecticut officials about this 
resettlement; the Mohegan sachem claimed it was done with the full knowledge and 
support of Ninigret.   Upon learning that Pequots had ―planted againe [in] part of the land 
which was conquered by us,‖ Connecticut magistrates sent John Mason out to the site 
with forty men.  Uncas and one hundred and fifty Mohegan warriors joined Mason‘s 
forces, and together they set out to destroy the Pequot village and ―gather the Corne there 
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planted by them.‖227  When the Connecticut-Mohegan forces advanced on the Pequots, 
they fled the village.  As the Mohegans gathered the villagers‘ corn, sixty Pequots broke 
from their hiding places and charged the invaders.  The Mohegans waited until the 
Pequots were within thirty yards, and then, ―giving a war whoop, the Mohegans rushed to 
meet the charging Pequots.‖  Mason and the English forces moved to cut off the Pequots, 
but as soon as they saw this, the Pequots fled.  The expedition captured seven Pequots.  
Uncas kept the prisoners, adding them to his own growing population of Pequot 
tributaries.
228
 
 The 1639 episode revealed that the Pequot survivors were eager to return to their 
homeland, and that they still maintained viable communities.  However, it also proved 
that despite those desires, the Pequots could never safely return to their lands unless they 
first resolved their post-war situation. Without a well-connected political leader, a 
sachem who legitimized their claims and negotiated on their behalf, the Pequots remained 
vulnerable to the machinations of Uncas, Ninigret, and others.           
 The Mohegans and Narragansetts agreed to pay an annual tribute for the Pequot 
survivors they spared and to execute those Pequots responsible for killing English 
colonists.
229
  This agreement facilitated the execution of most of the remaining Pequot 
sachems, allowing for the emergence of Cassacinamon.  Uncas and Miantonomi could 
not allow any belligerent Pequot sachems to survive, since the sachems might encourage 
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the Pequots to flee from the Mohegans and Narragansetts.   Only six of the original 
twenty-six Pequot sachems mentioned at the start of the war survived it.  Their survival 
was likely due to their cooperation with the Mohegans and Narragansetts; they entered 
into subordinate tributary relationships with the more powerful confederations as was the 
Algonquian custom.
230
   
 Purging the traditional Pequot leadership not only removed rivals for Uncas and 
Miantonomi, it created the necessary circumstances that aided Cassacinamon in his 
ascent to the sachemship.  Cassacinamon‘s survival during these purges suggests that he 
was not an office-holding sachem during the war otherwise he would have been on the 
initial lists.
231
  However, the fact that Cassacinamon became the Pequots‘ leader during 
the 1640s suggests that he held a legitimate claim to the position of sachem.  The 
destruction and social chaos caused by the war enabled capable people, regardless of their 
social stature, to ascend the political ladder.  However, the fact that Cassacinamon was 
recognized as a leader by his own people and by the Mohegans and Narragansetts, 
suggests that he possessed the necessary skills and the hereditary claims to the office. 
The surviving Pequots might not have followed Cassacinamon had he not possessed a 
hereditary claim to leadership.
232
        
 Uncas sided with the English during the Pequot War to remove the Pequots as an 
obstacle to his own ambitions.  After the war ended, Uncas maintained his alliance with 
John Mason.  Roger Williams noted that Native peoples had ―Protectors, under Sachims, 
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to whom they also carry presents, and upon any injury received, and complaint made, 
these Protectors will revenge it.‖233  Mason was not only an ally; he enforced Uncas‘s 
will, as much as Uncas served as an agent of Mason‘s.  It was a political masterstroke for 
Uncas to build an alliance with a man feared by the Algonquians.  Uncas used that 
against groups like the Niantics to bolster his own expansionist efforts.
234
   
 The second part of Uncas‘s plan involved the widows of the Pequot sachems, and 
it is in this context Cassacinamon first appears in the colonial records.  After the Pequot 
War, Uncas, the Niantic-Narragansett sachem Ninigret, and the Niantic-Pequot 
Wequashcook (son of the Niantic-Pequot Wequash) married as many of the wives and 
daughters of deceased Pequot sachems as they could arrange.  Wequashcook married the 
mother of the Pequot grand sachem Sassacus, and by 1640 Uncas boasted at least six or 
seven wives, including Tatobem‘s widow.235  These post-war power brokers claimed the 
hereditary titles, lands, and tribute through such strategic marriages to these Pequot 
women.
236
  Marriage to these Pequot noblewomen granted access to Pequot holdings, but 
it also served another purpose.  These marriages were but one strategy used by sachems 
to legitimize their authority and incorporate indigenous communities into their 
confederations.  While economic and military arrangements typified European alliances, 
intermarriage and kinship often solidified seventeenth-century indigenous alliances.
237
  
According to Kevin McBride, the chief archaeologist of the Mashantucket Pequots, this 
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served as a way of ―eliminating [major] Pequot leadership while keeping the basic social 
structure intact.‖238  By engaging in a well-established Algonquian social custom, a 
custom that the surviving Pequots accepted, Uncas and the others hoped to ease their 
transition into this new socio-political relationship.  Uncas expected these marriages to 
send a message to the other tribes in the region, so acquiring another Pequot wife would 
have been a vital mission carried out with the utmost urgency.  Uncas pursued Pequot 
women anywhere he could find them, even those who had become English servants.
239
  
This is why Uncas sent the delegation that included Cassacinamon to the Winthrop 
household in July 1638.    
 Uncas‘s selection of Cassacinamon for the diplomatic mission suggests something 
important about Cassacinamon‘s place within the regional Algonquian social and 
political structure.  It is clear that Cassacinamon and the Mohegans who accompanied 
him owed fealty to Uncas.  It is doubtful that Uncas sent ―commoners‖ to the home of 
John Winthrop, governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, and widely recognized as a 
preeminent figure within the New England colonies.
240
  This mission constituted an 
exchange between leaders, and the delegation represented Uncas‘s authority and power to 
an official counterpart.  However, Williams‘ specific reference to Cassacinamon as ―the 
Pequt Robin‖ is important.  As the only member of Uncas‘s delegation to be singled out 
and identified, Cassacinamon performed a vital role in the mission‘s success.  Entrusting 
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Cassacinamon with such an important task can be interpreted as a signal that Uncas 
intended to fully incorporate the Pequots into his confederation.
241
  Evidently, Uncas was 
satisfied with the results.  Cassacinamon may also have been related to the woman in 
question, which meant that he too, shared claims to important Pequot social titles and 
authority.  If Cassacinamon and the woman were kin, this could explain why Uncas chose 
Cassacinamon over any other Pequot candidates to retrieve the noblewoman.  After 
Uncas obtained the woman, he awarded Cassacinamon ten fathoms of wampum.  The 
reward was significant; it equaled the bride price often paid for a sachem‘s daughter.  
Having no legitimate reason to execute Cassacinamon, and exploiting any potential 
hereditary claims or community ties he possessed, Uncas used Cassacinamon as a link 
between the Mohegans and the incorporated Pequots.
242
    
 Another clue to Cassacinamon‘s social status may be found in the name/title 
bestowed to him in Williams‘s letter, ―the Pequt Robin.‖  Cassacinamon was his Pequot 
name, and the colonial documents referred to him as such, albeit with various 
spellings.
243
  However, he was just as often addressed by the name/title of ―Robin.‖244  
Some scholars have theorized that Cassacinamon acquired the additional title because his 
mark, the symbol with which he signed documents, looked like a robin when viewed a 
certain way.
245
   However, English colonists frequently bestowed nicknames on 
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Native leaders they encountered, with ―Robin‖ a common designation.  According to 
anthropologist Harold E. L. Prins, the name ―Robin‖ invoked a very specific cultural 
reference for sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English people.
246
  In English folk 
culture, ―Robin‖ referred specifically to the English folk figure Robin Hood.  Thanks to 
films, television, and popular literature, Robin Hood is a dashing and noble hero who, 
accompanied by his ―merry men,‖ robbed from the rich to give to the poor.247   
 However, in seventeenth-century English ballads and songs, Robin Hood 
possessed darker connotations; he exalted lawlessness and abandon.  During the spring 
May Fair festivities, Robin Hood was associated with an archery game and the Morris 
dance, a folk dance of rural English origin.  One man was chosen as the May Fair‘s ―Lord 
of Misrule,‖ he reigned over the games, dances, and ―rabble-rousing revelries‖ of the 
crowds.
248
  The May Fairs offered a socially acceptable opportunity for common folk to 
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act like ―wild men,‖ and their Lord of Misrule was Robin Hood.  However, to Puritan 
eyes these Robin Hoods were insolent fools and devils who wore garish costumes and led 
ragtag groups of barbarians.  When Cassacinamon and the Mohegans traveled to 
Winthrop‘s house, they likely wore their ceremonial costumes; adorned with wampum 
beads and important pieces of jewelry, with feathers in their hair, and painted faces.  
Their attire would not appeal to the Puritan aesthetic.  Therefore, Roger Williams‘ 
designation of Cassacinamon as ―the Pequt Robin‖ may have been a double-edged sword: 
it singled Cassacinamon out as a Pequot leader, but it also suggested he oversaw a 
subordinate community of lawless, funny-looking ―wild men.‖249 
 After 1638, Cassacinamon does not appear in the written records again until 1645.  
While his exact activities are unknown during those years, some bits of crucial 
information can be pieced together.  Cassacinamon lived in John Winthrop‘s household 
during this time, and learned English well enough to spend the rest of his life as an 
interpreter and intermediary between the Algonquians and the English.  By the mid-
1640s, Cassacinamon came to lead the Pequot community at Nameag, a village along the 
Connecticut coast that was part of Uncas‘s Mohegan confederation that housed several 
hundred Pequots by the late 1640s.
250
  These tantalizing clues further support the notion 
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that Cassacinamon was a person of status within the Pequot community, and that 
everyone — Pequot, Mohegan, and English — had use for him.  Cassacinamon, as a 
Pequot sachem linked to all three major groups in Connecticut, utilized these resources to 
enact his own agenda: the removal of the Pequots from Uncas‘s confederation.    
 After he secured the release of the Pequot noblewoman, Cassacinamon 
volunteered to serve in the Winthrop household.  Cassacinamon‘s service was likely not 
devoted toward manual labor.  Most of the Pequot captives living with the colonists were 
women and children, individuals who could be ―trained‖ to do the household duties of 
colonial women.
251
  Although few Pequot men entered into the service of English 
colonists, those who did served as interpreters for the English.
252
  Skilled Native 
interpreters were a valued and needed asset at this time.  Even Pequots, despite any 
negative feelings the English held towards them, were tapped as interpreters if they 
demonstrated sufficient language skills.  Yet, although interpreters fulfilled an essential 
function on the frontier, the English frequently expressed frustrations over their 
dependency on indigenous interpreters.  Colonial authorities feared and distrusted these 
intermediaries, as often as they expressed the need for their services.  Their necessity 
gave these interpreters a distinct political advantage; such advantages could easily be 
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exploited by opportunistic individuals.  If an interpreter‘s loyalty could be secured in 
some way, English anxieties lessened.
253
   
 As one of the leading families in New England, the Winthrop‘s certainly 
appreciated this kind of service from a willing Pequot volunteer.  As for Cassacinamon, 
living in the home of a man as well-connected as John Winthrop presented an invaluable 
opportunity.  Multilingualism was a skill encouraged by Native cultural practices, 
―including the fostering of high-status children from allied sachemships, intermarriage 
among the elites of these same groups, and possibly the presence of captives adopted into 
the community or used there as slaves.‖254  Such multilingual interpreters served as 
important nexuses between the different villages and confederations in the region; it 
made sense to incorporate the English into this network.  The chance to learn about how 
the colonists lived, and more importantly, to discern which colonists had influence, 
provided Cassacinamon with an opening to make connections with powerful English 
figures.  During these ―missing years,‖ Cassacinamon seized upon that opportunity and 
forged an alliance with John Winthrop Jr.  
                                                 
253―A Pequot maid who could speak English perfectly‖ was used by Massachusetts Bay as an 
interpreter during negotiations with Miantonomi in November 1640.  Miantonomi first refused to work 
with the interpretor, who he recognized and did not trust, but later acquiesced to her presence.  William 
Bradford to John Winthrop, 16 August 1640, WP, 4: 273; Winthrop, Journal, 336-337; Paul Alden 
Robinson, ―Lost Opportunities: Miantonomi and the English in the Seventeenth-Century Narragansett 
Country,‖ in Northeastern Indian Lives, 26; James H. Merrell, ―‗The Customes of Our Countrey‘: Indians 
and Colonists in Early America,‖ in “Strangers within the Realm”: Cultural Margins of the First British 
Empire, ed. Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
1991); Johnson, ―Some by Flatteries,‖ 108-109.  For essays that examine the phenomenon of cultural 
brokers, see Margaret Connell-Szasz, ed., Between Indian and White Worlds: The Cultural Broker 
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994).   
254
Bragdon, Native People, 205; Kathleen Bragdon, ―‗Another Tongue Brought In‘: An 
Ethnohistorical Study of Native Writings in Massachusett, Ph.D. dissertation (Brown University, 1981).  
 126 
 Although inconclusive, the evidence suggests that this alliance moved beyond 
simple political expedience.  The Cassacinamon-Winthrop alliance proved substantial 
and lasted for several decades, with Cassacinamon and the younger Winthrop offering 
what appears to be unwavering support of one another.  At its face, the Cassacinamon-
Winthrop coalition is not unusual; such alliances were a common political strategy, and 
as the Pequot War proved, an essential one.
255
  Seen in this light, Cassacinamon‘s 
alliance with John Winthrop Jr. proved to be nothing out of the ordinary.  Any competent 
Native leader realized that an alliance with a powerful Englishman yielded strategic 
benefits.
256
   
 However, on the surface, the Cassacinamon-Winthrop alliance appeared to be an 
imbalanced one.  Winthrop Jr. was a man of means and ambition.  He came from a 
leading Puritan family and had political connections throughout New England.  By 1646, 
Cassacinamon only led a single community, his people decimated and cast aside.  This 
did not appear to be an alliance of equals, and Cassacinamon was sometimes referred to 
as ―Robin, Mr. Winthrops Indyan,‖ a title that reinforced this concept of an imbalanced 
relationship.
257
  Connecticut authorities paid heed to Uncas‘s demands, because the 
Mohegans remained a vital part of the regional balance of power.   
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 Yet, despite this apparent unequal distribution of power, the permanence of the 
Cassacinamon-Winthrop Jr. relationship suggests that this alliance was not simply 
political.  On the one hand, the alliance between the younger Winthrop and the Pequot 
leader certainly fits within the understood Algonquian relationship between principal 
sachem and a tributary sachem.  Yet, seventeenth-century Algonquians often solidified 
such relationships using notions of kinship.
258
  What little can be gleaned from the 
available records suggests that the Cassacinamon-Winthrop alliance was one based on 
friendship as much as politics.  Winthrop Jr. never abandoned Cassacinamon, despite 
repeated calls for him to do so by family members and political opponents.  
Cassacinamon, although he struck out on his own when necessary, never abandoned the 
Winthrop family even after conditions improved for the Pequots.  The two men, and their 
communities, lived side-by-side for several years from the mid-1640s onward.  Each man 
benefited greatly from their association with one another; for Cassacinamon, this 
relationship may have been interpreted as one between ―fictive kin.‖259   
II 
 In September 1638, two months after Cassacinamon‘s journey to the Bay Colony, 
the Mohegans, Narragansetts, and Connecticut authorities met in Hartford to formalize 
their diplomatic relationship.  In the months prior to the meeting, Governor Winthrop of 
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the Bay Colony drew up treaties with both the Narragansetts and the Mohegans, 
agreements that, on the surface, strengthened the Bay Colony‘s claims to Pequot territory.  
Not wishing to relinquish control to Massachusetts, Connecticut authorities sought 
similar agreements with the two major Algonquian powers to solidify its own claims to 
the territory and place itself at the head of Anglo-Algonquian relations in the region.  
They settled upon a ―tripartite treaty‖ that more than anything else was geared toward 
bringing a sense of order to the Anglo-Indian frontier.  The Hartford agreement declared 
that neither the Mohegans nor the Narragansetts were to ―possess any part of the Pequots 
country without leave from the English.‖  It also called for ―a peace and familiarity‖ 
between Uncas and Miantonomi, whereby the two sachems pledged that ―if there fall out 
injuries or wrongs…they shall not presently revenge it,‖ but instead they would ―appeale 
to the said English and they are to decide the same.‖  The Mohegans and the 
Narragansetts were instructed not to give any shelter to enemies of the English, ―nor their 
men, nor dogs, nor trapps, shall kill nor spoile or hurt any of [the] Englishmen‘s hogs, 
swine, or cattle.‖  The treaty created a tributary relationship between the Native leaders 
and Connecticut that, in the words of historian Michael Oberg, was ―akin to that between 
a superior and inferior sachem.‖260   
 However, both sachems continued to act as independent agents, with Uncas in 
particular knowing full well that Connecticut depended on him to secure the colony‘s 
borders.  Uncas was not alone in this awareness.  Governor William Bradford of 
Plymouth wrote that Connecticut‘s support of Uncas ―did much increase his power and 
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augmente his Greatnes, which the Narigansets could not indure to see.‖261  The treaty 
exacerbated tensions between the Mohegans and the Narragansetts.  The favoritism 
Connecticut displayed to Uncas shown through when it came to apportioning some 
Pequot prisoners.  The treaty distributed some two hundred Pequots amongst the 
Mohegans, Narragansetts, and Niantics.  The Narragansett and Niantic sachems, 
Miantonomi and Ninigret, received eighty Pequots and twenty Pequots, respectively.  
However, Uncas, in recognition of the staunch support he had provided the English, 
received one hundred Pequots.  This huge boon to the Mohegans did not go unnoticed; 
the Narragansetts felt slighted at the disproportionate favoritism shown to the smaller 
Mohegan confederation.
262
  The Pequots were not present at these negotiations.   
 Stripping the Pequots of all their former power, the Treaty of Hartford formally 
divided the Pequot survivors and their lands amongst the victors, as a way to prevent 
them from ever again threatening the security of Connecticut.  The Mohegans and 
Narragansetts paid an annual tribute of wampum for the Pequots placed under their 
authority.  They promised to behead those warriors ―that had the chiefe hand in killing 
the English.‖  Connecticut authorities not only desired the removal of the Pequots as a 
political threat, they sought to destroy them as an identifiable community.  The Pequots 
―were not to live in their ancient country, nor to be called by their ancient name, but to 
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become Narragansetts and Mohegans.‖263  The same year the Treaty of Hartford denied 
the Pequots their ancient name, the colonial records still referred to them as Pequots and 
singled out one in particular, Robin Cassacinamon, as a Pequot leader.  A clue to the 
untenable nature of this English declaration, it also demonstrated how little the English 
understood Algonquian social structures.    
****************************************** 
 During the eight years when Cassacinamon was absent from the written records, 
the Native political scene in southern New England grew more contentious and the 
ongoing rivalry between Uncas and Miantonomi intensified.  The two sachems had never 
liked each other, but in the years after the Hartford Treaty their antagonism had exploded 
into an open rivalry of unabashed hatred.  Miantonomi had grown increasingly 
disenchanted with the English, and he used the threat of his superior numbers and the 
possibility of an alliance with the Mohawks and other Native peoples to attempt to 
influence regional politics in his favor.
264
  This made the English uneasy, and Uncas 
channeled that fear to his advantage.  Uncas consistently outmaneuvered Miantonomi in 
the political arena; he strengthened his support in Connecticut and gained more 
consideration from Massachusetts Bay.  In the process, Uncas absorbed more Pequot 
tributaries within his sphere of influence.  Uncas not only solidified the position of the 
Mohegans, he alienated the Narragansetts and the Niantics; soon he became the target of 
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several assassination attempts.  Uncas and the English believed these originated with 
Miantonomi.  By the summer of 1643, the two sachems were at war with one another.
265
   
 In response to the ongoing hostility between Uncas and Miantonomi, and 
convinced they needed some kind of organization to exert their authority over the region, 
the New England colonies formed the Confederation of New England in 1643.  Defined 
as ―a firme and perpetuall league of friendship and amytie for offence and defence, 
mutual advice and succor upon all just occations both for preserving & propagating the 
truth and liberties of the Gospell and for their own mutuall safety and wellfare,‖ the 
confederation created an eight-seat adjudicating body, whose members were drawn 
equally from Connecticut, New Haven (founded in 1638), Massachusetts Bay, and 
Plymouth.  The Commissioners of the United Colonies determined ―how all the 
Juirsdiccons may carry it towards the Indians, that they neither grow insolent nor be 
injured without due sattisfaccon, lest war break in upon the Confederates through such 
miscarriages.‖266  This body handled subsequent relations with the Native peoples in New 
England.  By creating this organization, the English colonies hoped to further their 
dominion over the Anglo-Algonquian frontier. 
 The Commissioners faced a difficult task as the war between Uncas and 
Miantonomi intensified.  However, victory was at hand for the Mohegans; Uncas 
captured the Narragansett sachem late in the summer of 1643.  The Mohegans turned 
Miantonomi over to English authorities at Hartford, per the Hartford Treaty of 1638, to 
wait for ―advice from the English how to proceed against him for sundry treacherous 
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attempts against his life.‖  At the first meeting of the Commissioners of the United 
Colonies in Boston, Miantonomi was brought before the committee in August 1643.  The 
Commissioners ruled against Miantonomi, citing his ―ambitious designes to make 
himself universal Sagomore or Governor of all these parts of the Countrey, of his 
treacherous plots by guifts to engage all the Indians at once to cut of the whole body of 
the English in these parts which were further confirmed by the Indians Generall 
preparations, messages, & sundry insolencies and outrages by them committed against 
the English and such Indians as were subject or friends to the English.‖  John Winthrop 
recorded that the Commissioners were ―all of the opinion that it would not be safe to set 
him at liberty.‖  However, they also knew that ―neither had we sufficient ground for us to 
put him to death.‖  The Commissioners devised a solution to their dilemma by ordering 
that Miantonomi be turned over to Uncas, so that he could ―justly put such a false and 
bloodthirsty enemie to death.‖267   
 The Commissioners justified their ruling by ingeniously arguing this was an 
internal dispute between the Mohegans and Narragansetts; therefore a Native leader, not 
English authorities, should put the Narragansett to death.  Without question the 
Commissioners saw Uncas as a convenient tool to eliminate a sachem that caused too 
much trouble.  Yet Uncas was no pawn.  He had every reason to want Miantonomi out of 
the way, for the removal of his rival was just one more step in his rise to power.  
Miantonomi was turned over for execution, and Uncas was happy to oblige.  
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Accompanied by several Mohegan warriors and two English observers, Uncas ordered 
his brother Wawequa to club Miantonomi to death in late August of 1643.
268
    
 The heightened tensions and shifting alliances generated by these events created 
an opportunity that Cassacinamon and the Pequots soon exploited.  English authorities 
required Native support to maintain peace along the Anglo-Native frontier.  However, the 
―unreliability‖ of allies such as Uncas — individuals who were still powerful enough to 
independently pursue their own objectives — frustrated English authorities who wanted 
the benefits provided by those allies, but none of the hassles.  This period of heightened 
tensions framed the efforts of Cassacinamon, the Pequots, and John Winthrop Jr. 
******************************** 
 In May of 1644, John Winthrop, Jr. journeyed to a coastal area near the mouth of 
the Pequot (Thames) River, an area claimed by Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay, to 
begin another English plantation.  The younger Winthrop intended this plantation to be a 
shining example to other settlements in the region, a haven of economic and intellectual 
developments.
269
  Although his previous tenure as governor at Saybrook had been 
unsuccessful, the younger Winthrop once again committed himself to Connecticut.  
Known subsequently as Pequot Plantation, Nameag, and later New London, the 
plantation was formally established in 1646 by Winthrop Jr. and Reverend Thomas 
Peters.  The plantation held strategic advantages for the colonists who settled there.  It lay 
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down river from Winthrop Jr.‘s lead mines, and he envisioned the plantation as the ideal 
base from which to launch the economic development of the region.  The site had access 
to abundant natural resources and was located along a deep water port that ensured easy 
trade and communication with other settlements.
270
     
 The younger Winthrop built his plantation in the midst of the jurisdictional battle 
between Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay.  While Winthrop Jr. professed a desire to 
be a stabilizing force in the region, and publicly declared his indifference as to whether or 
not his settlement fell under the banner of Connecticut or Massachusetts, some in 
Connecticut remained unconvinced.  He had received his charter from Massachusetts 
Bay, and some in the Connecticut government saw this as an attempt by the Bay Colony 
to annex the disputed area.  To ease these tensions, Winthrop joined forces with Reverend 
Peters, a prominent man from Saybrook with extensive ties in Connecticut.
271
  The 
dispute between Connecticut and Massachusetts continued until July 1647, when the 
Commissioners of the United Colonies ―concluded that the Jurisdiction of that plantation 
doth & ought to belong to Connecticut.‖272  However, Winthrop did not have to worry 
about losing control of his plantation.  The Commissioners declared that ―a Commission 
be directed to Mr. Wynthrop to execute justice [in Connecticut] according to our laws & 
the rule of righteousness,‖ allowing Winthrop to continue in the Connecticut colony.273      
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 Aside from these practical considerations, political motivations directed the 
placement of Pequot Plantation.  The Pequot village of Nameag lay adjacent to the 
younger Winthrop‘s alchemical haven.  Nameag, in the Pequot-Mohegan language, 
meant ―the fishing place,‖ a linguistic expression of the settlement‘s desirability.  The 
Nameag community fell under Uncas‘s jurisdiction and paid him tribute.  Most important 
of all, Nameag was Cassacinamon‘s village and center of power.  Cassacinamon aided 
Winthrop in the establishment of his plantation, and orchestrated the deal with Winthrop 
Jr. to build the settlement near his village.  And in another agreement Winthrop Jr. 
arranged with other Indian groups in 1645, Winthrop Jr. identified Cassacinamon as 
―Governour and Chief Councelor among the Pequots.‖ 274     
 Winthrop used the plantation and Cassacinamon to further his own position as a 
cultural broker between the English and the Indians in Connecticut.  For John Winthrop 
Jr., Cassacinamon and the Pequots solidified his reputation as a player in Anglo-
Algonquian politics.  He wrote that ―it was of great concernment to have [Pequot 
Plantation] planted, to be a curb to the [Mohegan] Indians.‖275  While Uncas still proved 
useful to colonial officials, they viewed him and his English partner John Mason as great 
sources of frustration as well.  The Commissioners of the United Colonies felt that the 
―highly partial alliance‖ between Uncas and Mason proved ―harmful to the [Connecticut] 
colony‘s relations with other neighboring Indian nations.‖276  Mason argued that Uncas 
was the only ally Connecticut could trust, and promoted the Mohegans above all other 
                                                 
274
Ibid.; WP, 5: 4-5; Johnson, ―Some by Flatteries,‖ 132.  
275
Winthrop, Journal, 2: 274.  
276St. Jean, ―Inventing Guardianship,‖ 370.  
 136 
Natives.  Yet, Connecticut officials found Uncas difficult to control, since Uncas lived 
outside of the colonial political structure.  This tension appears in a letter that Winthrop 
received from his brother-in-law, Samuel Symonds.  ―I could wish that Uncas may be 
kept a friend still to the English,‖ Symonds wrote, ―yet soe that he be not suffered to 
insulte or wronge other Indians.‖277  Nameag-Pequot Plantation served as the perfect 
setting from which John Winthrop Jr. and Cassacinamon could counter the Uncas-Mason 
alliance.   
 Cassacinamon also benefited from his ties to the younger Winthrop.  The 
Cassacinamon-Winthrop Jr. alliance fell squarely into Algonquian political 
arrangements.
278
  Local sachems in Algonquian confederations could increase their 
community‘s autonomy by breaking old alliances and forming new ones with more 
advantageous political arrangements.  Cassacinamon had to forge an alliance with 
someone in a position of power far greater than his own, in order for his own objectives 
to succeed.
279
  One could argue that John Winthrop Jr. used Cassacinamon as a pawn, but 
this seems not to be the case.  It is doubtful that John Winthrop Jr. persuaded the first 
Pequot he met, who happened to be Cassacinamon, to aid him in an attempt to keep the 
Mohegans in check.  For such a plan to succeed Winthrop required a Pequot with the 
proper credentials for leadership and strong ties within the Pequot community; he needed 
a willing partner, not a pawn.  Winthrop could not have convinced the Pequots to follow 
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any of his plans without Cassacinamon‘s help, and Cassacinamon would not have offered 
his help if he did not receive something substantial from the partnership.   
 The first wave of colonists moved to Nameag in 1646, and those settlers spent 
their first winter living in Indian wigwams.  The Nameag Pequots — about eighty men 
and their families — offered their services to the colonists as hunters and laborers. 280  
Cassacinamon and the Pequots offered their labor and provided the plantation with a 
sense of security.  ―I look at the quiet of our plantation principally,‖ Winthrop wrote, 
―and conceive a greate security to have a party of the Indians [Nameag Pequots] here, to 
have their chiefe dependance upon the English.  They will easily discover Indian 
plotts.‖281  Cassacinamon and the Nameag Pequots functioned as the perfect liaison 
between the colonists at Nameag and the Mohegans.  In turn, Cassacinamon‘s attachment 
to Winthrop Jr. and Pequot Plantation served as the Pequots‘ first significant sign of 
defiance against Uncas in the post-war period.
282
  
 As long as the Nameag Pequots paid their tribute and kept their official allegiance 
to him, Uncas remained secure in their relationship with him.
283
  The politically astute 
Uncas probably saw the same opportunity Winthrop Jr. did; if Cassacinamon‘s group 
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channeled information to the English, they could be used to gather information about the 
colonists.
284
  Uncas also found a use for John Winthrop Jr. himself when, in the spring of 
1645, the younger Winthrop provided medical aid to the Mohegans after a battle with the 
Narragansetts.
285
  However, Uncas objected when the indigenous residents of Nameag 
increased their numbers.  Almost immediately after signing the agreement with Winthrop 
Jr., the number of Pequots living at Nameag increased.  Cassacinamon and the Nameag 
Pequot settlement drew other Pequots from within the Mohegan confederation to them, 
due to Cassacinamon‘s persuasive abilities as leader and his alliance with the powerful 
Englishman.
286
  As more Pequots settled at the village, and as Cassacinamon and 
Winthrop Jr. strengthened the ties between the Nameag Pequots and the English 
plantation, Uncas perceived these actions as a threat to his authority.        
 During the summer of 1646, Thomas Peters asked Cassacinamon to conduct a 
hunt for the colonists.  Such hunts were not unusual, and Cassacinamon took twenty 
Pequot men from Nameag and headed out.  The Nameag men were accompanied by 
several Pequots from Wequashcook‘s Pawcatuck band of Pequots.287   Initially, this 
excursion was no different than other hunts Cassacinamon had organized for the 
colonists.  However, on this particular hunt, Cassacinamon led the party to ―the East side 
of [the] Pequat [River].‖  The land east of the Pequot (Thames) River was former Pequot 
territory that Uncas had claimed through one of his marriages to a Pequot noblewoman.  
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Since Uncas had not granted Cassacinamon permission to hunt in that area, he was 
furious.  The unauthorized hunt was symptomatic of Cassacinamon‘s increasingly 
obstructive behavior, which now included refusing to pay Uncas tribute.
288
   
 Such insubordination could not go unpunished.  Uncas amassed a force of three 
hundred warriors and ambushed the Pequot hunting party.  When the Mohegans attacked 
Cassacinamon‘s men, the Pequots ran.  Uncas‘s forces chased the Pequots ―with great 
clamor and fierceness back to the Plantation,‖ beating and wounding those who were too 
slow to avoid them all the way back to Nameag.  The Pequots and English settlers could 
only watch as Uncas and his warriors entered ―and divided themselves into squadrons.‖  
Hoping to avoid detection, some of Cassacinamon‘s men hid in their homes.  Uncas, 
always a master of political theater, made this a true spectacle.  Uncas stared down the 
Pequots and the English, and then he gave an order in Mohegan.  With that command, the 
Mohegans tore into the wigwams, and dragged the Pequots who had been hiding out into 
public view.  They then ransacked the settlement for anything of value, ―takinge there 
wompum, there skins [and] there baskets,‖ and destroyed their wigwams.  The Mohegans 
then publicly humiliated the Pequots, ―cutinge And sloshinge and beatinge‖ the men ―in a 
sore maner which was A sad sighte to the beholders.‖  After beating them and cutting 
their hair, Uncas ordered them stripped, ―tearing there breaches there hose from there 
legs there showes from there feete.‖  The beaten and naked Pequots were then forced into 
the water, as Uncas‘s warriors shot at them for sport.289   
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 The English settlers were not spared Uncas‘s ire either.  While none of the 
colonists were physically hurt, the Mohegans pointed their guns at them, drove away 
their livestock ―almost to Monhegan,‖ and ransacked their dwellings ―friteinge the 
women And children.‖  They then helped themselves to the English supplies, taking their 
corn and ―A great deal of mr. winterops wompum pege carrying away a hat and coat of 
mr. Peters also a coat and severall skins of other mens.‖290  Uncas then stared down the 
frightened denizens of Nameag, Pequot and English alike, and ―used some blasphemous 
speeches.‖  He then did something he rarely did – he spoke in English, ensuring that 
everyone present knew just how serious he was.  ―I am the victor‖ he said.  With that, the 
Mohegans took their loot and departed, leaving the Nameag Pequots and English to pick 
up the pieces.
291
   
 No one was killed, for Uncas intended the raid to be a display of dominance, not 
death.  Uncas wanted to prove to everyone at Nameag, but especially Cassacinamon and 
John Winthrop Jr., he was in charge.  The Nameag Pequots were his tributaries, 
Cassacinamon was his subordinate, and Winthrop Jr. and the English were only living at 
their plantation due to his benevolence.  However, Uncas‘s attempt at coercive 
intimidation backfired.  Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr., while shaken by the raid, 
refused to be cowed.
292
  Instead, they used the raid as the excuse they needed to publicly 
defy Uncas‘s authority, and justify freeing Cassacinamon‘s community from Uncas‘s 
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control.
293
  The Nameag raid was exactly the kind of aggressive response Cassacinamon 
hoped for, since it allowed Cassacinamon and Winthrop to take the issue to the 
Commissioners of the United Colonies for arbitration.  Colonial authorities had reserved 
the right to arbitrate disputes between Native communities since the end of the Pequot 
War in 1637.
294
  An audience with the Commissioners gave Cassacinamon the 
opportunity to describe how unjustly Uncas treated the Pequots in his confederation.  
Strengthened by John Winthrop Jr.‘s support, Cassacinamon stood a fair chance of 
persuading the Commissioners to take action.  
 Initially, Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr. called upon Winthrop Jr.‘s father in 
Massachusetts Bay for help.  Pequot Plantation may have been within Connecticut‘s 
jurisdiction, but the elder Winthrop‘s authority still carried weight.  Governor Winthrop 
sent a message to Uncas from Boston, and reminded him ―of what the English have done 
for your safety against the Narragansetts,‖ and that Uncas had ―invited our people to 
come and sitt downe by you.‖  The senior Winthrop was disappointed to hear that ―you 
[Uncas] do continually molest them, putting their women in feare, and the Indians 
Cutshamaskin Robin [Cassacinamon] and others who are helpful to them.‖  Winthrop 
then warned Uncas that if he continued this unjustified behavior, ―we shall leave you and 
your brother to shifte for yourselves and then (we knowe) the Naragansetts wilbe well 
pleased, and doe what we will require of them.‖  However, if Uncas and the Mohegans 
carried themselves well ―towards those of our new plantation and the Indians there,‖ 
Winthrop assured Uncas that ―we shall remaine your friends.‖  The letter was sent, and 
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the interpreter Thomas Stanton translated it ―into Indian that it may be read to him 
[Uncas] by any Englishman and yet hee understand it.‖295   
 Given the ongoing disputes between the English and Narragansetts, and the 
Narragansetts‘ hatred for Uncas, Winthrop‘s threat was not an idle one.  While he did not 
believe the English would side militarily with the Narragansetts, the loss of a powerful 
diplomatic ally would have weakened Uncas.  However, the elder Winthrop‘s stern words 
of warning were insufficient for John Winthrop Jr.  When he received his copy of the 
letter to Uncas, the younger Winthrop made an addition to the letter when he endorsed it.  
Winthrop Jr. ordered that Uncas was ―to be required and straightly charged not to come 
or send into the said plantation in any such manner, or any way to disturbe the same, or 
any way to trouble or offend the said Indians [Nameag Pequots].‖  This was, according to 
Winthrop Jr., ―an order that should have beene sent.‖296   
 When the Commissioners of the United Colonies met in New Haven on 
September 14, 1646, Uncas joined them and stated his case.
297
  Uncas seized the chance 
to reaffirm his ties with the English.  Ever the politician, he first ―acknowledged some 
miscarriages in vindicatinge his own right soe neare the English plantations.‖  However, 
while he admitted that his actions at Nameag went too far, he asserted that he had been 
driven to such a forceful display due to ―severall wrongs he had received‖ at the hands of 
Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr.  Uncas argued that the Nameag Pequots, who were by 
law his rightful tributaries, ―were drawne from him under colloure of submitting to the 
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English plantation at Pequat.‖  He then reminded the Commissioners that this 
unpleasantness started when the Pequots ―under some countenance and incouragemt 
given by the said English, hunted within his proper limit without his leave.‖298  For 
Uncas, the real troublemakers were Cassacinamon and John Winthrop Jr., and their 
various schemes to take the Nameag Pequots away from him.  The Commissioners 
reassured Uncas that if he continued to follow the guidelines of the Hartford Treaty, the 
Commissioners and the Connecticut government would not ―take any of them [Pequots] 
from him [Uncas], nor allow that they be withdrawne by any of the English plantations, 
till they have some further just grounds.‖299  With that said, the Commissioners and 
Uncas waited for the Nameag delegation to arrive for official deliberation to begin.   
 The Commissioner‘s invocation of ―just grounds‖ was crucial to Cassacinamon‘s 
entire effort.  If Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr. convinced the Commissioners that Uncas 
frequently mistreated the Pequots, then the Commissioners could remove the Pequots 
from Uncas.  This action would benefit not only Cassacinamon‘s community, but the 
English colonists at Nameag.  In a letter he sent to Thomas Peters before the 
Commissioners were to convene, Winthrop Jr. argued that ―if these Indians [Nameag 
Pequots] that we must live neere be still under Uncas command, there wilbe noe living 
for English there.‖  Uncas would continue to cause trouble for Cassacinamon and the 
English, and Winthrop Jr. warned that ―we must not expect to be quiet.‖300  However, if 
Cassacinamon‘s Pequots were freed from Uncas and could formally ally with the 
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English, the colonists would continue to reap the benefits of having a group of friendly 
Natives associated with them.  ―I looke at the quiet of our plantation principally,‖ 
Winthrop Jr. wrote, ―and conceive a greater security to have a party of the Indians there, 
to have their cheife dependence upon the English.‖  Cassacinamon and the Pequots 
functioned as a dependable buffer, a bulwark against the wilderness that the Puritans 
feared, a wilderness that still contained the ever-present danger of Indian attacks.  It made 
sense to have dependable Native allies who crossed both worlds – Native and English – 
and who would, in Winthrop Jr.‘s view, ―easily discover any Indian plotts.‖  Winthrop Jr. 
encouraged Peters to ―meet the Indians the captaine Casacinamon and some others in the 
name of the rest,‖ so that they ―may declare their desires by way of petition.‖  William 
Morton, a colonist living at Pequot Plantation, drafted the complaint sent to the 
Commissioners against Uncas in 1646.
301
            
 Even though Winthrop Jr. wanted the Pequots living near his plantation ―to have 
their cheife dependence upon the English,‖ the question remains as to why the Nameag 
Pequots chose Connecticut authority as being preferable to living under Uncas.   
Cassacinamon and the Nameag Pequots surely remembered that the Mohegans sided with 
the English in their destruction of the Mystic Fort in 1637.   It is not surprising that many 
Pequots had hard feelings, if not outright contempt, for Uncas because of the part he 
played in their defeat.  However, despite these possible negative feelings towards Uncas 
and other Native leaders, some Pequots did not join the community at Nameag, or 
Wequashcook‘s Pequot community affiliated with the Niantics.  The Pequots who 
remained with the Mohegans had most likely developed family ties with those 
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communities, and thus did not want to leave.
302
  The Pequots who went to Nameag likely 
did not have such strong ties with their adoptive communities.  Moving to Nameag 
provided them with the chance to reestablish their own separate Pequot community 
without fear of reprisal or attack, whereas earlier attempts to do so proved 
unsuccessful.
303
  At Nameag, Cassacinamon offered Pequots the chance to live openly as 
Pequots, under a leader who himself was Pequot, and who had powerful connections that 
could protect them from outside interference.
304
  In short, Cassacinamon acted as a 
sachem.     
 William Morton and three Nameag Pequots, including Cassacinamon‘s brother 
and a Pequot shaman named Wampushet, arrived in New Haven on September 16 to 
argue their case before the Commissioners.  It did not go well.  Neither Cassacinamon 
nor Winthrop Jr. attended the meeting.  Cassacinamon‘s exact whereabouts are unclear, 
although he likely remained at Nameag.  Winthrop Jr. was in Boston attending to family 
matters, but he also informed his friend Thomas Peters that ―I am not willing to deale in it 
because it may be conceived my intentions are other then they are.‖305  It appeared that 
Winthrop Jr.‘s favoritism towards Cassacinamon was so obvious he feared that the 
Commissioners would not believe the abuses the Pequots suffered were genuine.     
 The absence of the Pequots‘ two most vociferous advocates was a blow to the 
Nameag delegation, but what came next was a public relations disaster.  Despite the 
complaints listed by the Pequots and Morton, the Commissioners were not convinced, 
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and they ―fownde noe cause to alter the former writing given‖ Uncas.306  When it looked 
like the Commissioners were leaning against them, Morton implicated Uncas in yet 
another assault.  According to Morton, Uncas paid fifteen fathoms of wampum to 
Wampushet to use ―a hatchet a wounde another Indian‖ and lay the blame on 
Wequashcook.
307
  Uncas may have targeted Wequashcook to eliminate a potential rival, 
and since Wequashcook was a tributary of Ninigret‘s, this would have negatively 
impacted the Niantic leader as well.  Wequashcook led a Pequot community outside of 
Uncas‘s confederation; such a plot to discredit him may have drawn Pequots away from 
Wequashcook and Ninigret and towards Uncas.  While Cassacinamon antagonized 
Uncas, the Nameag group was already within the Mohegan confederation and 
Cassacinamon may have been closely tied to Uncas via the bride Cassacinamon secured.  
Thus, Uncas used different coercive tactics were used to keep them in line.   
 Wampushet completed the hit and took the wampum, but soon became ―troubled 
in conscience.‖  Morton testified that Wampushet ―could have no rest till he had 
discovered Uncas to be the author‖ of the plot.  The Commissioners were interested in 
Morton‘s charge, but as they pressed further in their questions they found the Pequot‘s 
story wanting.  When they asked Morton what other witnesses he had to corroborate 
Wampushet‘s story, he admitted ―that an Indian woeman had spoken as much, but whiter 
she had heard it from Uncas, or only from the Pequatt Powwow [Wampushet] he could 
not say.‖  The Commissioners then inquired as ―to whome the Pequat powowe had first 
charged Uncas as guilty in the plot,‖ and he admitted that ―it was to Robin 
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[Cassacinamon] an Indian who had served Mr. Winthrop.‖  If true, this attested to 
Cassacinamon‘s use of information and misinformation to foment dissent.  While he 
could not openly challenge Uncas with force, Cassacinamon could manipulate the more 
subtle aspects of politics to his advantage.
308
   
 Suspicious of this connection to Cassacinamon, whose rivalry with Uncas was 
well-known by this point, the Commissioners questioned Wampushet directly through the 
interpreter Thomas Stanton, and it is here where Cassacinamon‘s absence was the most 
damaging to the Nameag delegation.  Wampushet told his story; however, it was not the 
story the Nameag delegates expected.  To everyone‘s surprise, except perhaps for Uncas, 
Wampushet refuted Morton‘s claims: he ―cleared Uncas & cast the plot & guilt upon 
[Wequash] Cooke, & Robin Mr. Winthrops Indyan.‖309  The Pequots and Morton were 
furious, and the Commissioners demanded to know if this were true.  At some point after 
the assault, Cassacinamon discovered Wampushet was the assailant.  Instead of turning 
him over to Wequashcook, Cassacinamon offered him a deal.  Wampushet explained that 
―Robin had given him a payre of breeches, & promised him 25 fathome of wampam to 
cast the plot upon Uncas.‖  Worse yet, Wampushet claimed that ―the English Plantation 
& Pequat knew‖ that the charges against Uncas were false, and perjured themselves 
before the Commissioners.  Enraged by Wampushet‘s about face testimony, 
Cassacinamon‘s brother and the other Pequot man pleaded with the Commissioners that 
―Uncas hired him [Wampushet] to withdrawe & alter his charge.‖  Morton, himself 
angered by this reversal, questioned Wampushet himself.  Wampushet, with Uncas 
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watching him the entire time, did not change his testimony, and the Nameag Pequots‘ 
claim collapsed.  The Commissioners could not determine who hired Wampushet - 
Cassacinamon or Uncas.  Unsure of who to believe, the Commissioners dismissed 
Morton and the Pequots, and sent them away empty-handed.  They also rebuked Uncas, 
and advised him that ―if he expected any favoure & respect from the English to have no 
hand in any such designes or any other unjust ways.‖310  The central conflict between 
Cassacinamon and Uncas remained unresolved. 
 Unwilling to allow the situation to deteriorate further, in February 1647 the 
Commissioners drafted a resolution that they hoped would vitiate the dispute between 
Cassacinamon and Uncas.
311
  The agreement of February 1647 attempted to create 
specific guidelines for the Commissioners that explained the tributary relationship 
between the Mohegans and Nameag Pequots.  The agreement was signed by both 
Cassacinamon and Uncas and witnessed by their English allies/guardians Winthrop Jr. 
and John Mason.  It stipulated that the Nameag Pequots would pay ―soe much wampum 
per head unto Uncos as is sett downe by the English in Covenants betwixt them and the 
saide Uncos with others for one yeare and as formerly they have beene accustomed to 
doe.‖  However, Cassacinamon‘s community was allowed to pay one third of their tribute 
in ―Indian Tradeing cloth one yard and halfe at sixteen vix: shillings.‖  The agreement 
also required that Cassacinamon and the Pequots ―shall not offer wrong in word or deed 
to Uncos or his; but be ready to attend him in such services of peace or warre as they 
shall bee directed to by the Governor of Connecticott until the meeting of the 
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Commissioners.‖312  For their part, Cassacinamon‘s people were allowed to ―plant this 
present yeare in such place as Mr. John Winthrop shall appoint them.‖  If Cassacinamon 
complied with the agreement, the Nameag Pequots would live ―without disturbance of 
Uncos or any of his‖ and be allowed to ―improve theire labour and enjoy theire 
possessions and not receive interruption from Uncos other then that is before expressed.‖  
Cassacinamon was also allowed to keep the ―Niantique Indians that are now at Nameag‖ 
as full members of the community, as Uncas and the Mohegans promised not to ―hinder 
them or disturb them from fetching their corne and matts and other goods.‖313   
 The February agreement reaffirmed the Pequots‘ tributary status, and in that 
respect, it was a victory for Uncas.  Uncas had intimidated English settlers so that he 
could reassert his dominance over his Native tributaries.  He had gotten away with little 
more than a gentle rebuke from the Commissioners of the United Colonies, a clear 
indication of his continued importance to the regional power structure.
314
  John Winthrop 
advised his son to make peace with Uncas for the good of the colony, ―seeing he is your 
neighbor, I would wish you would not be averse to Reconciliation with him, if they of 
Connectecott desire it.‖315  However, by inserting themselves into the dispute between 
Uncas and the Nameag Pequots, and by trying to regulate the Native tributary 
relationship, English colonial authorities created an opening that Cassacinamon and 
Winthrop, Jr. could exploit.   
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 While English authorities saw this as a way to exert control over the frontier, for 
Algonquians like Cassacinamon it affirmed that English officials could be used by 
Algonquian leaders as a tool to promote their own agendas.
316
  While not a total victory, 
the agreement recognized that the Nameag Pequots were permitted to live near the 
English at Nameag, and ensured that Cassacinamon and his community retained access to 
English support.  The agreement further acknowledged Cassacinamon‘s leadership when 
it recognized additional Natives that lived at Nameag.  These Algonquians had not 
originally been under Uncas‘s jurisdiction, but had moved the village to be with family 
and kin under Cassacinamon.  These transplants only added to the size of the community.  
Those ―Niantique Indians‖ were likely Pequots who had previously been Niantic 
tributaries, and attests to Cassacinamon‘s continued ability to draw Pequots from all over 
the region to Nameag.  Roger Williams‘ assessment of ―the Pequt Robin‖ was proving to 
be correct.
317
  Uncas was instructed to leave the Nameag Pequots alone in domestic 
matters; their only contact with him was limited to paying tribute and accompanying him 
on matters of peace and war.  If it could be proven that Uncas violated this arrangement, 
the Commissioners might acquiesce to Winthrop Jr.‘s and Cassacinamon‘s requests.  
 The compromise agreement only spurred Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr. 
forward.  Winthrop Jr. argued that his settlement could not prosper if the Nameag 
Pequots remained under subjugation to Uncas.
318
  He complained again about the 
injustice of ―the late inrode by Uncas and his crue upon the Indians of this place in 
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robbing all their wigwams and depriving them of their neccessaries for their very life.‖  
Uncas‘s attempts to dominate the Nameag Pequots adversely affected the English settlers, 
who found themselves caught in the crosshairs, and who had been ―most barbarously 
injuriously and unchristianly dealt withal‖ by the Mohegans.319  When the 
Commissioners met again in July 1647, Cassacinamon issued a formal petition on behalf 
of the Nameag community and officially asked that the Pequots be released from 
Mohegan jurisdiction and placed under English authority.
320
   
 In the petition of 1647, Cassacinamon and his co-petitioner Obechiquod engaged 
in a game of pure diplomacy.  Cassacinamon crafted the petition to exploit English 
attitudes concerning the Pequots.  He acknowledged that the Pequots ―have done very ill 
against the English formerly,‖ and that ―they have justly suffered & beene rightfully 
conquered by the English.‖  After showing fealty to the English, Cassacinamon made 
clear that his community ―had no consent nor hand in shedding the English bloud.‖321  
Given the nature of the Pequot War, it is unlikely that no one at Nameag had fought in 
the war.  However, Cassacinamon knew that the English would never side with him if 
they believed he harbored warriors who had killed Englishmen.  He then played upon 
English largesse, saying that Wequash, the Pequot-Niantic sachem who had sided with 
the English, had advised Cassacinamon and the Nameag Pequots to flee ―from our 
Country‖ to escape the war.  According to Cassacinamon, Wequash promised that ―the 
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English should not hurt us if wee did not Joyne in warre against them.‖  Assured of 
English goodwill by Wequash, Cassacinamon and the Pequots hoped that they could 
count on that benevolence now, and requested the Commissioners ―to take us [the 
Pequots] under the subjection of the English, and appointe us a place where we may live 
peaceably under the government of the English.‖322   
 The petition made it clear that the Nameag Pequot community, not just their 
sachem Cassacinamon, wanted to be free of Mohegan control.  A total of sixty-two 
Pequot men put their marks on the petition: forty-eight Nameag Pequots along with 
fourteen Pequot Niantic tributaries.
323
  That some Niantic Pequots signed on to 
Cassacinamon‘s petition is telling, since they technically were not under Mohegan 
jurisdiction.  The Niantic tributaries living at Nameag received permission to settle there 
under the February 1647 agreement between Uncas and Cassacinamon.
324
  Despite 
attempts to divide the Pequots, this was proof of just how connected the Pequot people 
remained.  Cassacinamon not only drew Pequots to Nameag who, like himself, were 
under Uncas‘s sphere of influence; he attracted individuals who lived in other territories 
into his community.  That so many male heads of household signed Cassacinamon‘s 
petition indicates that the Nameag community was in agreement: English authority was 
preferable to Mohegan authority. 
 The 1647 petition was Cassacinamon‘s first overt attempt to remove the Pequots 
from Uncas‘s authority.  All of Cassacinamon‘s previous actions, allying with Winthrop 
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Jr., drawing Pequots to his community, and hunting in Uncas‘s territory without 
obtaining Uncas‘s permission, were tactics used to goad Uncas into a confrontation.  
Even the first complaint leveled against Uncas in 1646 was presented as a reaction to 
Uncas‘s abuse of power.  The petition was a bold step for Cassacinamon and the Nameag 
Pequots just ten years after the Pequot War.
325
  Cassacinamon‘s denial that any of his 
people fought in the war testified to the fear that many colonists had regarding the 
Pequots.
326
  The petition of 1647 was a direct assault on Uncas‘s authority, with 
Cassacinamon taking his fight to the next level.   
 Winthrop presented the petition on Cassacinamon‘s behalf to the Commissioners 
at their meeting in Boston.  Uncas did not attend the meeting, but instead sent his trusted 
diplomat Foxon to defend him
 
.
327
  Cassacinamon‘s petition listed the ―unjustice & 
tyranny‖ the Pequots suffered under Uncas‘s authority.  The Pequots claimed Uncas had  
extorted wampum payments from them that were intended for the English, saying ―that 
they have sent wampum by him to the English 25 times, but know not whither all, or any 
part of it was rightly delivered.‖328  The Pequots also complained that Uncas had abused 
their women, with two of the petitioners – Obechiquod and Sanaps – serving as prime 
examples of this.  Sanaps reported ―that Uncus had abused his wife,‖ and ―that after she 
was soe defiled, she grew forward & he had little peace with her.‖  Obechiquod claimed 
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―that Uncas had taken away his wife, defileth her, & keepeth her away per force‖ when 
Obechiquod abandoned Uncas to settle with Cassacinamon‘s Pequots at Nameag.329 
 The harassment escalated when John Winthrop Jr. planted his settlement near 
their community, as Uncas acted in increasingly irrational ways to exert his dominion 
over Nameag.  When one of Uncas‘s men was wounded in Long Island, he came to 
Nameag and demanded Cassacinamon and the Pequots join him in a retaliatory raid.    
Cassacinamon refused, saying that ―he had ingaged himself with some others to Mr. 
Winthrop…to build him a wigwam.‖  The rest of the Nameag warriors, ―not knowinge 
any cause why Uncus should take so many men with him,‖ were not convinced of the 
necessity of having such an overwhelming military force for so simple a task, so they 
―excused themselves‖ from the raid.  However, not wishing to violate their tributary 
obligations to Uncas, they promised him that ―if any should shoote an arrowe against him 
upon notice they would come over & assist him.‖330  Uncas ―threatened to be revenged.‖  
He got his vengeance when he ―cut all their [fishing] nets.‖  Uncas‘s outrageous behavior 
continued until he attacked Nameag after Cassacinamon conducted the hunt for Thomas 
Peters, which caused John Winthrop Jr. to complain to the Commissioners in 1646.
331
   
 The charges sounded severe enough, and they present the picture of a Native 
community trying to honor its tributary relationship, but being unable to do so due to the 
unreasonable demands of the sachem.  Cassacinamon probably exaggerated certain 
elements for greater dramatic effect, and he certainly downplayed his numerous attempts 
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to provoke Uncas.  However, most of the charges bore a ring of truth.  Uncas had indeed 
―stolen‖ the Pequot women he married to gain their titles, and there is no mention of the 
women ever being consulted whether or not they wished to marry Uncas.  As for the 
charges of extortion and revenge, Uncas had always been known to follow his own rules.  
If Uncas could get away something that benefited his own position, he did it.  It is not 
unreasonable to believe Uncas kept wampum intended for colonial authorities, nor was 
he above using coercion to solidify his power over his Pequot tributaries.     
 In addition to the threats and extortion of wampum, the Pequots accused Uncas of 
favoring the Mohegans over the Pequots, a charge that struck at the heart of the identity 
issue.  Uncas and other Native leaders incorporated Pequot survivors after the war, in the 
hopes of expanding their power and strengthening their populations.  The Hartford Treaty 
had called for the Pequots to be fully absorbed into their new Native communities.  Yet, 
according to Cassacinamon, Uncas refused to see them not as his own people, but as 
Pequots.  He did not treat them with the level of respect or mutual reciprocity that 
sachems were expected to show the communities under their care.
332
  Uncas therefore 
violated Algonquian social protocols as well as the terms of the Hartford Treaty.   
 This ill-treatment occurred at all levels between the Mohegans and Pequots, 
ranging from the most benign social situations to more serious political matters.  When 
the Pequots beat the Mohegans at games, the Mohegans refused to pay them their 
winnings.  When the Pequots petitioned Uncas for redress, they complained that Uncas 
―carries it p[ar]tially to the Mohegans & threatens the Pequats.‖333  Games of chance 
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fulfilled an important part in maintaining the reciprocal relationships between sachems 
and their communities.  As anthropologist Eric Spencer Johnson notes, gambling was a 
way in which goods and wealth were redistributed within Algonquian communities.  If 
the sachem sponsored these games, he upheld the cycle of tribute and mutual 
obligation.
334
  By always siding with the Mohegans in these matters, Uncas neglected his 
responsibility as sachem and instead reinforced a tiered social system within his 
confederation, with the Pequots always subordinate to the Mohegans. 
 According to Cassacinamon, the situation remained unchanged until a personal 
tragedy struck Uncas.  When one of Uncas‘s children died in the spring of 1647, he 
―commanded‖ the Pequots to give his wife a gift to help assuage her grief.  The Pequots, 
―being affraid‖ of Uncas‘s wrath, presented the grieving couple one hundred fathoms of 
wampum.  The gift ―pleased Uncus,‖ so much so that ―he promised thence forward to 
esteeme them as Mohegans.‖335  Cassacinamon hoped that a new understanding had been 
reached with Uncas, but it was short-lived.  ―A few days later,‖ Uncas‘s brother 
Wawequa ―came & tould them that Uncus & his Councell, had determined to kill some of 
them.‖  The Pequots were ―much amased‖ by this injustice.  According to Cassacinamon, 
it was this final betrayal by Uncas that caused the Nameag Pequots to ―with draw from 
Uncus, & to submit & subject themselves to the English‖ for protection.  The Nameag 
Pequots collected a gift of wampum to present to the English as part of this proposal.  
When Uncas learned of this, he escalated the conflict with Cassacinamon, ―and came 
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with his men armed to the forte, called for those who promoted that businesse, 
threatening to kill them.‖  The Pequots who had proposed the arrangement with the 
English avoided a fight by sneaking out of the fort and filing a complaint with the 
Connecticut magistrates.
336
   
  Uncas‘s frequent use of force and coercion enabled him to maintain control over 
his tributaries.  However, with the 1647 petition, Cassacinamon charged that by refusing 
to acknowledge the rights of the Nameag Pequots and by neglecting the Algonquian 
system of mutual reciprocity, Uncas had violated the traditional power and 
responsibilities of a sachem.
337
  For all of these reasons Cassacinamon felt the Pequots 
had no choice but to petition the Commissioners for redress.  By placing themselves 
under English jurisdiction, Cassacinamon and the Nameag Pequots felt they stood a 
chance of maintaining their own Pequot autonomy, community, and identity.  By seeking 
out a new ally for his people, one who engaged in this system of reciprocity, 
Cassacinamon was acting as a sachem.
338
 
 Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr. presented the Commissioners with a compelling 
argument.  Uncas found himself in a tenuous position with the Commissioners, who 
demanded an immediate explanation for why the situation at Nameag had deteriorated.  
Arguing on Uncas‘s behalf, Foxon confessed that the Mohegans ―were foolish & faulty in 
that rash assault which they made upon the Pequatts,‖ and expressed regret that his 
actions caused ―the affrightenment of the women & children there.‖339  However, Uncas 
                                                 
336
Ibid.  
337
Oberg, Uncas, 122; Johnson, ―Some by Flatteries,‖ 71-78, 132-136, 202-209.  
338Johnson, ―Some by Flatteries,‖ 97-105.  
339―July 1647,‖ Acts, I: 100.  
 158 
believed that the principle behind the action was justified.  Cassacinamon and the 
Nameag Pequots were Uncas‘s subjects who, by Native custom and English law, owed 
him their allegiance and tribute.
340
  Uncas stressed that Cassacinamon and the Pequots 
had engaged in illegal activities by hunting in his territory without his permission, by 
refusing to aid him and pay him tribute, and by conspiring to join the English.  Uncas was 
therefore ―justly offended,‖ and was within his right to stop such activities.341  With these 
illegal activities Cassacinamon attempted, with Winthrop Jr.‘s help, to generate dissent 
among the Pequots and impugn Uncas‘s reputation in the eyes of the Commissioners.342  
These actions could not go unrecognized or unpunished, otherwise Uncas would have 
appeared inept to his people, something a sachem could not let go unpunished.   
 Foxon had an answer to every Pequot accusation.  He denied Obechiquod‘s claim 
that Uncas had stolen his wife, saying that she left Obechiquod of her own free will, for 
―amonge the Indians it is usuall when a wife soe desert her husband another may take 
her.‖  Native women had ―considerable freedom when it came to dissolving a union,‖ so 
it is certainly within the realm of possibility that she had  left her husband for Uncas.
343
  
Ultimatley, Foxon argued ―that the Pequatts being an under people might have some 
wrong from the Mohegans in play & durst not presse for their right, but denyeth that 
Uncas had any hand therein.‖344  Cassacinamon and the Nameag Pequots only 
complained because they were a subject people, not because of excessively harsh 
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treatment at the hands of Uncas.  According to Foxon, this petition was just another 
example of Cassacinamon causing trouble for Uncas and the Commissioners. 
 In the end, power politics won the argument.  The Commissioners immediately 
dismissed Cassacinamon‘s attempts at flattering English authorities with his story about 
Wequash.
345
  The Commissioners once again issued Uncas a reprimand, saying ―that 
Uncas be duly reproved for any passage of tirannicall government over them 
[Cassacinamon‘s group], soe far as they may be proved.‖  They then ordered Uncas to 
return Obechiquod‘s wife to him, and warned Uncas that he must learn to control his 
brother Wawequa.  If he did not, the English would ―wholly disert & leave him, that the 
Narragansett & others may require & recover satisfaction.‖346   
 Despite the reprimand, the Commissioners ruled that they were ―not so far 
satisfied in those Pequat complaints, as to justify their disorderly withdrawing [from 
Uncas].‖  The Commissioners not only refused to find in favor of Cassacinamon, but they 
reaffirmed the Treaty of Hartford.  The Commissioners, ―remembering the proud wars 
some years since made by the Pequatts,‖ stated that most colonists and administrators still 
harbored negative feelings towards the Pequots.  Uncas and his assistant Foxon, played 
upon those feelings in their answer to the Commissioners.  In doing so, Uncas swayed the 
Commissioners to rule in his favor, claiming ―that some of the petitioners were in 
Misticke fort in fight against the English.‖347  Uncas‘s direct appeal to the 
Commissioners‘ fears, combined with the fact he knew the colonial authorities still 
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needed the alliance with him, ensured that Uncas was once again the victor.  The 
Commissioners reaffirmed that ―the remnant of that [Pequot] nation should not be 
suffered (if the English could help it) either to be a distinct people, or to retayne the name 
of Pequatt, or to settle in the Pequatt country, but that they should all be divided betwixt 
the Narragansett & Mohegan Indians.‖348     
 The Commissioners‘ ruling was a significant defeat for Cassacinamon.  
Cassacinamon and Winthrop had misjudged colonial attitudes towards the Pequots.  It 
also served as a reprimand to Winthrop Jr.; the Commissioners did not appreciate his 
attempts to insert himself into the power politics of the region, and his business with 
Cassacinamon and Uncas threatened the stability of the region.
349
  Ten years after the 
Pequot War was still too soon in the minds of many English colonists to risk allowing the 
Pequots to live openly as such.
350
  The 1647 petition exposed Cassacinamon as an open 
opponent of Uncas but resulted in little material gain for the Pequots.  Cassacinamon lost 
his first attempt at freedom from Uncas because maintaining an alliance with Uncas was 
still in the best interest of Connecticut.  Uncas knew this, and exploited that knowledge.  
In addition, Uncas still retained the support of John Mason.  Mason was not the most 
popular Englishman in Connecticut, but he commanded a great deal of respect, and fear, 
from colonists and Algonquians alike.  Therefore, the Commissioners continued to 
tolerate Uncas‘s actions for the time being.   
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********************************* 
 The New England Anglo-Indian frontier experienced significant social and 
political upheaval in the years immediately following the Pequot War.  As Uncas, 
Miantonomi, and Ninigret each asserted themselves as Native power brokers in the 
region, English authorities in Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay sought to exert their 
own authority over the Anglo-Algonquian frontier.  The Pequots were caught in the midst 
of this.  However, while the Pequots no longer had the military power they once did, their 
lands and people remained important factors in shaping regional politics.  By adding the 
Pequot survivors and their lands to their existing power bases, leaders like Uncas shaped 
colonial politics for their own ends. 
 Although stripped of their former prominence, the Pequots were not destroyed, 
despite the efforts of English authorities to be rid of them and other Native groups to 
incorporate them.  Even when divided amongst neighboring peoples, the Pequots retained 
a sense of their own unique peoplehood, as evidenced by the existence of Pequot towns 
within other tribal areas.  Someone with the right connections and prerequisites for 
leadership could tap into that potential and provide the Pequots with the means of 
creating their own communities away from men like Uncas.  Robin Cassacinamon was 
that leader.  Cassacinamon‘s skills and likely hereditary claims ensured his rise as the 
leader of the Nameag Pequot community.  His years of living in the Winthrop household 
guaranteed Cassacinamon‘s access to a powerful English family, and during this time he 
formed a lasting partnership with John Winthrop Jr.   For a time, Uncas exploited the 
links Cassacinamon possessed to exert his authority over the Pequots and place them as 
tributaries in his network of Native villages.  However, as soon as Winthrop Jr. 
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established a settlement near Nameag, Cassacinamon introduced a plan to remove the 
community from Uncas‘s sphere of influence.  He cultivated his alliance with Winthrop 
Jr., who proved a persistent advocate for the Pequots, and strengthened the ties between 
the Nameag Pequots and the English.  He petitioned the Commissioners of the United 
Colonies, demonstrating a familiarity with English legal proceedings.  Despite the threats, 
intimidation, and the repeated refusal of English authorities to find in favor of the 
Pequots, Cassacinamon‘s plan was fruitful in one respect: Pequots continued to resettle at 
Nameag.      
 Although the Commissioners dismissed Cassacinamon‘s 1647 petition, the same 
ruling that had ordered the Pequots to remain in Uncas‘s authority also gave 
Cassacinamon a small thread of hope.  The Commissioners reprimanded Uncas for his 
harsh treatment of the Pequots, demonstrating that the Commissioners grew tired of 
dealing with Uncas.  For Cassacinamon to persuade the Commissioners to rule in his 
favor, he had to keep pushing Uncas so he would respond in increasingly outrageous and 
inappropriate ways.  Though dangerous, this strategy had potential, but it required that 
Cassacinamon think quickly and trust that his public opposition to Uncas would persuade 
further Pequots to join him at Nameag.   
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Chapter 4: Returning Home 
 In 1647, Robin Cassacinamon faced a serious dilemma.  Having declared his 
intentions to free the Nameag Pequots from the Mohegan confederation, Cassacinamon 
and the Nameag community exposed themselves to certain retribution from the Mohegan 
grand sachem Uncas.  Uncas had proved willing to use coercive force to compel the 
allegiance of the Nameag Pequots.
351
  Now, Uncas had a favorable ruling from the 
Commissioners of the United Colonies that supported his claims.  To Uncas, 
Cassacinamon was but a local leader in his Mohegan confederation, and he sought to 
remind Cassacinamon of his place in the new Mohegan order.
352
  Cassacinamon and the 
Pequots at Nameag disagreed.  However, after losing the first round of petitions to 
persuade English authorities to intercede on their behalf, the next steps Cassacinamon 
took were of critical importance; another mistake might spell the end of Nameag.   
 Cassacinamon and the Nameag Pequots remained obstinate in their refusal of the 
Mohegan leader.  Cassacinamon retained the support of John Winthrop Jr., and the 
Pequot sachem needed that support to continue with his agenda.  Even as the 
Cassacinamon-Winthrop alliance suffered the 1647 setback, new opportunities presented 
themselves to the struggling Pequot leader and his English partner.  The Anglo-
Algonquian frontier of seventeenth-century southern New England remained a shifting 
mass of Native and English alliances, political intrigue, and transformed communities.  
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While Uncas struggled to retain control over his tributaries, the Mohegans and the 
Narragansetts continued their ongoing battles as each sought to be the premier Native 
power in the region.  As the Native confederations battled among themselves, the New 
England colonies expanded, eager to exert dominance over the frontier for their own 
benefit.  In this shifting political environment, anthropologist Eric Spencer Johnson 
argues that local Native leaders ―could increase their communities‘ autonomy by 
breaking unequal relationships with principal sachems and forging new, more favorable 
alliances.‖353  As circumstances in the region changed, Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr. 
deliberately inserted themselves into tense political situations.  Connected to both 
Algonquian and English political systems, Cassacinamon exploited both to achieve his 
objectives for the Pequots.  Given the Pequots status after the Pequot War, the only way 
Cassacinamon could accomplish his goals was through utilizing both systems.  
Cassacinamon pushed forward with his agenda by relying on two important tactics.  First, 
he controlled and manipulated information through direct personal action as an 
informant, interpreter, and negotiator. Second, he and Winthrop Jr. encouraged members 
of the Nameag community, both Pequot and English, to engage in physical acts of 
disobedience – civil and otherwise.354  Cassacinamon coordinated these tactics alongside 
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John Winthrop Jr. and the Nameag Pequots.  In so doing, Cassacinamon and the Pequots 
achieved a victory that ensured their survival.  But it was not without risks. 
I 
 With the Pequot business temporarily settled, Uncas turned his attention from 
Nameag to other threats pressing his Mohegan confederation.  These renewed challenges 
came from the Pocumtuck sachem Sequassen, whose territory lay west of Mohegan along 
the Connecticut River, and from the Niantics and Narragansetts to the east, who, after the 
murder of Miantonomi (which Uncas had orchestrated), were led by the sachem 
Ninigret.
355
  The Narragansetts, being the most populous Native confederation in 
southern New England, posed a significant challenge to Uncas, even with the strength he 
had accumulated since the Pequot War.  Conflicts between the two groups continued 
throughout the 1640s, and Uncas found his resources stretched to their limit fending off 
these new attacks.
356
  As these other leaders distracted Uncas, Cassacinamon and 
Winthrop Jr. rebounded from their 1647 setback; by the following year, they again 
challenged Uncas‘s authority as principal sachem over the Nameag Pequots.    
 Why did Cassacinamon stay allied with the younger Winthrop?  If an alliance 
with John Winthrop Jr. did not provide Cassacinamon with desirable results, why did the 
Pequot sachem not abandon the Englishman for another, more successful, advocate?  
Loyalty and opportunity may best explain Cassacinamon‘s actions, as well as the younger 
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Winthrop‘s.  It appears that Cassacinamon did not seek another English advocate during 
these early struggles.  After eight years of negotiating with the Winthrop family, and 
living with them for at least part of that time, by 1646 Cassacinamon had come to lead 
the Pequots settled at Nameag.  The Nameag Pequots had been incorporated into the 
Mohegan confederation after the Pequot War; under Algonquian and English customs, 
they owed allegiance to Uncas.
357
  And yet, from the beginning of Winthrop Jr.‘s 
involvement with Nameag, he dealt exclusively with Cassacinamon.  The 1645 
agreement that Winthrop Jr. had drawn up to create Pequot Plantation was not signed by 
Uncas but by Cassacinamon, who was already described as ―Governour and Chief 
Councelor among the Pequots.‖358  Thus, from the outset, John Winthrop Jr. recognized 
Cassacinamon as the leader of the Nameag Pequots.  From that point onward, the 
younger Winthrop had been a vocal advocate of Cassacinamon and the Pequots.  The 
younger Winthrop‘s dogged persistence may have been a rare commodity Cassacinamon 
could not take for granted.           
 The same question could be asked of John Winthrop Jr.  John Winthrop Jr. 
assumed a tremendous political risk by supporting Cassacinamon and the Nameag 
Pequots. While the Winthrop family was politically connected throughout the region, the 
only political office Winthrop held in Connecticut was his commission to govern Pequot 
Plantation.
359
  By 1648, it appeared to outside observers that the younger Winthrop had 
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attached his political future to a limited Algonquian community.  His previous efforts on 
behalf of Cassacinamon had resulted in failure, if not great personal embarrassment.
360
  
Winthrop Jr. risked alienating the very men who gave him his commission.  Soon, other 
colonial leaders — and even personal relations — pressured the younger Winthrop to 
abandon the Pequots.  Not surprisingly, John Mason, Uncas‘s chief advocate among the 
English, was one of those voices.  Despite Uncas‘s frequent expansionist endeavors, 
Mason advised Winthrop Jr. to ―encourage your people [English and Pequot] that they be 
not ouer much trobled.‖  The Nameag community may ―scope at the Monheags,‖ but 
Mason assured him that ―they are limited and cannot goe beyond their tether.‖361  Given 
the ongoing struggle between their respective Native allies, Mason‘s advice was likely 
not accepted at face value.  However, the younger Winthrop also received pleas from his 
family to let the matter with the Pequots drop.  John Winthrop Sr. went so far as to beg 
his son from his deathbed in 1649 to cease pushing the Pequot issue.  In a letter from his 
brother Adam, Winthrop Jr. learned that his father requested ―that you wold strive no 
more about the Pequod Indians but leave theme to the commissioners‘ order.‖362   
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 Native leaders who sought Winthrop Jr.‘s support for themselves also attempted 
to break his bond with Cassacinamon.  One such leader was the Narragansett-Niantic 
sachem Ninigret.  After the death of Miantonomi, Ninigret — connected to the Niantics 
and the Narragansetts via kinship bonds — led not only the Niantics, but a faction of the 
Narragansetts.  According to Roger Williams, Ninigret and other Narragansett and 
Niantic councilors thought that ―Causasenamon and the rest of the Pequts‖ should ―be as 
Your [Winthrop Jr.‘s] Little dogs but not as Your Confederates.‖  Treating such a lowly 
group as if they were his equals was, Williams related to Winthrop Jr., an action ―they 
say is unworthy [to] yourselfe.‖363  For sachems like Ninigret, Winthrop Jr. wasted his 
time with Cassacinamon; if Winthrop Jr. wanted to challenge Uncas and position himself 
as a mediator between the English and Natives, he was better served by siding with more 
powerful Native allies.
364
   
 Despite the pleading from family, and warnings from other Native and English 
leaders, Winthrop Jr. continued supporting Cassacinamon.  John Winthrop Jr. maintained 
designs of becoming a major ―cultural broker‖ between the Connecticut colonists and the 
Indians.  Despite the setbacks they faced extricating the Nameag Pequots from Uncas, 
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Cassacinamon and the Pequots still provided Winthrop with the perfect opportunity to be 
that mediator.
365
  For the younger Winthrop, the chance to obstruct Uncas and assert 
greater English control over the Connecticut frontier proved an invaluable opportunity.  
Perhaps he persisted with Cassacinamon because he felt that the Nameag Pequots were 
the right kind of ―dependable Indians‖: there were enough Pequots in the community to 
perform various functions as hunters, laborers, and informants, but they were not 
powerful enough to strike out on their own.   
 Yet, the younger Winthrop‘s consistent refusal to listen to anyone — English or 
Native — who advised him to abandon Cassacinamon suggests that something more than 
political goals bound the two men together.  Winthrop Jr. had known Cassacinamon for a 
decade by this point.  They united to build Pequot Plantation.  His steadfast commitment 
to Cassacinamon suggests that loyalty and friendship bound the Cassacinamon-Winthrop 
alliance together, above any other tangible advantages it may have produced.   
 One year after the ruling against Cassacinamon, Uncas complained to the 
Commissioners that ―noe Conformety hath hitherto been yealded‖ by the Nameag 
Pequots to follow the edict, despite being ordered to ―returne to their former subjection to 
Uncas.‖366  While Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr. filed petitions with the authorities, the 
Pequots and the English settlers at Nameag/Pequot Plantation engaged in more direct acts 
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of civil disobedience and sabotage.  Uncas complained that two Mohegan canoes were 
stolen by the English, who refused to return them to their rightful owners.  Along with 
these property thefts, the Pequot inhabitants of Nameag prevented Mohegans from 
fishing in the Pequot/Thames River.
367
  Given the seasonal subsistence patterns of the 
indigenous people of southern New England, this type of obstruction proved significant.   
 The Pequots did not limit their obstructionist activities to the Thames riverbed.  
Cassacinamon and the Nameag Pequots continued hunting in the disputed Pequot 
territory.  The Nameag Pequots were not alone in their hunts; individuals from the eastern 
Pawcatuck Pequot community frequently joined Cassacinamon‘s men.  Once again, the 
Pequots deliberately violated the usufruct rights claimed by Uncas, just as they had done 
before the Nameag raid.
368
  By the fall of 1648, the Nameag and Pawcatuck Pequots were 
also joined by some Narragansett hunting parties sent by Ninigret.  Control over the 
former Pequot territory proved an ongoing source of contention between the Mohegans, 
Narragansetts, Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay; additional stress could potentially 
escalate these tensions into a full-scale crisis.  By ignoring Uncas‘s presumed claims and 
the Commissioners‘ rulings, Cassacinamon and the Pequots (whether they were from 
Nameag or from Wequashcook‘s Pawcatuck group), directly challenged established 
authorities, and goaded them to take action.  The fact that both Pequot communities were 
involved in these actions suggests that a continued level of kinship, cooperation, and 
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coordination existed between the two groups despite the efforts of the English, 
Mohegans, and Narragansetts to dissolve them as a distinct, recognizable people.
369
   
 As Cassacinamon and the Nameag Pequots stepped up their attacks on Uncas‘s 
usufructary rights, Wequashcook made overtures to John Mason to relocate his 
community of Pequots from their imposed Narragansett affiliation, and place themselves 
under English jurisdiction.  In a letter from Mason to Winthrop Jr. dated September 9, 
1648, Mason acknowledged that Wequashcook was staying with him at Mason‘s home in 
Seabrook, and that the Pequot-Niantic leader pledged that ―he neyther hath nor will have 
any hand with the Nannoganset in theire plottinge against Oncos or the English.‖  Mason 
confessed to Winthrop Jr. that while he tended to believe Wequashcook, he desired ―to 
understand your [Winthrop Jr.‘s] thoughts in that particular‖ matter.370   
 The timing of these events – Cassacinamon‘s renewed hunting excursions, 
Wequashcook‘s entreaties to Mason, and Mason‘s questions to Winthrop Jr. – cannot be 
dismissed as mere coincidence.  It certainly demonstrates that by 1648, John Winthrop Jr. 
was the recognized Pequot ―expert‖ among English authorities.371  In that regard, the 
younger Winthrop‘s goal of becoming an intermediary between English and Native was 
successful.  That Cassacinamon‘s counterpart among the eastern Pequot settlement 
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approached Mason, not Uncas, with his offer suggests that both Pequot leaders and 
communities found a direct alliance with English authorities preferable to forced 
affiliations with Algonquian confederations.  This desire on the part of Cassacinamon and 
Wequashcook to break away from the Mohegans and the Narragansetts-Niantics – 
politically and physically - can ―only be understood against the background of Indian 
politics,‖ an awareness that the relationships between the English and their Native allies 
and opponents ―were inextricably linked to struggles within and among Native 
polities.‖372  Cassacinamon and Wequashcook sought separate Pequot communities, and 
they stood a better chance of achieving that goal by forming a direct political alliance 
with the English.  If such an alliance also obstructed the plans of the Mohegans and 
Narragansetts, that was fine with the Pequots.        
 While the Pequots hunts angered the Mohegan sachem, tensions escalated further 
when Ninigret sent Narragansett hunters into the disputed zone.  That Ninigret would do 
this was not altogether surprising; he hated Uncas and remained committed to destroying 
Mohegan power in the region.
373
  However, in a series of rapid exchanges between John 
Winthrop Jr., Roger Williams, and John Mason between September and October of 1648, 
it became clear that Cassacinamon was directly involved in bringing Ninigret into the 
dispute.  A little over a week after he had cordially reached out to the younger Winthrop 
seeking his advice on how to proceed with Wequashcook, Mason demanded answers 
from Winthrop Jr. as to why ―Nynygreat [Ninigret] with diverse others of that broode are 
resolued sodaynely to hunt all over the Pequot cuntrey.‖  Cassacinamon, whom Mason 
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dismissed in his letter as merely being ―your man Robin the Indian,‖ had reportedly given 
the Narragansett-Niantic sachem word from Winthrop Jr. that his people had Winthrop‘s 
―allowance‖ to hunt in the disputed zones.374   
 While he had no concern about displaying his anger towards Cassacinamon and 
Ninigret in his letter, Mason could not accuse Winthrop Jr. of deliberately causing 
trouble.  Winthrop Jr. was too well-connected, even if Mason believed the younger 
Winthrop knew more than he let on.  Still, his words to Winthrop Jr. are replete with 
passive-aggressive innuendo.  Mason assured Winthrop Jr. that when he heard the 
accusations that Winthrop, via Cassacinamon, had granted this permission to Ninigret, he 
believed the younger Winthrop was innocent, ―knowing that you will not engage in such 
a matter of soe ill savor with the Eng[lish] especially as it stands.‖  Instead, he advised 
Winthrop Jr. to ―please discountenance them whereby to hinder theire proceeding in any 
such way of hunting.‖  Still, the actions of Cassacinamon, the Pequots, and the 
Narragansetts did not go unnoticed, and if they continued they would not go unpunished.  
Mason warned Winthrop Jr. that he would ―give them [the offending Indian groups] a 
vissit which I suppose will not be very pleasing to them.‖375  This threat, coming from the 
man who had torched the Mystic fort eleven years earlier, could not be taken lightly.  
Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr. ignored the threats. 
 Winthrop Jr.‘s response to Mason‘s allegations was calculated and measured.  
First, he offered advice of his own to Mason, telling him that this report was probably 
―brought to you but from Surmises and Jelousies of the Mohegens‖ and should thus be 
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taken into careful consideration.  ―I told him [Ninigret] I could not give him licence,‖ 
Winthrop Jr. wrote, because he believed ―the privaledge to belong only to the English.‖  
However, Winthrop Jr. admitted that he ―said little against it‖ when he heard about 
Ninigret‘s desire to hunt in the region, and that ―it may be my silence about it he might 
take for consent and thinke it sufficient allowance.‖376  The answer offered the younger 
Winthrop plausible deniability; he never specifically said these groups could hunt in the 
region, but since he did not argue the English position on the matter forcefully enough, 
Cassacinamon and Ninigret acted on their own.  In the letter, Winthrop Jr. shared — on 
the surface at least — English frustrations over the independent actions of the Natives.  
The reality was much different.   
 Roger Williams, writing on behalf of Ninigret and the Narragansetts, sent 
Winthrop Jr. a letter clarifying the Narragansetts‘ position.  Williams informed Winthrop 
Jr. that ―Nenekunat [Ninigret] made great Lamentation that you had enteretained hard 
thoughts of him in this business.‖  However, despite the confusion, the Narragansetts 
hoped that Winthrop Jr. would not ―rob Nenekunat of those hunting places wch the 
Commissioners gave him leave to make use of and he with the English had fought for 
with the Expence of much treasure and hazard of his Life.‖  When he considered 
Cassacinamon‘s role in distributing ―questionable‖ information, Williams offered 
Winthrop Jr. some ―friendly advise‖ from the Narragansetts.  ―Causasenamon and the rest 
of the Pequts,‖ the Narragansetts had said, should ―be as Your Litle dogs but not as Your 
Confederates, wch they say is unworthy of Your selfe.‖377    
                                                 
376―John Winthrop, Jr., to John Mason, September 19, 1648,‖ WP, 5: 255.  
377―To John Winthrop, Jr. 10 October 1648,‖ RWC, I: 251-252.  
 175 
 This series of exchanges showcased one of the most significant abilities available 
to Cassacinamon: his role as an interpreter and negotiator to control and spread 
information and misinformation.  Throughout the 1640s and 1650s, Cassacinamon 
appears in the colonial records as an envoy, interpreter, and purveyor of information 
between various English officials and Native leaders.
378
  According to Eric Spencer 
Johnson, controlling information was ―an important way in which Indians manipulated, 
or tried to manipulate, their English allies‖ during this period in the seventeenth century.  
Cassacinamon, who was fluent in Pequot-Mohegan, English, and likely Narragansett-
Niantic, proved to be a valuable asset on the Anglo-Algonquian frontier.  Skilled linguists 
like Cassacinamon held an essential role because ―almost all the diplomatic proceedings 
between English and Native were carried out through Indian interpreters.‖  According to 
Johnson, while several Natives were multilingual, very few Englishmen spoke indigenous 
languages.  This language barrier meant that ―information from Native sources could be 
difficult to verify,‖ making independent confirmation a ―problem‖ for English leaders.  
The battle over accurate information, combined with the knowledge that the Natives on 
whom they depended could very easily deceive them, contributed to the guarded or 
outright negative attitudes that English officials had of Native peoples.
379
  Native leaders 
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knew they had a distinct advantage when it came to gathering intelligence on the Anglo-
Algonquian frontier, and they acted accordingly. 
 In this multilingual environment, Cassacinamon transformed his position as an 
―information broker‖ into a distinct political advantage.  Seen in this light, the 1648 
hunting controversy takes on an added significance.  Ninigret‘s comments to Winthrop Jr. 
regarding Cassacinamon are important.  Ninigret‘s advice to Winthrop Jr. — to treat 
Cassacinamon as if he were his ―little dog‖ — suggests that Cassacinamon utilized his 
position as an interpreter and intermediary as an explicitly political role, and that he 
deliberately manipulated the lines of communication to foment a crisis.  Ninigret‘s 
dehumanizing epithet intended to belittle Cassacinamon, and to warn Winthrop Jr. 
against treating an underling as if he were an equal, as did Mason‘s angry dismissal of 
Cassacinamon as ―Robin your Indian.‖  However, while the Mohegans and the 
Narragansetts, and their English advocates all dismissed Cassacinamon, the fact remained 
that he had either engineered or at the very least exploited an already tense situation for 
his own advantage.  That Winthrop Jr. did not vehemently deny or disavow 
Cassacinamon‘s actions indicates that he knew more than he revealed in his denial to 
John Mason.  Given Cassacinamon‘s previous history of petitions and actions, taken on 
his own and with Winthrop Jr., it is doubtful that Cassacinamon simply acted on ―orders‖ 
from the younger Winthrop.  The two men had coordinated their efforts for some time.  
This calculated manipulation of information only makes sense if Cassacinamon believed 
a conflict between the Mohegans and Narragansetts could benefit the Pequots.  Knowing 
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that tensions existed over the contested Pequot territory, it would be easy for 
Cassacinamon, as an intermediary between various Algonquian and English 
communities, to fan the flames of a dispute between the Mohegans and Narragansetts.  In 
the chaos of a conflict, Cassacinamon and Nameag could benefit in either the death or 
disgrace of their Native rivals in the struggle, or by siding with the English (via Winthrop 
Jr.) in quelling it.  Such action could garner an award from the English, namely 
Cassacinamon‘s request to remove the Pequots from Uncas‘s authority.   
 If this were Cassacinamon‘s plan, it was one with a great deal of personal risk.  If 
he deliberately instigated a fight, he opened himself up to punishment or death; the 
Commissioners of the United Colonies stepped aside when Uncas executed Miantonomi 
because they felt it was in their interest to do so.
380
  However, unlike Miantonomi, 
Cassacinamon possessed dual layers of protection.  For all of the problems he caused for 
Uncas, the Mohegan sachem never targeted Cassacinamon in the way he orchestrated 
Miantonomi‘s death.  Uncas used coercive force and innuendo to try and force 
Cassacinamon‘s compliance, but he never set out to remove him entirely.  Cassacinamon 
proved too valuable a link between Uncas and the Nameag Pequots to simply remove.  
Cassacinamon possessed the support of the Nameag community, and Uncas wanted to 
keep Nameag within his confederation; if he eliminated Cassacinamon it may have driven 
Nameag even closer to the English.  There is also the possibility that Cassacinamon held 
some kind of kinship ties to one of Uncas‘s wives, the woman he procured from the 
Winthrop‘s in 1638.  If they were tied in such a manner, Uncas faced a situation 
comparable to what Sassacus faced prior to the Pequot War.  Sassacus could not 
                                                 
380
Oberg, Uncas, 104-107.  
 178 
eliminate Uncas, despite his repeated attempts at subversion, due to their bonds of 
kinship; perhaps something similar was at work between Cassacinamon and Uncas in the 
1640s and 1650s.
381
  Cassacinamon also had a well-connected ally in John Winthrop Jr.  
Thus, Cassacinamon possessed certain Algonquian and English protections that were 
denied Miantonomi, and that distinguished Cassacinamon from his predecessor Sassacus.  
The previous decade, the Pequots were the only Algonquian confederation without 
English allies; Cassacinamon rectified that situation, out of necessity.  However, 
Cassacinamon still risked reprisal from Uncas or the Commissioners if he overplayed his 
hand. 
 By September 1648, the Commissioners had had enough.  Frustrated with the 
continued refusal by Cassacinamon, the Pequots, and Winthrop Jr. to follow their orders, 
and presented with evidence of Cassacinamon‘s troublemaking, the Commissioners 
issued a new decree.  The Commissioners ordered that it was ―Now thought fit and 
concluded that Mr. John Winthrape bee informed of the continued minds And 
Resolucions of the Comisrs for their [Nameag Pequots] returne‖ to Uncas382  After they 
reminded Winthrop Jr. as to who truly was the proper English authorities in the region, 
the Commissioners once again ruled that ―Uncas shall have order, & Lib[erty] by 
Constrainte‖ to force the Pequots to submit to his authority.  The Commissioners in no 
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uncertain terms advised Winthrop ―that the Government of Connecticut will provide hee 
[Uncas] bee not therein opposed by any English Nor the Peaquats or any of them 
harbored or sheltered in any of their houses.‖383   
 For two months Winthrop Jr. received repeated reminders of the Commissioner‘s 
ruling.  In October, John Mason wrote to the younger Winthrop, and told him to prepare 
for the reality that ―Onkos shall have libertie to fetch his Indians to theire former place 
who are now residing at Nameag.‖  He also made it clear that ―severall Eng: [b]oth to 
witness to the Carriag of the desig[n] and that there be noe wronge done to the English of 
Na[meag].‖  While he assured Winthrop Jr. that the English settlers at Nameag would not 
be hurt, Mason reiterated that ―the English of Nameage are required by the Comissioners 
order that they doe not Enterteyne any of Nameag Indians or there goodes unto their uses 
nor any way hinder Onkos in the prosecucion of this service.‖  He closed his letter by 
telling Winthrop Jr. that ―much is desired that you should be made acquainted‖ with the 
ruling, ―as alsoe the rest of your neighbors.‖  Mason‘s missive was followed by word 
from Edward Hopkins on November 1, 1648, in a letter that reiterated the 
Commissioners‘ orders.384  Uncas was coming.  Cassacinamon and the Nameag Pequots 
must submit to the order.  The English must not interfere.  No excuses would be tolerated 
this time.  Yet Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr. still refused to comply.    
 On November 21, 1648, Uncas and John Mason received leave from the 
Commissioners to march on Nameag.  Uncas was given ―leave by violence‖ to force the 
Pequots to submit, although he was once again reminded to leave the English settlers 
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alone.
385
  Hoping to avoid the hassles that had resulted from his 1646 raid on Nameag, 
Uncas included English officials as observers, and presented what he saw as a reasonable 
solution.  However, while Uncas worked closely with the Commissioners on this issue, 
that proximity did not make him an English pawn.
386
  The Mohegan grand sachem 
manipulated the English into helping him keep a group of his wayward tributaries in line.  
Uncas may have been prepared for this raid, but the same held true for Cassacinamon and 
Winthrop Jr.  They convinced the men of Nameag — Pequot and English, as well as the 
local constable — to obstruct Uncas‘s mission.387   
 Uncas‘s second raid on Nameag was an ugly and violent confrontation.  The 
Mohegans injured Pequot men and women, stripped them of their clothes, destroyed or 
stole their possessions, and carried away their food supplies.  The constable and colonists 
in the English settlement tried to intercede on behalf of the Pequots, but were rebuffed.
388
  
The debacle at Nameag generated another call to the Commissioners for arbitration, yet 
this new round of hearings produced unexpected results.  This time, Cassacinamon and 
Winthrop Jr. received more support for their case, and that support came from prominent 
colonial administrators.   
II 
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 The second raid on Nameag convinced other prominent colonial leaders that 
Uncas had gone too far.  In January of 1649, Roger Williams wrote to John Winthrop Jr., 
pledging his support in Winthrop‘s subsequent petition directed against Uncas and John 
Mason for their actions at Nameag the previous November, actions that Williams 
―feare[d] he [Mason] miscaried.‖  Williams admitted that Mason wrote to him several 
times, telling him ―of some extraordinary Lifts against Onkas and that he will favour him, 
but no more then Religion and Reason bids him.‖  Williams wondered ―how it stands 
with Religion and Reason that such a monstrous Hurrie and Affrightment should be 
offered to an English Town either by Indians or English, unpunished.‖  He then urged the 
younger Winthrop to ―heape Coales of Fire on Capt: Masons head, conquer evill with 
good but be not cowardly and overcome with any evill.‖  While those ―coales of fire‖ 
were likely metaphorical, the sentiment was clear.  John Winthrop Sr. (several weeks 
before his 1649 death bed plea to let the matter with the Pequots drop) also endorsed his 
son.  Although he wished that the younger Winthrop‘s constable ―had forborne to meddle 
with them,‖ he was not ―greatly sorry for Uncas his outrage‖ in failing to achieve his 
goals with Nameag.  In fact, Winthrop Sr. hoped that Uncas‘s latest overly aggressive 
actions at Nameag would ―give the Commissioners occasion to take stricter Course with 
him [Uncas].‖389  The senior Winthrop was worried about his son, but both Winthrop Sr. 
and Williams recognized the political implications if the situation with the Nameag 
Pequots continued to deteriorate.  Public support from other well-known and influential 
colonial authorities provided Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr. the kind of attention they 
had hoped would surface after the first petition in 1647.  Now that the necessary outside 
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support had surfaced, Cassacinamon and Winthrop seized it as leverage in their bid to 
place the Pequots under direct English jurisdiction.   
 The chaotic events surrounding Uncas‘s second raid greatly displeased the 
Commissioners.
390
  On top of that, Cassacinamon and the Pequots still remained at 
Nameag, so the raid failed.  Two important facts stand out.  No specific mention is made 
as to whether or not people were seriously injured or killed, only vague references that 
something bad had happened.  This is unusual because records of other incidents at 
Nameag mention when people were injured or when losses of life occurred.
391
  However, 
the records are curiously silent with regard to the November 1648 incident.  There are 
also no official reprimands from the Commissioners of the United Colonies against 
Cassacinamon or John Winthrop Jr.  Their silence on the matter is curious, given their 
previous adamant demands that the two men not defy their orders.  If the senior 
Winthrop‘s words had any truth to them, beyond just a father speaking out of concern for 
his son, they suggest that Uncas acted in a way that the English observers sent by the 
Commissioners to oversee the events found objectionable.  If that is the case, then their 
silence on Cassacinamon‘s and Winthrop Jr.‘s refusal to comply with the order is 
understandable.  The Commissioners finally understood that Cassasinamon would 
continue to make his case and cause trouble for Uncas until his demands were met.   
 Cassacinamon grew bolder in his defiance, and his plans directly involved his 
counterpart Wequashcook.  Before the second raid on Nameag, Wequashcook had 
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approached John Mason with overtures for an alliance with the Englishman, but the 
business with Cassacinamon and Nameag interfered with that particular discussion.
392
  
Despite the chaos that surrounded the Nameag Pequots, or perhaps because of it, 
Wequashcook had not let the matter go.  By early 1649, Roger Williams wrote to John 
Winthrop, Jr., having ―heard of Wequashcucks carrying of Peag to Capt. Mason.‖  The 
exchange of wampum (peag) was often the first step in negotiations between disparate 
parties in indigenous southern New England, so it appeared that Wequashcook still 
desired an alliance with Mason.
393
   
 While other English authorities appeared interested in Wequashcook‘s offer,394 
Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr. dealt with this possible challenge to their positions as 
Pequot leader and advocate.  On March 8, 1649, Mason wrote to Winthrop Jr. and told 
him that Wequashcook again visited Mason at Seabrook.  Wequashcook complained ―of 
an injury done as he sayth to one of his men by your servant Jno: Austin…whoe hat as he 
affirmeth take a Cannoe of his and keeps it from him by force having noe just cause soe 
to doe.‖  Mason pointedly looked to the younger Winthrop ―to enquire into the matter: 
that right may be doe done and if the Cannoe be deteyned wrongfully that it may be 
restored to the owner.‖395  Wequashcook then left Mason at Seabrook, and traveled to 
Nameag to reclaim his man‘s property.  Cassacinamon and his lieutenant Obechiquod did 
not return the canoe.  Instead, Cassacinamon seized Wequashcook and refused to release 
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him.  Cassacinamon, with Winthrop Jr.‘s consent and cooperation, held Wequashcook 
under house arrest at Winthrop‘s house.396 
 When Mason heard what Cassacinamon had done he was furious, and demanded 
to know why ―Weyquashcooke was lately bound by Abachickwood and 
Cassasenaman.‖397  If they imprisoned Wequashcook for something he did while visiting 
with Mason, he offered to answer any of Winthrop Jr.‘s questions.  However, if the 
younger Winthrop ―apprehend the matter soe weighty that he cannot be set free,‖ Mason 
asked that Wequashcook ―be carried to the common prison at Hartford,‖ presumably to 
let the Commissioners adjudicate the matter.  Mason‘s contempt for Cassacinamon is 
evident throughout the letter.  Mason dismisses Cassacinamon‘s role and authority as 
Pequot leader, writing that ―it is such a riddle that I doe not well understand nor can 
believe as yet that a Sachem should be bound by inferior men.‖  A great deal of bad 
blood had passed between Mason and Cassacinamon, so it is understandable that Mason 
would favor Wequashcook and acknowledge him as sachem at the expense of 
Cassacinamon.  He warned that ―when reckonings are cast up these twoe viz: Rob[in] and 
the other will find some troble.‖  This incident for Mason was just the latest in a long 
series of ―problems‖ started by Cassacinamon, and he predicted that ―Such things have 
past already that I suppose they will come to a second viewe, but I shall not 
particularize.‖398 
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 Why did Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr. hold Wequashcook under house arrest?  
It was sure to anger Mason, but it may also have alienated the Pawcatuck Pequot 
community, the Commissioners of the United Colonies, and possibly Ninigret as well.  
By allowing Cassacinamon to hold Wequashcook at his house, Winthrop Jr. once again 
placed himself in a very contentious situation due to his attachment to the Pequots.  It 
was hardly a coincidence that three days later, on March 13, Adam Winthrop wrote to his 
brother to pass him that message from their father whereby the senior Winthrop begged 
his son ―as if it wear his last request,‖ to ―strive no more about the pequod Indians but 
leave theme to the commissioners order.‖399  This bold action can only be understood by 
looking at the relationship between the two main Pequot communities, Nameag and 
Pawcatuck, and between their leaders Cassacinamon and Wequashcook.  Despite 
attempts to keep the Pequots separated, the Pequots living at Nameag and Pawcatuck had 
sustained contact with one another.  Since at least 1647, Cassacinamon had the support of 
several Pawcatuck Pequots who, although technically Narragansett tributaries, lived with 
Cassacinamon and the Nameag Pequots.
400
   
 The Pequots still possessed strong internal ties of kinship and community, and 
Cassacinamon drew strength from that in his attempts to break the Pequots away from 
Uncas.  Yet, this did not mean the Pequots were free from internal conflict.  The episode 
between Cassacinamon and Wequashcook illustrated possible tensions among the 
Pequots, specifically over the question of Pequot leadership.  In February 1649, Thomas 
Stanton discussed a situation between Cassacinamon and Wequashcook with John 
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Winthrop Jr.  According to Stanton, Cassacinamon had filed a complaint with 
Connecticut governor John Haynes.  This complaint was an independent action on 
Cassacinamon‘s part, so Stanton (on Governor Haynes‘s behalf) wrote to Winthrop Jr. to 
get some insight on the situation.  In the complaint, Cassacinamon asked Governor 
Haynes to address ―the wrounges don to him [Cassacinamon] by Wequascokes brother 
and to see him righted or to send them word that they may right him.‖401  Several weeks 
later, Edward Hopkins wrote to John Winthrop Jr. to discuss Wequashcook‘s offer of 
creating an alliance with the English.  Despite Hopkins general misgivings regarding the 
trustworthiness of the Native people, he described Wequashcook as being ―cordiall to the 
English,‖ and he agreed to hear Wequashcook‘s request.  Wequashcook desired this 
alliance because he felt Ninigret treated him unfairly and violated the reciprocal 
obligations of the tributary relationship.  According to Hopkins, Wequashcook‘s main 
objection to Ninigret was that the Narragansett-Niantic sachem endeavored ―to settle the 
Pequotts that lately were att Nameocke, upon his owne proper land and to out him of that 
which was his cleare undoubted inheritance.‖402  Hopkins wrote to Winthrop Jr. seeking 
his advice on the matter, and asked him to discover what ―the true state of the case, and 
how farre there is a reality in the informacion now given.‖403  In the midst of this 
endeavor, Cassacinamon seized Wequashcook and held him under house arrest at 
Nameag.  
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 These incidents suggest that for a brief time some kind of power struggle existed 
between Cassacinamon and Wequashcook over leadership of the Pequots.  Each man 
sought to free the Pequots from their forced affiliations with other Algonquian 
confederations, and each sought alliances with the English as a way to bring about those 
changes.  This invocation of English allies for political gain was a common strategy used 
by many Algonquian communities and leaders in the seventeenth century.
404
  That this 
struggle occurred during a period of heightened tension between the English, the 
Mohegans, and the Narragansetts is also not surprising, for the shifting political situation 
provided the Pequots with an opportunity to press forward their agenda.  However, 
despite the long-standing connections of kinship, and the shared goals that linked the 
Nameag and Pawcatuck communities, they were not a monolithic entity.  It is likely that 
each man desired to be the Pequots‘ principal sachem.  Both men used whatever 
resources were available to them to make that happen, including manipulating allies 
(English and Native alike) and exploiting the current political situation.   
 In this struggle between the Pequot leaders, Cassacinamon had the advantage.  It 
was Cassacinamon‘s community at Nameag that experienced continuous growth after 
1645, attracting not only Pequots who were tributaries of Uncas, but Narragansett-Niantic 
affiliated Pequots as well.  The Nameag population rose to somewhere between 300-500 
people.
405
  It was Cassacinamon who possessed the alliance with the prominent 
Englishman that provided him with critical protections.  And as his complaint to 
Governor Hayes regarding Wequashcook‘s brother demonstrated, Cassacinamon solicited 
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other English authorities besides his ally John Winthrop Jr. to challenge any threats to his 
position as leader within the Pequot community.  Even if those threats originated from 
other Pequots.  Perhaps this explains why Wequashcook approached John Mason and 
Edward Hopkins with overtures of an alliance; an English-Pawcatuck alliance could 
counter the Cassacinamon-Winthrop alliance and strengthen his own Pequot community.  
If Hopkins were to be believed, Wequashcook approached the English because Ninigret 
was trying to undermine his authority in Pawcatuck by bringing all the Pequots into the 
Narragansett territory as tributaries.  The Pawcatuck leader also wanted an English ally 
because, as Hopkins noted in his letter to Winthrop Jr., ―some English that are beginning 
to build upon part of his ground, without his leave or consent.‖406   
 If true, this explains why Hopkins wanted Winthrop Jr. to verify Wequashcook‘s 
story.  This overture to the English was a calculated ploy on Wequashcook‘s part; it 
played on English fears concerning Ninigret‘s expanding influence, as well as lingering 
English prejudices and fears regarding the Pequots.  It is doubtful that Wequashcook 
objected to a course of action that united the Pequots.  However, if such a plan resulted in 
Wequashcook losing his position of authority to Cassacinamon, that could explain his 
overtures to English authorities.   
 Cassacinamon met any potential challenge issued by Wequashcook with all the 
resources at his disposal.  If diplomatic channels did not produce the desired results, 
Cassacinamon turned to more direct methods, which is how Wequashcook ended up 
under house arrest at Winthrop Jr.‘s house at Nameag in March of 1649.407  How long 
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Wequashcook was held there is not clear, but when he was released a new understanding 
appears to have been reached among Cassacinamon, Wequashcook, and the younger 
Winthrop.  For his part, Winthrop Jr. began advocating on behalf of the Nameag Pequots 
and the Pawcatuck community.
408
  The records do not indicate further antagonistic 
actions between the two Pequot leaders.  However, when the dust had settled, 
Cassacinamon once again took center stage.                     
********************************* 
 As Cassacinamon and Wequashcook struggled for dominance over the Pequots, 
Uncas and Ninigret pursued their ongoing battle for regional supremacy.  Each of the 
powerful Native sachems claimed that the other had sent warriors and hunters into their 
territories, and both argued to the English that the other had used the Pequots in ways that 
defied the stipulations of the 1638 Hartford Treaty.  The crisis escalated in April of 1649.  
Uncas claimed to the Commissioners that Ninigret had sent an assassin to murder him.  
He then petitioned English authorities to help him achieve restitution.  Ninigret denied 
the charge.  While John Mason supported Uncas‘s claims, John Winthrop Jr., Roger 
Williams, and other English officials doubted the story.  This did not mean however, that 
English officials (minus Williams) sided with Ninigret and the Narragansetts.
409
  The 
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escalating battle between Uncas and Ninigret gave Cassacinamon and John Winthrop Jr. 
another opening to exploit.  The two men filed a new round of formal petitions to the 
Commissioners of the United Colonies, once again asking that Cassacinamon and the 
Nameag Pequots be removed from their tributary status to Uncas.  
 When Cassacinamon and Winthrop pressed forward with their new round of 
petitions, John Mason once again opposed the pair.  Mason continued to defend his 
Mohegan ally, and in yet another letter to the Commissioners, written in June 1649, 
Mason provided an evidentiary list that, in his mind, justified Uncas‘s actions to the 
Commissioners.  While the escalating situation was a cause for concern, Mason argued 
that the truly innocent party was, in fact, Uncas.  It was Ninigret and the Narragansetts 
who had illegally entered territory the English considered theirs by right of conquest, and 
it was Ninigret who had hired someone to assassinate the Mohegan sachem.  Thus, 
Ninigret bore the blame for this latest round of violence.
410
  
 Ninigret was not alone however.  According to Mason, Cassacinamon‘s actions 
compounded these serious problems.  Mason was again dismissive of Cassacinamon; he 
referred to the Pequot leader as ―Robbin Servant to Mr. Winthrop,‖ or simply as ―Mr. 
Winthrop‘s Servant.‖411  According to Mason, John Winthrop Jr. had empowered 
Cassacinamon with a false confidence, and he acted with impunity because of it.  
Cassacinamon used this alliance to deprive Uncas of ―his men who lived [at] Nameag.‖   
Uncas tried to deal with Cassasinamon in a reasonable manner, but Cassacinamon 
refused to negotiate in good faith.  Cassacinamon‘s arrogance affected not only his 
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relationship with Uncas, but his dealings with Wequashcook as well.  Mason, still bitter 
over the house arrest of Wequashcook and his thwarted attempts at an alliance with the 
Pawcatuck Pequots, spoke of the ―mistreatment‖ that Wequashcook had suffered at the 
hands of the Narrogansetts, who forced him to fight against Uncas and to pay exorbitant 
amounts of tribute to them.  Wequashcook was ill-treated by Cassacinamon as well, who 
threatened ―that his [Cassacinamon‘s] master shall there build and keepe Cowes and soe 
force him [Wequashcook] from thence.‖ Cassacinamon was a menace who did not 
contain his defiance to Nameag; he fomented the current troubles between Uncas, 
Ninigret, and the English.  Cassacinamon ―possessed and gave out that by his Masters 
[Winthrop Jr.‘s] allowance the Nannogans: had liberty to hunt Pequot cuntrey.‖412  
Uncas, if Mason were to be believed, only took aggressive action because there had been 
no other alternative; he was dealing with a band of ungrateful Pequots led by the 
conniving schemer Cassacinamon.   
 Mason attacked Cassacinamon‘s character and battered Winthrop‘s credibility as 
well.  Mason emphasized that Winthrop Jr. aided and abetted the unauthorized Native 
hunts, actions which threatened the delicate balance between the major Native and 
English powers in the region.  In so doing, Winthrop Jr. committed a ―breach of 
Covenant with the Commissioners.‖413  Winthrop‘s willful act of lawbreaking, and the 
―late insolencies‖ of the Nameag Pequots, threatened not only the stability of the region, 
but English claims to the territory.
414
  As duly appointed officials of the United Colonies, 
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Mason argued that the Commissioners should not let Winthrop get away with defying 
their orders.  It may have seemed ironic that Mason would be the one to advocate a 
position of loyalty and devotion to the Commissioners, since he frequently found himself 
at odds with leading magistrates over his ―highly partial‖ alliance with Uncas.415  
However, Mason‘s appeals did not sway the Commissioners as they had after the first 
raid in 1646.  Realizing that the moment was right, Winthrop Jr. once again issued 
another request on Cassasinamon‘s behalf. 
 In July 1649, Winthrop Jr. sent a formal declaration to the Commissioners of the 
United Colonies at their meeting in Boston, where he once again asked that the Pequots 
be allowed to remain at Nameag and that they be placed under English jurisdiction.
416
  In 
the declaration, Winthrop did not dwell on Uncas‘s injustices against the Pequots, nor did 
he bother to directly challenge Mason‘s charges against him.  Instead, Winthrop focused 
on the benefits that placing the Nameag Pequots under English protection would provide 
Connecticut.  The benefits would come in the form of information, labor, and new 
converts to Puritan Christianity.
417
  
 Winthrop Jr. argued that allying Cassacinamon‘s community with the settlers at 
Pequot Plantation increased the Commissioners‘ potential for ―the discovery of any 
pticular iniuries to the psons cattle or other goods of the English especially the small 
plantation at Pequott, and to the discovery of any trecherous plotts or whatever dangerous 
designs or preiuditiall in any kind to the English eyther from Narragansett, or mohegans, 
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or other indians.‖  Not only would the Pequots serve as informants, they would be 
―affording their labors and help for hire, or principally in attending to any dispensations 
of such light of the Glorious Gospel, which it may please the Lord in his good time to 
send amongst them.‖418  Though focused on political alliances and acquiring territory, the 
Commissioners also wished to promote Protestant Christianity to the Native peoples they 
encountered.
419
  Winthrop not only appealed to the Commissioners‘ political sensibilities, 
he also courted their heritage as Englishmen as well.  As Englishmen, the Commissioners 
believed they had reached a high level of civilization and justice.  Winthrop played upon 
that heritage when he asked that the Commissioners allow Cassacinamon‘s group to ―live 
under the shadow of the English Justice free from tyranny & oppression.‖420 
 The 1649 declaration is important for a number of reasons.  First, unlike the 
previous petitions of 1646 and 1647, Cassacinamon did not endorse the document with 
his name or signatory mark.
421
  This exclusion of Cassacinamon is odd, considering how 
prominent he was in all previous legal (and extra-legal) attempts to persuade the 
Commissioners to intervene on behalf of the Pequots.  When compared to those earlier 
petitions, the 1649 petition possessed a noticeable difference in language and tone.  
Winthrop Jr. had long argued that having the Nameag Pequots affiliated with the English 
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would be advantageous to the English.
422
  However, in the previous petitions, 
Cassacinamon and Winthrop Jr. argued that the Nameag Pequots should be freed because 
Uncas violated his treaty agreements with the English and the reciprocal relationships 
that Native leaders maintained with their tributaries.  Those violations caused the 
Nameag Pequots to unduly suffer, so Cassacinamon, on behalf of the Nameag Pequots, 
asked for English help in obtaining redress.  The 1649 declaration presented an entirely 
English-dominated narrative.  Winthrop argued that the Commissioners should place the 
Nameag Pequots under English authority solely for the benefits that such a relationship 
would provide the English.
423
  If the Commissioners could not be swayed by calls to 
fairness, perhaps they would respond to a proposal based entirely on English self-interest.  
If that interpretation is true, it explains the exclusion of Cassacinamon from the 
document; such an action presented the Nameag community as beholden to the English 
and Winthrop Jr., and therefore easier to control.          
 Winthrop Jr. also emphasized that the size of the Nameag community benefitted 
the English.  He referred to Nameag as ―those few Pequots wch did lately live neere the 
English plantation,‖ downplaying the number of Pequots living there.  He also said that 
even if Nameag became affiliated with the English, Uncas would still have ―many 
hundreds‖ of Natives in his Mohegan confederation.  While the Pequots were not as 
numerous as they had been before the 1637, and the Mohegans and Narragansetts 
remained more populous, it was disingenuous on Winthrop Jr.‘s part to downplay the size 
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of the Nameag community.  In 1646, Nameag had seventy-two men and eight boys listed 
in the official count done by the English.  If women and girls are included in these 
estimates, as well as the Pequots who moved to the community over the years, the Pequot 
population potentially reached some three hundred fifty to five hundred people by the 
mid-seventeenth century.
424
  There were more than just a ―few‖ Pequots at Nameag.  
Winthrop Jr. observed that ―whereas Uncus hath the sole militia of all the other Pequotts, 
w
ch
 are w
th
 him being many hundreds, and the Niantiques also,‖ if the Nameag Pequots 
were placed under English jurisdiction, Uncas ―might not have the militia of these few 
w
th
out the consent of the English or of them whom the commissioners please to 
appoint.‖425  If the Commissioners agreed with Winthrop‘s proposal, Uncas would still 
have many warriors at his disposal, certainly a benefit if fighting broke out with the 
Narragansetts, but the English would also have some dependable Natives on their side. 
 Two other events convinced the Commissioners to grant serious consideration to 
the Pequots‘ request.  In July of 1649, the same month he composed his declaration to the 
Commissioners, John Winthrop Jr. received several overtures to move to New 
Netherlands; they offered him the opportunity to bring the Nameag community (English 
and Pequot) with him to settle in the colony, possibly on Long Island.
426
  These personal 
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invitations continued throughout July and August of 1649, and included offers to bring 
―those Indians that liued under yow will come along with yow, and under your 
gouernment, yow shall haue sufficient to accommodate them or any number of families 
yow shall thinke meete,‖ suggest that he seriously.427  While the Commissioners may 
have been happy to be rid of the Pequots, the thought of losing the English settlers at 
Winthrop‘s plantation gave them pause.   
 The situation intensified in August of 1649, when word reached the 
Commissioners that a Mohegan war party had once again assaulted a Pequot settlement 
near Nameag.  In the attack, an old Pequot woman was killed, and as the six Mohegans 
fled, the pursuing Pequots managed to kill one of the Mohegan captains.
428
  The village 
the Mohegans attacked belonged to a group of Pawcatuck Pequots who had settled with 
Cassacinamon and the Nameag Pequots.
429
  For his part, Uncas seems to have honored 
the letter of the 1647 Commissioners‘ ruling: he did not attack any of Cassacinamon‘s 
Pequots at Nameag, only ones affiliated with Ninigret and the Narragansetts.
430
  Still, this 
attack threatened to ignite open war between the Mohegans and Narragansetts.  Roger 
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Williams convinced the Narragansetts to hold back, telling them that ―the Monhiggins 
have now kild but an old woman,‖ while the Pawcatuck Pequots ―have kild a Captaine.‖  
This seemed to satisfy most of the Narragansetts, but they still demanded that 
Connecticut authorities do something ―to stoppe Uncus his proceedings in this kind to 
provoke them to warre, which they are not willing to.‖  ―If such continuall iniuries‖ were 
not stopped, the Narragansetts warned that the Mohegans would ―force them to it.‖431               
 These incidents in the summer of 1649 forced the Commissioners to take action, 
and they drafted a compromise agreement.  The Commissioners granted Cassacinamon‘s 
group, all those Pequots who ―pfessing a Redy willingness to herken to the Comissioners 
advise…som fit place by the Concent of Conectacot.‖  This settlement was to be in ―no 
ways Preiuditiall to the Towne allredy begune at Nameoke,‖ but once that site was 
decided upon, the Pequots would have ―libbertie for the present to settle & plant.‖  
However, while Cassacinamon and the Pequots received permission to create their own 
settlement, the Commissioners did not place the Pequots under direct English 
jurisdiction.  The Commissioners ruled that Cassacinamon and the Pequots currently at 
Nameag remained officially tied to the Mohegans, ―thay owneing Uncas as theire 
Sachem & in all things Carring themselves as his subjects.‖432  Uncas, wishing to keep 
his English allies at his side should the Narragansetts decide upon retaliation, was forced 
to accept the deal.  The 1649 compromise gave Cassacinamon and the Pequots 
permission to live in their own settlement, although they still had to recognize Uncas as 
their grand sachem and give him tribute payments.  However, even this partial victory 
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provided Cassasinamon with a tremendous leap forward towards achieving his goal.  In 
1648, the Pequots had been ordered to return to Uncas; a year later, they obtained 
permission to live on their own, albeit close to the English of Pequot Plantation.  More 
importantly, Winthrop could not have made this compromise without the cooperation of 
Cassacinamon.  Beginning in the fall of 1649, Cassacinamon and the Pequots sent the 
first round of petitions asking for the land they were promised.
433
  They were one step 
closer towards returning home. 
III 
 Despite the favorable ruling from the Commissioners, the Pequots‘ fight was not 
yet over.  Cassacinamon and Nameag still encountered resistance from the English who 
were slow to act on setting aside the land promised for the new settlement.  This 
hesitation on the part of the Connecticut colonial government did not deter 
Cassacinamon, Winthrop Jr., or the Pequots.  In October 1649, the English settlers of 
Pequot Plantation, now called New London, wrote to the new Connecticut governor 
Edward Hopkins, asking for his advice.  The letter, endorsed by John Winthrop Jr., 
informed the governor that ―the Indians that formerly lived here are come today to desire 
a place to be appointed for them according to the order of the Commissioners and their 
promise to them.‖  However, even though the New London townspeople knew that ―there 
was such an order from the commissioners,‖ and that Hopkins himself ―did nominate 3 of 
our towne to looke out, and appoint the place which they being informed of by those 
Indians that were present when it was agreed upon,‖ they still had not carried out the 
order.  ―Yet because we have noe expresse direction from your selfe,‖ the letter stated 
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that the townspeople, ―doe not meddle in that matter.‖  They hoped that Governor 
Hopkins would be ―pleased to send speedy order about it.‖  If the governor and 
Connecticut officials continued to drag their feet on the matter, New London feared that 
―it will put them [the Pequots] upon such distractions as may prove very inconvenient to 
them and to our selues.‖434   
 It was apparent to Winthrop Jr. and the headmen of New London that until 
Cassacinamon and the Pequots received what they were promised, they would pressure 
colonial officials until they delivered on their ruling.  This proved to be an accurate 
assessment.  John Haynes wrote to John Winthrop Jr., informing him that Cassacinamon 
personally traveled to the governor‘s office, ―and desireds in the behalilfe of himselfe and 
somme others sitt downe with him that they may have A convenient place assighned 
them wher the English shall appoint.‖  Cassacinamon assured Connecticut officials that 
―they will attend Order in it,‖ but as for the sake of the Pequot community, he requested 
―that they may have this planting time now to come parte of the ould broke upp ground, 
to use, for this year until they can fitt the other place and ground for use.‖435   
 As the months passed, the Pequots pressed forward with their claims for a new 
settlement.  But by September of 1650 — a full year after the agreement — 
Cassacinamon and the Pequots grew anxious.  The leading townspeople of New London 
noted ―that the Pequot Indians doe often complain to mr. W[inthrop]: that some of the 
English thretne to send them away to the Sugar Country.‖436  While John Winthrop Jr. 
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supported Cassacinamon and the Pequots, if that passage is to be believed, not all of the 
residents in New London shared his view.  After the chaos that had surrounded 
Nameag/New London over the years, combined with the biased views many English 
colonists held towards indigenous peoples and any lingering fears about the Pequots, it is 
not surprising that some English settlers felt negatively towards the Pequots.  After the 
Pequot War many Pequots had been sold into West Indian slavery, so the specter of 
forced bondage remained a powerful threat.  While intimidating, as long as Winthrop Jr. 
carried considerable authority and Cassacinamon counted him as a powerful ally, it was 
doubtful that any of the Pequots would be sold into slavery in 1650.   
 The document reaffirmed the Pequots‘ reliance on Winthrop Jr.‘s support, as 
―they Expressing themselves to be [afraid] dissatisfied Unless they may have the 
[Countenance] friendship and protection of mr. W[inthrop].‖437  While Cassacinamon 
and the Nameag Pequots acted on their own — and frequently did so — this passage 
illustrates (perhaps in a melodramatic fashion) that the Pequots recognized the value of 
Winthrop Jr.‘s support.  They had learned the lesson of the Pequot War: to survive in the 
Anglo-Algonquian world, they needed Algonquian and English allies.  As the 
Englishman that Cassacinamon and the Nameag Pequots trusted the most, the Nameag 
community was adamant that the younger Winthrop be involved in the new land deal.  
The Pequots ―desired that mr. W: would Give them Liberty to Live and plant on his 
Land.‖  After several negotiations between Cassacinamon and the Pequots, New London, 
and Winthrop Jr., the townspeople decided, upon ―the advise and consent of Capt. 
Mason,‖ to work out a deal.  The Pequots received ―the land at Newayunck Neck 
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[Noank],‖ where they ―may Live and plant and fish at said Newayunck [Noank].‖  
Politically and personally, this was a clear victory for Cassacinamon, the Pequots, and for 
Winthrop Jr.  Winthrop further cemented his reputation as a political broker, and 
achieved his greatest triumph as the Pequots‘ advocate.  However, Winthrop was 
motivated by more than altruism or personal ties to Cassacinamon.  Winthrop was given 
―the fee Simple of said Land,‖ while use of ―the meadow on said Neck‖ was given to Mr. 
John Gallup, a local townsmen.
438
   
 This was the greatest achievement Cassacinamon and the Pequots experienced 
since the Pequot War.  With this agreement, Cassacinamon saw the creation of a new 
settlement, and the Pequots gained official sanction to live on their own.  Once the 
Commissioners of the United Colonies, Connecticut officials, and the New London 
headmen agreed to grant this new land to the Pequots, the community‘s transition to 
Noank happened in a rapid manner in 1650.  The Pequot community, now called the 
Noank Pequots, relocated to the new settlement by the end of 1650.  Noank was a small, 
five hundred acre, coastal reservation located on a peninsula ―on the west shore of Mystic 
Harbor,‖ a spot south-southwest of present-day Mystic, CT.  Further, the new settlement 
was five to six miles east of New London, a reasonable distance from the English 
settlement should they require the services of the Pequots, or should the Pequots seek 
employment opportunities.  However, unlike their former village at Nameag, Noank was 
a coastal settlement lying within the former Pequot territory.
439
  This one act, the 
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culmination of years of hard work by Cassacinamon, the Pequots, and Winthrop Jr., 
meant that several hundred Pequots (now identified by their Noank reservation) finally 
returned to their homeland.  This was a direct reversal of the 1638 Treaty of Hartford, 
which stated that the surviving Pequots ―were not to live in their ancient country, nor to 
be called by their ancient name, but to become Narragansetts and Mohegans.‖440  The 
treaty provision concerned with their name had never been enforced, and while the 
Commissioners ruled that Cassacinamon and the Noank Pequots were, for the time being, 
still politically affiliated with Uncas, the move to Noank invalidated the heart of the 1638 
treaty.  Cassacinamon and the Pequots had come home.     
 While Cassacinamon and the Noank Pequots celebrated their victory, some 
provisions foreshadowed later attempts by the English to assert direct control over the 
community.  Broader English support for a separate Pequot community occurred as a 
result of the continuing crisis between Uncas and Ninigret, because Winthrop Jr. and 
Cassacinamon convinced the English that the Pequots would be more ―dependable‖ 
Indians than the other two confederations.  The English agreed, but they still looked for 
ways to protect and dominate their ―investment.‖  As the Pequots moved to Noank, the 
Commissioners of the United Colonies sent a declaration to Uncas, Ninigret, 
Wequashcook, ―and the other Sachems to whom they belong as their other men in all 
other respects doe or ought to doe.‖  While the Commissioners reaffirmed that the Noank 
Pequots still held their political affiliation to those Native sachems, the Noank 
community was ―not [to] be oppressed but to injoy equall priviledges with the rest in 
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hunting and other wayes.‖441  While the Pequots had long demonstrated their ability to 
hunt anywhere they pleased despite whatever ―orders‖ were present, and Cassacinamon 
was probably satisfied with the English support in this matter, this declaration was 
another step toward English dominance in the Anglo-Indian New England frontier.  
Further, the English attempted to assert dominance in their relationship with the Noank 
Pequots as well.
442
   
 On November 18, 1651, a formal agreement between the Noank Pequots and the 
town of New London ordered ―that such part of the Land…which thy shall make use of 
to plant, the saide Indians shall fence the same and what damage shall come to any of 
there Corne by any English Cattle, or hogs they shall beare the damage of it themselves.‖  
The agreement went on to say that the Pequots ―shall make good any hurt that shall be 
done to any English Cattle or hogs by themselves or any other Indians that shall live 
amongst them.‖443  As time went on, Cassacinamon and the Pequots demonstrated their 
unwillingness to abide by this agreement — Cassacinamon filed several lawsuits over the 
years seeking compensation for damages done by English livestock, or appealed fines 
that were levied against Pequots for retaliating against the animals.
444
  These steps 
demonstrated some of the ways the Pequots exerted their own independence, even when 
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directly affiliated with the English.  They continued to file petitions, lawsuits, and 
complaints whenever they believed they were treated unfairly.  Further, Cassacinamon 
and the Pequots realized that when dealing with the English over issues of land, it was in 
their best interest to have written documents to back up their claims.  The Pequots 
requested and received a copy of the General Court‘s order allowing them to resettle in 
Noank in 1650, and they received similar copies of important documents after that.
445
  
These legal actions, paired with Cassacinamon‘s close alliance with John Winthrop Jr., 
shielded the Pequots from the more extreme efforts of the English to exert authority over 
the Pequots, at least while they lived.   
 As the crisis between Uncas and Ninigret continued, the Noank Pequots pressed 
their advantage.  Cassacinamon continued to act as an intermediary and information 
broker, while the Pequots themselves served as a ―buffer‖ between the English colonists 
and other Native groups.  The stalemate continued until the English, hearing rumors 
(some brought to them by Cassacinamon) that Ninigret sought an alliance with the Dutch, 
led the English to openly support Uncas in his dispute with Ninigret.  This response 
tipped the balance of power, at least temporarily, towards the Mohegans and the English, 
but Cassacinamon made certain that the Pequots benefited.  In 1654, the Narragansetts 
had Wequashcook‘s Pawcatuck Pequots removed from their confederation.  The 
Pawcatuck Pequots became English tributaries.
446
  The same year, Cassacinamon filed 
yet another petition to completely remove the Noank Pequots from Mohegan jurisdiction.  
                                                 
445
Holmes, ―‗In Behalf of My People & My Self,‖ 117.  
446―Simon Willard to John Winthrop, Jr., with Enclosures, 1654,‖ WP, 6: 458; ―Agreement of 
Captive Pequot Indians, Pauquatcuck, 16.8.1654,‖ WP, 6: 459-462; ―Agreement of Ninigret, 18.8.1654,‖ 
WP, 6: 463-464; ―Order for Resettling the Pequots, with Enclosure, October 23, 1654,‖ WP, 6: 465-466; 
―Pequots Submitting Themselves to English Rule, October 23, 1654,‖ WP, 6: 467.   
 205 
In recognition of the support Cassacinamon and the Noank Pequots provided the English 
in the struggle against Ninigret, the Noank Pequots were officially placed under English 
jurisdiction as well.  The Commissioners ruled that the Noank Pequots were ―freed from 
Subjection to any Indian Sachem…and taken under the protection of the English.‖  
Cassacinamon received the formal English title of governor of the community, which 
reinforced the Native credentials that he already possessed.
447
   
 While the Pequots (Noank and Pawcatuck) had removed themselves from the 
Mohegan and Narragansett confederations, they still were not completely independent, 
but semi-autonomous.  And despite Cassacinamon‘s best efforts, the entire Pawcatuck 
Pequot group was denied resettlement at Noank, thwarting his attempt at uniting all of the 
Pequots under his authority.
448
  Two Pequot reservations were officially created: Noank 
led by Cassacinamon, and Pawcatuck led by Wequashcook.  However, while denied 
official political reunification, the two groups maintained constant contact with one 
another through the informal kinship networks.   
 Uncas protested this decision, and petitioned the United Colonies for their help in 
restoring the Pequots to him as his tributaries.  They encouraged the tributaries that left 
Uncas and joined Cassacinamon ―to returne and those with him to continew still at 
Mohegene,‖ but few of the Pequots that left did so.  In one extreme example of this trend, 
Uncas paid the Commissioners four fathoms of wampum ―for one of his Indians Pequots 
now resideing with Robin incase hee will returne backe to Monhegine.‖  However, when 
it became clear this Pequot (like so many others) preferred Cassacinamon‘s leadership, he 
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asked the Commissioners to return the wampum in the event the Pequot did not return to 
him.  The power dynamics on the Anglo-Algonquian frontier had clearly shifted, and 
Cassacinamon and the Pequots benefited from that shift.  In fact, they played a crucial 
part in facilitating that new dynamic.  All the Commissioners could do was mitigate the 
damage to Uncas; they ordered Cassacinamon to stay off Mohegan lands, and keep the 
Pequot hunting and fishing parties on the east side of the Thames River.  In February 
1657, Uncas turned to Connecticut officials for aid; if the Commissioners would not help 
him, perhaps his Connecticut allies could.  However, the Mohegan grand sachem found 
no recourse with Connecticut officials either.  They ruled that Cassacinamon could ―keep 
the Mohegins or others of Uncasses men that are with him,‖ unless ―Uncas desires them 
& they desitre themselves to goe to Uncas.‖  It was an empty ruling however, as few 
Pequots desired to return.  Cassacinamon had defeated the Mohegan grand sachem.
449
   
 Cassacinamon and the Noank Pequots were now officially under the direct 
jurisdiction of the English, and had to pay the English the post-war wampum tribute they 
formerly gave the Mohegans.  However, the Noank Pequots seemed more accepting of 
this relationship with the English than their status under Uncas and the Mohegans.  While 
the English engaged in the horrific act of burning Mystic Fort, Uncas and the Pequots 
engaged in a complicated and acrimonious relationship before that war began.  Once the 
surviving Pequots were absorbed into the Mohegan confederation, Uncas violated the 
reciprocal relationship that Native sachems maintained with their people and tributaries.  
Seen in this light, it is easier to understand why Cassacinamon and the Pequots sought 
outside options to achieve their goals, and why the English proved such a powerful ally.  
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The alliance between Cassacinamon and John Winthrop Jr. was a mutually beneficial 
one, one that the Pequots themselves maintained and which protected them from the more 
egregious examples of English power; this may account for their acceptance of their new 
status.
450
   
 Once at Noank, Cassacinamon launched his next stage in his fight for his faction 
of Pequots. In less than a decade, the five-hundred-acre Noank reservation proved 
inadequate to meet the needs of the Pequots.  In 1658, Cassacinamon petitioned the 
Commissioners of the United Colonies for more reservation land, arguing that Noank‘s 
soils were exhausted and that there was no firewood available.
451
  The Commissioners 
ruled that ―Cashasinnimon and his Comapnie shall haue a fit proportion of land allowed 
them att Wawarramoreke neare the pat that leads from misticke Riuer to Moheage about 
fiue or six miles from the mouth of Misticke River.‖  They then instructed the 
Connecticut government to carry this order out, and ―appoint as soon as may bee some 
meet psons to lay out and bound the said lands for them.‖452  It took eight more years of 
negotiations and petitions to acquire this additional land, but in 1666, the two-thousand-
acre Mashantucket reservation was granted to Cassacinamon and the Pequots by the 
Connecticut colony.  Mashantucket, like Noank, lay within the Pequots‘ traditional 
territory.  It was about ten miles inland from Noank and had served as a Pequot hunting 
ground before the 1637 war.  It had also served as a refuge for the Pequots during the 
war; the cedar swamp located at the center of Mashantucket was known as Ohomowauke 
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(―owl‘s nest‖) and Cuppacommock (―refuge or hiding place‖).  Mashantucket became a 
refuge once again for the Pequots.  With both Noank and Mashantucket at their disposal, 
Cassacinamon and the Pequots recreated their seasonal subsistence patterns, traveling 
between the coast and inland to utilize the resources of both.
453
 
********************************************* 
 By mid-century, Cassacinamon and one major faction of Pequots had returned to 
their traditional homeland on their reservation at Noank, and by 1666 they had regained 
Mashantucket as well.  The once-feared nation, forbidden in 1638 to claim even their 
own name, had achieved one of the few net gains in reservation lands in colonial New 
England.  In the process, Cassacinamon‘s community assumed a new title, that of the 
Noank/Mashantucket Pequots.  Their success depended on several important factors.  
While forced to accommodate English legal methods and demands, Cassacinamon and 
the Pequots operated within a Native political context, and their actions can only be 
understood by keeping this in mind.  The Pequots, as a community, worked to preserve 
their own sense of identity.  From 1648 to 1666, Pequots congregated together, despite 
attempts by the Mohegans, Narragansetts and English to keep them apart — first at 
Nameag, then at Noank and Mashantucket.  These settlements offered the Pequots the 
chance to reunite with kin and live in their own communities.  While colonial authorities 
prevented the Noank/Mashantucket and Pawcatuck Pequots from achieving complete 
reunification, specifically denying them the right to live together on the same reservation, 
the two groups maintained their connections with one another in other ways.  Family and 
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kin moved back and forth between reservations, and the two groups continued to 
coordinate their activities (such as hunting) as they had managed in the 1640s and 1650s.   
 The Nameag/Noank/Mashantucket Pequots had also agitated for their 
independence from Uncas by using direct methods of civil and uncivil disobedience.  
They operated within ―official‖ legal channels when they endorsed the petitions of the 
late 1640s brought by their leader to the Commissioners of the United Colonies.  These 
petitions outlined just how Uncas had failed to meet his reciprocal obligations to them, 
which they felt justified their attempts to be freed from his authority.  The Pequots also 
endorsed complaints against English colonists who did not move fast enough to secure 
them the new lands that they were promised.  The Pequots also engaged in ―extra-legal‖ 
methods.  Their continued hunts in the disputed territorial zones; the seizure and 
destruction of property belonging to other Natives (namely Mohegans) that, in their view, 
violated their space; and their physical resistance to attempts by Uncas to force Pequot 
compliance all played a part in keeping the Pequot issue at the forefront of the Anglo-
Algonquian frontier of New England.  In these ways, the Nameag/Noank/Mashantucket 
Pequot community itself assumed an active role in agitating for their freedom from Uncas 
and in claiming their new reservations.     
 The important work of the Pequot community was matched only by the efforts of 
Robin Cassacinamon and his English ally, John Winthrop Jr.  Cassacinamon proved that 
he deserved the position of sachem, by directing the campaigns of the Pequot community.  
He secured for himself and the Pequots a powerful ally in John Winthrop Jr., who argued 
their case in the halls of New England colonial government, even when other Native 
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leaders and Englishmen (including his own family) dismissed it as a futile effort.  
Cassacinamon coordinated the unauthorized hunts and the resistance to Uncas‘s 1648 
raid at Nameag.  He personally filed grievances and petitions with the Commissioners of 
the United Colonies and with Connecticut governors to persuade them to release the 
Pequots from their subjugation to Uncas.  He encouraged community fission and 
reconstitution as a way to strengthen his own power base, by drawing Pequots to him and 
away from other Native leaders like Uncas.  And in the case of Wequashcook, 
Cassacinamon drew on his available resources to thwart an internal challenge to his 
authority among the Pequots.  But it was perhaps Cassacinamon‘s skills as an 
intermediary and interpreter that most benefited the Pequots in their struggle.  This ability 
to control and manipulate information placed Cassacinamon at the vanguard of the 
regional contest between the two major Native political powers in the southern New 
England.  His expertise cast himself as an indispensable asset to the English.  By 
engaging in these actions, Robin Cassacinamon and the Pequots achieved their goal of 
breaking away from Uncas and returning to their own territory.  While the trade-off 
involved directly affiliating themselves with the English, the primary goal had been met: 
separation from Uncas and a return to their traditional homelands, secure in their own 
settlements, and affiliation with a powerful ally of their own choosing.  The Pequots had 
come home. 
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Chapter 5:  “Wampum was like the grass…but if men be once kild they will live noe 
more” - Cassacinamon and Regional Politics 
By the 1650s, Robin Cassacinamon‘s use of advantageous political alliances, and 
his skills as an interpreter and information broker, secured his place within the diplomatic 
network of the southern New England Anglo-Indian frontier.  These successes proved his 
effectiveness as a sachem, and ensured a continual flow of Pequots to his community and 
his sphere of influence.
454
  As sachem, Cassacinamon utilized colonial legal proceedings 
in his ongoing fight for the Pequots, and became a fixture in the Connecticut courts as 
both the plaintiff and the defendant.   He provided expert testimony in land cases and 
boundary disputes concerning the Pequots and other Native peoples.  The Mashantucket 
Pequots further integrated into the economy and social structure of Connecticut, adding 
their labor to the workforce of the growing colony.  The acquisition of the Noank and 
Mashantucket reservations meant that Cassacinamon and the Mashantucket Pequots 
experienced a net gain of territory, a rare event on the New England Anglo-Algonquian 
frontier.
455
   
But while Cassacinamon and the Mashantucket Pequots ensured their own 
survival, the social and political reality of southern New England continued to change.  In 
the 1660s and early 1670s, the interconnected society that existed between the colonials 
and the Algonquians shifted into permanent state of colonial dominance.  That 
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interdependence had created the environment essential to Cassacinamon‘s plans; it 
provided the conditions which enabled the Pequots to return to their traditional 
homelands.  However, in the new political reality, only Cassacinamon‘s skill and the 
links forged by the Mashantucket Pequots could save them as the world changed again.   
 
I 
 As historian Neal Salisbury has argued, for several decades after the Pequot War a 
distinct (yet uneasy) interdependent socio-economic landscape flourished well into the 
1660s.
456
  The Algonquians of southern New England lacked the complete political 
autonomy they had possessed before Europeans arrived, but they still controlled enough 
land to provide for their subsistence needs, at the same time they engaged in reciprocal 
relationships with other Natives and the English.  Southern Algonquians traded furs, 
engaged in land transactions, sold their services and labor, and purchased European 
manufactured goods.  For their part, the English required what the Natives offered.  Their 
voracious hunger for land was ever-present, but the colonials also depended on the 
services of Natives as hunters, interpreters, laborers, and consumers.  Separated from 
Oliver Cromwell‘s Puritan Commonwealth in England, the colonials relied on Native 
wampum as a currency to enact these transactions.
457
  Algonquians and colonials needed 
one another.  
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Cassacinamon and the Pequots had participated in this interdependent system, but 
their status forced them to make accommodations avoided by other more powerful groups 
like the Mohegans.  Cassacinamon successfully exploited that ―outsider‖ status to secure 
his people‘s freedom from the Mohegans, but the Pequots had also accrued more 
experience navigating the colonists‘ political, social, and economic world than some of 
their indigenous neighbors.
458
  This working relationship provided Cassacinamon and the 
Mashantucket Pequots (previously known as the Nameag/Noank Pequots) with 
opportunities to solidify ties with English allies, and granted them another means to 
support themselves alongside their regular subsistence strategies at Noank and 
Mashantucket.  Pequots hunted for the colonists, traded with them, and worked for them 
in other ways, such as servants or day laborers.  Colonial authorities even set aside funds 
to train some Natives as apprentices in manual trades like smithing.
459
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As Pequots worked alongside English colonials, Cassacinamon applied his 
linguistic and political skills in ways that benefited the Mashantucket Pequots.  By the 
1650s, he had established himself as a translator and interpreter who worked in a variety 
of legal venues, as well as within regional diplomatic circles.  The English called upon 
the sachem to participate in legal proceedings between colonials and Native peoples, 
where he offered testimony in depositions and translated Indian wills.
460
  While not as 
overt a political act as controlling information between competing English and 
Algonquian polities, this legal work further cemented Cassacinamon‘s reputation as a 
reliable and desired resource for the English.  Cassacinamon parlayed that reputation into 
certain protections to himself and his community.
461
   
On December 3, 1657, Cassacinamon and the Pequots achieved greater security 
when John Winthrop Jr. accepted the governorship of the Connecticut colony.  
Throughout the 1650s, the younger Winthrop‘s political influence in Connecticut had 
grown.  Winthrop‘s reputation as a scientist, healer, and economic developer, as well as 
an Indian negotiator, proved useful to Connecticut colony.  He had served as an assistant 
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in the Connecticut government from 1651 to 1656.  His extensive network of connections 
throughout New England and England proper made him an attractive prospect to several 
colonies.  Hartford and New Haven each solicited his favor, and he seriously considered 
relocating to New Haven.  On May 21, 1657, Connecticut elected Winthrop governor in 
absentia; he considered the offer for six months before he accepted.  The following year, 
Winthrop served as deputy governor, but from 1659 until his death in 1676, Winthrop 
held the office of Connecticut governor.
462
  As Cassacinamon‘s ally did well for himself, 
the sachem shared in those benefits.          
The Mashantucket Pequots supported Cassacinamon as sachem, and the English 
backed his leadership as well when they bestowed upon him the official title of 
―governor.‖  Since the Pequots lay under English legal jurisdiction, the English claimed 
the authority to choose their principal officers.
463
  By claiming this right, Connecticut 
officials attempted to exert their influence over the Pequots.  However, the repeated 
selection of Cassacinamon over any other Pequots raised questions as to the effectiveness 
of the tactic.  While Cassacinamon helped the English, he often argued with Connecticut 
officials over issues of tribute and land rights.
464
   The sachem/governor walked a 
political tightrope: meeting his obligations to his own people, while ensuring at least their 
minimal cooperation with the English.  Perhaps the Connecticut General Court found it 
easier to cooperate with the Pequots on this matter of leadership.  Governor John 
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Winthrop Jr. was a powerful ally, but he could not protect Cassacinamon all the time; if 
Cassacinamon pushed the English too far, or alienated the Pequots too much, he risked 
losing his position.  However, Cassacinamon‘s value to the English was clear by this 
time, so they could not arbitrarily toss him aside.   
Cassacinamon personally benefited from this recognition,
465
 and it served as a 
reminder that Cassacinamon drew upon powerful reserves of support; he possessed the 
strongest allies over everyone else in the community. While he was responsible for 
turning a wampum tribute over to the Commissioners of the United Colonies, as sachem 
Cassacinamon also received a share of tribute from the Mashantucket Pequot community.  
The Commissioners ordered that all Native males ―over the age of sixteen were required 
to support their principal officers by paying an annual stipend of five shillings.‖  In this 
respect, the relationship between the Pequots and the English was similar to the 
relationships within Native confederations, where community leaders engaged in a 
system of tribute and reciprocity with those inside their sphere of influence.
466
   
The Pequots supported Cassacinamon with tribute, but he also received gifts from 
colonial officials who hoped to carry favor with him.  Fine coats were common gifts 
bestowed to Native leaders.  Cassacinamon received many such coats from government 
and religious organizations, as the Connecticut General Court and missionaries each 
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sought his assistance in influencing the Pequots.
467
  Along with these standard gifts, 
Cassacinamon received a rare honor for a Native leader at the time: a horse.  This prize 
reflected his status among both the Pequots and Connecticut officials, especially since 
colonial governments passed laws that forbade the sale of horses to Natives, as well as 
other items deemed too ―dangerous‖ for them to possess.468  Cassacinamon‘s receipt of a 
horse showcased his place among the Pequots and demonstrated the esteemed position he 
held among the English.  He was no mere servant.  Cassacinamon functioned as an 
essential agent on the frontier.  Having the governor of Connecticut colony as his close 
friend and ally shielded Cassacinamon and the Pequots from the most severe abuses of 
the English.  Cassacinamon was also close to other members of the Winthrop family, 
which only increased his pool of potential allies.
469
  His position as sachem secure among 
the Pequots, and having integrated himself into the socio-political dynamic of the Anglo-
Algonquian frontier, Cassacinamon settled into his defined role as leader and diplomat.        
However, during the 1660s and 1670s the nature of this arrangement in southern 
New England changed due to a variety of social, economic, and political factors within 
New England, and a political shift across the Atlantic.  In the spring of 1660, as 
Cassacinamon agitated for more lands for the Pequots, conflict erupted once again 
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between the Narragansetts and the Mohegans.  At the same time, the Niantics launched 
attacks against Algonquian bands living on Long Island.  The Commissioners of the 
United Colonies ordered Ninigret to pay 500 fathoms of wampum as punishment for the 
raids and 95 fathoms for leading a Narragansett-Pocumtuck assault against Uncas.  The 
Commissioners demanded payment within four months, and they declared that a sizable 
portion of Ninigret‘s lands would be held as security.  The Atherton Company, a group of 
land speculators, lent the Narragansetts the 595 fathoms of wampum in exchange for a 
six month mortgage.  The Atherton Company was led by a man named Humphrey 
Atherton, who had been Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Massachusetts, and included 
John Winthrop Jr., who by this time was both Connecticut governor and a Commissioner 
of the United Colonies.
470
   
The extensive political connections of the Atherton Company were not lost on 
Rhode Island officials.  Dr. John Clarke felt that members like Winthrop undermined 
Rhode Island interests and referred to their actions as ―a legalized robbery.‖471  Ninigret 
was unable to pay back the loan, so by 1662 the Atherton Company laid claim to all the 
Narragansett and Niantic lands.  To add to the confusion, Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
and Rhode Island were still mired in a series of boundary and jurisdictional disputes over 
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these same lands.  Much of the territory in question lay within Rhode Island, which was 
not part of the United Colonies, while Connecticut and Massachusetts were members of 
the English confederation.  Winthrop also claimed that the Warwick Patent, which 
provided the basis of Connecticut‘s original title, put Connecticut‘s eastern border at the 
Narragansett River, which was located within Rhode Island‘s borders.472  Ninigret and 
the Narragansetts refused to turn over their territory to either the Atherton Company or 
the United Colonies.   This aggressive maneuver by the United Colonies signaled a 
renewed effort by the colonials to control the Anglo-Indian frontier.
473
 
************************************ 
As the land speculators descended upon the Narragansetts, two decades of social 
and political instability ended in England with the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 
1660.  During the English Civil War (1642-1651), and the subsequent creations of the 
English Commonwealth (1649-1653) and the Protectorate (1653-1659) by the victorious 
Puritan faction led by Oliver Cromwell, the Puritan colonies in New England had largely 
been left to their own devices.  Once the Puritan leaders beheaded Charles I in 1649, and 
proved victorious in the civil war, they removed the great impetus for migration to New 
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England.  Dependent on the so-called ―newcomer market‖ of immigrants, the New 
England colonies found themselves in economic trouble when that influx of people and 
funds dwindled.  John Winthrop Jr. had spent many years launching business ventures to 
attract investors and bolster the New England economy, although the colonies exercised a 
great degree of independent action.  During this period, the colonists coined their own 
currency (and treated the Natives‘ wampum as a monetized commodity as well); they 
violated the English Navigation Acts by trading with the Dutch and the French; they 
seized control of Maine from its royal proprietors; and, in a move that enraged royalists, 
they harbored some of the men responsible for the death of Charles I.
474
   
In 1660, power was rested from the Puritans and Charles II, son of the executed 
king, was placed on the throne.  The re-instated royal government soon set about drawing 
the New England colonies back into its orbit.  To that end, the king established the 
Council for Foreign Plantations, so that the New England colonies ―should be collected 
and brought under such an uniforme inspeccon and conduct the Wee may the better apply 
our royall councelles to theire future regulacon securities and improvement.‖  Soon after 
its creation, the Council received several complaints against the United Colonies, 
detailing their frequent violations of English laws.  The crown considered what action to 
take next.
475
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Governor John Winthrop Jr. and other Connecticut officials surmised that this 
political change in England offered them opportunities to solidify Connecticut‘s holdings.  
As the crown debated on how best to incorporate the colonies, Winthrop Jr. and other 
Connecticut leaders made overtures to the restored royal government in London.  
Winthrop Jr. traveled to England in 1661 to secure a permanent royal charter for 
Connecticut, underscoring the importance of the mission.
476
  Connecticut based its claims 
on the Warwick Patent, but by 1639 Connecticut leaders had devised a new plan for 
centralized government under the Fundamental Orders.  These eleven laws spelled out a 
democratic system of government for the colony, created official offices for that 
government, clarified the relationship between the towns and the colonial government, 
and established the two General Courts that met in April and September of every year.  
The General Court was the ―Supreme Power of the Commonwealth,‖ and had the power 
to ―make laws or repeal them, to grant levies, to admit freemen, to dispose of lands 
undisposed of.‖477  Connecticut officials realized that their title claims were legally 
precarious, since they lacked any official documentation from the English government 
conferring lands to them.  Winthrop‘s journey to London was thus of critical importance. 
By April 23, 1662, Winthrop completed his negotiations and Charles II issued the 
royal charter, which ―allowed the Colony the freedom to run its own government with 
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little or no oversight from England.‖478  The charter contained many of the same liberties 
and procedures outlined in the Fundamental Orders, allowing for a great deal of 
continuity in its legal and governmental status.  The Connecticut General Court (also 
called the General Assembly) acted as a legislature and a judicial body, proposing new 
legislation and hearing individual cases; it  still met twice a year (now May and October), 
and it consisted of ―the governor, deputy-governor, and twelve assistants.‖479  The royal 
charter also redrew the colonial map.  New Haven lost its status as a separate colony, and 
its towns were absorbed into Connecticut by 1665; they move expanded not only 
Connecticut, but Winthrop‘s sphere of influence.480  
The trip was a clear success, personally and professionally, for Governor 
Winthrop.  The English Royal Society made him the first colonial member of their 
organization.  The Royal Society extended Winthrop‘s network of relationships — and 
by extension, Cassacinamon‘s — as many of its members served in Charles II‘s colonial 
regulatory agencies, such as the Board of Trade, the Council for Plantations, and the 
Corporation for the Propagation of the Gospel.
481
  The charter government did not require 
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the governor or elected officials to be members of an approved religious body, although 
the Congregational Church was the colony‘s established religion.  In a sign that reflected 
concern over the state of the Anglo-Indian frontier, and perhaps a renewed commitment 
to the spiritual salvation of the indigenous peoples, the royal charter also called upon the 
colony to ―administer the gospel to the Indians living within their borders,‖ at the same 
time it gave it leave to engage in pre-emptive attacks against hostile tribes.
482
   
By the early 1660s, Governor Winthrop and other Connecticut leaders seemed 
more interested in converting Algonquians than they had been in the past.
483
  Winthrop 
himself reportedly asked one Reverend Thomas James of East Hampton, who was 
proficient in the local Algonquian dialect, to come to Connecticut and preach to the 
Natives, promising the full support of the colony if he did so.
484
  In 1660, colonial 
officials set aside funds for Mr. William Tompson, who was paid a salary and 
―encurraged to proceed in learning the Indian Language and to teach and Instruct the 
Pequotts and other Indians elswher as hee may haue oppertunitie.‖  Thompson was also 
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―promised suitable Recompence out of the Indian Stocke for his paines and 
Incurragement therein.‖  The Commissioners of the United Colonies also tasked a Mr. 
Peirson ―to apply himself…to the worke of preaching the gospel to the Pequotts liueing 
thereabouts with promise of suitable Incurragement for his care paines and trauell 
therein.‖485   
In 1660, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England — an 
organization committed to administering the Anglican gospel to Native communities — 
distributed six coats to the Pequot principal officers and their assistants.  Fine coats were 
often given to Native leaders by English officials, and these gifts were a gesture that the 
Society hoped would ―encourage them in their service to the English in Governing the 
Pequotts and perswadeing them to attend such meas as shalbee used to gaine them to the 
knowlidge of God.‖486  Since no Pequot officer held a status higher than Cassacinamon, 
he often received these gifts.
487
  This sort of exchange was a necessary part of Native 
diplomatic protocols, which colonial officials and missionaries still observed if they 
hoped to retain Cassacinamon‘s support.  Although the Pequots had agreed to place 
themselves under direct English jurisdiction, they had not given up the pretenses of 
Native diplomatic custom.  As long as the English required Pequot assistance to maintain 
a semblance of control or influence on the frontier, English officials proved willing to 
follow at least some of these protocols.   
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Although these missionaries offered presents to Cassacinamon, there is no 
evidence that Cassacinamon ever converted to Christianity.  While missionaries had some 
presence on their reservations, Christian conversions among the Mashantucket Pequots 
were rare in the seventeenth-century.  The available evidence suggests that, at best, a 
limited syncretism occurred for some Pequots.
488
  A tribally-sponsored archaeological dig 
on the Mashantucket reservation uncovered a Pequot cemetery used in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.  The cemetery, now called Long Pond, belonged to the 
―Councilor‘s Town,‖ one of the two main settlements on Mashantucket.489  One of the 
burials was that of a young eleven-year-old Pequot girl, whose funerary artifacts 
demonstrate this limited religious syncretism.  Like the other interred Indians, the girl 
was buried in a traditional manner.  She was placed in a circular pit lined with reed and 
rush mats, her legs and arms were bent at the knees and elbows and drawn to her chin, 
symbolic of the fetal position and reflecting the connection between life and death.  The 
top of her skull pointed toward the southwest, where the indigenous peoples of New 
England believed the soul traveled to Cautantowwit‘s house.490  She was buried with 
several important items: wampum, jewelry, clothing, and a medicine bundle containing 
items of spiritual power.  Those items included a bear‘s left front paw, and a folded page 
from a seventeenth century Bible.  The inclusion of the Bible passage among these other 
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totems of power suggest that while this girl and her family were not Christian converts, 
they recognized that the Bible passage in question held some kind of power or 
significance, and they sought to incorporate that into their ritual.
491
  Despite English 
efforts to make spiritual inroads among this ―subjugated‖ people, the Pequots still 
maintained considerable personal agency in matters of faith. 
***************************************** 
When John Winthrop Jr. was once again elected as governor under the new 
charter, and John Mason, as his deputy-governor, Cassacinamon and Uncas gained access 
to the two highest elected officials in Connecticut.   Winthrop continued to be elected as 
governor until his death in 1676; under his leadership Cassacinamon enjoyed access to 
the highest political office in the entire colony.  While Cassacinamon‘s friendship and 
alliance with Governor Winthrop afforded him and the Pequots certain protections, it did 
not guarantee them complete security or non-interference by the English colonists.  
Technically, the Connecticut General Court was the ultimate authority in the colony 
when it came to dealing with Native peoples.  However, individual towns also inserted 
themselves into Anglo-Algonquian affairs, especially when it came to land issues.  The 
General Court ―guaranteed‖ land rights for Native communities, but the surveys for 
reservation lands were conducted by the neighboring towns and kept in their land records.  
This meant that the town of New London (and later offshoot towns like Groton) had a 
significant impact on Mashantucket Pequot lands, for the town proprietors ―viewed 
reservation lands as synonymous with common lands.‖  This was important, because the 
towns controlled the distribution of common lands.  According to Dr. Sarah Holmes, the 
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Mashantucket Pequots were thus ―forced to maneuver between three entities, the General 
Assembly who maintained authority over reservation lands, versus the town, and the 
town proprietors, who wanted to manage reservation lands to benefit their inhabitants.‖492  
Cassacinamon required all of his political skills to navigate through this new batch of 
hurdles, as the Mashantucket community drew upon their history of ―extra legal‖ actions 
to protect what was theirs.                      
Between 1650 and 1670, the population in Connecticut rose from nearly four 
thousand to over twelve thousand people.
493
  The General Court asserted its control over 
land issues, when it banned individuals and towns from ―buying land…either directly or 
indirectly‖ from Natives without first getting approval from the General Court.494  
However, as the colonial population grew, this proved difficult.  Land issues took on an 
increased importance for the Pequots, whose legal status as a ―conquered people‖ under 
English jurisdiction placed them at certain disadvantages when compared to their 
Algonquian neighbors.  Sachems like Uncas possessed ―native rights‖ to the land, which 
―pertained to the aboriginal territory a tribe either possessed or relied on for their 
subsistence at the time of European contact.‖  Connecticut authorities had to bargain with 
the Mohegans for land, which gave Uncas some leverage in his dealings with them.  The 
Pequots fell under a different category than the Mohegans; Pequot ―native right‖ no 
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longer existed, Connecticut ―claimed and extinguished‖ Pequot title to their land by right 
of conquest.       
Cassacinamon and the Pequots engaged in various personal and legal strategies to 
protect their lands from border disputes, protect their herbage rights, and seek restitution 
for damages caused by English hogs and cattle.  In each of these issues, Cassacinamon 
took the lead in battling with English authorities on the Pequots‘ behalf.  As always, 
maintaining powerful allies proved an important tactic.  The well-established 
Cassacinamon-Winthrop alliance remained strong, but Cassacinamon expanded his 
network of allies when the Commissioners of the United Colonies appointed ―overseers‖ 
for the Pequots.  This office was designed to keep the community within the English 
orbit, but it may also be read as recognition of the fact that Cassacinamon and the 
Pequots still served a purpose within the Anglo-Algonquian frontier.  The overseer 
position was a rotating one, and included prominent Connecticut men such as George 
Dennison, James Avery, Sam Mortgage, and Thomas Stanton.  The overseers were the 
official liaisons between the Pequots and colonial authorities.  Stanton had a long history 
of interactions with New England Algonquians, but it was Avery with whom 
Cassacinamon and the Pequots had the best working relationship.  Colonial authorities 
saw the overseers as a symbol of their dominion over Cassacinamon, but the Pequot 
sachem viewed it as an opportunity to extend his own network of English allies and 
advocates.
495
    
While the Pequots were technically under English jurisdiction, they were not 
without legal protections, which they frequently exercised.  One of the most important 
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lessons they learned was the need to keep copies of legal documents.  Cassacinamon and 
his counselors held copies of important court orders and grants, and they referred to them 
when issuing petitions on behalf of their community.  For example, the Pequots retained a 
copy of the original 1650 agreement from the General Court that granted them Noank in 
exchange for their lands at Nameag.  Pequot leaders kept this and other documents well 
into the eighteenth century when, during the controversy over the Noank land division, 
the Pequots explained that they had their own copy of the document to present before the 
General Court.
496
  The Pequots knew that any legal arguments they made depended upon 
this documentation, so they made a concerted effort to ensure that they maintained such 
documentary evidence.  When Cassacinamon‘s chief lieutenant, a Pequot with the 
English name of Daniel, lost all of his belongings in a fire, John Winthrop Jr.‘s son, Fitz-
John Winthrop, wrote to his father on Daniel‘s behalf.  Fitz-John Winthrop made 
arrangements to have several items replaced as soon as possible.  The valuables that 
Daniel lost included his ―wardrope, and armoury, Indian plate,‖ and £100 ―Indian 
money.‖  He also lost several ―papers of worth,‖ including a ―record of Court‖ that 
confirmed Daniel‘s position as Cassacinamon‘s chief counselor.497  This critical piece of 
information served as colonial recognition of Daniel‘s place within the Pequot leadership 
structure.  The colonial government‘s acknowledgement of proper Pequot leaders may 
have reduced any attempts at illegal business dealings between colonists and Pequots 
who did not speak for the community.   
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Another strategy Cassacinamon employed to protect Pequot lands and interests 
was the tried and true use of petitions.  Cassacinamon agitated for more lands, and when 
he believed that his requests were not processed fast enough, he withheld Pequot tribute 
payments and filed petitions to goad the English into action.
498
  In 1666, after receiving 
the 2,000 acre Mashantucket grant, Cassacinamon petitioned the General Court and 
requested a survey of the reservation.
499
  Cassacinamon‘s petition revealed a keen 
understanding of the English legal process, and English perceptions of Indians within the 
colonial world.  In the petition, he argued: 
Where as it hath pleased this Honored Court to grant us a trackt of land for our  
acommadation, the which hath bin in part layed out by your order, we humbly 
crave that said lands lines may be perfited, and the same orderly recorded to us  
and ours, that we may not afterward meete with any trouble or disrest about the  
same being Confirmed by your authoritye.
500
 
 
It is clear that Cassacinamon knew how to manipulate English perceptions 
concerning the subordinate nature of their Native ―dependents.‖  By requesting that a 
survey record the reservation boundaries, Cassacinamon demonstrated his awareness 
concerning the necessity of such legal documents in fending off white encroachments of 
Pequot lands.  Cassacinamon‘s adamant stance to ―perfect‖ and ―record‖ the 
Mashantucket borders does not seem unusual when one considers the hassles he faced in 
the preceding few years.  In 1659, the Town of New London voted to set aside the land at 
a place called ―Robin‘s Fort Hill‖ near Noank as common land.  The General Court often 
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allowed towns to use Native fields as common lands after Native harvests were brought 
in.
501
  The next year, Cassacinamon became embroiled in a dispute with a New London 
settler named John Packer over a border issue, with the court granting Packer ―a spetiall 
Warrant contr Robbin Cussa: to appeare at June Court.‖502  In 1665, the sachem 
confronted Packer in court.  Packer complained to Connecticut officials that he was in a 
―context betwixt him and the Indians of his land at Naiwayuncke [Noank]‖ over issues of 
boundaries and fencing.
503
  Since the Mashantucket reservation lay within the far 
northeast corner of the town of New London, and therefore vulnerable to town 
encroachment, Cassacinamon had to clarify its boundaries.  The General Court agreed 
with Cassacinamon, and it ratified ―the returne of the Comitte that were ordered to lay out 
land to Cussisinimon and the Puquots und
r
 him and doe order the Secretary to record 
it.‖504  Mashantucket was surveyed at the farthest reaches of New London, since it was 
the custom of the time to set aside lands for Natives that were too distant from established 
white settlements, thus making them unattractive to settlers.
505
  However, given the pace 
of white settlement, and the conflicts Cassacinamon already faced concerning border 
issues, it made sense to prepare for possible future disputes.  As white settlement 
expanded in Connecticut during the 1660s and 1670s, this provided the legal and written 
protection the Pequots needed in their arsenal should they have to petition the General 
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Court in the future.  Cassacinamon‘s persistence protected the Mashantucket reservation 
into the eighteenth century.      
Even though he won some key victories, the sachem was not immune to the social 
and political shifts that accompanied the increased English presence in Connecticut.  A 
persistent problem faced by all Native peoples in the region was the encroachment of 
English livestock onto their fields, with hogs being the biggest problem.
506
  Swine were 
voracious eaters.  They consumed not only wild plants and the remaining stalks after the 
harvests, they devoured the crops themselves, foods placed in Native storage pits, and the 
clam beds on the coasts.
507
  If the Algonquians attacked the animals, they risked fines or 
retaliation from colonials.  Yet if they did not stop the animals, an entire season‘s crop 
could be destroyed.   
Colonial officials, although occasionally sympathetic, offered no real solutions for 
Native peoples because the colonials refused to control their animals.  Cassacinamon 
served as an interpreter in cases involving Natives charged with killing English hogs, 
helping the defendants state their cases.  Occasionally, Cassacinamon succeeded.  On 
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their own, and in conjunction with English authorities, the Pequots fenced their lands to 
protect them from the roving swine.  In the Noank covenant signed by the Pequots and 
Connecticut in 1651, Cassacinamon agreed ―in his owne behalfe and the behalf of the 
Rest of the pequatt Indians‖ that the Pequots ―Shall fence the Same‖ lands they were 
given.
508
  However, the swine and cattle tore through their fences; if the Natives killed 
the animals in retaliation, the English penalized them.  In the same agreement that 
granted Noank to the Pequots, the Pequots were forced ―to bear the damage‖ caused ―by 
any English cattle, or hoggs,‖ and promised to ―make good any hurt that shall be done to 
any English Cattle or hoggs by themselves.‖509  Although the Pequots promised to ―bear 
the damage‖ done to their own fields, it did not prevent Cassacinamon from filing 
complaints in the 1660s seeking restitution for damages the animals caused.
510
  In 1679, 
the Pequots and Mohegans each presented petitions to the General Court, where they 
complained that English cattle once again destroyed their crops.  The General Court 
acknowledged the issue, and in an attempt to avoid any future conflicts, it ordered that 
fence viewers survey the Pequot and Mohegan fields to ensure the fences were 
maintained.  The Court also allowed the Natives to build pens in which to keep any 
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roaming cattle they found, although it is unknown how often such pens were used.
511
  
However, occasional victories did not stop the underlying problem.   
Despite his critical knowledge of English legal proceedings, Cassacinamon still 
experienced setbacks to his agenda.  Even as Cassacinamon achieved a major victory 
with the 2,000 acre Mashantucket reservation, he soon filed petitions for more territory.  
He petitioned for additional lands at the headwater of the Mystic River, but the English 
continually denied his requests.
512
  This land lay at the heart of the Pequots‘ traditional 
territory, so this served as an attempt by Cassacinamon to reclaim more of his people‘s 
homeland.  Colonial authorities refused his request because the Mystic River territory 
proved attractive to English settlers.  A desire to keep the Pequots under their orbit may 
also have factored into their refusal.  Their refusal demonstrated that no matter how 
honored or essential Cassacinamon was in maintaining the Anglo-Algonquian frontier, he 
did not have carte blanche to get what he wanted.  This was especially true if it conflicted 
with critical English goals.   
Connecticut statues from 1650 onward declared the right of the General Court to 
control sales of Native land, and to prevent settlers ―from buying any land of the Indians, 
either directly or indirectly,‖ without their authorization.  The statutes also prevented 
Natives from selling timber or herbage rights if they did not have the approval of the 
General Court.
513
  Herbage rights referred to the right of ―English livestock to graze upon 
reservation lands after the Indian harvest.‖  However, the Pequots alienated their own 
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herbage rights in one of the earliest breaches of this law.
514
  In 1660, the Commissioners 
of the United Colonies appointed Reverend William Thompson to minister the Gospel to 
the Pequots.  Reverend Thompson resided at Noank signed an agreement with 
Cassacinamon and his counselor Daniel for herbage rights in a field on the reservation.  
Cassacinamon and Daniel affirmed that the field was ―granted and confirmed to us to be 
for a planting field for the use of us an o
r
 heirs forever.‖  At the same time, they sold to 
Thompson the right ―to have and to hold the said field from year, to year, from the 
Twentieth day of the month called October until the Twentieth day of March for to put in 
Cattle, Sheep, or horses to Eat what Stalks of Corne or Grass shall be then left by us to 
him the said William Thompson his heires and Assignes for Ever.‖515  However by 1664, 
Cassacinamon complained to the County Court of New London that Thompson had 
violated this arrangement.  Instead of the seasonal, usufruct right that Cassacinamon sold 
Thompson, Thompson permanently seized the land granted to him.  The county court 
found in favor of Cassacinamon, and voided the deal.
516
   
The ruling was a pyrrhic victory.  The court negated the agreement based on the 
fact ―Casyecinamon hath no power to dispose of the Land or herberge but onely for the 
pequits use for planting the land at Nawywonuck.‖517  The court recognized that the land 
in question was Cassacinamon‘s and the Pequots‘ to use, and returned it to them.   
However, they did not punish Thompson for violating the original contract.  Instead, they 
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erased the contract, and the violation, by saying the parties involved had no right to make 
it in the first place.  The court reaffirmed that neither the Pequots themselves, nor local 
town officials, ―had the ability to alienate lands the General Court granted the Pequot 
rights to.‖518  Although Cassacinamon retained a great deal of influence, colonial 
authorities always eagerly exerted their authority whenever possible.        
II 
Based on the evidence gathered by Charles II‘s Council for Foreign Plantations 
and the continued resistance displayed by the United Colonies, King Charles II created a 
royal commission in 1664.  He tasked the commission with two goals: establish royal 
control over the New England colonies and conquer the Dutch colony of New 
Netherlands.
519
  To that end, the royal commissioners — Richard Nicolls, Robert Carr, 
Samuel Maverick, and George Cartwright — launched several plans to establish royal 
dominance.  They attempted to resolve the ongoing colonial boundary disputes, ordered 
the enforcement of the Navigation Acts, and investigated charges that the New England 
colonies had violated ―the civil and religious liberties of the king‘s subjects.‖  The royal 
agents also gathered military support from the colonies to help conquer their Dutch 
neighbor.  The royal commissioners also received secret instructions to convince the 
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magistrates of Massachusetts Bay ―to submit their charter for royal revision and review 
and to report on the state of relations between the colonists and the Indians.‖520   
In July 1664, Nicolls and Cartwright landed in Boston, while Carr and Maverick 
disembarked at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
521
  They marked their initial visit to the 
Bay Colony by delivering Charles II‘s pronouncement and submitting their request for 
aid against the Dutch.  In this matter, the royal commissioners received the desired 
support.  Dutch attacks on English settlements on Long Island facilitated colonial 
acceptance of the mission.  However, Massachusetts agreed to commit troops to the 
mission only after holding a vote of their entire General Court — an act that the royal 
commissioners found ―irksome,‖ but that enabled the Bay Colony to exert their 
independence.
522
  Once that bit of legal procedure was conducted, the English marshaled 
their forces.  They sailed towards New Netherland with a squadron of four ships and 450 
soldiers and militiamen, led by royal commissioner and colonel Richard Nicolls.
523
   
By August 1664, the English expedition readied for the siege of New Amsterdam.  
Dutch governor Peter Stuyvesant hastily reinforced New Amsterdam‘s defenses, while he 
negotiated with the English forces.  Nicolls demanded nothing short of a full surrender.  
After bitter debate, Stuyvesant gave in to the inevitable; on September 8, 1664 the 
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English took over New Amsterdam, which they renamed New York in honor of the 
king‘s brother and the colony‘s new proprietor, James, the Duke of York.  The other 
Dutch outposts in the colony fell in short order, and by October 1664, the Dutch colony 
of New Netherland was no more.
524
 
John Winthrop Jr. displayed little of the reluctance of Massachusetts Bay.  The 
cooperation between Governor Winthrop and these agents of the Restoration, in 
particular Richard Nicolls, benefitted not only Winthrop and Connecticut, but 
Cassacinamon as well.  Later, the relationship between New York and Connecticut grew 
strained, due to conflicts over colonial boundaries and overlapping patents.  Initially, 
however, Winthrop Jr. eagerly established an amicable relationship with his new 
neighbor.  In much the same way that Cassacinamon conducted a balancing act between 
the Pequots and the English, so too did Governor Winthrop balance Connecticut 
autonomy with compliance with the crown.
525
  This spirit of cooperation meant that for a 
time, Cassacinamon had access to two colonial governors.  Winthrop‘s connection to 
Nicolls also gave Cassacinamon access to broader regional power brokers and potential 
allies.   
When Colonel Nicolls assumed the office of New York governor, he established 
relations between the new English government and the Natives who lived in or near the 
New York colony.  He faced a difficult task.  The Algonquians of the Hudson River 
Valley had waged several wars against the Dutch.  It also meant sending diplomatic 
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overtures to the Mohawks, who remained a feared and respected power in the region.
526
  
The success of the New York colony depended on the ability of the new English 
authorities to establish a peace on this part of the Anglo-Indian frontier; peace with the 
Mohawks was critical, since they could ally themselves with the French and cause 
trouble.  The English had long considered the Mohawks as either a dangerous potential 
enemy, or a dangerous potential ally.  In New England, fear of the Mohawks cast a 
shadow over Anglo-Indian relations.  They loomed in the public consciousness as both a 
military threat and as a political tool.  New England Algonquians often invoked the 
suggestion or suspicion of joining with the Mohawks as a threat to encourage the English 
to side with one Native leader or another.
527
  Thus, the English understood the importance 
of maintaining peace on the New York Anglo-Indian frontier.   
In the spring, summer, and fall of 1665, several rounds of negotiations took place 
among the English, the Mohawks, and the Hudson Valley Algonquians.  Some of the 
most important negotiations took place between the English and the Esopus Indians, a 
Lenape group who lived just west of the Hudson River near the Catskills Mountains in 
what is now Ulster County, New York.
528
  The Esopus fought two wars with the Dutch, 
in 1659-1660 and 1663, and these recent conflicts convinced Governor Nicolls of the 
urgency of establishing peace with this group.  In October 1665, the Esopus and the 
English government of New York concluded a treaty.  Several Native observers and 
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translators were present at the proceedings, and one of them was Robin Cassacinamon, 
who endorsed the treaty with his own mark.
529
 
Why would Cassacinamon take part in a treaty negotiation over one hundred and 
fifty miles away from his home?
530
  Cassacinamon‘s friend and ally John Winthrop Jr. 
entered into an intense correspondence with Governor Nicolls as he established relations 
with the local Native groups.
531
  Nicolls requested Governor Winthrop‘s help in these 
negotiations; since this involved sensitive diplomacy between Natives and English, 
Winthrop enlisted the aid of his partner Cassacinamon.  Cassacinamon came highly 
recommended to the New York governor.  When Governor Nicolls sought Native allies 
for a military expedition, Winthrop Jr. praised the Mashantucket Pequots, and 
Cassacinamon in particular, saying that ―if any Indians be imployed‖ in such business, 
there were ―non more fit…then Robin & some other Pequot Indians.‖532  This praise 
reflected Cassacinamon‘s role as a ―dependable‖ Indian among the English.  However, it 
may have also referred to the Pequots‘ reputation as fierce warriors.  During the Pequot 
War, when the Pequots were unpredictable enemies, this reputation was something to be 
feared.  But once securely allied with the English, Winthrop considered it a benefit.   
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Cassacinamon‘s role in the treaty process indicates that he had earned the trust of 
both colonists and Natives in the region, something that defied the ―subjugated‖ status 
that he and the Pequots held.
533
  By creating ties among the Native peoples in New York, 
Cassacinamon extended his diplomatic sphere.  It may not have been a coincidence that 
after he completed his part in the New York negotiations, Cassacinamon occasionally 
invoked the threat of moving to the New York frontier to goad his English allies into 
helping him resolve disputes against his neighbors.
534
  The Pequots had not employed 
that particular tactic since the Pequot War. For Cassacinamon to invoke it after his trip to 
New York suggests that perhaps the Pequot leader seized the opportunity presented by 
the English to his own advantage.  At the very least, it reinforced his reputation as a 
regional political figure.  This is exemplified in the 1665 New York treaty itself.  Next to 
Cassacinamon‘s signature mark on the treaty was the written version of his name, ―Robin 
Cinnaman.‖  Also next to it was his title, ―Pekoct Sachem.‖  It was clear that by 1665, 
Cassacinamon‘s reputation as leader and diplomat had been firmly established.535       
********************************** 
While Nicolls led the expedition to take New Netherlands, the three other royal 
commissioners began their tour of the New England colonies.
536
  At each meeting with 
colonial leaders, the royal commissioners asked the colonial governments to ―remove 
church membership restrictions, if any, from the franchise and to strike any laws 
                                                 
533McBride, ―Legacy,‖ 82.  
534
Indian Papers, I: 15.  
535
NYCD, 13: 401.  
536
They began in Plymouth then travelled to Rhode Island and Connecticut.  After Connecticut, 
they moved back through Rhode Island; only then did they begin their official visit of Massachusetts Bay.  
Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same King, 55.  
 242 
repugnant to the laws of England.‖537  Reactions to the royal commissioners were mixed.  
Apart from the mission against New Netherland, Massachusetts Bay refused to comply 
with the royal commissioners, determined to maintain the freedom to which it had 
become accustomed.  However, Plymouth, Rhode Island, and Connecticut each 
cooperated with the royal envoys.  The cooperative colonies went to great lengths to 
ensure a peaceful working relationship, even in matters where the colonies disagreed with 
the crown.  There were several possible reasons for this.  The royal agents used a more 
conciliatory approach when dealing with those three colonies, seeing that they were 
―underdogs to the overbearing Massachusetts.‖  Colonial officials did not dissuade the 
king‘s agents of that perception.  In their letters to the king, the royal commissioners 
praised the three cooperative colonies and emphasized the difficult behavior of the Bay 
Colony. Charles II thanked those colonies for their earnest attempts at a working 
relationship with the crown.  In his letter to the Plymouth government, Charles noted that 
―Your carriage seems to be set off with the more luster by the contrary deportment of the 
colony of the Massachusetts, as if, by their refractoriness, they had designed to 
recommend and heighten the merit of your compliance.‖538   
Collaboration with the king‘s agents offered Connecticut and Rhode Island the 
chance to settle their ongoing border dispute in the Narragansett country.
539
  The visit 
also continued the friendly overtures Winthrop Jr. cultivated when he traveled to England 
three years earlier, so it is no surprise that he and other Connecticut officials maintained 
                                                 
537
Ibid.  
538
Palfrey, History of New England, 2: 68; ―Samuel Maverick to John Winthrop, Jr., August 29, 
1666,‖ MHSC, 4th series, 7: 313; Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same King, 55.  Samuel Maverick noted to 
John Winthrop Jr. in 1666, writing that the king ―resents as ill the Massachusetts standing out, or rather 
Rebellion.‖   
539
Oberg, Dominion & Civility, 135-136; Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same King, 55.   
 
 243 
the cordiality of that relationship.  In September 1664, Governor Winthrop wrote to 
Edward Hyde, 1
st
 earl of Clarendon and Charles II‘s Lord Chancellor, in London, and 
spoke of the ―happy arrival‖ of the commissioners in the colonies.  ―Dutie & affection 
inforceth me humbly to acknowledge w
th
 all thankfulnesse your Lordships accumulate 
goodnesse to your servant,‖ wrote the governor, ―and this colony of Connecticutt, & all 
New England.
540
  In a letter of thanks, Connecticut officials expressed their gratitude not 
only for the favors Charles bestowed upon them, but also for ―sending over your 
Majesty‘s Honorable Commissioners by whom we received your Majesty‘s Gracious 
Letter.‖  Governor Winthrop himself expressed the hope that the commissioners and the 
colonies continued to find ways ―for the inlargment of his Maties dominions, by filling that 
vacant wildernesse in tyme w
th
 plantations of his Ma
ties
 subjects.‖541      
The royal commissioners did not limit themselves to sharing niceties with 
officials like Winthrop Jr.; they made a concerted effort to exert their influence upon the 
Anglo-Indian frontier as well.  Officials in London were very concerned about the failure 
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of the Puritan colonies to firmly incorporate and control the Algonquians.
542
  While the 
Commissioners of the United Colonies ―could fine, they could threaten, and at times they 
could mediate and intervene‖ in Algonquian matters, they lacked the authority to control 
the region in the way English authorities desired.
543
  More often than not, the 
Commissioners themselves were pawns of the power politics of the Natives.  The king‘s 
men also found that previous attempts to gain religious converts among the Natives 
lacked both effort and pious sincerity.  Sir Robert Carr reported that because of this 
abrogation of their Christian duty, ―The lives, Manners, & habits of those, whom they say 
are converted cannot be distinguished from those that are not.‖544  The royal agents 
determined that the colonies exacerbated their own problems due to their aggressive 
pursuit of land.   
 The royal commissioners flexed their power by involving themselves in the 
Narragansett land dispute.  In a blow to many land speculators, they ruled that the 
Narragansetts were subjects of the English king and under the protection of Charles II.  
The Narragansett lands would be known as the ―King‘s Province,‖ and administered by 
Rhode Island.  The commissioners determined that the Narragansett sachems Pessicus 
and Canonicus had submitted ―themselves, people, and country into his Royall Majesties 
protection‖ to King Charles I in 1644.  The royal commissioners declared all of the 
                                                 
542
Oberg, Dominion & Civility, 2, 136. These London officials were ―metropolitans,‖ who, in the 
words of historian Michael Oberg ―sought to establish dominion and civility along the Anglo-American 
frontiers.  They hoped to derive a profit from their settlements, either for the crown or for their sponsoring 
organizations.  They hoped to secure and defend their colonial possessions from enemies both Native 
American and European.  And they hoped to spread English Christianity and English civility among the 
native population of the New World.‖  
543
Ibid., 134.  
544―Report of His Majesty‘s Commissioners concerning the Massachusetts,‖ in Documentary 
History of the State of Maine, 24 vols., ed. William Willis et al., eds., (Portland, ME: 1869-1916), 4: 294; 
Oberg, Dominion & Civility, 136.  
 245 
Atherton Company‘s claims to the Narragansett country null and void, and they ordered 
the purchasers to ―quit & goe of the said pretended purchased lands.‖545  The 
commissioners then paid a visit to the Narragansett country itself, where Narragansett 
leaders and the king‘s agents reaffirmed this arrangement via a reciprocal exchange of 
gifts, fulfilling Native and royal protocols.
546
   
This was a victory for the Narragansetts who, by petitioning the king directly, had 
gone over the heads of the United Colonies.
547
  Although the Narragansetts were the only 
Natives to directly petition the king, other Native leaders seized the opportunity to 
negotiate with this new English authority.
548
  However, Cassacinamon does not appear to 
have made such pronouncements.  Even though he lacked the official access to the royal 
commissioners, the Pequot sachem was not totally excluded.  Cassacinamon parlayed his 
connection to Connecticut Governor Winthrop to access New York Governor Nicolls, 
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and establish ties with Native people in the Hudson River Valley.
549
  It is also suspicious 
that after years of petitions and complaints to Connecticut officials requesting more 
reservation lands, Cassacinamon received an additional two thousand acres at 
Mashantucket in 1666.  This boon came after the Connecticut government entered its new 
cooperative arrangement with royal authorities, and after the sachem worked on behalf of 
royal officials in New York.  These benefits reflected Cassacinamon‘s place within the 
political framework of the Anglo-Algonquian frontier.   
Despite the presence of the royal commissioners, the king‘s agents did not foretell 
better fortunes for the southern New England Algonquians.  The royal commissioners 
later amended their Narragansett order: they permitted English settlers to remain on the 
Narragansett lands they were living on until the king made a formal decision on the 
matter.
550
  The royal commissioners may have declared the Atherton Company‘s holding 
null and void, but the colonials did not listen.  The colonies continued to pressure the 
Narragansetts for more land, even though the Narragansetts believed their negotiations 
with the king‘s agents gave them an equal status to the colonies.  The royal 
commissioners‘ failure to solve this problem illustrated the persistent challenges in 
governing the Anglo-Algonquian frontier.
551
   
III 
Despite the designs of London metropolitans and their royal agents, royal efforts 
at curtailing the independent actions of the colonies were not successful.  Even the 
Commissioners of the United Colonies were unsuccessful; after 1664, they would only 
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meet once every three years, a sign that the individual colonies felt secure in doing what 
they wanted.
552
  By the time the royalists had re-established themselves in England and 
flexed their political muscles in the colonies, the regional power balance in New England 
had tipped towards the colonials.  An influx of English hard currency into the colonies 
soon followed that reenergized the colonial economy, and allowed them to demonetize 
wampum in 1663 and 1664.
553
  While wampum maintained its cultural value for Native 
peoples, and retained an important function in Anglo-Indian relations (namely in treaties, 
tributes, and fines), its lost monetary value reduced the leverage available to the 
Algonquian peoples in the region.  It also increased their isolation from the colonial 
exchange networks that the Natives had come to rely on for acquiring English trade 
goods.
554
  New colonial laws accompanied this economic shift, laws that made Natives 
second-class subjects in Connecticut.  These new laws made it illegal for Natives to work 
on the English Sabbath, to own guns, purchase alcohol, or enter English towns.
555
  By 
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taking these actions, colonials only reinforced the Anglo-Algonquian social divide and 
exerted their newfound dominance over the frontier.
556
   
As the pressures mounted, the Pequots, Mohegans, and Narragansetts continued 
their political schemes.  Even in this changing political world, Cassacinamon relied on 
his skills as an intermediary, and his manipulation of information and misinformation, to 
promote his agenda.
557
  Cassacinamon, Uncas, and Ninigret plotted against one another 
throughout the 1660s, as each sachem sought to keep his people safe from English 
encroachments, and to expand his own spheres of influence.  In this respect, 
Cassacinamon proved their equal.   
In the 1660s, Ninigret accused Cassacinamon of sending Pequot warriors into his 
territory to cause trouble, a charge that Cassacinamon denied.  However, given the 
history between Cassacinamon and Ninigret, and the Pequot sachem‘s previous 
instigation of conflicts, it was a possibility.  Cassacinamon‘s intentions remained a 
mystery, but the decision of the Commissioners of the United Colonies was not.  They 
found in Cassacinamon‘s favor, saying the Pequot leader ―hath not Imployed or sent any 
of his Pequotts against the Narragansetts,‖ and the individuals responsible ―such as are 
taken and slayne…have justly suffered for theire disobedience.‖  Ninigret was then 
ordered ―not to molest the Pequots upon the account.‖  Furthermore, the Commissioners 
commanded that Ninigret not ―Retaine any Pequotts that shall run from theire Gour; but 
to secure them and giue notice therof to theire gou
r: that they may fetch them home.‖  
The Commissioners applied the same ruling to Cassacinamon‘s old rival Uncas, who was 
                                                 
556
Oberg, Uncas, 159-161.  
557Johnson, ―Some by Flatteries,‖ 108-109; Uncas, Oberg, 152.  
 249 
also reprimanded for disturbing the Pequots as they traveled to meet with the 
Commissioners.
558
  Cassacinamon continued to use the English to keep the Pequots 
within his community and sphere of influence; thus he secured his own powerbase and 
deprived his rivals of any additional people.  As the colonial population continued to 
expand, people proved a precious resource for Native leaders. 
Yet, the ongoing battle between Cassacinamon and Uncas provided most of the 
drama for Cassacinamon, and both sachems used English authorities to achieve their 
goals.  In 1662, Cassacinamon sued Uncas for restitution in a case involving the killing of 
English hogs.  Cassacinamon and the Pequots were blamed for the killings and charged a 
fine.  Cassacinamon argued that it was not the Pequots who had killed the beasts, but the 
Mohegans, and they should be the ones to pay the fine.
559
  The following year, 
Cassacinamon accused Uncas of ―entertaineing Pequott delinquents against his men‖ for 
the purposes of ―abuseing the Constable of New London,‖ ostensibly to cause trouble for 
Cassacinamon with English officials.
560
   
Cassacinamon struck back at Uncas in ways besides lawsuits.  In 1662 and 1663, 
Cassacinamon testified about a land claim Uncas had made before the Commissioners of 
the United Colonies.  Cassacinamon worked with officials to reconstruct a territorial map, 
and testified as to the places he had hunted for deer as a boy, thereby confirming an area 
that was part of the original Pequot territory.
561
  Uncas claimed these lands as his own, 
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but Cassacinamon testified that much of the land Uncas claimed had been Pequot 
territory; therefore, it belonged to the English, not Uncas.  He went further, saying that 
before the Pequot War Uncas was only the leader of a small community, and was often 
―proud and treacherous to the Pequot Sachem.‖  His insolence forced the Pequot sachem 
to ―drave Uncas out of his country‖ as a punishment, and Uncas was only allowed back 
after ―humbling‖ himself before the Pequots.  It was only through his alliance with the 
English, Cassacinamon claimed, that Uncas was of any political importance; it was the 
English who ―made him [Uncas] high.‖  Cassacinamon and the other witnesses (none of 
whom appear to have been supporters of Uncas), charged that ―according to their 
manners and customs, Uncas had no lands at all, being so conquered…if [Uncas] should 
deny it, the thing is known to all the Indians round about.‖562 
Cassacinamon‘s obstruction did not sit well with the Mohegan sachem.  In 1663, 
Cassacinamon, his counselor Daniel, and another Indian named Catchpoonas petitioned 
the English for their help.  According to Cassacinamon, Uncas planned to go to the 
General Court with a charge that the Pequots had hired an assassin to murder him, a 
charge Uncas had used against Native rivals in the past.  However, Cassacinamon warned 
that Uncas was lying; his witness, an Indian man named John Hakes, who was the son of 
Catchpoonas, had been cast out of the Pequot community for theft and drunkenness.
563
  
Therefore, this act of spite on Uncas‘s part should not be considered a serious charge.  
The Commissioners listened to Cassacinamon.   
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Uncas‘s schemes against Cassacinamon continued in 1664, when the Pequot 
overseers James Avery and George Denison wrote letters to Governor John Winthrop on 
Cassacinamon‘s behalf.  According to the overseers, an Indian man named Wathumganit 
had raped Cassacinamon‘s wife.  Cassacinamon was furious, and demanded that 
Wathumganit be arrested.  However, Wathumganit had fled to the Mohegan country and 
was given sanctuary by Uncas, before he then moved to the Pawcatuck Pequot 
community led by Wequashcook aka Cushawashet aka ―Harmon Garret.‖564  While the 
sources say that Wathumganit ―forced Cassasinimons wife,‖ it is unclear if this was a 
genuine sexual assault, or a case similar to Obechiquod‘s in the 1647 petition.565  
However, given that there is no mention of Cassacinamon‘s wife leaving the community, 
the evidence leans towards assault.  Either way, the fact that both Uncas and 
Wequashcook sheltered Wathumganit proved telling.  Perhaps Wathumganit was kin, or 
the two sachems may not have wanted to turn over an Algonquian to English justice.  
Given the personal and political histories of the people involved, it is also possible that 
Uncas and Wequashcook viewed this as an ideal chance to strike against Cassacinamon. 
Given this social and political rivalry, it struck the English as surprising and 
suspicious that Cassacinamon, Uncas, Ninigret, Wequashcook, and many other 
Algonquians gathered together at Noank for a ―great dance‖ hosted by the Pequot sachem 
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in the winter of 1669.
566
  Such large gatherings of Natives always made colonials nervous 
and suspicious.  When Connecticut officials heard rumors of an ―alleged widespread 
Indian plot threatening settlements throughout New England,‖ colonial authorities took 
notice.
567
  Several informants implicated Cassacinamon as a willing conspirator.  Thomas 
Stanton reported ―Credebell Indian reprtes heare yt Danyell Robin Sanemanes 
[Cassacinamon] partner hath bin up w
t
h the mowakes [Mohawks] this Spring w
t
h a great 
Sum of wampam and since his returne hath uttered discontent & y thee would Live no 
Longer under the Inglish but would goe & live under or w
th the mowakes.‖  John Mason, 
in his subsequent report on the incident, confirmed that several of his own sources told 
him that ―the Indians did speedily intend to Cut of[f] the Inglish [English],‖ a plan 
―plotted at Robines town at the dance.‖568   
That Cassacinamon hosted this gathering proved that the event had his blessing.  
Equally suspicious to colonial authorities was the fact that both Uncas and Ninigret 
attended the dance.  As Mason noted, ―Nenegrats and Unckas being together at the dans 
at Robinnes town is and was matter of wonderment to mee,‖ since as he cynically noted, 
the two sachems ―wod durst not Looke Each upon other this 20 yeares but at the mussel 
of a Gunn or at the pille of an arrow.‖569  Cassacinamon had his own complicated history 
with both sachems, so it seemed that only something dangerous would draw these three 
men together after years of political turmoil.  Stanton marched into Noank with soldiers, 
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determined to break up the dance and arrest Ninigret.  While Cassacinamon was viewed 
with suspicion for hosting the gathering, and Uncas was seen as a troublemaker, both 
leaders benefitted from having well-placed allies within the Connecticut government.  
The English targeted Ninigret for arrest because of his past insurrection in the 1650s, the 
―brazen‖ actions of the Narragansetts in directly petitioning the crown, and the testimony 
of informants.
570
 
What happened next stood as testament to Cassacinamon‘s regional influence and 
political savvy.  In a personal statement sent to the Connecticut General Court in May of 
1669, Cassacinamon told the authorities his side of the story.  He admitted ―that Uncas 
and Ninicraft and a great many other Indians mett together‖ at Noank.  However, he 
insisted that they intended ―no hurt at all to the Inglish,‖ but gathered ―in a place where 
no[ne] dwell to make a dance after the Indian fashion.‖571  As Stanton‘s troops squared 
off against the Algonquians, Stanton demanded that Cassacinamon help bring Ninigret 
into custody.  However, when Cassacinamon observed the escalating situation, he told 
the magistrates that ―I was much afraid that some men would be kild.‖  His fears proved 
justified when ―Ninicrafts men, almost one hundred of them have guns in their hands and 
the Inglish men layd their hands upon their swords redy to draw.‖  Violence seemed 
certain, until Cassacinamon ―cried out to them‖ and defused the situation.  Afraid that 
―Ninicraft‘s men might have fyred Inglishmens houses and that a great dell of hurt might 
have com of it,‖ Cassacinamon brokered a peaceful settlement.  Cassacinamon refused to 
help Stanton arrest Ninigret.  Instead, he secured his peaceful withdrawal from Noank, at 
                                                 
570―September 1654,‖ Acts, II: 125-134; Oberg, Uncas, 161.   
571―Petition of Robin Cassasinamon, May 16, 1669,‖ RCW, II: 141a.‖  
 254 
the same time he promised to pay Stanton ―a great deal of wampum‖ (some twenty 
pounds of it).  When he offered the wampum, Cassacinamon said it was a fair trade, as 
―wampum was like the grass when it was gon it would com againe but if men be once 
kild they will live noe more.‖572  All parties agreed to the settlement and Stanton 
departed; all that remained of the affair was for colonial authorities to sort out the truth. 
Although bloodshed was avoided that day, many questions remained.  The 
Pequots, Mohegans, and Narragansetts each defended themselves, and insisted that 
nothing untoward was planned at the gathering.  Ninigret defended his actions, saying 
that the ―informants‖ were disgruntled Long Island Indians.  He dismissed the colonists‘ 
concerns about Cassacinamon‘s dance, arguing just as Cassacinamon had done, that such 
dances were ―noe unusauall thing for us soe to doe.‖  He then claimed that since the 
Narragansetts had been accepted by the crown as direct subjects, he and his people were 
―insulated…from the working of Puritan justice.‖573  For his part, John Mason defended 
his Mohegan allies, arguing that ―I cannot yet be pswaded but the Mowhauks and sd 
Monheage are Cordeall to the English interest.‖  However, as a gesture of good will, he 
encouraged Uncas‘s son, Owaneco, to surrender some of the Mohegans‘ guns to the 
English.  Then, in an attempt to cast aspersions on the Pequots, he challenged ―the 
Pequotts if they will not deliver freely of their owne‖ guns.  Cassacinamon did not rise to 
Mason‘s bait.  Some officials remained suspicious of Cassacinamon‘s motives, but they 
decided to trust him.  The fact that he had resolved the situation peacefully may well have 
factored into that decision.
574
  The fact that such a suspicious event between longtime 
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enemies occurred only six years before King Philip‘s War, suggests that something more 
than just an ordinary dance had taken place.  The irony was that the Natives gathered at 
the Noank dance — Cassacinamon, Uncas, and Ninigret — were not the ones who 
eventually threatened the English.  In fact, Cassacinamon and Uncas would be crucial in 
saving them.                
The 1669 dance provided definitive proof that Cassacinamon earned the status of 
a prominent cultural intermediary.  The event demonstrated just how entrenched a role 
the Pequot sachem had carved out for himself in the regional Native political system.  If 
the rumors were true, this event was rooted in Cassacinamon‘s unhappiness with how his 
people were being treated, and his desire to live among the Mohawks.  On the one hand, 
this invocation of the Mohawks was a long-standing tactic used by New England 
Algonquians.  However, given Cassacinamon‘s recent forays into New York, it was 
possible that he had cultivated connections that made that threat more believable.
575
  The 
fact that Cassacinamon hosted the dance and brought together two mortal enemies, Uncas 
and Ninigret, indicated that despite whatever personal and political rivalries 
Cassacinamon had with those men, he had also achieved status and respect among 
Algonquian leaders in the region.  This respect came not only from other Native leaders, 
but English authorities as well, who listened to Cassacinamon‘s council and accepted his 
resolution of the dispute.   
******************************************** 
  By the time Cassacinamon hosted the ―great dance‖ in 1669, he had become an 
established fixture in the social, political, and economic networks that crisscrossed the 
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Anglo-Algonquian frontier of southern New England.  Cassacinamon was a diplomat, 
translator, sachem, governor, and advocate.  His skills as a negotiator and intermediary 
were evident throughout the 1650s and 1660s, as he formed alliances with English 
leaders and other Native peoples throughout southern New England and the recently 
conquered Dutch colony — now New York.  Cassacinamon fought in the courts and 
around the council fires to ensure that the Pequots were protected as the number of 
English settlers dramatically increased in Connecticut, and as the other Native leaders, 
like Uncas, also sought to protect what was theirs.  Cassacinamon retained copies of 
important documents, filed petitions, brought lawsuits, signed treaties, requested land 
surveys, and negotiated agreements, all designed to protect the Pequots‘ reservations at 
Noank and Mashantucket.  In the process of securing his peoples‘ lands, Cassacinamon‘s 
skills cement his reputation as a prominent cultural intermediary in the region.      
The networks that Cassacinamon navigated had, for several decades, kept the 
Algonquians and the English colonists tied together in a system of interdependence.  
Neither colonists nor indigenous people exerted full control over the region or over the 
other side, and since the end of the Pequot War, an uneasy peace had existed.  This 
situation crumbled during the 1660s, as those interdependent networks changed, and the 
Natives grew more dependent on the English.  Once this happened, the balance of power 
shifted towards the colonials, and the Algonquians had to find creative ways to survive 
within this new dynamic.  For Cassacinamon and Governor John Winthrop Jr., that meant 
forging an amicable relationship with the royal agents who arrived in the early 1660s.  
While the Pequots perhaps had more experience dealing with English authority than some 
of their neighbors, they did not automatically accept this arrangement.  Cassacinamon 
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built upon his relationship with Governor Winthrop, at the same time he fostered ties to 
the Pequot overseers appointed to work with him, and made overtures to English officials 
and Native powers in other colonies.  However, if the fear over the ―Indian dance‖ of 
1669 was any indication, tensions were building to a fateful confrontation.  Tensions 
finally exploded six years later with King Philip‘s War.     
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Chapter 6: “Remember us to Robbin” - Cassacinamon, the Pequots, and King 
Philip’s War 
 
 In April 1676, an Anglo-Algonquian military force marched east from 
Connecticut to the Narragansett country.  The majority of Narragansetts (minus Ninigret 
and his followers) now sided with the Wampanoag sachem Metacom, known to the 
English as King Philip, and joined his Algonquian uprising.  The conflict, known to the 
colonials and their descendents as King Philip‘s War, unleashed a level of destruction and 
death not seen since the Pequot War of 1637. The destruction soon surpassed that earlier 
conflict.
576
  Forty-seven colonial troops entered enemy territory alongside eighty Pequot 
and Mohegan warriors.  The Connecticut Anglo-Algonquian force had orders to stop the 
Narragansett sachem Canonchet who had destroyed several English settlements.  Robin 
Cassacinamon led the Mashantucket warriors, who fought alongside their kin from the 
eastern Pawcatuck community.  Catazapet, the son of Cassacinamon‘s Pawcatuck 
counterpart Wequashcook/Herman Garrett, commanded this second group of Pequots.  
Rounding out the Connecticut-Algonquian force was a group of Mohegan warriors led by 
Owaneco, a son of Cassacinamon‘s long-time political opponent Uncas.577  Whatever 
                                                 
576For works dealing with King Philip‘s War, see the following sample of works.  Jill Lepore, The 
Name of War: King Philip‟s War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1998); James D. Drake, King Philip‟s War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676 (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1999); Jenny Hale Pulsipher, Subjects Unto the Same King: Indians, English, and the 
Contest for Authority in Colonial New England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); 
Douglas Edward Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip‟s War (New York, 1958); 
Yashuhide Kawashima, Igniting King Philip‟s War: The John Sassamon Murder Trial (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 2001); Patrick M. Malone, The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics 
among the New England Indians (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Philip 
Ranlet, ―Another Look at the Causes of King Philip‘s War,‖ in New England Encounters: Indians and 
Euroamerican, ca. 1600-1850, ed. by Alden T. Vaughan (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999), 
136-155; Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 282-326. 
 
577
John William De Forest, History of the Indians of Connecticut from the earliest known period to 
1850 (Hartford, 1851), 282-283; Nathaniel Saltonstall, ―A New and Further Narrative of the State of New-
 259 
grievances existed between the Pequots, Mohegans, and their English allies were set 
aside for the mission at hand.  Finding the enemy was Cassacinamon‘s goal, along with 
seizing whatever spoils he could find in captives, wampum, and material goods.    
On April 11, the Connecticut forces found their prey in a swamp near Seaconk, 
Rhode Island.   The tide turned against the Narragansetts, and Canonchet fled.  As he 
sprinted through a brook, his gunlock got wet and was unable to fire.  Seeing the 
opportunity, a Pequot warrior overtook and disarmed Canonchet, and the Narragansett 
sachem ―found himself the prisoner of men whom he had enraged by his desperate and 
persevering hostility.‖578  When the fighting was over, fifty Narragansetts were executed 
on the spot and another forty, including Canonchet, were taken prisoner.  Cassacinamon 
and the others marched their prize back to Connecticut.  In the English town of 
Stonington, near Pawcatuck, the English, Pequots, and Mohegans decided the 
Narragansett sachem‘s fate.  Canonchet knew what was coming, and met his end with 
steely defiance.  When Cassacinamon and the others told the Narragansett prisoner he 
was to be executed, Canonchet told the Native commanders, ―It is well.  I shall die before 
my heart is soft.‖  Cassacinamon, Catazapet, and Owaneco then carried out the sentence 
―in such a manner as would give each tribe…a share in the deed.‖  Cassacinamon shot 
Canonchet where he stood, ending his life.  The Narragansett was dead, but the ritual was 
not yet done.  Owaneco beheaded and quartered Canonchet‘s lifeless body.  Catazapet 
and the Pequots started a large bonfire and cast the limbs upon it.  The three Native 
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leaders then jointly presented Canonchet‘s head to Captain George Denison as a trophy, 
which he sent off to the Connecticut magistrates as proof of their victory.
579
  With their 
triumph over Canonchet public for all to see, the Pequots, Mohegans, and English 
resumed the business of fighting the rest of Philip‘s forces. 
The capture and execution of Canonchet was but one bloody episode in the 
fourteen month conflict known as King Philip‘s War.  The war fundamentally altered 
Anglo-Algonquian New England.  Since the Pequot War, an uneasy balance had existed 
between the English colonials and the Algonquian peoples of southern New England.  
Tensions exploded in 1675 when the Wampanoag sachem Metacom led an Algonquian 
alliance against the New England colonies and their Algonquian allies.  It would be easy 
to cast the conflict as solely one where English battled Algonquian but, as with the 
Pequot War, the reality of the situation was far more complicated.  Canonchet‘s 
execution was but one graphic demonstration of how Natives fought on both sides of the 
conflict and for their own reasons.  As historian Jill Lepore noted, the wounds and words 
of war generated acts of narration that defined ―the geographical, political, cultural, and 
sometimes racial and national boundaries between peoples.‖580  Unlike the aftermath of 
the Pequot War, King Philip‘s War did not create an interconnected Anglo-Algonquian 
world.  After 1676, the English secured their dominance of southern New England, and 
an Anglo-Iroquoian frontier dominated regional politics.   
Cassacinamon and the Mashantucket Pequots crafted their own ―narratives‖ of the 
war.  For Cassacinamon, the conflagration of 1675-1676 reaffirmed old alliances and 
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created new ones, and forced concessions from colonial officials who once again needed 
his help.  After decades spent integrating themselves into the fabric of Anglo-Algonquian 
relations, the strategies employed by Cassacinamon and the Mashantucket Pequots 
protected them from the worst of the war.  For a brief time, this arrested the tightening 
grip of English control.  The Mashantucket Pequots strengthened their standing in the 
region, and reaped material benefits in the form of captives and wampum.  King Philip‘s 
War was, in the words of scholar James D. Drake, ―a civil war‖ that destroyed the 
previous Anglo-Algonquian New England society.
581
  Yet, the tactics, alliances, and 
strategies employed by Cassacinamon and the Mashantucket Pequots protected them 
from these changes, just as they had for decades.                   
I 
By the early 1670s, estimates put the regional population of New England at 
around 78,000 people, one out of every four people being indigenous.  In this Anglo-
Algonquian world, it was common practice for local and regional Algonquian and 
colonial leaders to enter their communities ―into voluntary, sometimes overlapping, 
coalitions of perceived common political interests.‖582  Cassacinamon, Uncas, John 
Winthrop Jr., John Mason, and countless others spent decades doing just that.  
Cassacinamon and the Mashantucket Pequots had carved out a place for themselves in 
the changing social and political world of southern New England.  Colonial leaders 
classified Native groups that lived outside the English colonies as ―nations,‖ and those 
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that lived within colonial boundaries as ―subjects.‖  ―Subject‖ was a loose classification 
however.  In the minds of many colonial officials, Natives living within colonial borders 
(such as Uncas and the Mohegans) remained stubbornly independent.  Historian Alden 
Vaughan developed a three-part classification system for those Natives residing within 
colonial boundaries: groups that ―maintained their independence from the English‖ (like 
the Mohegans), groups ―that nominally subjected themselves to the English (like the 
Pequots), and ―those individual Indians who lacked affiliation with any Indian group and 
lived within English communites.‖583  The ―nominal‖ part of Vaughan‘s second category 
is critical in understanding Cassacinamon‘s and the Pequots‘ status.  Cassacinamon‘s 
friendship/alliance with Governor John Winthrop Jr. granted the community access to the 
highest levels of colonial government.  The sachem and his lieutenants navigated the 
turbulent waters of the English legal system in defending their rights.  The Pequots 
replicated their seasonal subsistence rounds by traveling between their reservations at 
Noank and Mashantucket; at the same time, they took part in the larger colonial market 
economy.
584
  The Pequots were no longer scattered survivors, they were acknowledged 
political agents with a land base from which to operate.  Under Cassacinamon‘s guidance 
the Pequots reestablished themselves as a permanent Native presence in the region, with a 
defined role in regional politics. 
Cassacinamon and the Mashantucket Pequots were better equipped to handle the 
changes of the 1660s and early 1670s than other Native communities.  The 
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demonetization of wampum, the seizure of New Netherlands/New York, the efforts of the 
Restoration royal government to assert its authority over New England, and the increased 
importance of the Mohawks to the fur trade and to frontier relations, all put the southern 
New England Algonquians under augmented pressures.  Coupled with these changes was 
the inescapable fact that the English colonial population continued to grow.  Between 
1650 and 1670, their population doubled, causing rapid expansion and the establishment 
of new settlements in previously ―undeveloped‖ areas.  By 1665, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, New Hampshire, and Maine combined held over thirty English towns, while 
Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth possessed nearly fifty towns.
585
   One of the 
beleaguered Native groups that faced these increased pressures was the Wampanoags 
living near Plymouth colony.  The Wampanoags were led by the sachem Metacom 
(Philip), a man with an extensive history with the English.   However, Metacom could not 
navigate the negative trends of the 1660s and 1670s as effectively as the Pequot sachem. 
In June 1675, Plymouth authorities tried, convicted, and executed three 
Wampanoag men — important councilors of Metacom‘s — for the murder of a 
Massachusett Christian Indian named John Sassamon.  By the end of June, Metacom‘s 
warriors had attacked the Plymouth town of Swansea, the first of many towns put to the 
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torch.
586
  The Sassamon trial and its aftermath supplied the sparks that ignited the war, 
but the groundwork had been laid years before.  Anglo-Algonquian relations in 
Connecticut were often complicated, and at times contentious, but the importance of 
Natives like Cassacinamon to the security of the colony had forced English authorities 
there to deal with them in a diplomatic, though by no means perfect, manner.  Through 
years of skillful negotiations and dealings, Cassacinamon had secured the friendships and 
partnerships of the most powerful Englishmen in the Connecticut colony.  Metacom was 
not as fortunate.  In the years leading up to the war, Metacom/Philip — the grandson of 
Massasoit, the Indian leader famous for his peace with the Pilgrims — found himself cut 
off from potential English allies.  This isolation recalled the Pequots‘ experience prior to 
the outbreak of the Pequot War in 1637.
587
  Politically, Metacom‘s difficult relationship 
with English authorities contrasted sharply with Cassacinamon‘s shrewd relationship 
with them.  While both sachems dealt with similar historical forces, Cassacinamon‘s 
astute understanding of the English political system and his personal relationship with 
John Winthrop Jr., provided Cassacinamon and the Mashantucket Pequots with critical 
protections denied to Metacom.   
From the 1650s to the 1670s, the Wampanoags battled Plymouth Plantation, 
Massachusetts Bay, and Rhode Island over land rights, fencing, and grazing animals.  
However, their contentious relationship with Plymouth dominated Wampanoag 
politics.
588
  In 1662, Metacom became Wampanoag grand sachem after his brother 
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Wamsutta died.  In one of his first acts, he declared Plymouth his protectorate, or his 
nanauwunnumoonkan.
589
  At first, the relationship benefited Metacom; the colony aided 
him in removing intrusive Narragansetts who threatened his power.
590
  However, despite 
these early reaffirmations of friendship, over the next thirteen years Metacom battled 
colonial officials in the courts and in treaty negotiations to protect his people and their 
land.  Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay and the Narragansetts beset Metacom from all sides.  
Periods of high tension emanated from frequent rumors that Metacom secretly planned 
insurrections against the colonists.  The first of these rumored plots emerged in 1667.  
However, once it was revealed that the plot was based on deliberate misinformation by 
some of Metacom‘s Native enemies, the matter was settled.591   
In April 1671, Plymouth Colony demanded that Metacom answer new charges 
that he conspired against them.  These rumors surfaced after several of Metacom‘s 
followers had marched through the town of Swansea the previous March, brandishing 
their weapons at the English settlers.  Plymouth had established Swansea in 1667, around 
the time the previous rumors surrounded Metacom.  The closest English town to 
Metacom‘s own village, Swansea served as another sign of English encroachment.592  In 
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contrast to the (mostly) reciprocal relationship between the Pequots living at 
Noank/Mashantucket and the residents of New London, Connecticut, the proximity of 
Swansea to Metacom did not cement an easy peace.  Plymouth colonists frequently 
angered the Wampanoags; increased economic hardships, the destruction of Wampanoag 
fields by English livestock, and colonial desire for Wampanoag lands were common 
sources of tension.  Throughout the 1660s, the Wampanoags worked with English 
authorities and took their grievances to Plymouth‘s courts.  Plymouth officials made half-
hearted efforts to address the problems, but colonial expansion continued with little 
thought to Wampanoag concerns.
593
   
These issues affected relationships between the Pequots and New London as well, 
but they also shared a lengthy history of cooperation due to the Cassacinamon-Winthrop 
alliance.  Metacom had received approval from the royal commissioners in 1665, but this 
did not protect him from the colonial advance.  And although Protestant missionaries 
made overtures to the Pequots, Metacom faced a challenge that Cassacinamon did not: 
the Christian Indians of the ―Praying Towns.‖   The first ―Praying Town, Natick, was 
founded in 1651, by Puritan missionary John Eliot.  Designed to teach not only the 
Gospel but English ―civilization,‖ the towns drew numerous Algonquians to them for a 
variety of reasons.  Many settled in these towns as a way to rebuild their communities 
wracked by disease and dislocation; some expressed genuine interest in what the 
missionaries offered; others went for person reasons that they kept to themselves.  By 
1675, fourteen ―Praying Towns‖ had been established, with 2,500 Algonquians — nearly 
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20 percent of southern New England Natives — calling the towns home.  These towns 
posed a challenge to leaders like Metacom, as they drew individuals from established 
tribes and confederations into these new social arrangements.  Though Metacom 
expressed no interest in conversion our in joining these ―Praying Towns,‖ Eliot and other 
missionaries desired to convert the sachem and the other Wampanoags.  As these social, 
political, and economic pressures mounted, Metacom‘s resistance grew more entrenched, 
even as his options grew more limited.
594
       
After the March 1671 display, Metacom met with Plymouth officials in the town 
of Taunton.  When Plymouth authorities asked if he planned an insurrection, Metacom 
admitted that he was prepared for a fight.  Nothing of substance was resolved, but on 
April 10, 1671, Metacom signed a treaty whereby he agreed to turn over his guns.  While 
Plymouth magistrates expected him to turn over all his guns, Metacom just handed over 
the weapons he brought with him to Taunton.  He had others.
595
  By June, Plymouth had 
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charged Metacom with violating the agreement, and Eliot convinced Metacom and 
Plymouth to appeal for arbitration.  On September 24, 1671, John Winthrop Jr., John 
Leverett of Massachusetts Bay, and other representatives from the United Colonies 
gathered with Metacom and his councilors at Plymouth.  While the arbitrators stressed 
that Plymouth should follow a ―moderate‖ course of action, they clearly sided with 
Plymouth.  Winthrop‘s actions made it clear that while he protected his friend 
Cassacinamon, he withheld his favor from those Natives not-essential to his plans.  The 
arbitrators found Metacom totally at fault, and ordered him ―to amend his wayes, if hee 
expected peace, and that if hee went on in his refractory way, he must expect to smart for 
it.‖596  On September 29, 1671, Metacom was forced to accept an imposed treaty and pay 
a £100 fine within three years.  Forcibly made a subject of Plymouth colony, he agreed 
not to sell land or go to war with other tribes without first obtaining the colony‘s 
permission.
597
  Cassacinamon and the Pequots had chosen direct affiliation with the 
English over the Mohegans because it suited their own interests: the right to live in their 
own territory with their own Pequot leaders.  Metacom‘s forced subjugation to Plymouth 
did nothing to further his own objectives.  It proved a symbol of everything that had gone 
wrong for the Wampanoags.         
Metacom may have accepted nominal subjugation to Plymouth, but that did not 
mean Plymouth actually controlled the surrounding frontier.  Metacom raised the money 
to pay the fine by selling land.  The loss of land was bitter for the Wampanoag sachem, 
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but the proceeds did more than settle the debt.  He had plenty of money left over to 
purchase more guns.  The legal disputes also grew more contentious.  Natives filed court 
claims in such numbers that in 1673, Plymouth banned Indians from town when court 
was held save for the July and October sessions.
598
  By 1675, only the right set of 
circumstances were needed to trigger the violence.                            
The Wampanoag sachem faced opposition from Native leaders as well as 
colonials.  Cassacinamon‘s old opponent, the Narragansett-Niantic sachem Ninigret, was 
one of these foes.  The Christian Indian John Sassamon was another.  Each challenged 
Metacom‘s authority.599  Ninigret, denied satisfaction in Connecticut, turned towards the 
Wampanoags in an attempt to shore up his own power base and remove Metacom as a 
rival.  Ninigret spread the 1667 rumors about Metacom.
600
  Ninigret‘s use of 
misinformation was a well-worn political strategy, as well as casting about rumors of 
―Indian plots.‖  Such rumors always triggered fear among the English, and opportunistic 
sachems channeled that fear to their advantage.
601
  Cassacinamon employed this tactic 
himself, as did Uncas, but Metacom was not as astute with it.   
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Metacom faced a far more personal challenge from the Christian Indian John 
Sassamon.
602
  Sassamon was a Massachusett Indian who as a young teen was raised in an 
English household after his birth parents died.  They converted to Puritan Christianity 
shortly before their deaths, and Sassamon continued his spiritual conversion while living 
with his new English family.  He had an ongoing (though fitful) relationship with 
Calvinism throughout his life.
603
  Years spent living among the English was an 
experience shared by both Sassamon and Cassacinamon.  Sassamon learned to read and 
write as well.
604
  These skills made him a cultural intermediary like Cassacinamon, and 
Sassamon emerged as a trusted Native translator for the English.  Sassamon stepped on to 
the regional stage by working with the colonists in the Pequot War.  Sassamon, like 
Uncas and Miantonomi, made sure he was well-compensated for his services.  
―Compensation‖ came in the form of a Pequot woman, who likely became his wife.605   
Sassamon‘s linguistic skills and his Puritan faith made him the ideal partner for 
missionary John Eliot in his efforts to both learn indigenous languages and convert 
Native Americans.  Sassamon worked closely with Eliot for years; both men were well-
known as interpreters, linguists, and teachers, and Sassamon was one of several Natives 
who helped Eliot craft his bilingual Bible, Indian primer, and two books of Psalms.  
Sassamon even served as a teacher in the Massachusett/Wampanoag praying town of 
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Natick in 1650, and attended Harvard in 1653.
606
  By 1654 Sassamon‘s relationship with 
Eliot grew strained due to Sassamon‘s ongoing struggles living up to English ―standards‖ 
of conversion.  However, Sassamon‘s skills still made him a valuable asset.  In 1662, 
Sassamon entered Metacom‘s circle of counselors as an interpreter and scribe.607  Francis 
Jennings and others have suggested that Sassamon worked as a spy for Plymouth Colony, 
and funneled vital information to them about Metacom.  If true, this strengthens the 
parallels between Sassamon and Cassacinamon: both men used their multilingual abilities 
and cross-cultural connections to manipulate information to their own advantage.
608
    
For a time, Sassamon served as a critical link between the Wampanoags and the 
English.  Both sides viewed him in different ways: Eliot saw him as a vehicle by which to 
convert Metacom, and Metacom saw him as an important ally in dealing with the 
English.  However, by 1671 Sassamon had fallen out of favor with both Metacom and 
Eliot.  Eliot blamed him for not doing enough to convert Metacom, while Metacom 
increasingly viewed Sassamon as an untrustworthy rival.  First, Sassamon gave Metacom 
false information regarding the whereabouts of several of Metacom‘s Narragansett 
enemies.
609
  Then, Metacom discovered that Sassamon, in his capacity as scribe, tried to 
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cheat him.  Sassamon included a sizable land grant to himself in Metacom will.
610
  
Sassamon left Metacom, and lived among the English and Christian Indians at Nemsaket 
after that, where he served as a minister to the Christian Indians there.  In 1674, 
Sassamon returned to the Wampanoags, in what some felt was a renewed attempt to 
convert Metacom and establish a new relationship with the sachem.  However, in January 
1675, Sassamon met with Plymouth governor Josiah Winslow to tell him that Metacom 
once again plotted against the English.  Governor Winslow, in spite of the ongoing 
disputes with Philip, discounted Sassamon‘s information ―because it had an Indian 
original, and one can hardly believe them [even] when they speak truth.‖611  Sassamon 
disappeared within a week of meeting Winslow; his body was found in February 1675.  
Metacom was an immediate suspect, but ultimately three of his counselors — Tobias, 
Tobias‘s son Wampapaquan, and Mattashunannamo — were arrested, tried and convicted 
for the murder.  The three were executed on June 8, 1675.  By June 11, Metacom‘s 
warriors were seen arming themselves outside Plymouth ―in a posture of war.‖  On June 
23, two colonists killed a Wampanoag Indian on the outskirts of Swansea.  The next day, 
the Wampanoags attacked Swansea, killing nine colonists.  When a lunar eclipse 
darkened the skies on June 26, 1675, it seemed to both Algonquian and English alike an 
omen of things to come.
612
  The war had begun. 
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It is unclear whether Cassacinamon knew the Wampanoag sachem, the Christian 
Massachusett interpreter, or any of the Wampanoags who were executed.  Given the 
political climate of Anglo-Algonquian southern New England and the run-ins Metacom 
had with Winthrop and Ninigret, it is likely that Cassacinamon knew Metacom at least by 
reputation.  It is also unclear what, if any, knowledge the Pequot sachem had of John 
Sassamon, or if he had any strong reactions to his murder.  Due to Sassamon‘s 
involvement in the Pequot War and his taking of a Pequot woman after the conflict, it is 
doubtful Cassacinamon shed any tears over his death.   
Striking comparisons can be made between Robin Cassacinamon‘s story and 
those of Metacom and Sassamon.  Like Metacom, Cassacinamon led a community of 
Algonquians connected to a neighboring English colony.  And like Sassamon, 
Cassacinamon was a skilled interpreter and intermediary whose abilities put him at the 
center of diplomacy and the exchange of information.  Yet in comparing the three men, 
Cassacinamon‘s true skills as a leader and player in regional politics are made clear.  
Metacom led the Wampanoags, but his constant political setbacks with Plymouth and the 
lack of a dependable English ally left him vulnerable to the machinations of his 
neighbors, both English and Algonquian.  Cassacinamon was determined not to face a 
similar fate.  As the Sassamon murder trial unfolded in Plymouth‘s court, in May 1675 
Connecticut officials and Cassacinamon met in Hartford and agreed upon a set of laws to 
govern the Pequots.
613
  Ever since 1654, the Commissioners of the United Colonies and 
Connecticut colony had reserved the right to appoint governors and overseers for the 
Pequots.  Colonial officials also encouraged the Pequots to follow ―proper‖ laws that 
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regulated their behavior.  This authority was acknowledged throughout the 1660s in the 
petitions and agreements that secured the Mashantucket reservation.
614
  Cassacinamon 
received his official English appointments as Pequot ―governor,‖ but the office simply 
reinforced his Native qualifications as sachem.  Yet even after the more contentious 
incidents of the late 1660s, such as Cassacinamon‘s Indian dance of 1669, the English did 
not force Cassacinamon to revisit this matter of law.
615
  The Wampanoag crisis facilitated 
such a return, which Cassacinamon exploited to his own advantage. 
The timing of these laws cannot be dismissed as coincidence.  With colonial 
leaders casting worried eyes towards Plymouth, Connecticut magistrates needed some 
assurance that their borders were secure.  Cassacinamon seized the moment to strengthen 
his alliance with the colony.  In May 1675, Cassacinamon sent a petition to the 
Connecticut General Court and asked that ―some laws & orders‖ be drawn up ―for the 
present well governing of the Pequitt Indians.‖  The laws included penalties for crimes 
like murder and theft, but many of them focused on converting the Pequots to English 
modes of civilization.  There were laws about adultery, abiding the Sabbath, and 
requiring Pequots to attend services by Reverend James Fitch and any other missionaries 
who worked with the community.
616
  Given the fact that Cassacinamon never converted 
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to Christianity in his lifetime, and that English efforts at ―civilizing‖ the Pequots were not 
successful during the seventeenth century, the likelihood is that these cultural laws were 
not closely enforced.  However, the laws did offer additional protections to the Pequots.  
They bound the Pequots to the colony at a time when trust was an especially important 
commodity in Anglo-Algonquian relations.   
Several prominent Connecticut officials signed the agreement, including Lt. 
Governor William Leete and John Allyn, but one key signature was absent: John 
Winthrop Jr‘s.  While Winthrop Jr. was still Connecticut governor, by 1675 he was 
scaling back his governmental activities.  He had to be convinced by the council to take 
on another term as governor; but at sixty-nine years old, Winthrop Jr. was increasingly 
focused on more personal matters of health, family, and finance.
617
  By negotiating this 
agreement with other members of the Connecticut government, Cassacinamon 
established connections with the colonial hierarchy independent of his relationship with 
the Winthrops.  From an Algonquian standpoint, it strengthened the relationship between 
a principal sachem and a member of its confederation.  John Winthrop Jr. did not oppose 
this strategy, since it furthered his overall goal of allying the Pequots with the English.  
The escalating tensions with Metacom concerned Winthrop, as did a renewed border 
dispute with New York.
618
  In this tense environment, this proactive move by 
Cassacinamon was a welcomed gesture by Connecticut leaders.       
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The Pequot laws of 1675 also provided Cassacinamon with important personal 
benefits.  By proposing the agreement himself, Cassacinamon demonstrated he was an 
Indian leader Connecticut authorities could deal with in a ―reasonable‖ manner.  
Recognizing that the Pequot sachem/governor ―appeared to be faythfull in his trust under 
the Com
rs
, and hitherto under this Gouerment,‖ the orders reaffirmed his position of 
authority as well as that of his ―second or cheife counselor‖ Daniel.  The laws made the 
same arrangement for Cassacinamon‘s Pawcatuck counterpart Herman Garrett and his 
lieutenant, a Pequot by the name of Mamaho.  Further, the laws confirmed that the 
sachems/governors retained the power to appoint ―constables‖ who would serve as 
councilors and help keep peace within the community.  Added to this, every Indian male 
over the age of sixteen was to ―yearely pay unto the principall officer to which he 
belongs, the sume of five shillings in currant Indian pay.‖  This tribute was for the 
sachems‘ ―encouragement & support in their faythfull discharge of their duty and trust,‖ 
with the chief councilors (Daniel and Mamaho) of each sachem receiving a tribute of 
their own, one third of what the sachem/governors received.
619
  These tributes, and the 
use of councilors, were established features of Algonquian political systems; sachems 
often received such offerings from their communities through a system of mutual 
obligation and reciprocity.
620
  The Connecticut authorities reaffirmed elements of the pre-
existing Algonquian leadership.  However, by recognizing two Pequot governors, the 
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arrangement once again enforced the legal separation of the two Pequot communities: 
Mashantucket/Noank and Pawcatuck.
621
   
Eager to secure its Indian allies, the Connecticut colony negotiated with the 
Pequots.  However, not even this need for Pequot allies forced the English to accept an 
official merging of the two Pequot groups at Mashantucket and Pawcatuck.  However, 
the fact that Cassacinamon initiated the deal and took the lead in the negotiations 
suggests that, once again, he spoke as the main Pequot authority.  He demonstrated that 
he had powerful English allies on his side who supported his authority among the 
Pequots.
622
                        
In the midst of Metacom‘s political crisis, Cassacinamon devised an opportunity 
to shore up his own power and the security of his people.  Cassacinamon had integrated 
himself and the Pequots into the political fabric of the Connecticut-Algonquian frontier.  
While his relationship with Connecticut was at times difficult, it also produced tangible 
benefits for both the Pequots and the English.  Metacom could not convince the English 
that they needed him as a partner in order to keep the peace; they merely saw him as an 
obstacle to their expansionist endeavors.  He was soon beset on all sides by English 
colonists and other Natives seeking his land.  Since the office of sachem depended on 
lineage and ability, if Metacom could not meet these challenges he had no guarantee his 
people would follow him.  Coupled with this weakness, Metacom proved unable to 
master information and misinformation as a diplomatic tactic, which left him at a severe 
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political and personal disadvantage.  Unlike Metacom, Cassacinamon had mastered these 
techniques, and reaffirmed his people‘s place in Connecticut‘s Anglo-Algonquian 
frontier.   
Comparisons between Cassacinamon and John Sassamon suggest similar 
contrasts.  Sassamon‘s linguistic and literary skills made him indispensable, but both 
colonial and Algonquians also perceived him as a threat.  Individuals who crossed these 
various English and Algonquian worlds often had suspicions cast on their intentions.  
General distrust of interpreters, despite the fact their essential role in political life on the 
frontier, reflected this precarious fluidity.  Cultural intermediaries walked this socio-
political tight rope at various times throughout their lives.  Once the war began, Indian 
interpreters faced even greater suspicion.  In September 1675, John Allyn warned John 
Winthrop Jr.‘s son Fitz-John Winthrop to ―beware of having any linguist in your 
company, least he so hide himself as that you leave him behind you!‖623  This warning is 
odd, given the Winthrop family‘s lengthy relationship with Cassacinamon.  However, 
unlike John Sassamon, Cassacinamon had long relied on a Native powerbase and 
influential English allies to support his endeavors.  Both Cassacinamon and John 
Sassamon used their abilities to act as a nexus of information on the Anglo-Algonquian 
frontier.  Yet their own political ambitions also made them targets.  The critical 
difference was that Cassacinamon, as a sachem and as an interpreter, was also deeply 
connected to the social and political networks of the region.  Cassacinamon had served as 
the bridge between Uncas and the Pequots, and with John Winthrop Jr. as his advocate, 
none of Cassacinamon‘s Native opponents could risk eliminating him.  When 
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Cassacinamon finally secured a permanent land base and official ties with the English, he 
paired his interpretive skills with his political alliances in such a way that forced his 
Native opponents to acknowledge him as a regional player.
624
  None of the relationships 
Sassamon formed with the ―Praying Indians,‖ John Eliot, and Metacom generated links 
as permanent as Cassacinamon‘s in the Algonquian socio-political power structure. 
The inability of Metacom and John Sassamon to integrate themselves into the 
political fabric of the Anglo-Algonquian frontier left both men vulnerable to the social, 
political, and economic changes of the 1660s and early 1670s.  Cassacinamon drew upon 
his dual roles as sachem and intermediary and avoided similar damage.  The failure of 
Metacom, Sassamon, and Plymouth to negotiate a workable peace was a disaster waiting 
to happen.  The violence of Sassamon‘s murder, the execution of Metacom‘s men, and 
the attack on Swansea soon spread outside Plymouth and engulfed the region.  In the 
summer of 1675, the most deadly conflict per capita in American history began in 
earnest.
625
 
II 
 After the Swansea raid, Metacom‘s forces attacked the neighboring villages of 
Rehoboth and Taunton, the site of his previous humiliation.  The attacks continued 
throughout July 1675, and Metacom‘s warriors razed towns throughout Plymouth.  
Dozens of colonial homes were burned to the ground, and the warriors killed ―many 
people after a most barbarous manner; as skinning them all alive, some only their heads, 
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cutting off their hands and feet.‖626  With each successful raid, more and more 
Algonquians joined Metacom‘s cause.  The fighting broke outside the boundary of 
Wampanoag-Plymouth when Nipmuck warriors attacked the town of Mendon in central 
Massachusetts Bay, thirty-two miles from Boston.  Metacom‘s envoys to central 
Massachusetts and to the Connecticut River Valley were well-received by many 
Algonquians in those areas, people pushed to the brink by colonial abuses.
627
  
Throughout the summer and fall, Metacom‘s forces attacked English towns throughout 
Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay.  By September and October, Metacom‘s forces raided 
towns in the Connecticut River Valley.
628
   
Metacom‘s warriors blended elements of English military culture with more 
traditional Native martial tactics and weapons, another sign of just how enmeshed 
English and Algonquian society had become over the course of the seventeenth-
century.
629
  The colonials had a long-standing fear of what they called the Indians‘ 
―skulking way of war.‖  Metacom‘s forces preferred raids and hit-and-run tactics and 
avoided direct confrontations unless they were confident of winning.
630
  Metacom‘s 
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forces attacked the visible manifestations of English property and identity: homes, fences, 
livestock, and persons all fell before the warriors.
631
  The Algonquians used both Native 
and English weapons with great efficiency: bows and arrows, tomahawks, and flintlock 
muskets.  But perhaps the most devastating weapon used during the conflict was fire.  
After the burning of Mystic fort, Natives were shocked at the brutal deployment of fire as 
a weapon of war.  But during King Philip‘s War, previous notions of restraint were tossed 
aside in favor of ―a high-casualty form of total warfare.‖632  
 The long-dreaded ―Indian conspiracy‖ had finally erupted.  The colonials‘ own 
actions in bringing that fear to life were ignored by most, though not all, New 
Englanders.  In a rare display of unity, the United Colonies and Rhode Island joined 
together to face Metacom.
633
  Towns and settlements closest to indigenous-controlled 
areas being the most susceptible to Indian attacks urged a moderate course of action.  As 
the fighting intensified, that restraint burned away along with many settlements.
634
  At the 
governmental level, Connecticut and Rhode Island also stressed moderation.  Distanced 
from most of the intense fighting, their main concern was keeping the Pequots, 
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Mohegans, and Narragansetts from siding with Metacom.  Plymouth and Massachusetts 
Bay advocated a more aggressive stance.  They had already alienated most of their Indian 
neighbors, and as a result, most of the fighting was within their borders.
635
     
Not all Native communities joined Metacom.
636
  Their reasons varied.  Some, like 
the Pequots and Mohegans, had long established relationships with English authorities.  
Some smaller Native communities felt they could not risk alienating the English.  Yet, 
from the onset of the war, all of the colonies talked about utilizing Native allies.  Just as 
Metacom‘s forces combined aspects of Algonquian and English warfare, so too did the 
colonials.  However, as the fighting intensified and took on increasingly racial overtones, 
the colonies split on how to treat their Indian allies, or even to use them at all.  Since 
Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay bore the brunt of the war, they had the sharpest 
negative reactions.  After the sacking of Springfield on October 5, 1675, Massachusetts 
Bay interned the Praying Indians on Deer Island in Boston Harbor, despite the fact that 
they had sided with the English and enjoyed high-profile supporters like John Eliot and 
Daniel Gookin.
637
  Although their villages were destroyed during the war, the Praying 
Indians split their loyalties; some sided with Metacom, others with the English.  Yet even 
these drastic actions were not the final word on Indian allies.  Metacom himself 
ultimately met his end at the hands of a Praying Indian named Alderman on August 12, 
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1676.  Alderman was part of a joint English-Christian Indian force based out of Plymouth 
Colony.
638
    
Connecticut was by far the most successful at utilizing its Algonquian allies, and 
was thus spared the worst of the war.  While the colony passed laws that severely 
punished those who illegally sold guns to Indians, many Connecticut policies supported 
their Algonquian allies.  Increase Mather noted that Connecticut was wise ―not to make 
the Indians who lived amonst them their enemies.‖  In so doing, the Puritan minister felt 
that ―the Lord hath made them to be as a wall to them, and also made use of them to do 
great service against the common Enemies of the English.‖639  Just as the trial of 
Metacom‘s men presented Cassacinamon with a singular opportunity, the colony‘s need 
for Native allies provided the sachem with another.  As the fighting intensified, 
Connecticut once again turned to the Pequots and the Mohegans.
640
  On July 2, 1675, 
John Pynchon wrote to Governor John Winthrop Jr. and proclaimed that ―It is absolutely 
necessary to engage some Indians with us…I hope you will have the Pequots true to 
you.‖641  Pynchon had little to worry about; with Cassacinamon coordinating their 
activities there was little doubt that the Pequots would remain ―true.‖  The ties binding 
Cassacinamon and the Pequots to the Winthrop family and Connecticut were still evident.  
John Winthrop, Jr. confided to his son Fitz-John that ―I am glad to heare there is so good 
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issurance of fidelity‖ from the Pequots.  He then offered these words of advice.  ―Its good 
to cherish, & keepe them confirmed,‖ the governor said, ―by all fit meanes.‖642  These 
ties remained unbroken on the July mission to the Narragansett country.  On July 12, 
1675, John Allyn of the Connecticut General Court wrote to Wait Winthrop, militia 
commander for New London County and son of John Winthrop Jr.  A group of Pequots 
traveled with Wait‘s military attachment, and Allyn extended his gratitude on behalf of 
the colony to Cassacinamon and Mamaho.  ―Remember us to Robinn & Mamaho,‘ Allyn 
asked, ―& tell them we well accept of their readiness to attend or orders, & shall keep it in 
remembrance for their future advantage.‖643   
At first the Narragansetts stressed their neutrality, and colonial officials sought to 
keep it that way.
644
  In early July 1675, Wait Winthrop urged his father to send out a joint 
Anglo-Algonquian expedition to meet with Narragansett leaders ―and prevent the 
Narrogansetts from Joyning with Philip.‖  A small English expedition marched east from 
Connecticut, ―with sum of the Moheges and Pequots which seme redy to attend us.‖  
Members of the Connecticut expedition traveled to speak with Ninigret and the other 
Narragansett sachems.  However, it was apparent that tensions still separated these Native 
groups.  Ninigret would only meet with the colonials if they did not bring ―any of Uncas 
his men with us, for reasons which he will tell us when we speake with him.‖  
Connecticut officials struck a deal with Ninigret, and three weeks later, Ninigret‘s men 
delivered several enemy heads as a sign of his loyalty to the English.  The English agreed 
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to pay a reward for every enemy head brought in to colonial authorities.
645
  Officials in 
Hartford received many enemy heads as trophies during the war.   
However, Ninigret did not speak for all of the Narragansetts.  Ninigret‘s 
Narragansett-Niantic faction split from the rest of the Narragansett confederation, which 
publicly proclaimed its neutrality.
646
  Upon Ninigret‘s separation, Miantonomi‘s brother 
Pessicus and Canonchet became the dominant sachems for the confederation.  However, 
reports soon circulated that they harbored some of Metacom‘s men.  In October 1675, the 
Commissioners of the United Colonies secured a pledge from the Narragansetts that they 
would turn over Metacom‘s followers by November 2.  When the deadline passed 
unobserved, a massive Anglo-Algonquian expedition entered the Narragansett country.  
Connecticut‘s quota was 315 soldiers, and on November 28, they sent ambassadors to the 
Pequots and Mohegans for support.  One hundred fifty warriors arrived; Owaneco led the 
Mohegans, and Catazapet led the Pequots.  The army gathered in Rhode Island, and in 
December they marched towards the Narragansetts.
647
   
On December 19, the Anglo-Algonquian forces found the Narragansett stronghold 
in a swamp near West Kingston, Rhode Island, using information taken from a captured 
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Narragansett scout.  Before dawn broke, the army took its position.  What happened next 
came to be known as the Great Swamp Fight.  The fighting was fierce and bloody.  The 
Narragansetts killed nearly seventy Englishmen and wounded 150 others before they 
burst through the Narragansett palisades.  The English killed ninety-seven warriors and 
wounded forty-eight but, in a grim parallel to the Mystic massacre, hundreds of 
Narragansetts died ―by the burning of the houses.‖  The Great Swamp Fight, the bloodiest 
campaign of the war, pushed the Narragansetts fully into Metacom‘s camp.648    
************************************** 
On July 15, 1675, Cassacinamon and Uncas officially declared their allegiance to 
Connecticut.  Ever the self-promoter, Uncas ―made a longe narrative of his acts of 
friendship in former days to the English.‖  When James Fitch visited ―Kosssisinaman‘s 
towne,‖ he noted that Cassacinamon and his men ―doe declare the same to me.‖649  No 
mention was made as to whether Cassacinamon prefaced his allegiance with a lengthy 
speech detailing his past deeds for the English.  What mattered was that Cassacinamon 
and his warriors supported Connecticut.  Cassacinamon not only spoke for 
Mashantucket/Noank, but for Pawcatuck as well.  This support proved critical to 
Connecticut‘s defense.  Based on population estimates, the Mashantucket Pequots fielded 
eighty warriors and the Pawcatuck sent sixty.  The Mohegans contributed one hundred 
warriors.  While the number of Pequot warriors may not seem impressive, their skills 
proved invaluable.  Throughout months of fighting, Pequots served alongside 
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Connecticut soldiers in multiple engagements.  Colonial units ranged in size, depending 
on the nature of the mission, from sixty to five hundred men.  These unites were 
accompanied by thirty to two hundred Native warriors.  This alliance helped ensure that 
―the Connecticut militias suffered the lowest casualty rate of any New England force‖ 
during the war.
650
     
While Connecticut needed both the Pequots and the Mohegans for its defense, 
Fitch made a passing reference in his letter to John Allyn that denoted key difference in 
how the English viewed the two sachems.  Fitch told Allyn to ―send your advise to Unkus 
and your order to Kossisinaman‖ (italics mine).  Since the Pequots fell under direct 
English jurisdiction, many in the government thought it permissible to give them orders.  
However, the reality was far different.  Between July 1675 and July 1676, Cassacinamon 
and the Pequots fought in at least twenty-three military expeditions against hostile 
Natives loyal to Metacom.  Though the Pequots never overwhelmed their opponents by 
their sheer numbers, their skills proved invaluable.  Three of these expeditions ventured 
into the heart of Wampanoag territory, while another four traveled to the middle of the 
Connecticut River Valley.  But the majority of the expeditions, sixteen in all, were 
directed against the Narragansetts and the Nipmucks.
651
  Cassacinamon and the Pequots 
targeted the Narragansetts as an opportunity to eliminate a long-time foe.   
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The Pequots and Mohegans routinely acted as scouts and messengers, and 
Cassacinamon himself joined the Pequots on these missions
652
  John Winthrop Jr., 
William Leete, and others argued that the Pequots and the Mohegans fought in ways the 
English could not, and frequently enlisted ―the Mowheags and Pequots in a sculking 
manner to suppress the enemie.‖653  In this manner, the Indian allies channeled their 
―skulking way of war‖ to benefit the colonials.  Without Native allies like the Pequots at 
their side, the colonial militias made easy targets.  ―More of ours are like to fall, rather 
than theirs,‖ Leete wrote, ―unless the Lord, by speciall providences, doe deliver them into 
our handes.‖654  The River Colony embraced Governor Winthrop‘s vision that ―there will 
be need to ingage the Pequotts…for y{e assistants of the English of a vigorus pursuit of 
the th{r Enemy.‖  The successful joining of Cassacinamon‘s Pequot warriors and other 
Natives alongside the Connecticut militias immediately produced positive results.  
Connecticut forces were never ambushed, and proved the most effective military forces 
during the war.
655
   
On August 5, 1675, James Fitch, James Avery, and John Mason Jr. enlisted 
―Robbin Cassacinamon and Mawmohoe‖ and their warriors, to ―repaire to the English 
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that are in the pursuit of the Indians, and assist them what they can.‖   Eighty Pequots and 
one hundred Mohegans joined a small English force commanded by Lt. John Browne to 
pursue Metacom‘s forces in the Narragansett and Nipmuck territories.656  Commanders 
and government officials praised the Pequots as a relief force.  In August 1675, John 
Pynchon wrote to Governor Winthrop and John Allyn, telling them of the dire situation in 
Brookefield.  Pynchon wrote of rumors that more enemy Indians were coming, so he 
asked that the ―Pequets…make all Posible speed to come quickly.‖  With the aid of the 
Pequots, Pynchon felt confident about their success against the enemy.
657
   
Connecticut officials openly championed the incorporation of Native warriors, 
and argued the point to other colonials who expressed reservations.  In April 1676, 
Secretary John Allyn of Connecticut sent a letter to officials of the Bay Colony, 
emphasizing that Connecticut‘s success was due to their units being ―part English and 
part Indian.‖  Nearly a year before, on June 28, 1675, Edward Rawson of Massachusetts 
Bay had advised John Winthrop, Jr. to ―use your utmost Authority to restreine the 
monhegins & pecquods.‖658  This warning was issued only days after the war began, so 
the Bay Colony‘s fears are understandable.  However, Connecticut‘s experience in the 
following months belied those fears.  Allyn asked the Bay Colony‘s council, ―why may 
not yourselves set out such volunteers of both sorts and encourage, as we do, who o grant 
them all plunder, and give them victuals, with ammunition, and soldier‘s pay during time 
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they are out?‖659  The joint Connecticut-Algonquian forces were ―very diligent hardy 
stoute vallyant men used and enured to ye said service [they] take very many and kill all 
save some boys and girls which soe afraights ye Indeans yt they make haste to deliver 
themselves to ye Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Rhode Island where they have quarter.‖  
While the other colonies used Native allies, albeit begrudgingly, Connecticut embraced 
the idea.  So comfortable were Connecticut militiamen with their Algonquian allies that 
on several expeditions, the number of warriors in a company surpassed the number of 
English soldiers.  By 1676, Connecticut militias refused to participate in expeditions 
unless they were joined by Pequot or Mohegan warriors.
660
  Forty years before, 
Connecticut militiamen ventured out into the unknown wilderness to battle the Pequots.  
Now they marched side-by-side, a turnaround made possible by the work of leaders like 
Robin Cassacinamon. 
However, this relationship was not without problems.  Despite the skills of 
Natives like Cassacinamon, their ―otherness‖ generated questions among some colonials 
as to where their motives truly lay.  Fitz-John Winthrop wrote to his brother Wait in July 
1675, whereby he expressed these lingering doubts.  Fitz-John agreed that ―the Pequots & 
Mohegan Indians may be of very good use if securely managed, & will be usefull to send 
out in parties or march a distance from y
e
 body to clere up any suspitious [pl]aces.‖  
However, he cautioned his brother that ―good care must be had of their faythfullnes, & tis 
good to suspect them a little, altho noe great reason appeare for it.‖661  Wait Winthrop 
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responded to these familial concerns with an air of confidence.  ―I have about 60 of the 
Pequots with me well armed with Robin and Momoho,‖ Wait wrote, ―which if they prove 
true as I have no cause to suspect them theay may do good servis‖ (italics mine).662  
These sons of John Winthrop Jr. had known Cassacinamon for years, and their 
association continued throughout the sachem‘s life.  The Connecticut General Court 
tapped the Winthrop brothers to work with the Pequots because they had ―so good an 
interest in the Pequots.‖  It was assumed that such a long history with the Pequots ―a neer 
guesse how farr they may be [ap]proued‖ in the war effort.663  Yet despite that personal 
history, Fitz-John Winthrop still expressed reservations regarding Indians.  Fitz-John‘s 
warning was especially ironic, given the fact that his brother, Cassacinamon, and 
Mamaho were on the mission to the Narragansett country that elicited John Allyn‘s high 
praise for their efforts.
664
   
While Wait Winthrop vouched for Cassacinamon and the Pequots, the incident 
demonstrated the complex issue of identity on the New England Anglo-Algonquian 
frontier.  These issues were heightened during a war that, for many, reflected clear ethnic 
overtones.  Metacom‘s forces attacked English colonials and the symbols of the English 
way of life.  New Englanders who ―perceived no utilitarian or spiritual benefit in 
recognizing Indians as members of their society,‖ were the most outspokenly anti-Indian.  
Even colonials like Fitz-John Winthrop, who felt Natives had a place within the social 
order, felt that ―their hierarchical view of New England society, with the English 
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occupying a higher rung than the Indians, presented a natural fault line along which the 
two sides of the war could be drawn.‖665       
******************************************** 
The Pequots‘ support for Connecticut forces strengthened Cassacinamon‘s 
relationships with members of the colonial government.  Governor Winthrop turned 
seventy during the war, so Cassacinamon found it prudent to widen his circle of allies and 
forge stronger relationships with the next generation of Connecticut leaders.  
Cassacinamon fought alongside Fitz-John and Wait Winthrop, as well as James Avery, 
George Denison, and John Allyn.  These men shaped Connecticut in the post-war period, 
so it was essential that Cassacinamon establish connections with them independent of his 
relationship with John Winthrop Jr.  When he negotiated the Laws for the Pequot of 1675 
and fought alongside Connecticut militias, Cassacinamon strengthened the bonds 
between the Pequots and the English.
666
  Approximately in his mid-to-late-50s during 
King Philip‘s War, Cassacinamon often went on the warpath with his warriors.  There, he 
garnered the honor and spoils of war for himself, and was even injured in one of the last 
engagements of the war.  Connecticut officials often extended their thanks to the Pequot 
sachem, and rewarded him with wampum and coats.
667
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The Pequots expected compensation for the risks they engaged in during the war.  
Cassacinamon made sure that the Pequots received weapons, wampum, material goods, 
and captives.  At a time when the New England colonies punished those who illegally 
sold guns to Indians, or fined colonists who shot their guns except at Indians or wolves, 
Connecticut supplied the Pequots with guns and ammunition.
668
  With each victory, the 
Pequots made sure to claim their share of the war booty.  In order to encourage the 
participation of warriors in a major campaign against the Narragansetts, Connecticut 
officials decided ―that whosoever shall imploy themselves in this service, whether 
Indians or English…shall have all such plunder as they shall seize, both of persons and 
corn or other estate.‖  Wartime disrupted many of the subsistence activities of the 
Pequots, so any additional supplies they gained were crucial for the community‘s 
survival.
669
   
Perhaps the greatest compensation garnered by Cassacinamon and the Pequots 
was the receipt of captive Indians.  Cassacinamon and his lieutenant Daniel each 
personally received several captives during the war.  The English executed captive 
Indians on the spot or sold them into slavery.  However, many captive Algonquians found 
respite among the Native allies of the English.  Disease still hit Native communities hard 
in the latter half of the seventeenth century, and wartime losses exacerbated demographic 
decline.  Just as they did after the Pequot War, captives (or adoptees) kept Native 
communities alive.  The Pequots, Mohegans, and Narragansett-Niantics all desired to 
keep the Indians they captured or who sought refuge in their communities.  This became 
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a point of contention between the English and Natives. On February 16, 1675, the 
Connecticut War Council tried to rectify the situation.  Recognizing that ―there be sundry 
of the enemie now in the hands of the Pequots, Moheags and w
th
 Ninicraft,‖ the Council 
offered to buy captives from their allies, offering ―for every man, woman and child…two 
coates apiece.‖  Forty captives were worth ―a barell of powder.‖   This offer did not settle 
the matter.  The Pequots kept many of the captives they took during the war, and 
Connecticut officials did not pursue the matter vigorously because they depended on the 
Pequots‘ help.670     
King Philip‘s War also offered Cassacinamon, Uncas, and Ninigret the 
opportunity to settle some old scores and long-standing political grudges.  Edward 
Palmes argued for a uniform Indian policy for the Pequots, Mohegans, and Ninigret‘s 
Narragansett-Niantics, noting that ―the great Difficulty…is how to keepe friendship with 
all three.‖671  They also took care ―to prvent all disquietments & commotions between or 
Indian friends that goe out‖ against the enemy.  The sachems knew how essential they 
and their warriors were to Connecticut‘s goals, and Connecticut officials knew it, too.  
Their alliances with Connecticut forced the sachems to work together, but their political 
attacks against one another did not cease.  In this respect at least, the war did not alter the 
relationship between these long-time opponents.  In August 1675, after the first excursion 
into the Narragansett country, Connecticut officials summoned Cassacinamon and Uncas 
to a council meeting because some Pequots accused the Mohegans of perpetrating attacks 
that had been attributed to rebel Nipmucks.  They settled the matter, but it served as yet 
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another sign that the two rival sachems still disliked one another.  Cassacinamon then 
launched a series of complaints against Thomas Stanton and Ninigret, saying that they 
owed him a large sum of wampum.  Perhaps this debt related to the bribe Cassacinamon 
paid in 1669.  It was certainly was a major point of contention with the Pequot sachem, 
and he vigorously pursued this matter.  Connecticut officials begged the Pequot sachem 
to hold off on his requests until after the war.  They swore to help Cassacinamon achieve 
satisfaction, and they delivered; Cassacinamon received his payment.
672
          
 The war provided a socially acceptable way for Pequot men to attain status in the 
community.   Ever since the battle with Ninigret in the 1650s, the Pequots had found 
limited opportunities for battle.  This deprived young Pequot men of one of the traditional 
means of achieving status within their community.  This changed quickly with King 
Philip‘s War.  Pequot warriors knew they were a highly prized resource, and fought on 
their terms.  Connecticut offered incentives for them to fight, and protected them from 
cases of mistaken identity during battles.  Connecticut authorized that ―if the Moheags 
and Pequots doe still proffer their service…care must be taken for a signal marke to 
distinguish from other Indians.‖  The Pequots and Mohegans fought bravely, but when 
they completed their mission, they said so.  After a major victory against the 
Narragansetts in July 1676, when a joint Pequot-Mohegan-Connecticut force killed three 
hundred Narragansetts and captured sixty more, the Pequots and Mohegans demanded 
that they return to Connecticut rather than pursue Metacom.  The English desired to give 
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chase, but the Pequots and Mohegans would not be moved.  So, ―to gratify the Mohegin 
and Pequod Indians,‖ the English complied.673     
The Pequots embraced the opportunity to attack their enemies.  The 
overwhelming majority of their military operations targeted their old foes the 
Narragansetts, rather than Metacom himself; the Pequots directed sixteen of their twenty-
three confirmed military engagements against the Narragansetts and Nipmucs.
674
  In a 
rare display of unity, the major Pequot and Mohegan leaders all participated in one 
Narragansett expedition in late January/early February 1675.  Connecticut‘s Council of 
War appreciated their efforts, and voted ―to return thankes to Uncas, Owanecoe, 
Mawmawho and Robbin for y
r
 good service.‖  The Council then encouraged 
Cassacinamon and the others ―to scout abroad and pick up such of the enemie as they 
shall find, with the promise of reward for such service.‖  The largest number of Pequot 
volunteers always came forward for operations in the Narragansett country.  Perhaps they 
sought revenge for the Pequot War all those years ago.  Pequots watched the 
Narragansetts burn during the Great Swamp Fight as Narragansetts watched the Pequots 
burn at Mystic.
675
   
This vendetta against the Narragansetts explains why the Pequots and Mohegans 
were so eager to defeat Canonchet.  It also adds greater significance to Canonchet‘s 
execution at the hands of Cassacinamon, Owaneco, and Catazapet in April 1676.  The 
ritual killing of the Narragansett sachem was not just an execution, but the ultimate 
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display of power and authority.  Canonchet displayed his strength by not showing fear.  
Cassacinamon exhibited his strength by taking Canonchet‘s life.  The fact that all three 
Native leaders played a part in Canonchet‘s death and dismemberment gave each man a 
part in that victory.  Cassacinamon thus acquired Canonchet‘s power and added it to his 
own.
676
                    
The Mashantucket Pequots proved to be important allies in ways beyond their 
fighting prowess.  Their location also proved advantageous.  The Mashantucket 
reservation separated the eastern Connecticut towns of New London, Groton, Mystic, 
Stonington, and Norwich from the territory of the Wampanoags, Narragansetts, and 
Nipmucs.
677
  Connecticut feared invasion from these eastern groups, so the reservation‘s 
prime location served as a rendezvous point for the English and Algonquian allies.  
Soldiers met ―at Meshuntupit (Mashantucket),‖ and staged several joint Connecticut-
Pequot-Mohegan military expeditions from February to May of 1676.  Warriors and 
soldiers also stored supplies of food and munitions there.  From Mashantucket, Anglo-
Algonquian forces marched east into Narragansett and Nipmuck territory.
678
  The Pequot 
reservation also served as a ―holding center.‖  Pequot warriors detained captive enemies 
at Mashantucket; sometimes Cassacinamon sent them along to the English, and 
sometimes he kept them there.  Mashantucket, once the refuge for the Pequots escaping 
the horrors of war, now acted as the staging ground for another war. 
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The Pequots‘ frequent participation on these military expeditions left their own 
homes and families undefended.  In July 1675, during the first Narragansett expeditions, 
Cassacinamon requested that Wait Winthrop provide English troops to the reservation, 
with the expressed purpose of protecting the Pequot wives and children at Mashantucket 
while the warriors were away.
679
  Cassacinamon made this his major condition for 
participation, and Connecticut authorities, eager to secure the Pequots‘ aid, complied.  
The General Court empowered Wait Winthrop to secure the Pequot civilians ordering 
that ―when there shall be occasion to imploy‖ the Pequots he ―must endeavourer to secure 
their wives & children.‖680 
To protect these civilians, the English and the Pequots constructed a fortified 
village in Mashantucket.  The site, now known as Monhantic Fort, was located on the 
eastern end of a 40-acre peninsula that extends into the southwestern corner of the 500-
acre Great Cedar Swamp, the place the Pequots called Cuppahommock during the Pequot 
War.  Cuppahommock meant ―refuge or hiding place‖ in the Pequot-Mohegan dialect, 
and once again it provided protection to the Pequots in a time of trouble.   Although not 
large enough to hold the entire Mashantucket Pequot population, the archaeological 
evidence proves that it housed many Pequot families.  That same evidence also confirms 
that the Monhantic village was just a brief Pequot settlement.  The palisade was not 
designed for longevity, and that there are no overlapping domestic structures or features 
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that suggest long-term occupation.  Archaeologists estimate that it was a two to five year 
occupation.
681
 
The Monhantic Fort was not the first Native fortification that Englishmen helped 
Native allies build.
682
  But Monhantic Fort was more than just another fortification.  The 
fort combined Native and European architectural styles.  The domestic structures in the 
village — the wigwams, hearths, and storage pits — were all built using Native 
techniques.  However, the palisade ―integrated elements of Native and English military 
architecture.‖683  Like the Mystic fortifications of the Pequot War, the Monhantic 
palisades were made of thick logs, and the entrances formed where the palisades 
overlapped.  Unlike previous Native fortifications, Monhantic‘s palisade was not circular, 
but rectangular.  Defenders manned lookout towers placed at the corners, a common 
feature of European siege defenses.  This blending of styles served as a tangible symbol 
of the successful Pequot-Connecticut alliance, a physical representation of how enmeshed 
the Pequot and English worlds had become under Cassacinamon‘s efforts.684  Forty years 
before on that very spot, Pequots sought refuge from the English and their allies.  Now, 
the Pequots and English worked to defend Pequot women and children.  The English had 
once feared the Pequots‘ prowess as warriors; now they celebrated it as essential to an 
English victory, due to the persistent work of Robin Cassacinamon.       
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III 
Connecticut heralded their Anglo-Algonquian alliances, and credited allies like 
Cassacinamon and Uncas with many of their victories, but the situation was 
demonstrably different in Boston.  As the war continued, it took on characteristics that 
would now label it a ―race war.‖  In October 1675, the Massachusetts General Court 
interned the denizens of Natick on Deer Island.  Three weeks later, the Bay Colony 
magistrates passed another act that prevented the Natick people from leaving the island 
―upon paine of death.‖  Bay Colony residents viewed colonials with close ties to Indians, 
such as Daniel Gookin and John Eliot, with suspicion and hatred.  Lynch mobs roamed 
Boston streets, ―ruthlessly putting to death suspect Indians and denouncing and 
threatening ‗Indian-lovers.‘‖ Indian captives not retained by Native allies were sold into 
West Indian slavery or bound in servitude among the English.
685
  New Englanders, with 
some important exceptions, retaliated against Algonquians with less and less restraint; 
villages were burned to the ground, and thousands of men, women, and children died.
686
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Despite this ethnic violence, the hope for final victory against Metacom lay in the 
Anglo-Indian alliances forged by people like Cassacinamon and the Winthrops.  
Connecticut officials directly attributed their wartime success to these alliances.  Even 
Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay, despite the presence of virulent anti-Indian colonials, 
eventually incorporated Native allies into their companies.  Throughout 1675 and 1676, 
most of the key victories against Metacom‘s forces were won by joint Anglo-Algonquian 
expeditions.  By the spring of 1676, the tide turned against Metacom, and the colonials 
and their Indian allies had gained the upper hand.
687
 
In January 1676, the decisive blow against Metacom came not from the New 
Englanders and their Algonquian allies, but from New York and the Mohawks.  Under 
the leadership of a new royal governor, Edward Andros, New York avoided the 
devastation unleashed by King Philip‘s War.  Andros was the consummate royal official, 
determined to exert the crown‘s authority over this unruly region of Britain‘s North 
American empire.  Andros reaffirmed the peace agreements negotiated between New 
York and several Algonquian groups in the Hudson Valley region, and he strengthened 
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Albany as a secure and friendly settlement where Indians and English could conduct 
business.  Governor Andros cemented his reputation as a political figure on this 
northeastern Anglo-Indigenous frontier by formalizing a peace agreement with the 
Mohawks.
688
  And it was the Mohawks who had ended the fighting in the Pequot War, 
when they killed Sassacus and sent his head to the English.
689
 
In January 1676, the Mohawks, the Keepers of the Eastern Door of the Iroquois 
League, attacked Metacom‘s followers at a place called Hoosick, fifty miles east of 
Albany.  Andros feared that Metacom would eventually attack New York, or seek the aid 
of the Hudson River Valley Algonquians.  Temporarily setting aside long-standing 
disputes with Connecticut and the other New England colonies, Andros and the Mohawks 
agreed to attack any Algonquian groups who sided with Metacom.  The martial prowess 
of the Mohawks was well-established.  Uncas himself had predicted ―that the said 
Mohucks were the only Persons likely to put an End to the War.‖690  The Mohawk 
victory ―broke the back‖ of Metacom‘s resistance.  It drove his forces back into New 
England and straight into the sights of Anglo-Algonquian forces.  The Mohawks also cut 
off Metacom from the French supplies and weapons he had come to depend on to carry 
out his war effort.
691
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Facing defeat, the Wampanoag sachem and his remaining forces returned to their 
homeland.  Metacom then confronted a joint Plymouth-Christian Indian force led by 
Benjamin Church.  On August 12, 1676, Metacom was shot and killed by a Christian 
Indian named Alderman.  Church desecrated the body as a warning for all to see: he took 
Metacom‘s head, quartered the rest of the body, and hung the parts from four trees.  The 
Wampanoag sachem‘s head was put on a pike and paraded from town to town.  His wife, 
his son, and many of his followers were sold into West Indian slavery.   
King Philip was dead, but some of his followers were still on the loose.  By the 
summer of 1676, most of the Pequots and Mohegans had grown tired of fighting and 
wanted to return home.  However, Cassacinamon and a small group of Algonquians 
joined Major John Talcott‘s troops on one last expedition.  On August 15, 1676, Talcott‘s 
Connecticut-Algonquian troops routed a group of Natives near present-day Great 
Barrington, Massachusetts.  The group was heading west, perhaps seeking refuge among 
the New York Algonquians.  Twenty of the refugees were captured and three were killed, 
but some of the Connecticut-Algonquian troops were also wounded, including 
Cassacinamon.  On August 22, the Connecticut government ―ordered that Mathew Joanes 
be imprest to transport Robin Cassinamon and the wounded Indians and their attendants 
to N. London,‖ where they received medical attention and rest.692  The war for 
Cassacinamon, the Pequots, and Connecticut was over.                       
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IV 
New England after King Philip‘s War was not the same Anglo-Algonquian 
society that had existed before the war.  Where one out of every four New Englanders 
had once been Native, a new demographic reality set in.  The ―covalent‖ Anglo-
Algonquian society was replaced by one in which the English colonials were clearly the 
dominant power.  Between 1670 and 1680, despite the violence and death, the English 
colonial population leapt from 52,000 to 68,000.
693
  By contrast, New England 
Algonquians lost between 56-69% of their people due to the war.  These Algonquians 
were killed during the war, sold into slavery, or fled the region.  In this post-war New 
England, Algonquians made up only 8-12% of the regional population.  The war 
devastated the Wampanoags and the Nipmucs.  The Christian Indians were also reduced; 
the number of Praying Towns dropped from fourteen to four.  Most of the surviving 
Narragansetts fled to Ninigret‘s confederation.694  Along with these demographic shifts, 
the focus of frontier politics shifted farther west, as Anglo-Iroquoian relations took center 
stage.  The Mohawks, a specter in New England Anglo-Indigenous politics for decades, 
now took center stage as the new power to be courted by the New England colonies and 
New York.  As the Mohawks and New York wielded greater influence, the Pequots faced 
a met challenge.    
Cassacinamon faced these circumstances without his closest English ally.  On the 
morning of April 5, 1676, John Winthrop Jr. died in the city of Boston after battling a 
respiratory illness.  He was in the city on business for the United Colonies, helping to 
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coordinate war activities.  The governor was seventy years old.  In his later years, 
Governor Winthrop kept busy with personal and economic interests.
695
  Yet, Anglo-
Algonquian frontier politics concerned him until the end of his life.  In his last official 
duties with the United Colonies, Winthrop Jr. championed a moderate stance when 
dealing with the Native peoples.  In the long term, a moderate attitude stabilized the 
region, but such a policy had immediate payoffs as well.  If the English treated the 
Indians with an even hand, the enemy would retain a ―sympatheticall‖ attitude toward 
―those poore English in their hands.‖696   
No record exists of Cassacinamon‘s reaction to the death of his long-time friend 
and political ally.  What words could adequately express nearly forty years of friendship, 
struggle, and triumph?  Cassacinamon continued the work that he and his friend had 
initiated decades earlier.  A sachem of the Pequot and the scion of a leading Puritan 
family had been an unlikely partnership, but it proved a successful one.  Now, 
Cassacinamon nurtured his relationships with the remaining members of the Winthrop 
family and with others in the Connecticut government.  In so doing, he sought the 
protection of his people and an end to the war.   
Despite the loss of his long-time partner, King Philip‘s War reaffirmed Robin 
Cassacinamon‘s status as a political lynchpin in Anglo-Algonquian Connecticut.  
Cassacinamon‘s steadfast application of advantageous political alliances, his skills as a 
negotiator, and his persuasive abilities as a sachem strengthened the Pequots‘ position in 
Connecticut during the war.  Once feared, his people were now celebrated.  The English 
provided him with weapons and ammunition, and they protected Pequot women and 
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children.  Cassacinamon and the Pequots received wampum, property, and prisoners who 
were soon adopted into the tribe.  The Pequot sachem and his people were heroes, at least 
for a time.  Proportionally, the Pequots and Mohegans had contributed more men to stop 
Metacom‘s revolt than had the Connecticut colonials.697  For a brief time, the Pequots 
regained significant influence with the Connecticut government, and arrested the steady 
encroachment of English authority.  In the aftermath of King Philip‘s War, New 
Englanders — Algonquian and English — rebuilt their communities, but things had 
changed.  Robin Cassacinamon once again took up the task of securing a place for his 
people in this altered power structure.  But he did so without his long-time partner, John 
Winthrop Jr.  He now had to forge new alliances to continue the work.  
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Chapter 7: “Bequithed to them as a legacy of Robin Cassasinamon” – The 
Mashantucket Pequots after King Philip’s War 
 
 In the aftermath of King Philip‘s War, a different Anglo-Algonquian New 
England rose from the ashes of burned-out colonial towns and Algonquian villages.  
Gone was the ―covalent‖ society that had existed prior to 1675, and in its place, the 
English finally attained the dominance they had long sought.  The new focus of English-
Indigenous relations lay further west, in New York, with the Anglo-Iroquoian frontier 
taking center stage.  After 1676, southern New England Algonquians sat firmly 
entrenched within the English colonial system.   
Even in this altered environment, Cassacinamon and the Pequots navigated 
colonial politics and society.  Cassacinamon dealt with these changes through well-
established political tactics: personal alliances, extensive ties to his community, and legal 
petitions that confirmed Pequot land rights and bound the Pequots to Cassacinamon.
698
  
The gratitude of Connecticut authorities towards Cassacinamon and the Pequots 
temporarily shielded them from the changing Anglo-Algonquian world.  The final sixteen 
years of Cassacinamon‘s life saw the sachem face new challenges — both internal and 
external — to his authority.  As always, Cassacinamon utilized every resource at his 
disposal to combat those threats, and he relied on the established strategies of alliances, 
petitions, and personal charisma to gather Pequot communities within his sphere of 
influence.  Thus, Cassacinamon retained the core of the Mashantucket Pequots around his 
person, while the tribe maintained their kinship networks and reservation.     
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I 
 In the closing months of King Philip‘s War and the years that followed, 
Cassacinamon and the Pequots reaped considerable benefits from their alliance with the 
English.  During the war, the English offered several incentives to their Native allies to 
induce them to fight on their behalf.  They permitted the Pequots, Mohegans, and 
Ninigret‘s Narragansett-Niantics to retain spoils of war (corn, wampum, furs, etc.) 
captured from the enemy.  In addition, the English agreed to pay for the services of their 
Indian allies in the form of highly prized manufactured goods.  These in-kind payments 
featured knives, kettles, copper pots, coats, duffels, and firearms and ammunition; all of 
these goods had been difficult to obtain after the collapse of the wampum economy in the 
1660s.
699
  After the war this sharing of resources continued, at least for a time.  As a sign 
of gratitude, the General Court also recognized the Pequots‘ right ―to hunt in the 
conquered lands in the Narrogancett Country, provided they sett not traps to prejudice 
English cattell, and that they doe their best to attacque and destroy the enemie, and 
continually upon all such occasions they make reporte thereof to the next Authority of the 
English in this colony.‖  In 1685, the Connecticut General Court reaffirmed that the 
Pequots and Mohegans had ―free liberty to hunt in any of the conquered lands within the 
limits of this colony.‖  This expansion of hunting rights benefited the Pequots, enabling 
them to persist in their traditional seasonal subsistence activities well into the eighteenth 
century.
700
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The Pequots also continued their association with Connecticut‘s militias.  By 
siding with the colony, Pequot men had participated in sanctioned warfare.  This offered 
them the opportunity to engage in traditional rites of passage and advance socially, re-
affirming their place within Pequot society.  It also afforded them economic advantages.  
For years after the war, the colony continued to acknowledge their participation.  In 1690, 
Wait-Still Winthrop spoke to the General Court and reminded that ruling body that the 
Indians were a valuable asset to Connecticut.  ―So many as can be procured of the 
Pequots and Moheags or others armed and cloathed we are willing to imploy in the 
service,‖ he said, ―& desire you to signify it to such persons as may make it most 
effectual.‖701  The General Court approved a measure that paid Indians for their 
participation in military operations.  ―The Indians that goe out in the service shall be 
allowed as the captaines shall agree with them,‖ the law said, ―provided they allowe not 
above twenty shillings per month.‖  While the compensation provided Pequot men with 
an opportunity to earn a wage, the pay rate was still lower than what the average English 
private soldier earned for his service.
702
   
Natives and English alike were deeply interested in the fate of the captives taken 
during King Philip‘s War.  From a Pequot perspective, the taking and retention of war 
captives may have been the most important reason for siding with the colonials.
703
  
Captive taking fulfilled demographic needs and cultural demands within Pequot society, 
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and provided material compensation.  Captives benefitted Native societies like the 
Pequots because they helped replenish their populations.  In this respect, the issue of 
Indian captives taken during King Philip‘s War fit into traditional Native social 
paradigms.  Compounding wartime losses, Native groups were still ravaged by epidemic 
diseases.  These realities pressured the Pequots and other tribes to keep their captives.  
The English intended to track down all of Metacom‘s remaining followers, and they 
knew they might seek shelter among other Indian communities.  In February 1675, as the 
war raged, Connecticut officials offered material and financial compensation to the 
Pequots and other Algonquian allies who turned over those captives.
704
  While the 
Pequots occasionally participated in these exchanges, they also kept many of the captives 
they took.  Cassacinamon and Daniel each requested and received captives as rewards for 
their services,
705
 but they were not the only ones to enjoy this privilege.   
The total numbers are unknown, but the captives taken by the Pequots, Mohegans, 
and Ninigret‘s Narragansett-Niantics proved sufficiently numerous for the English to pass 
several laws that attempted to monitor and control the fate of those captives.  In April 
1676, the Connecticut Council of War prohibited colonists from ―buying‖ Indian captives 
without first receiving an official government license.
706
  They ordered that ―such Indians 
as are in hands of the Narrogancetts, Nahantick or Pequots…except such ancient persons 
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as mercy forbids their remove,‖ be turned over to English authorities.707  In October 
1676, Connecticut magistrates issued a set of rules to determine the status of surrendering 
Indians.  Indians who killed English soldiers and settlers faced either execution or 
enslavement in the West Indies.  Those who had not killed colonists ―shall have theire 
lives and shall not be sould out of the Country for slaves.‖  Instead, the magistrates ruled 
that they would spend ten years in service to the English.  After that ten-year period, they 
―were free to live in English towns under English laws.‖708   
One month later, Connecticut commissioners met with Pequots, Mohegans, and 
Ninigret‘s Narragansett-Niantics at the town of Norwich.  This Anglo-Algonquian 
meeting intended to sort out the captive issue and determine a unified policy for those 
who ―forfeited their lives by warring against us.‖  The commissioners were instructed to 
assemble a list ―of all captives and the surrendering Indians‖ and secure something ―more 
than words to binde them to fidelity.‖  A yearly tribute would be imposed for each adult 
male and they were also to ―take off all young and single persons of all sorts to be put 
into English famalys (as pledges for theyr fidelity) and to be apprenctices for ten years; 
after which terme they may be returned to their parents, upon the proofe of the fidelity of 
both children and parent; otherwise to be forfeited to slavery.‖709  The meeting between 
the allies took place in December, but no records reveal what happened there.  However, 
based on what is known about captive taking and adoption in the Eastern Woodlands, it 
can be safely theorized that any captives who remained among the Pequots were 
eventually incorporated into those tribes.    
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With the passing of John Winthrop Jr. in 1676, Cassacinamon searched for a new 
English advocate.  Cassacinamon appears to have had reasonably close relationships with 
the deceased governor‘s children, so they were the logical choice.  However, while 
Cassacinamon had friendly relations with the Winthrop children, it was not the same 
arrangement.  Winthrop‘s daughters, while apparently friendly with Cassacinamon, did 
not possess political power due to seventeenth century English gender views.  Winthrop‘s 
sons, Fitz-John and Wait-Still, were already involved in politics, but they did not yet 
carry their father‘s clout.  Still, the brothers‘ advocated for the Pequots in their own ways.  
Wait Winthrop shared his father‘s overt appreciation of Cassacinamon and the Pequots, 
and he championed the use of Pequots as military allies during and after King Philip‘s 
War.  Despite this support, Wait‘s political interests were split between Connecticut and 
Massachusetts Bay.
710
  In time, Wait Winthrop became a Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
and a strong advocate for the Pequots in the eighteenth century.
711
  However, in the 1670s 
and 1680s, Wait Winthrop was still building his own power base.  His words encouraged 
Connecticut officials to take action, but he did not shape colonial policy as his father had 
done.  Fitz-John‘s political career was grounded in Connecticut, and he held a variety of 
government posts from the 1670s to 1690s.  In time, he followed his father‘s footsteps as 
governor of Connecticut, and served from 1698 to 1707.  Once in power, he too aided the 
Pequots.
712
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Outside of the Winthrop family, Cassacinamon found an advocate in Captain 
James Avery.  Avery served alongside Cassacinamon and the Pequots during King 
Philip‘s War, and after the war those ties continued with Avery as their appointed 
overseer.  In the Pequot Laws of 1675, James Avery (then a lieutenant) was chosen by the 
General Court to work as the tribe‘s principal agent, and ―to give theire advice and help 
in all cases of difficulty for the well mangagement of their trust and affayres; to whome 
they are in all such cases to repayre.‖713  The overseers managed tribal resources and 
accounts, and kept books on all important economic and demographic information.  The 
office of the overseer lasted into the nineteenth century, and in some respects it reflected 
the increased power that the English and their American descendants exerted over the 
Pequots.  The overseer was an appointed position, and as the decades passed it became 
marginalized.  However, the relationship between the Pequots and their overseers did not 
reflect simple subjugation, and in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the 
office still carried weight.  When managed correctly by all the concerned parties, the 
Pequot-overseer relationship replicated elements of the original Cassacinamon-Winthrop 
alliance.  When the Mashantucket Pequots dealt with an overseer they liked, they worked 
well with the man and made advances in the defense of their rights.  When the tribe 
received an overseer they clashed with, they drove the man away.  Tribal members made 
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his job extremely difficult, through outright or passive resistance, and petitioned the 
government to remove him and replace him with a candidate approved by the tribe.
714
   
Avery proved an important ally for Cassacinamon, and he continued as Pequot 
overseer for several decades.  Over the years, he grew very close to the sachem and the 
―old councilors‖ of the Mashantucket Pequots, and he was known to have ―manifest(ed) a 
great tenderness‖ towards the tribe.  Avery spoke fluent Pequot, and this linguistic skill 
only facilitated his closeness with the tribe.  Avery‘s linguistic abilities mirrored 
Cassacinamon‘s, and were something of a rarity among the English.715  Not even 
Winthrop Jr. had spoken Cassacinamon‘s language with any fluency.  Although it is 
unclear, this attachment may have crossed lines in ways that other colonials found 
inappropriate.  In October 1678, the General Court passed a law that prohibited English 
participation in Native ceremonies, which some English feared ―doth too much 
countenance them in those fooleries, if not encourage them in their divill worship.‖  
Despite being told by those ―acquainted with their customes‖ that ―their exercises at such 
times is a principle part of the worship they attend,‖ the General Court remained 
unconvinced.  ―Whereas there is notice taken of some people that doe frequent the 
meetings of the Indians at theire meetings and dances, and doe also joyne with them in 
their plays [gambling],‖ the law ordered forbade ―all persons in this colony from 
countenancing the Indians in such meetings.‖  Individuals who took part in dances were 
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fined forty shillings, while those who participated in ―plays‖ or gambling were fined ten 
pounds.
716
   
The law was another attempt by the English to control and transform Pequot 
society, but it also illustrated the persistence of Pequot cultural practices.  Ceremony 
remained an important aspect of diplomatic and government procedure for the Pequots 
and as the work of Eric Spencer Johnson demonstrates, gambling served as a vital tool for 
the redistribution of goods among the community.  The tribute given to sachems was 
―often lost to others in game of chance‖ and redistributed amongst the community, 
thereby binding the sachem and the community together.
717
  By employing these 
measures, Cassacinamon operated within the prescribed parameters of his office, and he 
likely included Avery in these ceremonies.  It is unclear if Avery was ever fined for 
violating this law, but if he was as close to the Pequots as the evidence suggests, he 
would have participated in at least some of these ceremonies with Cassacinamon.  These 
actions bound the overseer to the Pequots, and Avery spent his tenure as a strong 
advocate for Cassacinamon and the tribe.   
The law did little to dissuade Avery from his duties, and Cassacinamon relied on 
their connection to protect Pequot lands.  In 1679, the Pequots and Mohegans issued 
formal petitions for restitution; their crops had once again been destroyed by roaming 
colonial cattle and swine.  The towns blamed the damages on poor Indian fencing, despite 
the fact that the General Court ―acknowledged in the past that some cattle could not be 
held back with ordinary barriers.‖  The General Court, in an effort to avoid conflict 
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between the tribes and the towns, ordered that fence viewers be appointed to monitor 
Pequot and Mohegan fields.  The ruling also allowed the Pequots to build their own 
pounds to hold any runaway livestock.  Avery and another overseer, James Morgan, were 
chosen as the Pequots‘ fence viewers; Morgan would himself build a long term 
relationship with the tribe.  Although no evidence was recovered that states the Pequots 
utilized these pens, given the relationship between Cassacinamon and Avery, it would not 
be a surprise if they did.  That same year Avery orchestrated a deal with the town of 
Groton for an additional tract of common land in ―behalf of the Pequitt Indians under 
Cassacinamon.‖718 
******************************************** 
The end of King Philip‘s War did not mean peace for the Pequots, and as one 
phase of Indian-on-Indian violence ended, another one began.  This conflict was a 
product of the shifting Anglo-Indian frontier, as the Mohawks and New York colony 
(headed by Governor Edmund Andros) became the new center of regional Anglo-Indian 
politics.  A committed royalist, Andros believed that the Puritans brought about King 
Philip‘s War through poor frontier management.  In the post-war period, Andros declared 
―that all Indyans, who will come in & submit, shall be received to live under the 
protections of the Government‖ of New York‘s proprietor, James, the duke of York.  As 
the duke‘s representative, Andros administered this new arrangement ―to prevent the 
Puritan colonies from making individual treaties with defeated Algonquian 
communities.‖719  Many Connecticut Algonquians took Andros up on his offer.  Fleeing 
                                                 
718
CR, III: 43; Holmes, ―In Behalf of Myself & My People,‖ 83, 91-92, 145-146.   
719
CR, II: 297-298, 487-488; Pawpeqwenock‘s Engagement, 16 August 1677, ―Wyllys Papers,‖ 
265-267; ―Council Minutes, May 29, 1676,‖ E.B. O‘Callaghan, Documents Relative to the Colonial History 
 317 
vengeful Puritans out for any Indian blood they could find and Mohawks who often 
raided their camps, these Algonquians settled in the Mahican village of Schagticoke, 
located near Metacom‘s winter camp at Hoosick.720  These new Algonquian settlers 
provided New York with a buffer against the French in Quebec and tightened Albany‘s 
hold over the regional Indian trade.  Their resettlement also provided Andros oversight of 
Indian diplomacy in southern New England.  Andros wielded that influence over the 
Puritan colonies with relish.  When the Connecticut Council asked Andros for permission 
to enter New York in August 1676 ―to persue and destroy those of the enemies that are in 
those parts; or doe something effectual yourselfe, for the utter suppression of the enemie 
in those parts,‖ he refused.  He rejected a similar request from Massachusetts Bay with a 
cool dismissal, telling them that ―it is not proper.‖721          
Andros may have protected Algonquian refugees from Puritan vengeance but he 
also needed to protect them from the Mohawks.  Although the ―Keepers of the Eastern 
Door‖ worked with the governor, they also pursued their own interests.  The Mohawks 
launched a series of raids against the New England Algonquians to extend their own 
power and influence, as well as take captives for adoption and ransom.  While not the 
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conflagration of the previous war, the Mohawk raids threatened the fragile peace.  
Cassacinamon and the Pequots fell victim to these Mohawk raids, and they demanded 
justice. Cassacinamon appealed to his Connecticut allies for aid.  In July 1677, 
Cassacinamon and Daniel petitioned the Connecticut Council that ―they may be 
permitted to strengthen themselves by engaging the freind Indians of the English, one 
with another to defend themselves against a common enemie.‖  It was a smart political 
move on Cassacinamon‘s part; he played along with English expectations of dependence, 
while seeking their support for an Indian defensive alliance.  The ―friend Indians‖ of the 
English included the Pequots, Mohegans, and Narragansett-Niantics.  Connecticut 
authorities were cautious in their response.  They told the Pequot sachem that while they 
had ―a good respect for all their freind Indians, and are willing that they should be 
unanimous in aposeing any common enemie,‖ the Council stated that ―all such Indians 
that they should stand upon their guard and defend themselves, and not begin to manage 
any offensive war, before the matter be heard and considered by the Councill.‖  The 
Council granted Cassacinamon ―ten pownd of powder and bullets or lead 
proportionable…to be kept in his forte as a magazeen for their necessary defence.‖722  
The fort in question was Monhantic Fort.  While he did not get everything he wanted, it 
was clear that Cassacinamon still held influence among Connecticut officials.  Yet, the 
General Court‘s decision was symptomatic of the noticeable shift in Anglo-Indian 
politics. 
The Mohawk-Algonquian confrontation was settled not in New England, but in 
New York.  Andros, in his new role as regional intermediary, invited New England 
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delegates to meet with the Indians settled under his protection.  The Mohawks agreed to 
halt their raids against the friendly New England Algonquians, make peace with the 
Mahicans, and instead fight the Abenakis (who battled settlers in northern New England).  
The New Englanders surrendered their right to treat with New York tribes independently.  
The Mohawks insisted that all negotiations take place in Albany, presided by Governor 
Andros.
723
    
The decision disappointed Cassacinamon and the other ―friend Indians‖ of New 
England.  While Cassacinamon appreciated the weapons he received, the Council‘s 
adamant stance that the Connecticut Algonquians only defend themselves but not 
retaliate, challenged indigenous notions of pride.  This remained a sticking point three 
years later, after the dust had settled with the Mohawks.  In May 1680, ―Uncass 
Cassasinamon & the rest of the chife with them‖ petitioned Connecticut authorities once 
again.  The Algonquians reminded Connecticut that ―the Mohauks about 3 yeres Since 
gave them molestation and part afright and disgust upon them in that they seized sundry 
Indians…and conveighed them away.‖  They demanded restitution for this, as well as 
payback for the insults the Mohawks hurled at them during the raids.  The Mohawks used 
gendered insults, telling the Algonquians that ―they are but as so many Squas and are 
afraid of them.‖  This taunt not only struck at Native notions of masculinity, it offered a 
clue as to how the Mohawks viewed their neighbors within their expanding sphere of 
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influence.  Connecticut officials denied them their request.
724
  In the interest of regional 
peace, Connecticut authorities deemed it necessary that the matter just be dropped.   
Despite the harassment by the Mohawks and Andros‘s offer, Cassacinamon and 
the Pequots remained in Connecticut.  While Cassacinamon had established connections 
with New York Indians during his previous diplomatic forays in the area, the sachem 
expressed no real desire to relocate to Andros‘s domain.  Cassacinamon repeatedly used 
the threat of relocating to force concessions out of Connecticut officials, and that tactic 
met with success.  However, when presented with a genuine offer at relocation, the tribe 
refused to move.  Cassacinamon and the Mashantucket Pequots had risked much to return 
to their homeland; the prospect of abandoning did not appeal to the Pequots in the 
seventeenth century, no matter the difficulties they faced.
725
        
In this new Anglo-Indian reality, the Anglo-Iroquoian frontier replaced the 
Anglo-Algonquian one in terms of regional importance.  The Covenant Chain between 
New York and the Iroquois solidified this fact.
726
  The treaties of the Covenant Chain 
melded Iroquois and English diplomatic councils and political objectives, and bound the 
Iroquois and New York together in a mutually beneficial arrangement.  The alliance 
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brought the Iroquois English support, secured the southern and eastern borders of 
Iroquois territory, and provided the Five Nations ―access to thousands of potential allies 
settled under their protection‖ in New York.727  English officials guaranteed the Iroquois 
hunters and warriors access to Albany markets, where they could sell their furs at higher 
prices than were offered in New France.  In return, Governor Andros placed Albany at 
the center of regional Anglo-Indian relations, and English influence among the Iroquois 
increased while French influence declined.  From 1677 to 1755, the Covenant Chain 
secured peace for New York and New England‘s established settlements, and ―opened 
the west to English settlement.‖  It organized trade arrangements between the colonials 
and various tribes, and arranged for the ―systemic retreats of Indians from defeats in New 
England and the southern colonies into sanctuaries in New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Iroquoia.‖  The Chain also ―covered the peaceful retreat of Indians from eastern 
Pennsylvania to the Ohio region beyond the Appalachians.‖  These negotiations opened 
many new lands for colonial settlement.  The structure and rituals of the Covenant Chain 
placed the Iroquois in a position of regional leadership.  Subsequent treaty arrangements 
between the Iroquois and other tribes bound them together in a system of mutual 
obligation and reciprocity, one in which placed the Iroquois as the dominant partner in 
the arrangements.
728
  The Pequots survived this transition, just as they survived the other 
upheavals of the seventeenth-century.  But as the Mohawk crisis demonstrated, while 
Cassacinamon and the Pequots did not directly shape these political transitions, they felt 
their impact in significant ways. 
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II 
In the midst of these dramatic political upheavals, Cassacinamon and the Pequots 
remained firmly within Connecticut‘s sphere of influence.  Yet, even in this new political 
reality, Cassacinamon and the Mashantucket Pequots exercised certain options and 
retained protections that shielded them from the extreme elements of this shifting 
political arrangement.  As they had done for decades, the Pequots operated within the 
gaps of these various political agents and agendas.  By the 1680s, Cassacinamon‘s long-
standing relationship with Connecticut ensured that for quite some time, good-will 
existed between the Pequots and Connecticut.  However, the shifting Anglo-Iroquoian 
frontier effected the Pequots in other ways besides the raids.  It unleashed an internal 
power struggle among the Pequots.  For the first time in decades, Cassacinamon faced a 
substantial challenge to his authority as sachem.  This challenger emerged not from 
within the Mashantucket group; Cassacinamon had long-established his authority among 
them.  The challenge rose out of the eastern Pawcatuck group: Mamaho, sachem of the 
Pawcatuck Pequots.   
In the 1670s, Mamaho served as chief counselor to Wequashcook/Herman 
Garrett, Cassacinamon‘s Pawcatuck counterpart.  Mamaho was to Herman Garrett what 
Daniel was to Cassacinamon.  The Pequot Laws of 1675 recognized Mamaho as a 
leading Pequot, and during King Philip‘s War, Mamaho served alongside Cassacinamon 
in several wartime engagements.  Both men led Pequot warriors into battle, and both 
were singled out by the English for their skills and abilities.  It was to Cassacinamon and 
Mamaho that the English pledged to ―protect their [Pequot] wives and children.‖729   
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Mamaho‘s leadership ability and charismatic presence soon eclipsed that of 
Herman Garrett‘s own son, Catazapet.  Catazapet joined Cassacinamon and Owaneco in 
ritually dispatching the Narragansett sachem Canonchet during King Philip‘s War, but 
that episode did not translate into long-term political power for Catazapet.
730
  In 
September 1676, Herman Garrett renewed a land claims petition for the Pawcatuck 
Pequots.  The Pawcatuck leader not only expressed his desire for more land for his 
people, he also emphasized how he, Catazapet, and the Pawcatuck group had been loyal 
to the English.  He hoped they would be rewarded for that loyalty.
731
  Herman Garrett 
died in 1678, but it was not Catazapet who succeeded him.  In May 1678, Catazapet 
petitioned Connecticut authorities that he was the heir of his father‘s land rights and 
authority, but he was rebuffed.  In May 1684, Catazapet complained that Mamaho was 
―takeing and withdraweing his men from their obedience to him [Catazapet].‖  It did not 
make a difference.  It was clear to both the Pawcatuck Pequots and Connecticut 
authorities that Mamaho was the recognized Pawcatuck leader.
732
   
Mamaho quickly made a name for himself by wielding his power in much the 
same way Cassacinamon had done during his rise to prominence.  The Pawcatuck sachem 
employed the same strategies to consolidate his power base among the Pequots.  
Throughout the late 1670s and 1680s, Mamaho filed petitions with the General Court and 
worked with the Pequot overseers to secure his group‘s land base, and advocated on 
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behalf of his people in legal matters to ensure they received justice.
733
  Mamaho‘s rising 
star attracted not only Pawcatuck Pequots to him, but Mashantucket Pequots as well.  In 
May 1678, several Mashantucket Pequots petitioned the General Court ―to Shift‖ from 
―Cassacinamons Authority‖ to Mamaho‘s.  The petitioners told Connecticut authorities 
that they had originally been from the Pawcatuck group, but had moved to Mashantucket.  
They now wished to move back to Mamaho.  Connecticut authorities were puzzled, and 
asked, ―hath Robbin done you any wrong‖?  The petitioners were silent, ―mute, being 
ashamed of the proposal.‖  As Cassacinamon had not done them any harm or mistreated 
them in any way, they were dismissed with a question, ―if he hath done you none then 
why do you trouble us with such propositions‖?734   
However, that was not the only incident of relocating Pequots.  In 1680, 
Cassacinamon complained to Connecticut officials that ―Indians that belong to his 
goverm
t
 scatter into sundry townes contrary to his minde.‖  The Pequot sachem worried 
that these scattered settlements ―are not so capable to defend themselves,‖ a reasonable 
concern given the lingering fear of Mohawk raids.
735
  However, concern for his people‘s 
welfare was not the only matter at hand.  Cassacinamon informed authorities ―that he 
cannot take that care and watch that otherwise he might do, and therefore desires that if 
damage be done to y
e
 English by their hogs or cattle that he may not be accountable for it, 
but for the Indian town so removed.‖  Cassacinamon then requested English assistance in 
bringing those communities back into his sphere of influence.  The sachem asked that 
―they be commanded to live near him, that so he may inspect them.‖  The General Court 
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sided with Cassacinamon and ordered James Avery and others ―to acquaint the sayd 
Pequot Indians under Robert‘s government, to return to his town as soon as planting and 
weeding is over, and continue to be under Robert‘s government as formerly.‖736  
Cassacinamon‘s request appears to have been answered, as there were no subsequent 
complaints by the sachem concerning this matter.  If these issues came up after 1680, 
they were handled away from colonial eyes.   
It is not known whether the Pequots Cassacinamon complained about were the 
same Pequots who petitioned to move to Mamaho‘s jurisdiction.  However, given the 
proximity of the events, it is a strong possibility.  Taken on their own, these shifting 
residence patterns were not an unusual event among New England Algonquians.  
Mobility was a powerful strategy employed by Native peoples, who moved due to 
marriages and to be close to kin.  Married couples established residences in communities 
that ―provided them with the most advantageous situation, such as social standing and 
economic support from family members.‖737  Mobility also had political implications, as 
people sometimes relocated so as to be closer to a preferred leader.  It gave Native 
peoples the ability to literally vote with their feet.
738
   
But why after several decades would this be a concern or problem for 
Cassacinamon?  He knew from personal experience how powerful mobility could be if 
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used as a political strategy.  These strategies of mobility and shifting residence patterns 
were some of the first successful tactics Cassacinamon had used in his campaign to 
remove his people from Uncas.
739
  Mamaho successfully employed this strategy against 
Cassacinamon and Catazapet, making him a true challenge to Cassacinamon.  These 
episodes suggest that Cassacinamon‘s power and influence waned for a brief period at the 
end of the 1670s, likely due to the stress caused by the Mohawk raids.  In 1678, 
Cassacinamon and Connecticut reaffirmed the Pequot Laws ―at a great concourse 
amongst the Pequitts.‖  Cassacinamon attended, as did Catazapet, Mamaho, and 
Ninigret‘s daughter, ―the Naragansett sunk squaw and her councell.‖  The conference 
confirmed the same laws and provisions, including the benefits given to the 
sachems/governors.  However, Connecticut officials noted that ―the forepart, which 
respects Robin‘s own intrest, was earnestly desired by Robin not to bee published as 
yett.‖740  The Pequots expected their sachem to protect them, and if Cassacinamon could 
not stop the raids, he may have, in their minds, faltered in his duties.  Mamaho, younger 
and more energetic than the aging Cassacinamon, perhaps struck some Pequots as a more 
appealing prospect.  Whatever the reason, Cassacinamon considered these shifting 
residence patterns to be a threat to his authority, and Cassacinamon dealt with Mamaho 
by calling upon his powerful Connecticut allies to reinforce his authority.                                
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The issues between Cassacinamon and Mamaho paralleled the earlier 
disagreements between Cassacinamon and Wequashcook in the late 1640s.
741
  Although 
the Pequots were separated into two branches that acted independently at times, 
ultimately, Cassacinamon served as the surviving Pequots‘ grand sachem.  The 
Wequashcook episode reaffirmed the Pequots‘ leadership hierarchy, with Cassacinamon 
at its apex.  The ruling that Cassacinamon obtained in 1680 to keep the Pequots under his 
authority served the same purpose.  Cassacinamon realized how effective mobility was as 
a political strategy, having employed it himself.  It stands to reason he would not want 
someone like Mamaho using it against him.  In turning to his long-time English allies to 
reinforce his authority among the Pequots, Cassacinamon once again proved that he not 
only had the proper lineage to be sachem, he also possessed the strongest allies around to 
support his decisions and desires.
742
   
Yet it appears that any personal or political conflicts between Cassacinamon and 
Mamaho were neither long-lasting nor bitter.  The two sachems, and the two Pequot 
groups, continued to be intertwined with one another.  The settlement patterns 
demonstrated this fact.  The movement of Pequots between Mashantucket and Pawcatuck 
was likely a manifestation of marriages that took place between the two groups.  These 
shifts reflected the continued establishment of family and kin networks as well as 
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residence patterns that went undetected by most colonial officials.
743
  These kin 
connections reached the top of Pequot society, a reality made clear when Robin 
Cassacinamon chose his successor. At some point during his final years, Cassacinamon 
selected a young man named Kutchamaquan to succeed him as sachem.
744
   
Cassacinamon‘s choice had clear political and social implications for the Pequots.  
Kutchamaquan was Mamaho‘s son, and the young man also had the support of the elders 
and ―the old councellors‖ of both the Mashantucket and Pawcatuck Pequots.745  
Cassacinamon‘s choice, coupled with the Pequot settlement patterns, illustrates that the 
social and political connections between the Mashantucket and Pawcatuck Pequots 
remained strong.  Cassacinamon operated within traditional Algonquian understandings 
of the sachemship, specifically as it related to the issue of eligibility.  In order to become 
a sachem, an individual had to demonstrate ability, and claim the necessary family 
lineage.
746
  That Cassacinamon chose Kutchamaquan above all others, even his own 
children if he had them, suggests that he not only saw the young man‘s potential for the 
office, but that the two were quite possibly kin.  If true, ties of kinship and family 
between Cassacinamon and Mamaho may have smoothed over any possible hard 
feelings.  Either way, Cassacinamon‘s relationship with Mamaho and Kutchamaquan 
demonstrated that the ties binding the Mashantucket Pequots and the Pawcatuck Pequots 
— in leadership and populations — remained entrenched.  
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III 
 Even as Cassacinamon resolved his leadership crisis, his English allies 
experienced political upheavals of their own.  Despite his success in establishing the 
Anglo-Iroquois alliance, Edmund Andros never ceased his attempts to control the New 
England colonies.  Andros‘s disdain for the Puritan colonies (particularly Massachusetts) 
was well known; he disparaged their attempts at Indian policy and at one point during 
King Philip‘s War, he attempted to seize control of Connecticut.747  His plan failed, due 
in part to the efforts of John Winthrop Jr. to defuse the situation, but relations between 
Andros and New England remained strained.   
After King Philip‘s War, Andros‘s authority grew beyond the realm of Anglo-
Indian relations.  Andros and other royal officials still desired to extend Crown authority 
over New England, and after the war they renewed their efforts.  Massachusetts Bay drew 
most of the royal attention, as it openly flaunted royal efforts at incorporation.  The late 
1670s and early 1680s were marked by dramatic contests between the New Englanders 
and the Crown.  Efforts to revive the United Colonies fell flat, while royal attempts at 
exerting its authority grew bolder.  Charles II removed New Hampshire from 
Massachusetts jurisdiction and established a royal government there in 1679, while in 
1680 royal agents opposed efforts by Massachusetts to reestablish its authority in Maine.  
In 1684, Charles II revoked Massachusetts Bay‘s charter due to their insubordination, and 
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their refusal to comply with navigation, tariff, and trade laws.  As a result of this action, 
the United Colonies collapsed.
748
   
In 1685, Charles II died; he was succeeded by his Catholic brother, James II.  
More authoritarian than his brother, James was determined to bring New England into 
royal orbit.  In 1686, James created the ―Dominion of New England,‖ an organization 
designed to join the New England colonies and New York into one administrative body.  
The Dominion was created to enforce the Navigation Acts and served as a mutual defense 
pact to protect the colonies from the French and hostile Native American tribes.  Edmund 
Andros was selected to administer the Dominion, and entered Boston accompanied by 
two foot-companies late in 1686.
749
  Massachusetts immediately balked at this action, but 
it was not alone.  Connecticut officials — led by Governor Robert Treat, John Allyn, and 
James Fitch — desired their independence.  They hoped that the colony‘s previous good 
relations with the Stuart monarchy, carefully cultivated by John Winthrop Jr., would 
spare them from the Dominion but it only delayed the inevitable.  On October 27, 1687, 
Governor Andros marched into Hartford and formally annexed the River Colony into the 
Dominion.  He then appointed Treat and Allyn to the Council of the Dominion of New 
England.
750
 
However, Connecticut‘s involvement with the Dominion proved short-lived.  In 
the spring of 1689, word reached the colonies that the Glorious Revolution had deposed 
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James II and replaced him with the Protestant monarchs William and Mary.  In short 
order, the Dominion of New England collapsed.  On April 18, 1689, Massachusetts 
colonials seized and imprisoned Andros and other royal officials; Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Plymouth all restored their charter governments.
751
  
Elections were held in Hartford on May 9, 1689, and the Connecticut freemen voted to 
restore their old charter government, as well as reinstate Treat and the former government 
officials.  However, confusion and fear lingered as to the legitimacy of the charter.  After 
the previous royal court annulled the charter, some within the Connecticut government 
wondered if the document was valid.  In 1693, Fitz-John Winthrop traveled to England to 
petition the monarchs William and Mary for a royal charter; his mission paralleled that of 
his father, John Winthrop Jr., thirty years earlier.  And, like his father, Fitz-John 
succeeded.  The monarchs reconfirmed Connecticut‘s 1662 charter.752                                 
IV 
 Cassacinamon did not live to see his ally‘s success. In October 1692, word 
reached the Connecticut General Court that Robin Cassacinamon, the old Pequot sachem, 
had died.
753
  His death, like his birth, remains a mystery; only the year of his death can be 
confirmed with any certainty.  If the assumptions placing his birth in the 1620s are in any 
way accurate, the sachem was an elder in his early seventies when he died.  However, no 
reliable account of his final days exists.  One version, recorded decades later in the 
eighteenth century by Congregationalist minister, and later Yale president, Ezra Stiles, is 
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difficult to believe.  According to this account, Cassacinamon‘s death allegedly involved 
a scandal with the family of his old rival Uncas, specifically two of Uncas‘s children, an 
unnamed daughter and his youngest son Ben Uncas.  Overcome with rage during an 
argument, Cassacinamon reportedly threw a boiling pot of succotash on the breast of the 
Mohegan woman, inflicting a grave wound that killed her.  Cassacinamon was then 
arrested and jailed at New London.  As this was an Indian-on-Indian crime, Connecticut 
authorities turned Cassacinamon over to Uncas, and let him settle the matter.  The 
English left the Pequot to Mohegan justice, which in this case, meant execution.  Ben 
Uncas then shot and killed Robin Cassacinamon in retaliation for his sister‘s death.754    
 This scenario is unlikely for several reasons.  First, the dates do not correspond 
with what is known about the lives of Cassacinamon, Uncas, and the other participants.
755
  
The only reliable information in the account is the year of Cassacinamon‘s death, as that 
can be corroborated with other sources.  The rest of the story is implausible, namely 
because Uncas himself had died sometime between June 1683 and June 1684.
756
  The 
Mohegan grand sachem could not have condemned Cassacinamon to any sort of fate, 
unless he did it from beyond the grave.  Presumably, Ben Uncas figures prominently in 
the account because he was the brother of the woman in question, and because he and his 
son, also named Ben Uncas, each served as Mohegan grand sachem.  However, the son 
who succeeded Uncas, and who held the position in 1692, was the warrior Owaneco.  
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Owaneco held the title until his death in 1703, when he was succeeded by his brother 
Caesar.  The first and second Ben Uncas did not serve as Mohegan sachems until well 
into the eighteenth century, from 1723 to 1726 and from 1726 to the early 1730s, 
respectively.  After Ben Uncas II, Owaneco‘s son Mahomet became the leader 
recognized by the majority of Mohegans.
757
  However, the issue of Mohegan succession 
remains so unclear in the story that, when added to the discrepancy over Uncas, severe 
doubts are cast on this tale. 
 The power and social dynamics related in the story suggest that Cassacinamon 
was still a subject sachem within the Mohegan confederation, and by 1692 that was 
definitely not the case.
758
  The crime is also presented as a domestic dispute; 
Cassacinamon and the Mohegan woman were at home while a meal was being prepared.  
Domestic relationships between Native men and women often went unrecorded or 
unappreciated by English observers, but such an outburst of violence seems out of 
character compared to what is known about Cassacinamon.  This scenario suggests that 
Cassacinamon either married or cohabitated with a daughter of Uncas.  Marriages often 
sealed alliances in seventeenth-century Native New England communities; Uncas himself 
used the tactic extensively in his expansion of the Mohegan confederation in order to 
incorporate the Pequots.
759
  Yet, if Cassacinamon had been married or connected to a 
daughter of Uncas, such a marriage may have been mentioned much earlier than 1692.  It 
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would have cast the personal struggles between Cassacinamon and Uncas in a new light, 
and it seems unlikely that such a connection would have gone unnoticed in the myriad 
petitions issued by the sachems during those decades.     
In some ways, the execution presented in the account seems patterned after the 
execution of Miantonomi in 1643, when the Commissioners of the United Colonies 
turned the Narragansett sachem over to Uncas for execution, saying it was an ―Indian 
matter.‖760  But this was no longer the New England of 1643, and the power dynamics 
between Anglo and Algonquian communities far different.  After King Philip‘s War, 
colonial authorities could extend their power and authority over the New England 
Algonquians in ways they could not before the war.  It is unlikely that such a major 
incident concerning Algonquians whom Connecticut considered under their jurisdiction 
would have escaped the notice of Connecticut authorities.  Instead, the Connecticut 
General Court simply said that ―Whereas Cassinimon is deceased and the Pequots 
thereby destitute of a present Governo
r
, this Court doe nominate, appoint, and impower, 
Daniell and Mamohoe to be chiefe rulers and governo
rs
 of the Pequotts.‖761  Taken on its 
own, the fact that Connecticut officials do not mention precisely how or when 
Cassacinamon died does not prove or disprove the assertions made in the account.  
However, combined with the other questionable aspects, these omissions cast 
considerable doubts over the veracity of the account. 
 The Mashantucket Pequots do not acknowledge any negativity surrounding 
Cassacinamon‘s death.  This is not unexpected given his importance to the tribe.  What 
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the Pequots remembered, in the years following the sachem‘s death and well-into the 
modern era, was the authority and reverence associated with Cassacinamon‘s memory, 
his mark, and his name among the tribe.  Cassacinamon‘s death left a large void among 
the Pequots: he had been the sole leader of the Mashantucket Pequots since the 1640s, 
and he had guided them through years of uncertainty and trouble to a much more stable 
place within the colonial world.  Thanks to Cassacinamon‘s leadership, the Pequots 
returned to their traditional lands, and lived in their own communities headed by their 
own councils.  These were not minor successes, and it soon fell to subsequent generations 
to protect them as best they could.  They relied on methods Cassacinamon had mastered: 
alliances, legal claims and petitions, and the affirmation of community ties.
762
 
After Cassacinamon died in 1692, Pequot and Connecticut authorities backed 
Daniel as leader of the Mashantucket Pequots, while Mamaho was once again affirmed as 
the leader of the Pawcatuck Pequots.
763
  Daniel acted as a ―regent‖ of sorts for 
Cassacinamon‘s chosen successor, Mamaho‘s son Kutchamaquan.   Although 
Kutchamaquan had the support of ―the old councellors‖ of both the Mashantucket and 
Pawcatuck Pequots, at the time of Cassacinamon‘s death, he was still too young to serve 
as sachem.
764
  As examined earlier in the chapter, Cassacinamon‘s choice of 
Kutchamaquan, coupled with the Pequot settlement patterns in the 1680s, had clear 
political and social implications for the Pequots.  It demonstrated the deep connections 
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between the Mashantucket and Pawcatuck Pequots, despite their legal separation under 
Connecticut jurisdiction.   
Daniel served as Cassacinamon‘s chief counselor, and the English felt he would 
be a suitable governor until Kutchamaquan came of age.  The only community satisfied 
with the choice of Daniel as governor was Daniel‘s; other Pequots were unhappy with the 
situation, and they bided their time until Kutchamaquan became sachem.  Unfortunately, 
Daniel died two years later.  Daniel‘s death compounded the loss of Cassacinamon, and it 
initiated a crisis of leadership that divided the Mashantucket Pequots into two rival 
political camps.  A man by the name of Scattup (Schadabe), was chosen by the 
Connecticut General Court to be Daniel‘s replacement in 1694, a decision that was 
immediately opposed by Kutchamaquan‘s supporters.  For the next several years, 
Scattup, Kutchamaquan, and their supporters vied for the right to lead the Pequots.
765
        
During this battle over Cassacinamon‘s rightful successor, colonial authorities 
emerged as an important factor in the selection process.  While Cassacinamon lived, he 
had operated within the traditional rules and guidelines of the sachemship.
766
  During 
Cassacinamon‘s tenure as sachem, the English simply affirmed the Pequots‘ choice of 
leader.  Cassacinamon possessed the necessary family lineage to hold the office, while 
his leadership abilities, political skills, and personal alliances satisfied both the Pequot 
and English requirements for leadership.  By the 1690s, this situation had changed.  In 
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this English-dominated New England, Connecticut asserted greater influence over the 
Pequots.   
By backing the Daniel/Scattup faction, Connecticut authorities obstructed Pequot 
reunification.  Kutchamaquan had supporters in both Mashantucket and Pawcatuck, while 
Scattup‘s Pequot support came only from Mashantucket.767  Factionalism among Native 
Americans had been a common social and political phenomenon.  However, without a 
unifying figure like Cassacinamon, factionalism led to fragmentation.  Scattup, like 
Cassacinamon before him, courted the support of powerful allies in the Connecticut.  
Scattup worked closely with Pequot overseers like James Avery and James Morgan, and 
to some extent replicated the Cassacinamon-Winthrop alliance.
768
  Like Cassacinamon, 
Scattup used those alliances for his own agenda, and Daniel and Scattup were not without 
Pequot followers of their own.  Their strongest support came from their own 
village/community in Mashantucket and at least one of the Pequot counselors, a man by 
the name of Pisshaweno, who probably came from Scattup‘s town.  However, while they 
were clearly powerful and influential within the tribe, it appears that Daniel and Scattup 
did not possess the traditional lineage necessary for the Pequot sachemship.
769
  By 
backing the Daniel/Scattup faction, Connecticut authorities influenced internal Pequot 
politics in ways they were incapable of doing during Cassacinamon‘s lifetime.  For an 
enterprising individual like Scattup, Connecticut authorities presented an opportunity for 
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leadership that would not have been possible under earlier Algonquian systems, or during 
the earlier Anglo-Algonquian frontier.   
This lack of traditional credentials proved a major source of contention for 
Kutchamaquan‘s supporters.  The majority of Pequots supported Kutchamaquan‘s claims.  
He was Cassacinamon‘s choice, and even Daniel supported this; Daniel made 
Kutchamaquan his heir and left the young man his land rights.  The General Court 
recognized and honored that request.
770
  In 1694, the ―Concill of the Pequots…in the 
name of y
e
 greatest part of y
e 
Pequots ancient men & young men,‖ petitioned the 
Connecticut General Court.  The councilors invoked Cassacinamon in their petition, 
telling the English that ―the greate Sachem yt we honrd & Loved declared at his death that 
Cisshamaquen (Kutchamaquan), Mamohos son, should succeed as sachem as his will and 
desire, & Left his estate to him, most of it.‖  In 1701, the councilors and old men 
petitioned the Connecticut General Court once again, and declared that their dissent was 
legitimate.  They informed the Court that they were ―the Old Stock from whence The 
other indeans swarmed,‖ and that Kutchamaquan was the proper choice for the 
sachemship based upon their own criteria.  The Pequot elders requested that the General 
Court ―Grant them A Sachem to be head over them According to their own Choyce.‖  
They then asked that they and Kutchamaquan ―be not denigrated and made inferior to 
Scattob and his Associates.‖  The Pequot councilors asserted that Kutchamaquan‘s right 
to the sachemship was ―bequithed to them as a legacy of Robin Cassasinamon after his 
death.‖771    
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Connecticut authorities were in a bind.  They wanted peace among the Pequots, 
but they also wanted to keep the Mashantucket and Pawcatuck groups separate.  The 
Connecticut General Court agreed that Kutchamaquan was entitled to the estate and 
material wealth bequeathed to him by Cassacinamon and Daniel.  However, the General 
Court also knew that the faction that supported Kutchamaquan desired that the 
Mashantucket and Pawcatuck Pequots be reunited, and it could not let that happen.
772
  
For the English, Scattup was the better choice; his power base was only within 
Mashantucket.  Scattup refused to give up his governorship, and he continued to assert 
his position as Pequot leader.  The Pequot elders continued to support Kutchamaquan.  
Eventually, a compromise was reached.  Scattup remained governor/sachem, while 
Kutchamaquan became Scattup‘s chief counselor.  This compromise neutralized the 
political factionalism at Mashantucket until the 1720s.
773
       
The fission that occurred after Cassacinamon‘s death was, in a way, a testament to 
his ability as a leader to direct and coordinate these Pequot factions.  Cassacinamon‘s 
abilities as a sachem were clearly powerful.  He held the Pequot communities together for 
most of his life through the most trying of times.  While the factionalism that took place 
after his death was troublesome, the Pequots still looked to Cassacinamon as a symbolic 
figure to build peace among the people.  Pequot leaders invoked Cassacinamon‘s 
memory, his tactics, and the specter of his authority to justify their claims to the 
sachemship well into the eighteenth century.  Scattup and Kutchamaquan each formed 
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strong alliances with English official overseers and cultivated ties to the Connecticut 
political system; Scattup allied with John Morgan and Kutchamaquan bonded with James 
Avery.
774
  Given Avery‘s previous relationship with Cassacinamon, it is not surprising 
that he sided with Cassacinamon‘s preferred successor.  Both Pequot leaders issued 
petitions and legal claims to justify their positions and seek redress of grievances.  
Scattup used Cassacinamon‘s distinctive mark to sign documents as the Pequots‘ leader.  
At some point during the leadership struggle, Kutchamaquan changed his name to ―Robin 
Cassacinamon II,‖ and he used this name throughout the eighteenth century.  
Kutchamaquan‘s renaming suggests once again that kinship ties existed between the two 
men, bolstering the namesake‘s claims of legitimacy.775  Despite Connecticut‘s intrusion 
into the issue of Pequot succession, they could not escape or undo Cassacinamon‘s 
influential legacy.  Robin Cassacinamon became, even after death, the essential sign of 
legitimacy among the various factions and branches of the Pequots. 
********************************************** 
 No tawdry scandal or crime of passion closed the book on Robin Cassacinamon‘s 
life.  If Cassacinamon was in his early seventies in 1692, the sachem may simply have 
expired due to physical infirmity or illness.  Given the available evidence, that seems the 
more likely cause of death, and that is how the Mashantucket tribe views it today.
776
  If 
that is true, Cassacinamon — like his old foe Uncas — died of old age, in his own lands, 
and among his own people.  This was an impressive feat for a sachem during a turbulent 
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century of change.  For the Mashantucket Pequot tribe, Cassacinamon died after a 
lifetime of service, having fulfilled to the best of his rare abilities his responsibilities as 
sachem.  His exact burial site remains unknown.  Perhaps the Pequots interred him in the 
Long Pond cemetery, the place noted by Mashantucket Pequots of the ―Old Stock‖ in the 
eighteenth century as being a place ―where our predicessors anciently dwelt and our 
grandfather and fathers planted.‖777  If he was not interred at Long Pond, he was buried at 
some other undiscovered gravesite on either Noank or Mashantucket.  But, significantly, 
he was buried on Pequot land. 
Robin Cassacinamon outlived many friends, like John Winthrop Jr., who helped 
him achieve his goals.  The Pequot sachem outlasted many adversaries as well, crafty and 
powerful men like Uncas, Miantonomi, Ninigret, and John Mason.  Perhaps that filled 
him with a certain feeling of satisfaction at the end.  As Pequot sachem, he would have 
been buried with wampum and other goods (both ritual and mundane) that denoted his 
rank and status as leader.  No conclusive evidence suggests that Cassacinamon ever 
converted to Christianity.  Given the relationship with John Winthrop Jr., he may have — 
at most — incorporated certain aspects of Christianity into his own Algonquian spiritual 
world view, but that is all.
778
  He would have been buried in the traditional Algonquian 
way: with his head pointed towards the southwest, the dwelling place of Cautantouwwit 
the benevolent creator.  It was Cautantouwwit who, with the crow as his messenger, 
brought to the Pequots — the People of the Shallow Waters — the gift of maize.  
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Cassacinamon‘s family and kin, guided by a shaman or powwow, would have invoked 
the proper rituals and manitou ensuring that Cheepi/Hobbomok, the spirit of the dead, 
allowed Cassacinamon into the afterlife.
779
   
The changing regional political situation made the last years of Cassacinamon‘s 
life particularly difficult.  The shift to an Anglo-Iroquoian frontier initiated a chain 
reaction that consolidated English power within colonial New England.  Connecticut 
authorities exercised a level of authority and control that they had never previously been 
able to express.  Even the Pequots, who faced significant English influence after the 
Pequot War, had never encountered such control prior to the 1680s.  Among the Pequots, 
this change manifested in greater English control over their reservation lands, an internal 
challenge to Cassacinamon‘s authority as sachem, and English interference in the 
succession struggle after Cassacinamon‘s death in 1692.   
However, despite these political challenges, the sachem and the Mashantucket 
Pequots were not powerless.  Cassacinamon weathered Mamaho‘s challenges, and he 
incorporated Mamaho into his network of allies and kin by using the skills and strategies 
that he had depended on for decades.  And although Connecticut authorities increasingly 
meddled in Pequot affairs by the end of the seventeenth-century, the personal affiliations 
Cassacinamon nurtured within the Connecticut government produced advocates who 
aided the Pequots even after his death.  The sachem‘s influence, plans, and legacy left an 
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indelible impression upon the Mashantucket Pequots, as evidenced by their invocation of 
his memory even after his death.   
Cassacinamon left behind definitive signs of an accomplished life.  His skills as 
an interpreter and intermediary, his persuasive abilities as sachem, and his strategic 
alliances all produced tangible results for the Mashantucket Pequots.  Although he did not 
reunite all of the Pequots under his sachemship, his victories ensured that the 
Mashantucket Pequots survived into the modern era.  The land, a home for his people, 
and the power of his name, all stood as a testament to the strength and life of Robin 
Cassacinamon.  The Pequots survived due to their ties with one another and their land, 
and their support of a leader who earned the right to serve them.  That is what endured. 
The sachem had served his people well.                                         
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Conclusion 
 The Pequots held on to the memory and legacy of Robin Cassacinamon.  
However, colonials and later Americans who were not members of the tribe largely 
ignored Cassacinamon‘s contributions to Pequot history, and they certainly minimized 
his role in regional Anglo-Algonquian politics.  Two nineteenth-century exceptions to 
this trend are John William De Forest and Francis Caulkins.  Both men published 
histories of Connecticut in 1851 and 1852 respectively.
780
  De Forest and Caulkins 
recognized Cassacinamon as an important Pequot leader after the Pequot War.  They 
knew he secured the Mashantucket reservation for the tribe, and they also criticized the 
brutal treatment the Pequots received during the Pequot War and the abuses they suffered 
after it.  While important, De Forest and Caulkins only briefly acknowledge 
Cassacinamon.  They did not truly examine the significance of Cassacinamon‘s efforts, 
and fell into the trap that later twentieth century scholars experienced.   
As time passed, the opinion that Cassacinamon was little more than a ―sidekick‖ 
of John Winthrop Jr. grew in strength.  In other nineteenth and early twentieth histories 
written about the Pequots, authors described Cassacinamon with the same dismissive tone 
as John Mason, if they mentioned him at all.  In volume one of B.B. Thatcher‘s Indian 
Biography published in 1837, Cassacinamon is referred to as little more than ―Mr. 
Winthrop‘s Indian‖ and dismissed as ―a man of no particular note.‖781  Another work 
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referred to Cassacinamon as Winthrop‘s ―spicy assistant,‖ a juvenile play on the fact that 
his name sounded like the word ―cinnamon.‖782  It is not surprising that this ignorance of 
Pequot history occurred at a time when popular histories and popular culture believed the 
Pequots to be extinct.  Dismissed or ignored by outsiders for decades, the Mashantucket 
Pequots and their memory of Cassacinamon weathered the storm of neglect and abuse 
well into the twentieth century. 
Robin Cassacinamon returned to the consciousness of the general public in the 
1970s, when the Mashantucket Pequots launched their second resurgence.  As members 
of the tribe returned to their reservation lands and began rebuilding their community, 
tribal chairman Richard Hayward and the tribe adopted Cassacinamon‘s mark as part of 
their official tribal seal, seeing obvious parallels between Cassacinamon‘s efforts and 
their own.  Tribal leaders once again invoked Cassacinamon in their efforts to bring tribal 
members home, revitalize their communities, and campaign for federal recognition.
783
  
They achieved these goals beyond their wildest expectations.  Tribal members gathered, 
their numbers grew, and they achieved federal recognition.  Economic development 
began on the reservation, and the tribe eventually embraced casino gambling – and all of 
the benefits and drawbacks brought by the casino.  Most importantly, tribal members 
embraced efforts toward cultural revitalization.  Feast days, festivals, tribal arts and 
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crafts, a language reclamation program, and other activities that fostered a sense of 
Pequot community and identity developed on the reservation, and the memory of 
Cassacinamon holds a place in that mission.                 
Robin Cassacinamon‘s importance in Mashantucket Pequot history cannot be 
underestimated.  In the interconnected world of seventeenth-century Anglo-Algonquian 
New England, neither Algonquians nor English exerted exclusive regional dominance.  
This enmeshed society fostered unique conditions during the forty-year period between 
the Pequot War and King Philip‘s War that enabled the Pequots to reconstitute their 
communities after the devastation of the Pequot War.  Robin Cassacinamon was the 
essential figure in this process, and to understand his life is to understand how the 
Pequots survived as a distinct, recognizable people.  His skills as an interpreter, diplomat, 
intermediary, and community leader connected Cassacinamon to the surviving Pequots 
and to important regional Algonquian and Puritan figures such as John Winthrop Jr., the 
Mohegan grand sachem Uncas, and the Narragansett-Niantic sachem Ninigret.   
Yet, an examination of his life suggests Cassacinamon‘s importance transcends 
the Pequots.  Cassacinamon‘s abilities as a sachem, his deep ties among the Pequots and 
other Algonquian groups, and his connections with the Winthrop family and other 
colonial leaders empowered the sachem.  Cassacinamon‘s leadership credentials and 
political alliances, his linguistic skills, and his diplomatic talents made him an important 
information broker, cultural intermediary, and political leader.  These abilities made him 
an essential part of the regional political framework encompassing the Algonquian and 
English polities of southern New England.  In this way, Cassacinamon utilized several of 
the political and social strategies described by Eric Spencer Johnson in order to 
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implement his agenda.  By operating in the gaps and intersections where these polities 
interacted with one another in the interconnected, ―covalent‖ Anglo-Algonquian society 
that Neil Salisbury and others have examined, Cassacinamon and the Pequots carved out 
a place for themselves within the regional social and political power structure.  This 
interconnected society proved finite; after King Philip‘s War English control over 
southern New England solidified, and a new Anglo-Iroquoian frontier formed in the west.  
Cassacinamon utilized every tool at his disposal — his lineage and role as sachem, 
political alliances, and skills as a cultural broker, as well as the support of the surviving 
Pequots — and obtained tangible benefits for the Pequots and for himself.  
Cassacinamon‘s leadership provided the Pequots with the essential tools they needed for 
long-term survival as a distinct people: a land-base, the ability to form and maintain their 
own communities, and the power to choose their own leaders.  Although provided the 
window of opportunity remained finite, Cassacinamon‘s achievements proved stable 
enough to survive the political shift that occurred at the end of the seventeenth-century.      
Thus, we return once again to the statue of Robin Cassacinamon in the 
Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center.  In his lifetime, Cassacinamon‘s 
persistence and shrewdness produced tangible success.  Over three hundred after his 
death, the Pequots have reconstituted themselves as a people, they have regained their 
own land, and they are governed by Pequot leaders.  On his passing, Cassacinamon was 
likely laid to rest among his Pequot ancestors, on Pequot lands where the Pequots had 
long resided.  The tribe owes its continued existence to the tenacity and will of its people 
and to Robin Cassacinamon‘s effective leadership during those critical years after the 
Pequot War.  The sachem served his people well. 
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